Appendix A: Links and References
(原始链接http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html#theNtlmUserSessionKey)
Note that due to the highly dynamic and transient nature of the Web, these may or may not be available.
-
The jCIFS Project Home Page
-
http://jcifs.samba.org/
jCIFS is an open-source Java implementation of CIFS/SMB. The information presented in this article was used as the basis for the jCIFS NTLM authentication implementation. jCIFS provides support for both the client and server sides of the NTLM HTTP authentication scheme, as well as non-protocol-specific NTLM utility classes.
-
The Samba Home Page
-
http://www.samba.org/
Samba is an open-source CIFS/SMB server and client. Implements NTLM authentication and session security, and a reference for much of this document.
-
Implementing CIFS: The Common Internet FileSystem
-
http://ubiqx.org/cifs/
A highly informative online book by Christopher R. Hertel. Especially relevant to this discussion is the section on authentication.
-
The Open Group ActiveX Core Technology Reference (Chapter 11, "NTLM")
-
http://www.opengroup.org/comsource/techref2/NCH1222X.HTM
Closest thing to an "official" reference on NTLM. Unfortunately, also rather old and not terribly accurate.
-
The Security Support Provider Interface
-
http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/security/sspi2000.asp
A whitepaper discussing application development using the SSPI.
-
NTLM Authentication Scheme for HTTP
-
http://www.innovation.ch/java/ntlm.html
Informative discussion on the NTLM HTTP authentication mechanism.
-
Squid NTLM Authentication Project
-
http://squid.sourceforge.net/ntlm/
Project to provide NTLM HTTP authentication to the Squid proxy server.
-
Jakarta Commons HttpClient
-
http://jakarta.apache.org/commons/httpclient/
An open-source Java HTTP client which provides support for the NTLM HTTP authentication scheme.
-
The GNU Crypto Project
-
http://www.gnu.org/software/gnu-crypto/
An open-source Java Cryptography Extension provider supplying an implementation of the MD4 message-digest algorithm.
-
RFC 1320 - The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm
-
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt
Specification and reference implementation for the MD4 digest (used to calculate the NTLM password hash).
-
RFC 1321 - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
-
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt
Specification and reference implementation for the MD5 digest (used to calculate the NTLM2 session response).
-
RFC 2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
-
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
Specification and reference implementation for the HMAC-MD5 algorithm (used in the calculation of the NTLMv2/LMv2 responses).
-
How to Enable NTLM 2 Authentication
-
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=KB;en-us;239869
Describes how to enable negotiation of NTLMv2 authentication and enforce NTLM security flags.
-
Microsoft SSPI Function Documentation
-
http://windowssdk.msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms717571.aspx#sspi_functions
Provides an overview of the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) and related functions.
Appendix B: Application Protocol Usage of NTLM
This section examines the use of NTLM authentication within some of Microsoft's network protocol implementations.NTLM HTTP Authentication
Microsoft has established the proprietary "NTLM" authentication scheme for HTTP to provide integrated authentication to IIS web servers. This authentication mechanism allows clients to access resources using their Windows credentials, and is typically used within corporate environments to provide single sign-on functionality to intranet sites. Historically, NTLM authentication was only supported by Internet Explorer; recently, however, support has been added to various other user agents.
The NTLM HTTP authentication mechanism works as follows:
- The client requests a protected resource from the server:
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
- The server responds with a 401 status, indicating that the client must authenticate. "NTLM" is presented as a supported authentication mechanism via the "WWW-Authenticate" header. Typically, the server closes the connection at this time:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: NTLM Connection: closeNote that Internet Explorer will only select NTLM if it is the first mechanism offered; this is at odds with RFC 2616, which states that the client must select the strongest supported authentication scheme.
- The client resubmits the request with an "Authorization" header containing a Type 1 message parameter. The Type 1 message is Base-64 encoded for transmission. From this point forward, the connection is kept open; closing the connection requires reauthentication of subsequent requests. This implies that the server and client must support persistent connections, via either the HTTP 1.0-style "Keep-Alive" header or HTTP 1.1 (in which persistent connections are employed by default). The relevant request headers appear as follows (the line break in the "Authorization" header below is for display purposes only, and is not present in the actual message):
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAABzIAAAYABgArAAAACwALACAAAABXT1 JLU1RBVElPTkRPTUFJTg== - The server replies with a 401 status containing a Type 2 message in the "WWW-Authenticate" header (again, Base-64 encoded). This is shown below (the line breaks in the "WWW-Authenticate" header are for editorial clarity only, and are not present in the actual header).
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8 AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAARABPAE0AQQBJAE4AAgAMAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAAEADABTA EUAUgBWAEUAUgAEABQAZABvAG0AYQBpAG4ALgBjAG8AbQADACIAcwBlAHIAdgBlAHI ALgBkAG8AbQBhAGkAbgAuAGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= - The client responds to the Type 2 message by resubmitting the request with an "Authorization" header containing a Base-64 encoded Type 3 message (again, the line breaks in the "Authorization" header below are for display purposes only):
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAGoAAAAYABgAggAAAAwADABAAA AACAAIAEwAAAAWABYAVAAAAAAAAACaAAAAAQIAAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAHUAcwBlAHIA VwBPAFIASwBTAFQAQQBUAEkATwBOAMM3zVy9RPyXgqZnr21CfG3mfCDC0+d8ViWpjB wx6BhHRmspst9GgPOZWPuMITqcxg== - Finally, the server validates the responses in the client's Type 3 message and allows access to the resource.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
This scheme differs from most "normal" HTTP authentication mechanisms, in that subsequent requests over the authenticated connection are not themselves authenticated; NTLM is connection-oriented, rather than request-oriented. So a second request for "/index.html" would not carry any authentication information, and the server would request none. If the server detects that the connection to the client has been dropped, a request for "/index.html" would result in the server reinitiating the NTLM handshake.
A notable exception to the above is the client's behavior when submitting a POST request (typically employed when the client is sending form data to the server). If the client determines that the server is not the local host, the client will initiate reauthentication for POST requests over the active connection. The client will first submit an empty POST request with a Type 1 message in the "Authorization" header; the server responds with the Type 2 message (in the "WWW-Authenticate" header as shown above). The client then resubmits the POST with the Type 3 message, sending the form data with the request.
The NTLM HTTP mechanism can also be used for HTTP proxy authentication. The process is similar, except:
- The server uses the 407 response code (indicating proxy authentication required) rather than 401.
- The client's Type 1 and 3 messages are sent in the "Proxy-Authorization" request header, rather than the "Authorization" header.
- The server's Type 2 challenge is sent in the "Proxy-Authenticate" response header (instead of "WWW-Authenticate").
With Windows 2000, Microsoft introduced the "Negotiate" HTTP authentication mechanism. While primarily aimed at providing a means of authenticating the user against Active Directory via Kerberos, it is backward-compatible with the NTLM scheme. When the Negotiate mechanism is used in "legacy" mode, the headers passed between the client and server are identical, except "Negotiate" (rather than "NTLM") is indicated as the mechanism name.
NTLM POP3 Authentication
Microsoft's Exchange server provides an NTLM authentication mechanism for the POP3 protocol. This is a proprietary extension used with the POP3 AUTH command as documented in
RFC 1734. On the client side, this mechanism is supported by Outlook and Outlook Express, and is called "Secure Password Authentication".The POP3 NTLM authentication handshake occurs during the POP3 "authorization" state, and works as follows:
- The client may request a list of supported authentication mechanisms by sending the AUTH command with no arguments:
AUTH
- The server responds with a success message, followed by the list of supported mechanisms; this list should include "NTLM", and is terminated by a line containing a single period (".").
+OK The operation completed successfully. NTLM . - The client initiates NTLM authentication by sending an AUTH command specifying NTLM as the authentication mechanism:
AUTH NTLM
- The server responds with a success message as shown below. Note that there is a space between the "+" and the "OK"; RFC 1734 states that the server should reply with a challenge, but NTLM requires the Type 1 message from the client. So the server sends a "non-challenge", which is basically the message "OK".
+ OK
- The client then sends the Type 1 message, Base-64 encoded for transmission:
TlRMTVNTUAABAAAABzIAAAYABgArAAAACwALACAAAABXT1JLU1RBVElPTkRPTUFJTg==
- The server replies with the Type 2 challenge message (again, Base-64 encoded). This is send in the challenge format specified by RFC 1734 ("+", followed by a space, followed by the challenge message). This is shown below; the line breaks are for editorial clarity and are not present in the server's reply:
+ TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAA RABPAE0AQQBJAE4AAgAMAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAAEADABTAEUAUgBWAEUAUgAEABQAZA BvAG0AYQBpAG4ALgBjAG8AbQADACIAcwBlAHIAdgBlAHIALgBkAG8AbQBhAGkAbgAu AGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= - The client calculates and sends the Base-64 encoded Type 3 response (the line breaks below are for display purposes only):
TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAGoAAAAYABgAggAAAAwADABAAAAACAAIAEwAAAAWABYAVA AAAAAAAACaAAAAAQIAAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAHUAcwBlAHIAVwBPAFIASwBTAFQAQQBU AEkATwBOAMM3zVy9RPyXgqZnr21CfG3mfCDC0+d8ViWpjBwx6BhHRmspst9GgPOZWP uMITqcxg== - The server validates the response and indicates the result of authentication:
+OK User successfully logged on
After successful authentication has occurred, the POP3 session enters the "transaction" state, allowing messages to be retrieved by the client. RFC 1730; the NTLM mechanism is a proprietary extension provided by Exchange and supported by the Outlook client family.
NTLM IMAP Authentication
Exchange provides an IMAP authentication mechanism similar in form to the POP3 mechanism previously discussed. IMAP authentication is documented in
The handshake sequence is similar to the POP3 mechanism:
- The server may indicate support for the NTLM authentication mechanism in the capability response. Upon connecting to the IMAP server, the client would request the list of server capabilities:
0000 CAPABILITY
- The server responds with the list of supported capabilities; the NTLM authentication extension is indicated by the presence of the string "AUTH=NTLM" in the server's reply:
* CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4rev1 IDLE LITERAL+ AUTH=NTLM 0000 OK CAPABILITY completed. - The client initiates NTLM authentication by sending an AUTHENTICATE command specifying NTLM as the authentication mechanism:
0001 AUTHENTICATE NTLM
- The server responds with an empty challenge, consisting simply of a "+":
+
- The client then sends the Type 1 message, Base-64 encoded for transmission:
TlRMTVNTUAABAAAABzIAAAYABgArAAAACwALACAAAABXT1JLU1RBVElPTkRPTUFJTg==
- The server replies with the Type 2 challenge message (again, Base-64 encoded). This is send in the challenge format specified by RFC 1730 ("+", followed by a space, followed by the challenge message). This is shown below; the line breaks are for editorial clarity and are not present in the server's reply:
+ TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAA RABPAE0AQQBJAE4AAgAMAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAAEADABTAEUAUgBWAEUAUgAEABQAZA BvAG0AYQBpAG4ALgBjAG8AbQADACIAcwBlAHIAdgBlAHIALgBkAG8AbQBhAGkAbgAu AGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= - The client calculates and sends the Base-64 encoded Type 3 response (the line breaks below are for display purposes only):
TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAGoAAAAYABgAggAAAAwADABAAAAACAAIAEwAAAAWABYAVA AAAAAAAACaAAAAAQIAAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAHUAcwBlAHIAVwBPAFIASwBTAFQAQQBU AEkATwBOAMM3zVy9RPyXgqZnr21CfG3mfCDC0+d8ViWpjBwx6BhHRmspst9GgPOZWP uMITqcxg== - The server validates the response and indicates the result of authentication:
0001 OK AUTHENTICATE NTLM completed.
After authentication has completed, the IMAP session enters the authenticated state.
NTLM SMTP Authentication
In addition to the NTLM authentication mechanisms provided for POP3 and IMAP, Exchange provides similar functionality for the SMTP protocol. This allows NTLM authentication of users sending outgoing mail messages. This is a proprietary extension used with the SMTP AUTH command (documented in
RFC 2554).The SMTP NTLM authentication handshake operates as follows:
- The server may indicate support for NTLM as an authentication mechanism in the EHLO reply. Upon connecting to the SMTP server, the client would send the initial EHLO message:
EHLO client.example.com
- The server responds with the list of supported extensions; the NTLM authentication extension is indicated by its presence in the list of AUTH mechanisms as shown below. Note that the AUTH list is sent twice (once with an "=" and once without). The "AUTH=" form was apparently specified in a draft of the RFC; sending both forms ensures that clients implemented against this draft are supported.
250-server.example.com Hello [10.10.2.20] 250-HELP 250-AUTH LOGIN NTLM 250-AUTH=LOGIN NTLM 250 SIZE 10240000 - The client initiates NTLM authentication by sending an AUTH command specifying NTLM as the authentication mechanism and providing the Base-64 encoded Type 1 message as a parameter:
AUTH NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAABzIAAAYABgArAAAACwALACAAAABXT1JLU1RBVElPTkRPTUFJTg==
According to RFC 2554, the client may opt not to send the initial response parameter (instead merely sending "AUTH NTLM" and waiting for an empty server challenge before replying with the Type 1 message). However, this did not appear to work properly when tested against Exchange.
- The server replies with a 334 response containing the Type 2 challenge message (again, Base-64 encoded). This is shown below; the line breaks are for editorial clarity and are not present in the server's reply:
334 TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMADAAAAABAoEAASNFZ4mrze8AAAAAAAAAAGIAYgA8AAAA RABPAE0AQQBJAE4AAgAMAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAAEADABTAEUAUgBWAEUAUgAEABQAZA BvAG0AYQBpAG4ALgBjAG8AbQADACIAcwBlAHIAdgBlAHIALgBkAG8AbQBhAGkAbgAu AGMAbwBtAAAAAAA= - The client calculates and sends the Base-64 encoded Type 3 response (the line breaks below are for display purposes only):
TlRMTVNTUAADAAAAGAAYAGoAAAAYABgAggAAAAwADABAAAAACAAIAEwAAAAWABYAVA AAAAAAAACaAAAAAQIAAEQATwBNAEEASQBOAHUAcwBlAHIAVwBPAFIASwBTAFQAQQBU AEkATwBOAMM3zVy9RPyXgqZnr21CfG3mfCDC0+d8ViWpjBwx6BhHRmspst9GgPOZWP uMITqcxg== - The server validates the response and indicates the result of authentication:
235 NTLM authentication successful.
After authenticating, the client is able to send messages normally.
NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the LM User Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with LM User Session Key NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange). NTLM response is manually removed from the Type 3 message to force the server-side context to use the LM User Session Key.
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4e544c4d53535000010000003782000000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
37820000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000358281006da297169f7aa9c2
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35828100 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
6da297169f7aa9c2 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message; NTLM response
is removed to force usage of the LM User Session Key:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018004000000000000000000000000c000c00
5800000008000800640000000c000c006c000000000000000000000035828000
2e17884ea16177e2b751d53b5cc756c3cd57cdfd6e3bf8b95400450053005400
4e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180040000000 LM/LMv2 Response (length 24, offset 64)
0000000000000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response (empty, removed)
0c000c0058000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 88)
0800080064000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 100)
0c000c006c000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 108)
0000000000000000 Session Key header (empty)
35828000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
2e17884ea16177e2b751d53b5cc756c3cd57cdfd6e3bf8b9 LM/LMv2 Response
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35828101 flags
0000000000000000f8290900f8290900782a0900782a09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f28010000
624aac413795cdc10000000000000000 outbound signing key
624aac413795cdc10000000000000000 inbound verifying key
624aac413795cdc10000000000000000 outbound encrypting key
624aac413795cdc10000000000000000 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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59ad15f0da768c3d17b6c57d41885c21d530a998e4140743f86c0a45067994a3
4a91002db96aae962b0b7abe77feaf1651ccaa249ae754563ab8abe6c9869ddc
1d1052e3328a6f2564b0f7408eeb6b57e9d268dd73198b5bf3c75a995e1fbffa
bcdf851a958fc2ea49a8d839fc5dd755fb44c4a258600523ed7ea1ee38351bca
29b72f37d075b567a5d4123ee20de5a09b63ffd633183bfd660ef5780ceccb28
6e97c8e0e84e48c16d7b114cbaa622b4c62708655f1e20c32cf2bb7fb136f672
accf84027c3101d1902eb2932ab3e13f4271826209343c1c61269cd3f4509253
80cd47f946f1efc00313cedb4fa49e879fbd04a7748969d970830f4b8dde814d
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
lmHash = lmEncrypt(password, "KGS!@#$%") = 0x624aac413795cdc1ff17365faf1ffe89
LMUserSessionKey = trunc(lmHash) = 0x624aac413795cdc10000000000000000
Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys).
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
0100000090010700cacc888006466cb5
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0xdd0e70b1cacc888006466cb5
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0x90010700 here):
0100000090010700cacc888006466cb5 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
48793abbf0145ddb01000000a0030700e286c6021ffc3742
09613b9790f7d40e0100000088030700fb8e614d1cf2284c
same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset):
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x48793abbf0145ddb
trailer buffer gets signature; again uses same RC4 cipher
(sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x623bc698e286c6021ffc3742
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0xa0030700):
01000000a0030700e286c6021ffc3742 = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x09613b9790f7d40e
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f02000000) = 0x85433470fb8e614d1cf2284c
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x88030700)
0100000088030700fb8e614d1cf2284c = trailer signature
NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 56-bit Lan Manager Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with 56-bit Lan Manager Session Key NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
4e544c4d5353500001000000b782008000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b7820080 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000b5828180c77c1fcdb77ad042
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
b5828180 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
c77c1fcdb77ad042 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c00540000000000000090000000b5828080
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
2e1580af209c1579bbd95a0c9568e2a7455764064cd8ff8c75791b1820178018
c9d00365a5dedfaa455ef8c3b3ad1c1c
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty)
b5828080 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
2e1580af209c1579bbd95a0c9568e2a7455764064cd8ff8c LM/LMv2 Response
75791b1820178018c9d00365a5dedfaa455ef8c3b3ad1c1c NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
b5828181 flags, also has an unknown flag set
0000000000000000e8290900e8290900682a0900682a09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
f41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b
f41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b
f41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b
f41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b
000000000000000000000000
f41115be030662aca4a022504869d30421ae431964da92b42af589ea8a4e5f5e
4c140ab6b342bacb3405ce25e787e5176f30108229c538b5db44e86b1367ad86
573b5294818d6e5174f683c10ecf2ec7a27831dd1efbeeb2fe7302e48b402061
af07bf45d5bcfacc36b81c3e3d6018128e79a54b93998097ab66b798720bbd47
d96a6890d2c2f0ffcdc985a9955ae09fc36c54f17f71d0287d8fdea34df35688
6dc6bb1dc823241a7e7ac4edefa10d7c26d18c77639675d40ce37bebf75cd62c
ecfd84769a3fb15ba82d2f53d74f32fca7e6aa0f279bb02b41084ae1f8dff2e9
e2399c003aa6b95d5833ca1b37dc65593c914916099e7001551f9dd8c04635f9
00000000000000000000000000000000
f41115be030662aca4a022504869d30421ae431964da92b42af589ea8a4e5f5e
4c140ab6b342bacb3405ce25e787e5176f30108229c538b5db44e86b1367ad86
573b5294818d6e5174f683c10ecf2ec7a27831dd1efbeeb2fe7302e48b402061
af07bf45d5bcfacc36b81c3e3d6018128e79a54b93998097ab66b798720bbd47
d96a6890d2c2f0ffcdc985a9955ae09fc36c54f17f71d0287d8fdea34df35688
6dc6bb1dc823241a7e7ac4edefa10d7c26d18c77639675d40ce37bebf75cd62c
ecfd84769a3fb15ba82d2f53d74f32fca7e6aa0f279bb02b41084ae1f8dff2e9
e2399c003aa6b95d5833ca1b37dc65593c914916099e7001551f9dd8c04635f9
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
lmHash = lmEncrypt(password, "KGS!@#$%") = 0x624aac413795cdc1ff17365faf1ffe89
trunc(lmHash + pad) = 0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd
lmResponse[0-7] = 0x2e1580af209c1579
LanManagerSessionKey =
lmEncrypt(0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd, 0x2e1580af209c1579) =
0xf41c7848bec59daa4cfe52156645f77b
Key is weakened to 56-bit w/0xa0 = 0xf41c7848bec59da0
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
0100000090010700598d18d8150514cc
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x2cfc55af598d18d8150514cc
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0x90010700 here):
0100000090010700598d18d8150514cc = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
357f77b267a494c101000000a0030700fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a
4db804533e6ffc2301000000880307003736d2b43c149c48
same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset):
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x357f77b267a494c1
trailer buffer gets signature; again uses same RC4 cipher
(sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x757b9976fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0xa0030700):
01000000a0030700fb2ce7d1bfd23a0a = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x4db804533e6ffc23
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f02000000) = 0x5eb9ab2f3736d2b43c149c48
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x88030700)
01000000880307003736d2b43c149c48 = trailer signature
NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4e544c4d5353500001000000b782000000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b7820000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000b58281007116b94341ee4e70
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
b5828100 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
7116b94341ee4e70 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c00540000000000000090000000b5828000
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
66271e46d60b246d25fcc3340235841057c2821f490d073304c6e94c5624abad
6c922d8e64b6c86d43138f8f0d94fc3f
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty)
b5828000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
66271e46d60b246d25fcc3340235841057c2821f490d0733 LM/LMv2 Response
04c6e94c5624abad6c922d8e64b6c86d43138f8f0d94fc3f NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
b5828101 flags
0000000000000000182e0900182e0900982e0900982e09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
b98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1 outbound signing key
b98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1 inbound verifying key
b98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1 outbound encrypting key
b98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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b94480a5718a4f50e1a4e815e91021e0a9a387263fbbd69d6e3b03a2027c0e56
1c47582cab375deacb92462f4db09bb32965670de5dc573e7bf20a901fb68ecd
6d697800a1ced9de7a9a79091b5318b104c827bf7791ad3448c606c5e4bca6eb
7da0949e28ec137596fd5cbaeedb08af52898845a75a95e78d63c36bfe054af0
703df1432aef32f3b2d8594e9961b5251d33f9ae8b2b8fc46a2ef520140fc1d1
d3f785428493a8ff3af8cad216da734c556fdfb4384bb8acf4687672367f1a23
835fc20bcfc05bd0fadd31edfb98b78c823cc9cc629faa1924e3d4300c8681bd
7411e6e235be49396601419cd7541251f6605ed51e6cfcc7407e97176407222d
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
lmHash = lmEncrypt(password, "KGS!@#$%") = 0x624aac413795cdc1ff17365faf1ffe89
trunc(lmHash + pad) = 0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd
lmResponse[0-7] = 0x66271e46d60b246d
LanManagerSessionKey =
lmEncrypt(0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd, 0x66271e46d60b246d) =
0xb98a3a22c81e31f99e7eca1e123c04d1
Key is weakened to 40-bit w/0xe538b0 = 0xb98a3a22c8e538b0
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000ffffff001a7599e9ad0ad460
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0xbeb185ce1a7599e9ad0ad460
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0xffffff00 here):
01000000ffffff001a7599e9ad0ad460 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
075c81a318754894010000006003070033df86be9d65813d
da731ecef152bd750100000048030700a61d753437944ee5
same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset):
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x075c81a318754894
trailer buffer gets signature; again uses same RC4 cipher
(sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x0004c5b033df86be9d65813d
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x60030700):
010000006003070033df86be9d65813d = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xda731ecef152bd75
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f02000000) = 0xf012a98ca61d753437944ee5
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x48030700)
0100000048030700a61d753437944ee5 = trailer signature
NTLMv1 Datagram-Style Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated
Demonstration of datagram-style authentication with default options (defaults to 40-bit Lan Manager Session Key NTLM1 with key exchange when used with NTLMv1).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with:
ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY | ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ISC_REG_DATAGRAM
Produces no token (datagram-style). Client context can be used for signing
and sealing immediately.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with:
ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY | ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY | ASC_REG_DATAGRAM
Produces a Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000000000030000000f38298e0ada5839570b5cb99
00000000000000000000000030000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0000000030000000 Target Name header (empty)
f38298e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Datagram Style (0x00000040)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Request Init Response (0x00100000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
ada5839570b5cb99 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
0000000030000000 Target Information header (empty)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c00540000001000100090000000f5828040
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
e8cff653006525da77c6bef2fed79bc6d7d839f598ead91a4e37300050075eeb
aa5915480c3620b8ee6fa869cdf16e7c9227ebee8b19a312664fa4ed44bd3377
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
1000100090000000 Session Key header (length 16, offset 144)
f5828040 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Datagram Style (0x00000040)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
e8cff653006525da77c6bef2fed79bc6d7d839f598ead91a LM/LMv2 Response
4e37300050075eebaa5915480c3620b8ee6fa869cdf16e7c NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
9227ebee8b19a312664fa4ed44bd3377 Session Key
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
f5828041 flags
000000000000000080740a0080740a0000750a0000750a000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 outbound signing key
d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 inbound verifying key
d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 outbound encrypting key
d56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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05f9b27f16db3ea4563b296433256b1076cdd372908ac60367f37d5e495c11ab
378f70d165ea3d633ca5f819e2f45a3906328b8993718c7726d78145042099a7
b0dde1c831986f661ef6bc9dc7de558d80ed447e4cdf749b02b346c4227915cc
09cb75c9430fa3ba53c018fa78b7daff9f62b9efd2a92a60845fe5e0278692dc
e983be951f24b6a2ec592194bd352c0cb596fd7ae747fba0a1c5340861b85dc1
91f1aad9fc14e801858251d687a61dbbb157303fd0bf73e4ce526a9c0d0ec250
d454cf2e38ad4dac6c42f0b41223079ef21b7ba83a0a7c5b2debca404f1300e6
d58e582b692f68eee31a88c3ae4a17fe4b484e419a1c280b6e36afd8f56d97f7
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
lmHash = lmEncrypt(password, "KGS!@#$%") = 0x624aac413795cdc1ff17365faf1ffe89
trunc(lmHash + pad) = 0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd
lmResponse[0-7] = 0xe8cff653006525da
LanManagerSessionKey =
lmEncrypt(0x624aac413795cdc1bdbdbdbdbdbd, 0xe8cff653006525da) =
0x97dba8c110cd6b7976c02c203c6be07a
Key exchange performed:
type3Key (from Type 3) = 0x9227ebee8b19a312664fa4ed44bd3377
key = RC4(LanManagerSessionKey, type3Key) =
0xd56070a4c355c2d91693d8f3406d4d82
Key is weakened to 40-bit w/0xe538b0 = 0xd56070a4c3e538b0
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
010000009801070012c00705ba25a7ec
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x39ec604d12c00705ba25a7ec
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0x98010700 here):
010000009801070012c00705ba25a7ec = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
38ee6349d24eca32010000008803070012c00705ba25a7ec
38ee6349d24eca32010000007003070012c00705ba25a7ec
RC4 cipher is reset after each signing/sealing operation in datagram-style:
RC4(key, 0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x38ee6349d24eca32
trailer buffer gets signature; RC4 cipher is reset and sequence number is
*not* incremented in datagram-style:
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x39ec604d12c00705ba25a7ec
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x88030700):
010000008803070012c00705ba25a7ec = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x39ec604d12c00705ba25a7ec
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x70030700):
010000007003070012c00705ba25a7ec = trailer signature
NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 "Dummy" Signing and Sealing Using the NTLM User Session Key
Demonstration of "dummy" signing and sealing. Context is *not* initialized with support for integrity or confidentiality. "Negotiate Always Sign" is negotiated, which allows the context to be used in dummy signing and sealing.
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with default options. Produces Type 1 message:
4e544c4d5353500001000000078200a000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
078200a0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with default options. Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000058281a0eacf7d5a2a6fa7d4
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
058281a0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
eacf7d5a2a6fa7d4 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty)
058280a0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
6c454794b50321a067fdf78e92ee5085a5b0a23057e9125b LM/LMv2 Response
d2025bc5d6c201af7472550a677ca9904245a16ebb542a8e NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
058281a1 flags
000000000000000028f5080028f50800a8f50800a8f508000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c outbound signing key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c inbound verifying key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c outbound encrypting key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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ae3787b72ff94884680d3e5658c064df9d9e5d8f0655f22a002ebc7e9f944e29
08cf90e0057f622d31a92b7d0ca6f586d5d36e24af70cdbe52ea49d067aa4ffa
e85a5cb1a41e3241a288f8de8a4c8909593cc698b657750af014b26f13778eee
855310d716f61ce5c795a0a3bbac358bb02611c954a54b2791d6e297f1fd8c6d
18fffc190b9c69b80122f7c8fb036146c2b581443960fe239b967b17e33de15b
73e445401f1db3a8c5ad51f48d665e38796b8263b9ca363f763aef71d1ec12d8
a76cb46a333b0fddab7850ba3493dcd4077299d22515eb5f300221e9e79a80d9
1a1b4d2865e6ccc3470eda7c4ace04bfbddbedc1cb207483f343c4a1422c7a92
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
NTLMUserSessionKey = md4(ntlmHash) = 0xae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c
Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys).
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000000000000000000000000000 ("dummy" signature)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
2194108dc8f329290100000048020700fa4f9c95a098b258
8f88dc2f36cd5e710100000030020700d825f5a1154aa5fc
RC4(key, 0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x2194108dc8f32929
trailer buffer gets signature; uses same RC4 cipher as sealing
(sequence number is 0, previous dummy signing doesn't count):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x039ae5c5fa4f9c95a098b258
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x48020700):
0100000048020700fa4f9c95a098b258 = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x8f88dc2f36cd5e71
trailer buffer signature with sequence 1 (previous trailer signature
incremented it):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x6b9317f7d825f5a1154aa5fc
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x30020700)
0100000030020700d825f5a1154aa5fc = trailer signature
NTLM2 Session Response Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using the 128-bit NTLM2 Session Response User Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with 128-bit NTLM2 Session Response User Session Key NTLM2 signing and sealing, with key exchange enabled.
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
4e544c4d5353500001000000b78208e000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b78208e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000358289e0677f1c557a5ee96c
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
358289e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
677f1c557a5ee96c Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c00540000001000100090000000358288e0
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
404d1b6f6915258000000000000000000000000000000000ea8cc49f24da157f
13436637f77693d8b992d619e584c7ee727a5240822ec7af4e9100c43e6fee7f
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
1000100090000000 Session Key header (length 16, offset 144)
358288e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
404d1b6f6915258000000000000000000000000000000000 LM/LMv2 Response
ea8cc49f24da157f13436637f77693d8b992d619e584c7ee NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
727a5240822ec7af4e9100c43e6fee7f Session Key
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
48a42e7848a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
70f10b00 server context handle dwUpper
358289e1 flags
0000000000000000382e09003c2e0900b82e0900c82f09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
6c713b60e6571035c9396ece1e456395 outbound signing key
e775c02a63d159ec64185f6d7d993344 inbound verifying key
e9b0f8e2cbf7b453b8389e8d2d7bb4ba outbound encrypting key
cc0fc51f360b7da837cde6cb417fd735 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000
e932727927bbfe589b599a99d212bf23479fa99e7d8953bd6764862e690a6fac
b5f935ba02df8a75e415ddf7d30fc9a89778a2b7d4f0cc0c032b8757b4312663
8c0b39136536b8af1c3a774fc890cf30fbd16b18059c5eec7b3b3782efe06628
216aeda7e83fcb1446344bdeeb1ef5914ad894333d96ea51fdfc8311ad175b52
254ed93ce58bff50d0c78561aeb36ef8952c205acef3cad506085d5c700080ab
c6d77c22b1c22fb9c32a73a0481d100e298e929dc0e1a671ee1f8d4438a5c476
f22d847ec1196ce6094d5f3edc4201b28f6d43aaf4cdf1e362d6fa98a19307b0
55f640e7544c457424bc04c5dadb41160d7f88beb656a41be21a607a688149a3
00000000000000000000000000000000
cc094487604571968040c0ac1fe2da492938751932bc4139040def8c27635807
ad4e68b5ab6c6a65897f8f2df24f02164cc35466d0111d81f026a23d6d7221fd
34c9cb885e52b10ec88e532ec57a8ba5a6eb3f769446b62ab8a3840548220cd8
ff3b9bb2b731e1e64a50ae08917dc28d869215cf5a677920a801a493c143ec97
1efb576bd717b0303ea9be9fdb9a5dd55b1b8a77aaf42f9ccea183ea6eb36428
f7984bf9d39e9524a7eedd00cae5425533d9bded0b51ded2e43769c7c41a7bc6
af595ff1e33612e8614ddfe9f523785673a085fcd1d67ed4356f5ccd9ddc9003
0a4799bb2b70e71418823cfa06e0f62cbffe133a7cb4baf8101cf325620fb974
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
NTLMUserSessionKey = md4(ntlmHash) = 0xae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c
challenge (from Type 2) = 0x677f1c557a5ee96c
nonce (from Type 3) = 0x404d1b6f69152580
NTLM2SessionResponseUserSessionKey =
HMAC(NTLMUserSessionKey, challenge + nonce) =
0x0d4b30a8750b73ab2dab39e889455fcd
Key exchange performed:
type3Key (from Type 3) = 0x727a5240822ec7af4e9100c43e6fee7f
key = RC4(NTLM2SessionResponseUserSessionKey, type3Key) =
0x5764dc0a93b1292fa898c29524c30a54
We are using server context:
serverSigningConstant =
"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207369676e696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
serverSealingConstant =
"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) =
0x6c713b60e6571035c9396ece1e456395
User Session Key is not weakened (128-bit negotiated).
sealingKey = MD5(key + serverSealingConstant) =
0xe9b0f8e2cbf7b453b8389e8d2d7bb4ba
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
0100000069de1aff9cbee43100000000
Sequence number is 0.
seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708
HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) =
0x9d642651faec52f2164297dcaaa1ff6e
sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0x69de1aff9cbee431
version num + sig + seqnum:
0100000069de1aff9cbee43100000000 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
5b4cbbd3b2d8e8a401000000272c6dee5b236fe201000000
29535954c1e00fb9010000002922b8fcada4cda202000000
Uses RC4 cipher from previous signing operation (key exchange encrypts
signature with sealing key as well).
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x5b4cbbd3b2d8e8a4
trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous
signing, same RC4 cipher used for this signature too):
HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) =
0x1b7fc502e4cc73b6d85360d7ee052800
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0x272c6dee5b236fe2
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000272c6dee5b236fe201000000 = trailer signature
second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous operations:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x29535954c1e00fb9
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
HMAC(signingKey, 0x020000000102030405060708) =
0x3e46a45716671a6e0d056636f77db4bb
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0x2922b8fcada4cda2
version num + sig + seqnum:
010000002922b8fcada4cda202000000 = trailer signature
NTLM2 Session Response Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit NTLM2 Session Response User Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with 40-bit NTLM2 Session Response User Session Key NTLM2 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4e544c4d5353500001000000b782080000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b7820800 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c003000000035828900919013ccde5c4d16
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35828900 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
919013ccde5c4d16 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c0054000000000000009000000035828800
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
02a668799b43b02600000000000000000000000000000000191c91d68a26a933
82ec89178c1e496d8f2f63a1c7dc0b54
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty)
35828800 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
02a668799b43b02600000000000000000000000000000000 LM/LMv2 Response
191c91d68a26a93382ec89178c1e496d8f2f63a1c7dc0b54 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35828901 flags
0000000000000000f8290900fc290900782a0900882b09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
605b738984f36aea7d2ccc5678670f2c outbound signing key
94d75dd6591eb8569d8480b5c9c25136 inbound verifying key
e4c55ca209611e9e007009731b7103d5 outbound encrypting key
738e75e9b0df0ac9139839abf5cc8354 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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eb024b64187446dcf798db69a299356807ba78fec2b642e6cd77a097a80bb9a5
38e7548a935d923dbd22e1b7d80127fc1cc9fad61e404eac033f6bab10e57923
878f729e84500ce97139d5cb8c11c7b21741e2325f56a34aad757a804f34ed19
a747bf05af9b912f94ffea700dd43a8806d73eb4458bd97e1a375c6d9633f3c6
49092dc8635a9a589ce35221c5dda1f926ef1f6a5bc03bb1ce65e089149d2baa
28b3cab59f448655306c25133629bc812c57be592a1b0e1204537bcf00d176b0
3c0faecce8f6c4dfd0674cfbd27d95fdf1da318e8d8582bbec7f16f0c162eea6
0a8324f26660151d2eb851736edea9e4f86f08a45e4dc3d37c48f54390f46120
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
NTLMUserSessionKey = md4(ntlmHash) = 0xae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c
challenge (from Type 2) = 0x919013ccde5c4d16
nonce (from Type 3) = 0x02a668799b43b026
NTLM2SessionResponseUserSessionKey =
HMAC(NTLMUserSessionKey, challenge + nonce) =
0x6b60097a8f9dbbff2d23f5b15377ca28
We are using server context:
serverSigningConstant =
"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207369676e696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
serverSealingConstant =
"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) =
0x605b738984f36aea7d2ccc5678670f2c
User Session Key is weakened to 40-bit for sealing by truncating =
0x6b60097a8f
sealingKey = MD5(weakenedKey + serverSealingConstant) =
0xe4c55ca209611e9e007009731b7103d5
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000d1e2d811145d81ec00000000
Sequence number is 0.
seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708
HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) =
0xd1e2d811145d81ecf5f8723312c75e3c
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000d1e2d811145d81ec00000000 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
ab8d38bb0cad7dd601000000eed64de8afb80c8001000000
b011cc07a7f6127b01000000644a8509d73ac48c02000000
RC4(sealingKey, 0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xab8d38bb0cad7dd6
trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous
signing):
HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) =
0xeed64de8afb80c801ea5ddd1d98cbdc8
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000eed64de8afb80c8001000000 = trailer signature
second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous sealing operation:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xb011cc07a7f6127b
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
HMAC(signingKey, 0x020000000102030405060708) =
0x644a8509d73ac48c8f5a7f7f65bc8381
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000644a8509d73ac48c02000000 = trailer signature
NTLMv2 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the 40-bit NTLMv2 User Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv2 authentication with NTLMv2 User Session Key NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 3 (LMv2/NTLMv2).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4e544c4d53535000010000003782000000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
37820000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000358281000033b02d17275b77
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35828100 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
0033b02d17275b77 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000076007600780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c005400000000000000ee00000035828000
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
5d55a02b60a40526ac9a1e4d15fa45a0f2e6329726c598e8f77c67dad00b9321
6242b197fe6addfa0101000000000000502db638677bc301f2e6329726c598e8
0000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d004200
4500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e00
63006f006d000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
7600760078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 118, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
00000000ee000000 Session Key header (empty)
35828000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
5d55a02b60a40526ac9a1e4d15fa45a0f2e6329726c598e8 LM/LMv2 Response
NTLM/NTLMv2 Response:
f77c67dad00b93216242b197fe6addfa0101000000000000502db638677bc301
f2e6329726c598e80000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c00
4d0045004d0042004500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e007400
6500730074002e0063006f006d000000000000000000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35828101 flags, also has an unknown flag set
0000000000000000782e0900782e0900f82e0900f82e09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810 outbound signing key
1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810 inbound verifying key
1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810 outbound encrypting key
1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810 inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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783ee50c1d1209b1cb2ea115e7899fbe9547b2b03c1ef14c20d102e0a7282a00
d4919756821af4ff388a5333c51835fc482c71a5f6bdea3745e2dc6124dd3241
c9a9849d267ebc3d7608554962235fb568d6874699cd141fb7395b801b796650
ca0edaee65d2304afe707504067aefb38669eda3547f7c5d946ecf3aadbf437d
6f4288e1d9a6935e63ae7ba467afaac1ccc3529a1c36d7b49cf2e407779e2985
3173db8d814e9b405cc00d01d5d016a022b6c62be96b90c2f792ecce4dc4f36c
f58b2d74980a6dde17d3d8f8e63b0b7264342f600fab05580344bae88ffa5ab9
27df19f96a51bba8f083eb3f10ac218cfdc8fb8ea2255711c74b4f5913e3b896
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
ntlmv2Hash = hmac(ntlmHash, "TESTTESTNT") = 0xc4ea95cb148df11bf9d7c3611ad6d722
challenge (from Type 2) = 0x0033b02d17275b77
blob (from Type 3) = 0x0101000000000000502db638677bc301f2e632972
6c598e80000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004
d0042004500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e007400650073007
4002e0063006f006d000000000000000000
NTLMv2UserSessionKey = HMAC(ntlmv2Hash(HMAC(ntlmv2Hash, challenge + blob))) =
0x1c4c7aaa7403acf01b1fa565bc950810
Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys).
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000ffffff0051cefea77f098ee3
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x8661cb7d51cefea77f098ee3
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0xffffff00 here):
01000000ffffff0051cefea77f098ee3 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
f483b904264d83060100000098010700bd9719c0b34f5362
022cc2127f9e206e01000000800307001855ec8494231273
same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset):
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xf483b904264d8306
trailer buffer gets signature; again uses same RC4 cipher
(sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x2246e9cbbd9719c0b34f5362
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x98010700):
0100000098010700bd9719c0b34f5362 = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x022cc2127f9e206e
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f02000000) = 0x6fde4d031855ec8494231273
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x80030700)
01000000800307001855ec8494231273 = trailer signature
NTLMv2 Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using the 56-bit NTLMv2 User Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv2 authentication with 56-bit NTLMv2 User Session Key NTLM2 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 3 (LMv2/NTLMv2).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
4e544c4d5353500001000000b782088000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b7820880 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c003000000035828980514246973ea892c1
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35828980 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
514246973ea892c1 Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000076007600780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c005400000000000000ee00000035828880
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
bf2e015119f6bdb3f6fdb768aa12d478f5ce3d2401c8f6e9caa4da8f25d5e840
974ed8976d3ada46010100000000000030fa7e3c677bc301f5ce3d2401c8f6e9
0000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d004200
4500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e00
63006f006d000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
7600760078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 118, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
00000000ee000000 Session Key header (empty)
35828880 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
bf2e015119f6bdb3f6fdb768aa12d478f5ce3d2401c8f6e9 LM/LMv2 Response
NTLM/NTLMv2 Response:
caa4da8f25d5e840974ed8976d3ada46010100000000000030fa7e3c677bc301
f5ce3d2401c8f6e90000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c00
4d0045004d0042004500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e007400
6500730074002e0063006f006d000000000000000000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35828981 flags
0000000000000000282e09002c2e0900a82e0900b82f09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
f7301e5d23f1d578c51ec0728b67453e outbound signing key
06403212f9e8c05ce1739938c200eca5 inbound verifying key
3d6483dce52cd6c4d7553545e607d92d outbound encrypting key
ccc6efbcea980c0ac685753a4c9bbe0c inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000
3a6d27764b2010cdeda24d421b961cb92835eac0ecd6bf50375d308219362975
443ce13be9d2621d1283dc484f3e6ae66c4e8851f12632c3c1d9d5808763770b
9b61ebf7b7152252da1ff484b611732e3dcca15e9567939ce48bac450c7d46df
14ff026557a49db4dbe54cde538c21c6d0a59a24d87a06498dd74340bc4a13ab
6f851aa070a7587f9fa86b560d16d4e3b22d97b33147eefccbc87c6e3479f53f
bab898af09865aa3692f5b330a99f600c2b118cec766fec903a6551ecfe0e225
e77bae642ad3c5fa0fbb0e5caac4bd9e07ef2b602c1754f2908eb501be5991fd
41ad688add8f392308f3f974f881783872b07ee8fb7104055fa99289d1f0ca94
00000000000000000000000000000000
21a58f9635cee06b4f94512adc8125717aa7a877750d646503e17073b1e5c1a6
d874c3a2b0499f905bebef1a3f5f8bee8e8ce69c4b87c900bf2f41ea72167f91
1dfc82a959862708575caf3a0a7bbbd7f337ba5ab6fae7c69734e9a1e367a44e
cfc5292ed9da1f5e0f2d01a0ae0214b58a1eb8619b524c7dbe47d41bc83bb346
0983d533dd40ab76c742ca45c0e4c2cbf5e8f6f7f222b76658a31c795005193e
f17812d0c4247e806e4afddb10cc68d6b90c2807b20e9860549318621130ac06
bc15e2f8232b9aec20fb95decd89d2f43d0b69bdd3136f382644888d533284b4
92feedaa7c9df9393c55316cffd1489ead172cdf43995636636a85f05d6d044d
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
ntlmv2Hash = hmac(ntlmHash, "TESTTESTNT") = 0xc4ea95cb148df11bf9d7c3611ad6d722
challenge (from Type 2) = 0x514246973ea892c1
blob (from Type 3) = 0x010100000000000030fa7e3c677bc301f5ce3d240
1c8f6e90000000002000c0054004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004
d0042004500520003001e006d0065006d006200650072002e007400650073007
4002e0063006f006d000000000000000000
NTLMv2UserSessionKey = HMAC(ntlmv2Hash(HMAC(ntlmv2Hash, challenge + blob))) =
0x62ff13231f566f5dadf7391e183b5f39
We are using server context:
serverSigningConstant =
"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207369676e696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
serverSealingConstant =
"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) =
0xf7301e5d23f1d578c51ec0728b67453e
User Session Key is weakened to 56-bit for sealing by truncating =
0x62ff13231f566f
sealingKey = MD5(weakenedKey + serverSealingConstant) =
0x3d6483dce52cd6c4d7553545e607d92d
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000fa317a333d8f510c00000000
Sequence number is 0.
seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708
HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) =
0xfa317a333d8f510cccab257d9f2193c4
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000fa317a333d8f510c00000000 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
a8e6671c79cf265701000000673773407fb60b4201000000
2fe89f6c6ea06d4b01000000244e0bcbce6ec16c02000000
RC4(sealingKey, 0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xa8e6671c79cf2657
trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous
signing):
HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) =
0x673773407fb60b428f70358ca67720ba
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000673773407fb60b4201000000 = trailer signature
second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous sealing operation:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x2fe89f6c6ea06d4b
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
HMAC(signingKey, 0x020000000102030405060708) =
0x244e0bcbce6ec16ce3493f55854bcc5c
version num + first 8 bytes + seqnum:
01000000244e0bcbce6ec16c02000000 = trailer signature
Anonymous NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using the 128-bit Null User Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated
Demonstration of anonymous authentication with signing and sealing.
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with empty string ("") for domain, user, and
password.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Produces Type 1 message:
4e544c4d5353500001000000b78208e000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b78208e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c0030000000358289e05bce6f12f47ddbdf
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
358289e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
5bce6f12f47ddbdf Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000010001004c000000000000004d00000000000000
4000000000000000400000000c000c0040000000100010004d000000358a88e0
4d0045004d0042004500520000c1442e6cca8c010e77138430aa35738e
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
010001004c000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 1, offset 76)
000000004d000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (empty)
0000000040000000 Domain Name header (empty)
0000000040000000 User Name header (empty)
0c000c0040000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 64)
100010004d000000 Session Key header (length 16, offset 77)
358a88e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Anonymous (0x00000800)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
00 LM/LMv2 Response
c1442e6cca8c010e77138430aa35738e Session Key
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export (on Win2k, appears to vary by OS):
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
358a89e1 flags
0000000000000000e8290900ec290900682a0900782b09000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f00000000
9128c3e5df618a48a83b44cfd92d58fe outbound signing key
594757aaa803afd943de25e087e3f9f1 inbound verifying key
fc52e8bf1605ab57e89c6d6b4ffa92f6 outbound encrypting key
96465577ba181d141711572e5e15fe5d inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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09dd12ae4213ac358896e19a9d26cfc8957750b5f557bae5f3ef98d891a4059f
f25ed0195d141aea3d62e31fd7a9aa1e07fd83cb4d3f7401825b7e66a14b28cd
52d6e8a2049036756dfcb929d220d5463499ca3368a071634c0c9cd10dcc4ef9
11d30f108a45648979477f0641c2b485f6adc0a8922be91dde847c93278040a6
b886c6605ac132fe731c589467a76131c9498db13beb2f9baf2c59e06f6c6af0
bbc4b00e6bce78da2de602e797f103b2b6bf4f1b388c0816dfbde2258bd9a3b7
157b5600c55ffaf79e3ac78e48ee55308737ff43817d515cf83e6e70c317bcec
2aed21442e24d465a56923be0b53f4fb8fb3e454ab18760a7adc2239723c4adb
0000000000000000
Anonymous User Session Key = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
Key exchange performed:
type3Key (from Type 3) = 0xc1442e6cca8c010e77138430aa35738e
key = RC4(AnonymousUserSessionKey, type3Key) =
0x1f5ca72d69bb5c34fd159a57fd5be1e3
We are using server context:
serverSigningConstant =
"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207369676e696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
serverSealingConstant =
"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) =
0x9128c3e5df618a48a83b44cfd92d58fe
sealingKey = MD5(key + serverSealingConstant) =
0xfc52e8bf1605ab57e89c6d6b4ffa92f6
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000ae0cbe0dd0b2110300000000
Sequence number is 0.
seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708
HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) =
0xc14074817421530195b4532d61a4e625
sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0xae0cbe0dd0b21103
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000ae0cbe0dd0b2110300000000 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
fb2e1d6ff8a3569a01000000cc2c5bf59319e7ca01000000
1e2216588e5a7d9801000000e9a3066b8fab0bf102000000
Uses RC4 cipher from previous signing operation (key exchange encrypts
signature with sealing key as well).
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xfb2e1d6ff8a3569a
trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous
signing, same RC4 cipher used for this signature too):
HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) =
0x25141e76f441b10622cfaf0e61450663
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0xcc2c5bf59319e7ca
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000cc2c5bf59319e7ca01000000 = trailer signature
second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous operations:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x1e2216588e5a7d98
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
HMAC(signingKey, 0x020000000102030405060708) =
0x7efa2ba18ed911696a0f4d571b05a244
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0xe9a3066b8fab0bf1
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000e9a3066b8fab0bf102000000 = trailer signature
Local NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM2 Signing and Sealing Using an Unknown Session Key With Key Exchange Negotiated (Analysis Incomplete)
Demonstration of local authentication with signing and sealing. It is assumed that the User Session Key derivation and Key Exchange processes are performed normally offline within the established local context (in the absence of the required information being provided over-the-wire).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with NULL identity (using default credentials
handle for authenticated local user).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Produces Type 1 message:
4e544c4d5353500001000000b7b208e006000600260000000600060020000000
4d454d424552544553544e54
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
b7b208e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Domain Supplied (0x00001000)
Negotiate Workstation Supplied (0x00002000)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
0600060026000000 Supplied Domain header (length 6, offset 38)
0600060020000000 Supplied Workstation header (length 6, offset 32)
4d454d424552 Supplied Workstation ("MEMBER")
544553544e54 Supplied Domain ("TESTNT")
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c003000000035c289e0d7ef496afa055352
08ee0b0000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35c289e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Local Call (0x00004000)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
d7ef496afa055352 Challenge
08ee0b0000000000 Context (equal to server context handle's dwUpper field)
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, offset 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d53535000030000000000000040000000000000004000000000000000
4000000000000000400000000000000040000000000000004000000035c288e0
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
0000000040000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (empty, local authentication)
0000000040000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (empty, local authentication)
0000000040000000 Domain Name header (empty, local authentication)
0000000040000000 User Name header (empty, local authentication)
0000000040000000 Workstation Name header (empty, local authentication)
0000000040000000 Session Key header (empty)
35c288e0 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Local Call (0x00004000)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35c289e1 flags
0000000000000000182e09001c2e0900982e0900a82f09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f00000000
65836771d7bf52df502634e521b3154b outbound signing key
9ed7ce6558f0f26db1fbf5163d7b24f9 inbound verifying key
f56d6b81749b7adaf3467f37bc36224e outbound encrypting key
65adf5ede40e84e7338d681e6cbc38ff inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000
7263d05c01f686ab2717e06f35c91b7a10fd0f5289ced6b6c423a213e6256a4d
3d128d30290899cbb502412f2d77ae1d4e55cf3fa6df5a785ded4aa3504c5484
155396d88345ff065beab3b738956e07f2b0ad36b8a80ba9f49305753e14e540
3428b4ccd3641ad18b037e9b67be3c1e70a17d816520565e744bd587bfc5b27f
8558099048ec800af1a5bbef92cdd2afe8c3042e510026f3bac7579ec8db5fbd
eb24bc43a742fc6111def922666dfe9d4791e9c60ef0d431d98cc259e2162b7c
49c0da1c2af5ee8e4f440c9a60ca4668391f3b213288f7a46be1c19f198a9c79
699737aadcfb829476f8d7b17be42c73338f71a0fa986c0dac18b9e3e73add62
00000000000000000000000000000000
651771fae2f5fc6da8973bd149126e92212b2f896101d23c568e40b325a383bd
42ec2752b295e5d09e36c899a94fffb8e053ac1c5c72d4de7c66b14b8d862977
bf5f47cfb76a81201f829098a067df7b78dc51630d8f790e0985316cb459e7d5
7f466b6f5a13948b38434ac54c7ee9ab340a6926d75d2aa523d81d0bc23ae4cc
aa1a419fc303cd88f6a4be04e100bb32e6cbf4feae9ab04808d9a111f937fb76
50104dc1c696b6c0740528f193f87d14cedd3f442e15d324454e64c7733e0f9c
ea0c163de8f3c92d1eebed33ba30f7f2350757d6b98abccafd7568229d1bef7a
5519da065e709be3ad2c8418dbb5f002a2eea68c395891c454af62806087a75b
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
User Session Key = ????
Key exchange performed somehow? Shows up in signatures.
We are using server context:
serverSigningConstant =
"session key to server-to-client signing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207369676e696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
serverSealingConstant =
"session key to server-to-client sealing key magic constant" =
0x73657373696f6e206b657920746f207365727665722d746f2d636c69656e74
207365616c696e67206b6579206d6167696320636f6e7374616e7400
signingKey = MD5(key + serverSigningConstant) =
0x65836771d7bf52df502634e521b3154b (from context export)
sealingKey = MD5(key + serverSealingConstant) =
0xf56d6b81749b7adaf3467f37bc36224e (from context export)
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
01000000adc70c8bd4834ae800000000
Sequence number is 0.
seqnum + message = 0x000000000102030405060708
HMAC(signingKey, 0x000000000102030405060708) =
0xb0bd637382da53f4ad3edf2c5a2c9592
sig = RC4(sealingKey, first 8 bytes) = 0xadc70c8bd4834ae8
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000adc70c8bd4834ae800000000 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
9c89720008251ab601000000d4af70567f5ab1df01000000
a8950e40b10e9af501000000c5447ccf7102d98c02000000
Uses RC4 cipher from previous signing operation (key exchange encrypts
signature with sealing key as well).
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x9c89720008251ab6
trailer buffer gets signature (sequence number is now 1 because of previous
signing, same RC4 cipher used for this signature too):
HMAC(signingKey, 0x010000000102030405060708) =
0xcd1d04a1962b7d82e6ffd7c37871bf15
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0xd4af70567f5ab1df
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000d4af70567f5ab1df01000000 = trailer signature
second message is same, using RC4 cipher from previous operations:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0xa8950e40b10e9af5
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
HMAC(signingKey, 0x020000000102030405060708) =
0x3011549106db10de5694f567749cb9eb
sig = RC4(first 8 bytes) = 0xc5447ccf7102d98c
version num + sig + seqnum:
01000000c5447ccf7102d98c02000000 = trailer signature
Appendix D: Java Implementation of the Type 3 Response Calculations
Listed below is an annotated sample implementation of the various Type 3 response calculations in Java. This example requires a JCE provider implementing the MD4 message-digest algorithm; the author recommends GNU Crypto, available at
http://www.gnu.org/software/gnu-crypto/.
import java.security.Key; import java.security.MessageDigest; import javax.crypto.Cipher; import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; /** * Calculates the various Type 3 responses. */ public class Responses { /** * Calculates the LM Response for the given challenge, using the specified * password. * * @param password The user's password. * @param challenge The Type 2 challenge from the server. * * @return The LM Response. */ public static byte[] getLMResponse(String password, byte[] challenge) throws Exception { byte[] lmHash = lmHash(password); return lmResponse(lmHash, challenge); } /** * Calculates the NTLM Response for the given challenge, using the * specified password. * * @param password The user's password. * @param challenge The Type 2 challenge from the server. * * @return The NTLM Response. */ public static byte[] getNTLMResponse(String password, byte[] challenge) throws Exception { byte[] ntlmHash = ntlmHash(password); return lmResponse(ntlmHash, challenge); } /** * Calculates the NTLMv2 Response for the given challenge, using the * specified authentication target, username, password, target information * block, and client nonce. * * @param target The authentication target (i.e., domain). * @param user The username. * @param password The user's password. * @param targetInformation The target information block from the Type 2 * message. * @param challenge The Type 2 challenge from the server. * @param clientNonce The random 8-byte client nonce. * * @return The NTLMv2 Response. */ public static byte[] getNTLMv2Response(String target, String user, String password, byte[] targetInformation, byte[] challenge, byte[] clientNonce) throws Exception { byte[] ntlmv2Hash = ntlmv2Hash(target, user, password); byte[] blob = createBlob(targetInformation, clientNonce); return lmv2Response(ntlmv2Hash, blob, challenge); } /** * Calculates the LMv2 Response for the given challenge, using the * specified authentication target, username, password, and client * challenge. * * @param target The authentication target (i.e., domain). * @param user The username. * @param password The user's password. * @param challenge The Type 2 challenge from the server. * @param clientNonce The random 8-byte client nonce. * * @return The LMv2 Response. */ public static byte[] getLMv2Response(String target, String user, String password, byte[] challenge, byte[] clientNonce) throws Exception { byte[] ntlmv2Hash = ntlmv2Hash(target, user, password); return lmv2Response(ntlmv2Hash, clientNonce, challenge); } /** * Calculates the NTLM2 Session Response for the given challenge, using the * specified password and client nonce. * * @param password The user's password. * @param challenge The Type 2 challenge from the server. * @param clientNonce The random 8-byte client nonce. * * @return The NTLM2 Session Response. This is placed in the NTLM * response field of the Type 3 message; the LM response field contains * the client nonce, null-padded to 24 bytes. */ public static byte[] getNTLM2SessionResponse(String password, byte[] challenge, byte[] clientNonce) throws Exception { byte[] ntlmHash = ntlmHash(password); MessageDigest md5 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5"); md5.update(challenge); md5.update(clientNonce); byte[] sessionHash = new byte[8]; System.arraycopy(md5.digest(), 0, sessionHash, 0, 8); return lmResponse(ntlmHash, sessionHash); } /** * Creates the LM Hash of the user's password. * * @param password The password. * * @return The LM Hash of the given password, used in the calculation * of the LM Response. */ private static byte[] lmHash(String password) throws Exception { byte[] oemPassword = password.toUpperCase().getBytes("US-ASCII"); int length = Math.min(oemPassword.length, 14); byte[] keyBytes = new byte[14]; System.arraycopy(oemPassword, 0, keyBytes, 0, length); Key lowKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 0); Key highKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 7); byte[] magicConstant = "KGS!@#$%".getBytes("US-ASCII"); Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding"); des.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, lowKey); byte[] lowHash = des.doFinal(magicConstant); des.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, highKey); byte[] highHash = des.doFinal(magicConstant); byte[] lmHash = new byte[16]; System.arraycopy(lowHash, 0, lmHash, 0, 8); System.arraycopy(highHash, 0, lmHash, 8, 8); return lmHash; } /** * Creates the NTLM Hash of the user's password. * * @param password The password. * * @return The NTLM Hash of the given password, used in the calculation * of the NTLM Response and the NTLMv2 and LMv2 Hashes. */ private static byte[] ntlmHash(String password) throws Exception { byte[] unicodePassword = password.getBytes("UnicodeLittleUnmarked"); MessageDigest md4 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD4"); return md4.digest(unicodePassword); } /** * Creates the NTLMv2 Hash of the user's password. * * @param target The authentication target (i.e., domain). * @param user The username. * @param password The password. * * @return The NTLMv2 Hash, used in the calculation of the NTLMv2 * and LMv2 Responses. */ private static byte[] ntlmv2Hash(String target, String user, String password) throws Exception { byte[] ntlmHash = ntlmHash(password); String identity = user.toUpperCase() + target; return hmacMD5(identity.getBytes("UnicodeLittleUnmarked"), ntlmHash); } /** * Creates the LM Response from the given hash and Type 2 challenge. * * @param hash The LM or NTLM Hash. * @param challenge The server challenge from the Type 2 message. * * @return The response (either LM or NTLM, depending on the provided * hash). */ private static byte[] lmResponse(byte[] hash, byte[] challenge) throws Exception { byte[] keyBytes = new byte[21]; System.arraycopy(hash, 0, keyBytes, 0, 16); Key lowKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 0); Key middleKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 7); Key highKey = createDESKey(keyBytes, 14); Cipher des = Cipher.getInstance("DES/ECB/NoPadding"); des.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, lowKey); byte[] lowResponse = des.doFinal(challenge); des.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, middleKey); byte[] middleResponse = des.doFinal(challenge); des.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, highKey); byte[] highResponse = des.doFinal(challenge); byte[] lmResponse = new byte[24]; System.arraycopy(lowResponse, 0, lmResponse, 0, 8); System.arraycopy(middleResponse, 0, lmResponse, 8, 8); System.arraycopy(highResponse, 0, lmResponse, 16, 8); return lmResponse; } /** * Creates the LMv2 Response from the given hash, client data, and * Type 2 challenge. * * @param hash The NTLMv2 Hash. * @param clientData The client data (blob or client nonce). * @param challenge The server challenge from the Type 2 message. * * @return The response (either NTLMv2 or LMv2, depending on the * client data). */ private static byte[] lmv2Response(byte[] hash, byte[] clientData, byte[] challenge) throws Exception { byte[] data = new byte[challenge.length + clientData.length]; System.arraycopy(challenge, 0, data, 0, challenge.length); System.arraycopy(clientData, 0, data, challenge.length, clientData.length); byte[] mac = hmacMD5(data, hash); byte[] lmv2Response = new byte[mac.length + clientData.length]; System.arraycopy(mac, 0, lmv2Response, 0, mac.length); System.arraycopy(clientData, 0, lmv2Response, mac.length, clientData.length); return lmv2Response; } /** * Creates the NTLMv2 blob from the given target information block and * client nonce. * * @param targetInformation The target information block from the Type 2 * message. * @param clientNonce The random 8-byte client nonce. * * @return The blob, used in the calculation of the NTLMv2 Response. */ private static byte[] createBlob(byte[] targetInformation, byte[] clientNonce) { byte[] blobSignature = new byte[] { (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0x01, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00 }; byte[] reserved = new byte[] { (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00 }; byte[] unknown1 = new byte[] { (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00 }; byte[] unknown2 = new byte[] { (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00, (byte) 0x00 }; long time = System.currentTimeMillis(); time += 11644473600000l; // milliseconds from January 1, 1601 -> epoch. time *= 10000; // tenths of a microsecond. // convert to little-endian byte array. byte[] timestamp = new byte[8]; for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { timestamp[i] = (byte) time; time >>>= 8; } byte[] blob = new byte[blobSignature.length + reserved.length + timestamp.length + clientNonce.length + unknown1.length + targetInformation.length + unknown2.length]; int offset = 0; System.arraycopy(blobSignature, 0, blob, offset, blobSignature.length); offset += blobSignature.length; System.arraycopy(reserved, 0, blob, offset, reserved.length); offset += reserved.length; System.arraycopy(timestamp, 0, blob, offset, timestamp.length); offset += timestamp.length; System.arraycopy(clientNonce, 0, blob, offset, clientNonce.length); offset += clientNonce.length; System.arraycopy(unknown1, 0, blob, offset, unknown1.length); offset += unknown1.length; System.arraycopy(targetInformation, 0, blob, offset, targetInformation.length); offset += targetInformation.length; System.arraycopy(unknown2, 0, blob, offset, unknown2.length); return blob; } /** * Calculates the HMAC-MD5 hash of the given data using the specified * hashing key. * * @param data The data for which the hash will be calculated. * @param key The hashing key. * * @return The HMAC-MD5 hash of the given data. */ private static byte[] hmacMD5(byte[] data, byte[] key) throws Exception { byte[] ipad = new byte[64]; byte[] opad = new byte[64]; for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++) { ipad[i] = (byte) 0x36; opad[i] = (byte) 0x5c; } for (int i = key.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) { ipad[i] ^= key[i]; opad[i] ^= key[i]; } byte[] content = new byte[data.length + 64]; System.arraycopy(ipad, 0, content, 0, 64); System.arraycopy(data, 0, content, 64, data.length); MessageDigest md5 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5"); data = md5.digest(content); content = new byte[data.length + 64]; System.arraycopy(opad, 0, content, 0, 64); System.arraycopy(data, 0, content, 64, data.length); return md5.digest(content); } /** * Creates a DES encryption key from the given key material. * * @param bytes A byte array containing the DES key material. * @param offset The offset in the given byte array at which * the 7-byte key material starts. * * @return A DES encryption key created from the key material * starting at the specified offset in the given byte array. */ private static Key createDESKey(byte[] bytes, int offset) { byte[] keyBytes = new byte[7]; System.arraycopy(bytes, offset, keyBytes, 0, 7); byte[] material = new byte[8]; material[0] = keyBytes[0]; material[1] = (byte) (keyBytes[0] << 7 | (keyBytes[1] & 0xff) >>> 1); material[2] = (byte) (keyBytes[1] << 6 | (keyBytes[2] & 0xff) >>> 2); material[3] = (byte) (keyBytes[2] << 5 | (keyBytes[3] & 0xff) >>> 3); material[4] = (byte) (keyBytes[3] << 4 | (keyBytes[4] & 0xff) >>> 4); material[5] = (byte) (keyBytes[4] << 3 | (keyBytes[5] & 0xff) >>> 5); material[6] = (byte) (keyBytes[5] << 2 | (keyBytes[6] & 0xff) >>> 6); material[7] = (byte) (keyBytes[6] << 1); oddParity(material); return new SecretKeySpec(material, "DES"); } /** * Applies odd parity to the given byte array. * * @param bytes The data whose parity bits are to be adjusted for * odd parity. */ private static void oddParity(byte[] bytes) { for (int i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) { byte b = bytes[i]; boolean needsParity = (((b >>> 7) ^ (b >>> 6) ^ (b >>> 5) ^ (b >>> 4) ^ (b >>> 3) ^ (b >>> 2) ^ (b >>> 1)) & 0x01) == 0; if (needsParity) { bytes[i] |= (byte) 0x01; } else { bytes[i] &= (byte) 0xfe; } } } }
Appendix C: Sample NTLMSSP Operation Decompositions
This section contains detailed analysis and decomposition of various authentication and signing/sealing operations. This is by no means a comprehensive catalog of possible scenarios, but does include some of the more interesting variants. These were produced by calling the InitializeSecurityContext and AcceptSecurityContext SSPI functions between two peers, and applying subtle manipulations to the resulting NTLM messages. After the context was established, the ExportSecurityContext function was called to dump the contents of the context to a file, for use in subsequent offline analysis. Additionally, the MakeSignature and EncryptMessage functions were used to perform signing and sealing, respectively.
NTLMv1 Authentication; NTLM1 Signing and Sealing Using the NTLM User Session Key
Demonstration of NTLMv1 authentication with NTLM User Session Key NTLM1 signing and sealing (without key exchange).
LMCompatibilityLevel set to 0 (LM/NTLM).
AcquireCredentialsHandle called with domain "TESTNT", user "test", password
"test1234".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called with ISC_REQ_INTEGRITY and
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY. Following flags were masked off of resulting Type 1
message:
Negotiate Lan Manager Key (0x00000080)
Negotiate NTLM2 Key (0x00080000)
Negotiate 128 (0x20000000)
Negotiate Key Exchange (0x40000000)
Negotiate 56 (0x80000000)
4e544c4d53535000010000003782000000000000000000000000000000000000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
01000000 Type 1 message
37820000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Negotiate OEM (0x00000002)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
0000000000000000 Supplied Domain header (empty, supplied credentials)
0000000000000000 Supplied Workstation header (empty, supplied credentials)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called with ASC_REQ_INTEGRITY and ASC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY.
Produces Type 2 message:
4e544c4d53535000020000000c000c003000000035828100b019d38bad875c9d
0000000000000000460046003c00000054004500530054004e00540002000c00
54004500530054004e00540001000c004d0045004d0042004500520003001e00
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d000000
0000
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
02000000 Type 2 message
0c000c0030000000 Target Name header (length 12, offset 48)
35828100 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Target Type Domain (0x00010000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
b019d38bad875c9d Challenge
0000000000000000 Context
460046003c000000 Target Information header (length 70, length 60)
54004500530054004e005400 Target Name ("TESTNT")
Target Information block:
02000c00 NetBIOS Domain Name (length 12)
54004500530054004e005400 "TESTNT"
01000c00 NetBIOS Server Name (length 12)
4d0045004d00420045005200 "MEMBER"
03001e00 DNS Server Name (length 30)
6d0065006d006200650072002e0074006500730074002e0063006f006d00
"member.test.com"
00000000 Target Information Terminator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
InitializeSecurityContext called. Produces a Type 3 message:
4e544c4d5353500003000000180018006000000018001800780000000c000c00
40000000080008004c0000000c000c0054000000000000009000000035828000
54004500530054004e00540074006500730074004d0045004d00420045005200
1879f60127f8a877022132ec221bcbf3ca016a9f76095606e6285df3287c5d19
4f84df1a94817c7282d09754b6f9e02a
4e544c4d53535000 "NTLMSSP"
03000000 Type 3 message
1800180060000000 LM/LMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 96)
1800180078000000 NTLM/NTLMv2 Response header (length 24, offset 120)
0c000c0040000000 Domain Name header (length 12, offset 64)
080008004c000000 User Name header (length 8, offset 76)
0c000c0054000000 Workstation Name header (length 12, offset 84)
0000000090000000 Session Key header (empty)
35828000 Flags
Negotiate Unicode (0x00000001)
Request Target (0x00000004)
Negotiate Sign (0x00000010)
Negotiate Seal (0x00000020)
Negotiate NTLM (0x00000200)
Negotiate Always Sign (0x00008000)
Negotiate Target Info (0x00800000)
54004500530054004e005400 Domain Name ("TESTNT")
7400650073007400 User Name ("test")
4d0045004d00420045005200 Workstation Name ("MEMBER")
1879f60127f8a877022132ec221bcbf3ca016a9f76095606 LM/LMv2 Response
e6285df3287c5d194f84df1a94817c7282d09754b6f9e02a NTLM/NTLMv2 Response
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AcceptSecurityContext called to complete the server-side context.
Server Context Export:
40a42e7840a42e7800000000000000000000000000000000
08ee0b00 server context handle dwUpper
35828101 flags
0000000000000000e8290900e8290900682a0900682a09000000000000000000
d002000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200000000000000
ffffffffffffff7f20010000
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c outbound signing key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c inbound verifying key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c outbound encrypting key
ae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c inbound decrypting key
000000000000000000000000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ae3787b72ff94884680d3e5658c064df9d9e5d8f0655f22a002ebc7e9f944e29
08cf90e0057f622d31a92b7d0ca6f586d5d36e24af70cdbe52ea49d067aa4ffa
e85a5cb1a41e3241a288f8de8a4c8909593cc698b657750af014b26f13778eee
855310d716f61ce5c795a0a3bbac358bb02611c954a54b2791d6e297f1fd8c6d
18fffc190b9c69b80122f7c8fb036146c2b581443960fe239b967b17e33de15b
73e445401f1db3a8c5ad51f48d665e38796b8263b9ca363f763aef71d1ec12d8
a76cb46a333b0fddab7850ba3493dcd4077299d22515eb5f300221e9e79a80d9
1a1b4d2865e6ccc3470eda7c4ace04bfbddbedc1cb207483f343c4a1422c7a92
0000000000000000
54004500530054004e0054005c007400650073007400 "TESTNT/test"
ntlmHash = md4(password) = 0x3b1b47e42e0463276e3ded6cef349f93
NTLMUserSessionKey = md4(ntlmHash) = 0xae33a32dca8c9821844f740d5b3f4d6c
Key is *not* weakened (NTLM1 only weakens Lan Manager Session Keys).
Called MakeSignature on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields signature:
0100000090010700087de41e039ae5c5
CRC32(0x0102030405060708) = 0xc588ca3f
Sequence number is 0.
0x00000000 + crc32 + seqnum = 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000
RC4(key, 0x00000000c588ca3f00000000) = 0x20961389087de41e039ae5c5
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten with counter value (0x90010700 here):
0100000090010700087de41e039ae5c5 = signature
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Called EncryptMessage twice on the server-side context for message
"0x0102030405060708".
Yields encrypted messages:
3ec555aea59eb55001000000a0030700f64393466a9317f7
1caf3c9a114ca2f4010000008803070095c1958123ecafce
same RC4 cipher is used from previous signing operation (i.e., not reset):
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x3ec555aea59eb550
trailer buffer gets signature; again uses same RC4 cipher
(sequence number is now 1 because of previous signing):
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f01000000) = 0x8e8adf2bf64393466a9317f7
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0xa0030700):
01000000a0030700f64393466a9317f7 = trailer signature
second message is same:
RC4(0x0102030405060708) = sealed message = 0x1caf3c9a114ca2f4
trailer buffer signature with sequence 2:
RC4(0x00000000c588ca3f02000000) = 0xf23fc1e495c1958123ecafce
version num + first 4 bytes overwritten w/counter (0x88030700)
010000008803070095c1958123ecafce = trailer signature
10万+
被折叠的 条评论
为什么被折叠?
到【灌水乐园】发言
