INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standards Track OpenLDAP Foundation
Expires September 2005 18 March 2005
Updates: RFC 2595
The PLAIN SASL Mechanism
<draft-ietf-sasl-plain-08.txt>
Status of Memo
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standards Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF SASL mailing list
<ietf-sasl@imc.org>. Please send editorial comments directly to the
document editor <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section
4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been
disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will
be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document
for more information.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-sasl-plain-08.txt 18 March 2005
Abstract
This document defines a simple clear-text user/password Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanism called the PLAIN
mechanism. The PLAIN mechanism is intended to be used, in combination
with data confidentiality services provided by a lower layer, in
protocols which lack a simple password authentication command.
1. Background and Intended Usage
Clear-text passwords are simple, interoperate with almost all existing
operating system authentication databases, and are useful for a smooth
transition to a more secure password-based authentication mechanism.
The drawback is that they are unacceptable for use over an unencrypted
network connection.
This document defines the PLAIN Simple Authentication and Security
Layer ([SASL]) mechanism for use in protocols with no clear-text login
command (e.g., [ACAP] or [SMTP-AUTH]). This document updates RFC
2595, replacing Section 6. Changes since RFC 2595 are detailed in
Appendix A.
The name associated with this mechanism is "PLAIN".
The PLAIN SASL mechanism does not provide a security layer.
The PLAIN mechanism should not be used without adequate data security
protection as this mechanism affords no integrity nor confidentiality
protections itself. The mechanism is intended to be used with data
security protections provided by application layer protocol, generally
through its use of Transport Layer Security ([TLS]) services.
By default, implementations SHOULD advertise and make use of the PLAIN
mechanism only when adequate data security services are in place.
Specifications for IETF protocols which indicate that this mechanism
is an applicable authentication mechanism MUST mandate that
implementations support an strong data security service, such as TLS.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [Keywords].
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 2]
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2. PLAIN SASL mechanism
The mechanism consists of a single message, a string of [UTF-8]
encoded [Unicode] characters, from the client to the server. The
client presents the authorization identity (identity to act as),
followed by a NULL (U+0000) character, followed by the authentication
identity (identity whose password will be used), followed by a NULL
(U+0000) character, followed by the clear-text password. As with
other SASL mechanisms, the client does not provide an authorization
identity when it wishes the server to derive an identity from the
credentials and use that as the authorization identity.
The formal grammar for the client message using Augmented BNF [ABNF]
follows.
message = [authzid] UTF8NULL authcid UTF8NULL passwd
authcid = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
authzid = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
passwd = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
UTF8NULL = %x00 ; UTF-8 encoded NULL character
SAFE = UTF1 / UTF2 / UTF3 / UTF4
;; any UTF-8 encoded Unicode character except NULL
UTF1 = %x01-7F ;; except NULL
UTF2 = %xC2-DF UTF0
UTF3 = %xE0 %xA0-BF UTF0 / %xE1-EC 2(UTF0) /
%xED %x80-9F UTF0 / %xEE-EF 2(UTF0)
UTF4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2(UTF0) / %xF1-F3 3(UTF0) /
%xF4 %x80-8F 2(UTF0)
UTF0 = %x80-BF
The authorization identity (authzid), authentication identity
(authcid), password (passwd), and NULL character deliminators SHALL be
transferred as [UTF-8] encoded strings of [Unicode] characters. As
the NULL (U+0000) character is used as a deliminator, the NULL
(U+0000) character MUST NOT appear in authzid, authcid, or passwd
productions.
The form of the authzid production is specific to the
application-level protocol's SASL profile [SASL]. The authcid and
passwd productions are form-free. Use of non-visible characters or
characters which a user may be unable to enter on some keyboards is
discouraged.
Servers MUST be capable of accepting authzid, authcid, and passwd
productions up to and including 255 octets. It is noted that the
UTF-8 encoding of a Unicode character may be as long as 4 octets.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-sasl-plain-08.txt 18 March 2005
Upon receipt of the message, the server will verify the presented (in
the message) authentication identity (authcid) and password (passwd)
with the system authentication database, and verify the authentication
credentials permit the client to act as the (presented or derived)
authorization identity. If both steps succeed, the user is
authenticated.
The presented authentication identity and password strings, as well as
the database authentication identity and password strings, are to be
prepared before being used in the verification process. The
[SASLPrep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm is the RECOMMENDED
preparation algorithm. The SASLprep preparation algorithm is
recommended to improve the likelihood that comparisons behave in an
expected manner. The SASLprep preparation algorithm is not mandatory
to allow, when appropriate, the server to employ other preparation
algorithms (including none). For instance, use of different
preparation algorithm may be necessary for the server to interoperate
with an external system.
When preparing the presented strings using [SASLPrep], the presented
strings are to be treated as "query" strings [Section 7, Stringprep]
and hence unassigned code points are allowed appear in their prepared
output. When preparing the database strings using [SASLprep], the
database strings are to be treated as "stored" strings [Section 7,
Stringprep] and hence unassigned code points are prohibited from
appearing in their prepared output.
Regardless of the preparation algorithm used, if the output of a non-
invertible function (e.g., hash) of the expected string is stored, the
string MUST be prepared before input to that function.
Regardless of the preparation algorithm used, if preparation fails or
results in an empty string, verification SHALL fail.
When no authorization identity is provided, the server derives an
authorization identity from the prepared representation of the
provided authentication identity string. This ensures that the
derivation of different representations of the authentication identity
produce the same authorization identity.
The server MAY use the credentials to initialize any new
authentication database, such as one suitable for [CRAM-MD5] or
[DIGEST-MD5].
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 4]
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4. Pseudo-Code
This section provides pseudo-code illustrating the verification
process (using hashed passwords and the SASLprep preparation function)
discussed above. This section is not definitive.
boolean Verify(string authzid, string authcid, string passwd) {
string pAuthcid = SASLprep(authcid, true); # prepare authcid
string pPasswd = SASLprep(passwd, true); # prepare passwd
if (pAuthcid == NULL || pPasswd == NULL) {
return false; # preparation failed
}
if (pAuthcid == "" || pPasswd == "") {
return false; # empty prepared string
}
storedHash = FetchPasswordHash(pAuthcid);
if (storedHash == NULL || storedHash == "") {
return false; # error or unknown authcid
}
if (!Compare(storedHash, Hash(pPasswd))) {
return false; # incorrect password
}
if (authzid == NULL ) {
authzid = DeriveAuthzid(pAuthcid);
if (authzid == NULL || authzid == "") {
return false; # could not derive authzid
}
}
if (!Authorize(pAuthcid, authzid)) {
return false; # not authorized
}
return true;
}
The second parameter of the SASLprep function, when true, indicates
that unassigned code points are allowed in the input. When the
SASLprep function is called to prepare the password prior to computing
the stored hash, the second parameter would be false.
The second parameter provided to the Authorize function is not
prepared by this code. The application-level SASL profile should be
consulted to determine what, if any, preparation is necessary.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 5]
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It is noted that the DerivateAuthzid and Authorize functions (whether
implemented as one function or two, whether designed in a manner in
which these functions or the mechanism implementation can be reused
elsewhere) require knowledge and understanding of mechanism and the
application-level protocol specification and/or implementation details
to implement.
It is also noted that the Authorize function outcome is clearly
dependent on details of the local authorization model and policy.
Both functions may be dependent on other factors as well.
5. Examples
This section provides examples of PLAIN authentication exchanges. The
examples are intended to help the readers understand the above text.
The examples are not definitive.
"C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server
respectively. "<NULL>" represents a single NULL (U+0000) character.
The Application Configuration Access Protocol ([ACAP]) is used in the
examples.
The first example shows how the PLAIN mechanism might be used for user
authentication.
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5") (STARTTLS)
C: a001 STARTTLS
S: a001 OK "Begin TLS negotiation now"
<TLS negotiation, further commands are under TLS layer>
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5" "PLAIN")
C: a002 AUTHENTICATE "PLAIN"
S: + ""
C: {21}
C: <NULL>tim<NULL>tanstaaftanstaaf
S: a002 OK "Authenticated"
The second example shows how the PLAIN mechanism might be used to
assume the identity of another user. In this example, the server
rejects the request. Also, this example makes use of the protocol
optional initial response capability to eliminate a round-trip.
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5") (STARTTLS)
C: a001 STARTTLS
S: a001 OK "Begin TLS negotiation now"
<TLS negotiation, further commands are under TLS layer>
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5" "PLAIN")
C: a002 AUTHENTICATE "PLAIN" {20+}
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-sasl-plain-08.txt 18 March 2005
C: Ursel<NULL>Kurt<NULL>xipj3plmq
S: a002 NO "Not authorized to assume asserted identity"
6. Security Considerations
As the PLAIN mechanism itself provided no integrity nor
confidentiality protections, it should not be used without adequate
external data security protection, such as TLS services provided by
many application layer protocols. By default, implementations SHOULD
NOT advertise and SHOULD NOT make use of the PLAIN mechanism unless
adequate data security services are in place.
When the PLAIN mechanism is used, the server gains the ability to
impersonate the user to all services with the same password regardless
of any encryption provided by TLS or other network privacy mechanisms.
While many other authentication mechanisms have similar weaknesses,
stronger SASL mechanisms address this issue. Clients are encouraged
to have an operational mode where all mechanisms which are likely to
reveal the user's password to the server are disabled.
General SASL security considerations apply to this mechanism.
"stringprep" and Unicode [StringPrep] security considerations also
apply, as do [UTF-8] security considerations.
7. IANA Considerations
It is requested that the SASL Mechanism registry [IANA-SASL] entry for
the PLAIN mechanism be updated to reflect that this document now
provides its technical specification.
To: iana@iana.org
Subject: Updated Registration of SASL mechanism PLAIN
SASL mechanism name: PLAIN
Security considerations: See RFC XXXX.
Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@openldap.org>
IETF SASL WG <ietf-sasl@imc.org>
Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Note: Updates existing entry for PLAIN
8. Acknowledgment
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 7]
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This document is a revision of RFC 2595 by Chris Newman. Portions of
the grammar defined in Section 2 were borrowed from [UTF-8] by
Francois Yergeau.
This document is a product of the IETF SASL WG.
9. Normative References
[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[Keywords] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
[SASL] Melnikov, A. (Editor), "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)",
draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User
Names and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
[StringPrep] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", RFC 3454,
December 2002.
[Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0"
(Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5),
as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode
3.1" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the
"Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2"
(http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
[UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and, E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in
progress.
10. Informative References
[ACAP] Newman, C. and J. Myers, "ACAP -- Application
Configuration Access Protocol", RFC 2244, November 1997.
[CRAM-MD5] Nerenberg, L., "The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism",
draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-xx.txt, a work in progress.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 8]
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[DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P., C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest
Authentication as a SASL Mechanism",
draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[IANA-SASL] IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
MECHANISMS",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms>.
[SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
RFC 2554, March 1999.
11. Editor's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org
Appendix A. Changes since RFC 2595
This appendix is non-normative.
This document replaces Section 6 of RFC 2595.
The specification details how the server is to compare client-provided
character strings with stored character strings.
The ABNF grammar was updated. In particular, the grammar now allows
LINE FEED (U+000A) and CARRIAGE RETURN (U+000D) characters in the
authzid, authcid, passwd productions. However, whether these control
characters may be used depends on the string preparation rules
applicable to the production. For passwd and authcid productions,
control characters are prohibited. For authzid, one must consult the
application-level SASL profile.
Pseudo-code was added.
The example section was expanded to illustrate more features of the
PLAIN mechanism.
Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 9]
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Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found
in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification
can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Full Copyright
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 10]
Intended Category: Standards Track OpenLDAP Foundation
Expires September 2005 18 March 2005
Updates: RFC 2595
The PLAIN SASL Mechanism
<draft-ietf-sasl-plain-08.txt>
Status of Memo
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standards Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF SASL mailing list
<ietf-sasl@imc.org>. Please send editorial comments directly to the
document editor <Kurt@OpenLDAP.org>.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section
4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been
disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will
be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material
or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document
for more information.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 1]
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Abstract
This document defines a simple clear-text user/password Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) mechanism called the PLAIN
mechanism. The PLAIN mechanism is intended to be used, in combination
with data confidentiality services provided by a lower layer, in
protocols which lack a simple password authentication command.
1. Background and Intended Usage
Clear-text passwords are simple, interoperate with almost all existing
operating system authentication databases, and are useful for a smooth
transition to a more secure password-based authentication mechanism.
The drawback is that they are unacceptable for use over an unencrypted
network connection.
This document defines the PLAIN Simple Authentication and Security
Layer ([SASL]) mechanism for use in protocols with no clear-text login
command (e.g., [ACAP] or [SMTP-AUTH]). This document updates RFC
2595, replacing Section 6. Changes since RFC 2595 are detailed in
Appendix A.
The name associated with this mechanism is "PLAIN".
The PLAIN SASL mechanism does not provide a security layer.
The PLAIN mechanism should not be used without adequate data security
protection as this mechanism affords no integrity nor confidentiality
protections itself. The mechanism is intended to be used with data
security protections provided by application layer protocol, generally
through its use of Transport Layer Security ([TLS]) services.
By default, implementations SHOULD advertise and make use of the PLAIN
mechanism only when adequate data security services are in place.
Specifications for IETF protocols which indicate that this mechanism
is an applicable authentication mechanism MUST mandate that
implementations support an strong data security service, such as TLS.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [Keywords].
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 2]
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2. PLAIN SASL mechanism
The mechanism consists of a single message, a string of [UTF-8]
encoded [Unicode] characters, from the client to the server. The
client presents the authorization identity (identity to act as),
followed by a NULL (U+0000) character, followed by the authentication
identity (identity whose password will be used), followed by a NULL
(U+0000) character, followed by the clear-text password. As with
other SASL mechanisms, the client does not provide an authorization
identity when it wishes the server to derive an identity from the
credentials and use that as the authorization identity.
The formal grammar for the client message using Augmented BNF [ABNF]
follows.
message = [authzid] UTF8NULL authcid UTF8NULL passwd
authcid = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
authzid = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
passwd = 1*SAFE ; MUST accept up to 255 octets
UTF8NULL = %x00 ; UTF-8 encoded NULL character
SAFE = UTF1 / UTF2 / UTF3 / UTF4
;; any UTF-8 encoded Unicode character except NULL
UTF1 = %x01-7F ;; except NULL
UTF2 = %xC2-DF UTF0
UTF3 = %xE0 %xA0-BF UTF0 / %xE1-EC 2(UTF0) /
%xED %x80-9F UTF0 / %xEE-EF 2(UTF0)
UTF4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2(UTF0) / %xF1-F3 3(UTF0) /
%xF4 %x80-8F 2(UTF0)
UTF0 = %x80-BF
The authorization identity (authzid), authentication identity
(authcid), password (passwd), and NULL character deliminators SHALL be
transferred as [UTF-8] encoded strings of [Unicode] characters. As
the NULL (U+0000) character is used as a deliminator, the NULL
(U+0000) character MUST NOT appear in authzid, authcid, or passwd
productions.
The form of the authzid production is specific to the
application-level protocol's SASL profile [SASL]. The authcid and
passwd productions are form-free. Use of non-visible characters or
characters which a user may be unable to enter on some keyboards is
discouraged.
Servers MUST be capable of accepting authzid, authcid, and passwd
productions up to and including 255 octets. It is noted that the
UTF-8 encoding of a Unicode character may be as long as 4 octets.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 3]
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Upon receipt of the message, the server will verify the presented (in
the message) authentication identity (authcid) and password (passwd)
with the system authentication database, and verify the authentication
credentials permit the client to act as the (presented or derived)
authorization identity. If both steps succeed, the user is
authenticated.
The presented authentication identity and password strings, as well as
the database authentication identity and password strings, are to be
prepared before being used in the verification process. The
[SASLPrep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm is the RECOMMENDED
preparation algorithm. The SASLprep preparation algorithm is
recommended to improve the likelihood that comparisons behave in an
expected manner. The SASLprep preparation algorithm is not mandatory
to allow, when appropriate, the server to employ other preparation
algorithms (including none). For instance, use of different
preparation algorithm may be necessary for the server to interoperate
with an external system.
When preparing the presented strings using [SASLPrep], the presented
strings are to be treated as "query" strings [Section 7, Stringprep]
and hence unassigned code points are allowed appear in their prepared
output. When preparing the database strings using [SASLprep], the
database strings are to be treated as "stored" strings [Section 7,
Stringprep] and hence unassigned code points are prohibited from
appearing in their prepared output.
Regardless of the preparation algorithm used, if the output of a non-
invertible function (e.g., hash) of the expected string is stored, the
string MUST be prepared before input to that function.
Regardless of the preparation algorithm used, if preparation fails or
results in an empty string, verification SHALL fail.
When no authorization identity is provided, the server derives an
authorization identity from the prepared representation of the
provided authentication identity string. This ensures that the
derivation of different representations of the authentication identity
produce the same authorization identity.
The server MAY use the credentials to initialize any new
authentication database, such as one suitable for [CRAM-MD5] or
[DIGEST-MD5].
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 4]
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4. Pseudo-Code
This section provides pseudo-code illustrating the verification
process (using hashed passwords and the SASLprep preparation function)
discussed above. This section is not definitive.
boolean Verify(string authzid, string authcid, string passwd) {
string pAuthcid = SASLprep(authcid, true); # prepare authcid
string pPasswd = SASLprep(passwd, true); # prepare passwd
if (pAuthcid == NULL || pPasswd == NULL) {
return false; # preparation failed
}
if (pAuthcid == "" || pPasswd == "") {
return false; # empty prepared string
}
storedHash = FetchPasswordHash(pAuthcid);
if (storedHash == NULL || storedHash == "") {
return false; # error or unknown authcid
}
if (!Compare(storedHash, Hash(pPasswd))) {
return false; # incorrect password
}
if (authzid == NULL ) {
authzid = DeriveAuthzid(pAuthcid);
if (authzid == NULL || authzid == "") {
return false; # could not derive authzid
}
}
if (!Authorize(pAuthcid, authzid)) {
return false; # not authorized
}
return true;
}
The second parameter of the SASLprep function, when true, indicates
that unassigned code points are allowed in the input. When the
SASLprep function is called to prepare the password prior to computing
the stored hash, the second parameter would be false.
The second parameter provided to the Authorize function is not
prepared by this code. The application-level SASL profile should be
consulted to determine what, if any, preparation is necessary.
Zeilenga The SASL PLAIN Mechanism [Page 5]
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It is noted that the DerivateAuthzid and Authorize functions (whether
implemented as one function or two, whether designed in a manner in
which these functions or the mechanism implementation can be reused
elsewhere) require knowledge and understanding of mechanism and the
application-level protocol specification and/or implementation details
to implement.
It is also noted that the Authorize function outcome is clearly
dependent on details of the local authorization model and policy.
Both functions may be dependent on other factors as well.
5. Examples
This section provides examples of PLAIN authentication exchanges. The
examples are intended to help the readers understand the above text.
The examples are not definitive.
"C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and server
respectively. "<NULL>" represents a single NULL (U+0000) character.
The Application Configuration Access Protocol ([ACAP]) is used in the
examples.
The first example shows how the PLAIN mechanism might be used for user
authentication.
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5") (STARTTLS)
C: a001 STARTTLS
S: a001 OK "Begin TLS negotiation now"
<TLS negotiation, further commands are under TLS layer>
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5" "PLAIN")
C: a002 AUTHENTICATE "PLAIN"
S: + ""
C: {21}
C: <NULL>tim<NULL>tanstaaftanstaaf
S: a002 OK "Authenticated"
The second example shows how the PLAIN mechanism might be used to
assume the identity of another user. In this example, the server
rejects the request. Also, this example makes use of the protocol
optional initial response capability to eliminate a round-trip.
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5") (STARTTLS)
C: a001 STARTTLS
S: a001 OK "Begin TLS negotiation now"
<TLS negotiation, further commands are under TLS layer>
S: * ACAP (SASL "CRAM-MD5" "PLAIN")
C: a002 AUTHENTICATE "PLAIN" {20+}
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C: Ursel<NULL>Kurt<NULL>xipj3plmq
S: a002 NO "Not authorized to assume asserted identity"
6. Security Considerations
As the PLAIN mechanism itself provided no integrity nor
confidentiality protections, it should not be used without adequate
external data security protection, such as TLS services provided by
many application layer protocols. By default, implementations SHOULD
NOT advertise and SHOULD NOT make use of the PLAIN mechanism unless
adequate data security services are in place.
When the PLAIN mechanism is used, the server gains the ability to
impersonate the user to all services with the same password regardless
of any encryption provided by TLS or other network privacy mechanisms.
While many other authentication mechanisms have similar weaknesses,
stronger SASL mechanisms address this issue. Clients are encouraged
to have an operational mode where all mechanisms which are likely to
reveal the user's password to the server are disabled.
General SASL security considerations apply to this mechanism.
"stringprep" and Unicode [StringPrep] security considerations also
apply, as do [UTF-8] security considerations.
7. IANA Considerations
It is requested that the SASL Mechanism registry [IANA-SASL] entry for
the PLAIN mechanism be updated to reflect that this document now
provides its technical specification.
To: iana@iana.org
Subject: Updated Registration of SASL mechanism PLAIN
SASL mechanism name: PLAIN
Security considerations: See RFC XXXX.
Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@openldap.org>
IETF SASL WG <ietf-sasl@imc.org>
Intended usage: COMMON
Author/Change controller: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Note: Updates existing entry for PLAIN
8. Acknowledgment
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This document is a revision of RFC 2595 by Chris Newman. Portions of
the grammar defined in Section 2 were borrowed from [UTF-8] by
Francois Yergeau.
This document is a product of the IETF SASL WG.
9. Normative References
[ABNF] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[Keywords] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
[SASL] Melnikov, A. (Editor), "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)",
draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User
Names and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
[StringPrep] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", RFC 3454,
December 2002.
[Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0"
(Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5),
as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode
3.1" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the
"Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2"
(http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
[UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and, E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version
1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in
progress.
10. Informative References
[ACAP] Newman, C. and J. Myers, "ACAP -- Application
Configuration Access Protocol", RFC 2244, November 1997.
[CRAM-MD5] Nerenberg, L., "The CRAM-MD5 SASL Mechanism",
draft-ietf-sasl-crammd5-xx.txt, a work in progress.
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[DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P., C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest
Authentication as a SASL Mechanism",
draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[IANA-SASL] IANA, "SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION AND SECURITY LAYER (SASL)
MECHANISMS",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/sasl-mechanisms>.
[SMTP-AUTH] Myers, J., "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication",
RFC 2554, March 1999.
11. Editor's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org
Appendix A. Changes since RFC 2595
This appendix is non-normative.
This document replaces Section 6 of RFC 2595.
The specification details how the server is to compare client-provided
character strings with stored character strings.
The ABNF grammar was updated. In particular, the grammar now allows
LINE FEED (U+000A) and CARRIAGE RETURN (U+000D) characters in the
authzid, authcid, passwd productions. However, whether these control
characters may be used depends on the string preparation rules
applicable to the production. For passwd and authcid productions,
control characters are prohibited. For authzid, one must consult the
application-level SASL profile.
Pseudo-code was added.
The example section was expanded to illustrate more features of the
PLAIN mechanism.
Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Full Copyright
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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