IIS 6.0 Security
|IIS 6.0 Security |
by Rohyt Belani and Michael Muckin
last updated March 5, 2004
Secure by DefaultIn the past, vendors including Microsoft packaged the default installations of their web servers with an array of sample scripts, file handlers and minimal file-system permissions to provide administrators the necessary flexibility and ease of use. However, this approach tended to increase the available attack surface and was the basis of several attacks against IIS. As a result, IIS 6.0 is designed to be more secure out-of-the-box than its precursors. The most noticeable change is that IIS 6.0 is not installed by default with Windows Server 2003. Other changes include:
Secure by DesignThe fundamental design changes incorporated in IIS 6.0 include improved data validation, enhanced logging, rapid-fail protection, application isolation and adherence to the principle of least privilege.
Improved data validationA principal new feature incorporated in the design of IIS 6.0 is the kernel-mode HTTP driver, HTTP.sys. It is not only tuned to enhance the web server's performance and scalability characteristics, but also to significantly strengthen the security posture of the server. HTTP.sys acts as the gateway for user requests to the web server. It first parses the request and then dispatches it to the appropriate user-level worker processes. The restriction of the worker processes to the user-mode prevents them from accessing privileged resources in the system kernel. Thus the target space of an attacker intending to gain privileged access to the server is greatly limited.
The kernel-mode driver incorporates several security mechanisms to augment the inherent secure design of IIS 6.0. These features include protection against potential buffer overflows, improved logging mechanisms to aid the process of incident response and advanced URL parsing to check for the validity of user requests.
In order to impede the exploitation of a potential buffer or memory overflow vulnerability that may arise at a later point in time, Microsoft has resorted to the defense-in-depth principle of security in the design of IIS 6.0. This has been accomplished by adding specific URL parsing capabilities to the repertoire of features incorporated in HTTP.sys. These capabilities can be further fine-tuned by appropriately modifying specific registry values. The following table provides a brief overview of vital registry keys (found at the following path: HKLM/System/CurrentControlSet/Services/HTTP/Parameters):
Enhanced logging mechanismsComprehensive logging is a fundamental requirement for the successful detection of, and response to, a security incident. Microsoft has recognized this need and implemented an extensive and reliable logging mechanism in HTTP.sys. HTTP.sys writes to the log file before dispatching the request to the specific worker process. This ensures that an error condition is logged even if it causes the worker process to terminate. An entry in the log file consists of the date and time stamp of the occurrence of the error condition, the source and destination IP addresses and ports, the protocol version, HTTP verb, the URL, protocol status, the site ID and the HTTP.sys reason phrase. The reason phrase provides detailed information about why the error occurred - whether it can be attributed to a timeout condition or a connection being abandoned by the application pool due to the unexpected termination of the worker process.
An example HTTP.sys log file entry can be found at the following link:
Rapid-Fail ProtectionIn addition to tweaking the registry, an IIS 6.0 administrator can also configure the server to automatically shutdown or restart orker processes whose applications have failed repeatedly (a set number of times) within a specific period of time. This is an additional safeguard to protect the application against repeated failures, which may be an indication of attack. This feature is called Rapid-Fail Protection.
Rapid-Fail protection can be configured through IIS manager as follows:
Application isolationIn previous versions of IIS (version 5.0 and earlier), the performance penalty for segregating web applications into independent units made it infeasible to do so. Thus, more often that not the failure or compromise of one web application had a cascading effect to the other applications resident on the same web server. However, performance enhancements coupled with design changes to the request processing architecture of IIS 6.0 have made it viable to isolate applications into self-contained units called application pools (without affecting performance). Each application pool is served by one or more independent worker processes. This allows for the localization of failure, preventing the malfunction of one worker process from affecting the others. This boosts the reliability of the server and in turn that of the applications hosted by it.
Adherence to principle of least privilegeIIS 6.0 adheres to a fundamental tenet of security - the principle of least privilege. This is achieved by including all the code that needs to run with Local System (high-level) privileges in HTTP.sys. All the worker processes execute as Network Service, a new type of account built-in to Windows 2003 with extremely limited operating system rights. Further, IIS 6.0 only allows system administrators to execute command-line tools, thus preventing malicious exploits from using these tools. These design changes reduce the exposure due the compromise of the server via a potential vulnerability. Apart from these fundamental design changes, some simple configuration modifications include denying anonymous users write access to the home directory of the web server and isolating FTP users into their own home directories also greatly enhance the security posture of IIS 6.0.
IIS 6.0 is a step in the right direction, by Microsoft, to help organizations improve their security postures. It provides a reliable and secure infrastructure to host web applications. The improved security can be attributed to the secure default configuration, the evident emphasis to security in the design process and enhanced monitoring and logging capabilities of the IIS 6.0 server. However, administrators should not acquire a false sense of security by simply migrating to this platform but couple it with the implementation of multiple layers of security. This would be in accordance with the defense-in-depth tenet of security to safeguard against the ever-looming threat of another Code Red or Nimda.