HMAC

介绍文档及C实现

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt

 

	Network Working Group H. Krawczyk
	Request for Comments: 2104 IBM
	Category: Informational M. Bellare
	UCSD
	R. Canetti
	IBM
	February 1997
	HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
	Status of This Memo
	This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
	does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
	this memo is unlimited.
	Abstract
	This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication
	using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any
	iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in
	combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of
	HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function.
	1. Introduction
	Providing a way to check the integrity of information transmitted
	over or stored in an unreliable medium is a prime necessity in the
	world of open computing and communications. Mechanisms that provide
	such integrity check based on a secret key are usually called
	"message authentication codes" (MAC). Typically, message
	authentication codes are used between two parties that share a secret
	key in order to validate information transmitted between these
	parties. In this document we present such a MAC mechanism based on
	cryptographic hash functions. This mechanism, called HMAC, is based
	on work by the authors [BCK1] where the construction is presented and
	cryptographically analyzed. We refer to that work for the details on
	the rationale and security analysis of HMAC, and its comparison to
	other keyed-hash methods.
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	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	HMAC can be used in combination with any iterated cryptographic hash
	function. MD5 and SHA-1 are examples of such hash functions. HMAC
	also uses a secret key for calculation and verification of the
	message authentication values. The main goals behind this
	construction are
	* To use, without modifications, available hash functions.
	In particular, hash functions that perform well in software,
	and for which code is freely and widely available.
	* To preserve the original performance of the hash function without
	incurring a significant degradation.
	* To use and handle keys in a simple way.
	* To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of
	the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumptions on the
	underlying hash function.
	* To allow for easy replaceability of the underlying hash function in
	case that faster or more secure hash functions are found or
	required.
	This document specifies HMAC using a generic cryptographic hash
	function (denoted by H). Specific instantiations of HMAC need to
	define a particular hash function. Current candidates for such hash
	functions include SHA-1 [SHA], MD5 [MD5], RIPEMD-128/160 [RIPEMD].
	These different realizations of HMAC will be denoted by HMAC-SHA1,
	HMAC-MD5, HMAC-RIPEMD, etc.
	Note: To the date of writing of this document MD5 and SHA-1 are the
	most widely used cryptographic hash functions. MD5 has been recently
	shown to be vulnerable to collision search attacks [Dobb]. This
	attack and other currently known weaknesses of MD5 do not compromise
	the use of MD5 within HMAC as specified in this document (see
	[Dobb]); however, SHA-1 appears to be a cryptographically stronger
	function. To this date, MD5 can be considered for use in HMAC for
	applications where the superior performance of MD5 is critical. In
	any case, implementers and users need to be aware of possible
	cryptanalytic developments regarding any of these cryptographic hash
	functions, and the eventual need to replace the underlying hash
	function. (See section 6 for more information on the security of
	HMAC.)
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	2. Definition of HMAC
	The definition of HMAC requires a cryptographic hash function, which
	we denote by H, and a secret key K. We assume H to be a cryptographic
	hash function where data is hashed by iterating a basic compression
	function on blocks of data. We denote by B the byte-length of such
	blocks (B=64 for all the above mentioned examples of hash functions),
	and by L the byte-length of hash outputs (L=16 for MD5, L=20 for
	SHA-1). The authentication key K can be of any length up to B, the
	block length of the hash function. Applications that use keys longer
	than B bytes will first hash the key using H and then use the
	resultant L byte string as the actual key to HMAC. In any case the
	minimal recommended length for K is L bytes (as the hash output
	length). See section 3 for more information on keys.
	We define two fixed and different strings ipad and opad as follows
	(the 'i' and 'o' are mnemonics for inner and outer):
	ipad = the byte 0x36 repeated B times
	opad = the byte 0x5C repeated B times.
	To compute HMAC over the data `text' we perform
	H(K XOR opad, H(K XOR ipad, text))
	Namely,
	(1) append zeros to the end of K to create a B byte string
	(e.g., if K is of length 20 bytes and B=64, then K will be
	appended with 44 zero bytes 0x00)
	(2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in step
	(1) with ipad
	(3) append the stream of data 'text' to the B byte string resulting
	from step (2)
	(4) apply H to the stream generated in step (3)
	(5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the B byte string computed in
	step (1) with opad
	(6) append the H result from step (4) to the B byte string
	resulting from step (5)
	(7) apply H to the stream generated in step (6) and output
	the result
	For illustration purposes, sample code based on MD5 is provided as an
	appendix.
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	3. Keys
	The key for HMAC can be of any length (keys longer than B bytes are
	first hashed using H). However, less than L bytes is strongly
	discouraged as it would decrease the security strength of the
	function. Keys longer than L bytes are acceptable but the extra
	length would not significantly increase the function strength. (A
	longer key may be advisable if the randomness of the key is
	considered weak.)
	Keys need to be chosen at random (or using a cryptographically strong
	pseudo-random generator seeded with a random seed), and periodically
	refreshed. (Current attacks do not indicate a specific recommended
	frequency for key changes as these attacks are practically
	infeasible. However, periodic key refreshment is a fundamental
	security practice that helps against potential weaknesses of the
	function and keys, and limits the damage of an exposed key.)
	4. Implementation Note
	HMAC is defined in such a way that the underlying hash function H can
	be used with no modification to its code. In particular, it uses the
	function H with the pre-defined initial value IV (a fixed value
	specified by each iterative hash function to initialize its
	compression function). However, if desired, a performance
	improvement can be achieved at the cost of (possibly) modifying the
	code of H to support variable IVs.
	The idea is that the intermediate results of the compression function
	on the B-byte blocks (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad) can be precomputed
	only once at the time of generation of the key K, or before its first
	use. These intermediate results are stored and then used to
	initialize the IV of H each time that a message needs to be
	authenticated. This method saves, for each authenticated message,
	the application of the compression function of H on two B-byte blocks
	(i.e., on (K XOR ipad) and (K XOR opad)). Such a savings may be
	significant when authenticating short streams of data. We stress
	that the stored intermediate values need to be treated and protected
	the same as secret keys.
	Choosing to implement HMAC in the above way is a decision of the
	local implementation and has no effect on inter-operability.
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	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	5. Truncated output
	A well-known practice with message authentication codes is to
	truncate the output of the MAC and output only part of the bits
	(e.g., [MM, ANSI]). Preneel and van Oorschot [PV] show some
	analytical advantages of truncating the output of hash-based MAC
	functions. The results in this area are not absolute as for the
	overall security advantages of truncation. It has advantages (less
	information on the hash result available to an attacker) and
	disadvantages (less bits to predict for the attacker). Applications
	of HMAC can choose to truncate the output of HMAC by outputting the t
	leftmost bits of the HMAC computation for some parameter t (namely,
	the computation is carried in the normal way as defined in section 2
	above but the end result is truncated to t bits). We recommend that
	the output length t be not less than half the length of the hash
	output (to match the birthday attack bound) and not less than 80 bits
	(a suitable lower bound on the number of bits that need to be
	predicted by an attacker). We propose denoting a realization of HMAC
	that uses a hash function H with t bits of output as HMAC-H-t. For
	example, HMAC-SHA1-80 denotes HMAC computed using the SHA-1 function
	and with the output truncated to 80 bits. (If the parameter t is not
	specified, e.g. HMAC-MD5, then it is assumed that all the bits of the
	hash are output.)
	6. Security
	The security of the message authentication mechanism presented here
	depends on cryptographic properties of the hash function H: the
	resistance to collision finding (limited to the case where the
	initial value is secret and random, and where the output of the
	function is not explicitly available to the attacker), and the
	message authentication property of the compression function of H when
	applied to single blocks (in HMAC these blocks are partially unknown
	to an attacker as they contain the result of the inner H computation
	and, in particular, cannot be fully chosen by the attacker).
	These properties, and actually stronger ones, are commonly assumed
	for hash functions of the kind used with HMAC. In particular, a hash
	function for which the above properties do not hold would become
	unsuitable for most (probably, all) cryptographic applications,
	including alternative message authentication schemes based on such
	functions. (For a complete analysis and rationale of the HMAC
	function the reader is referred to [BCK1].)
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	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	Given the limited confidence gained so far as for the cryptographic
	strength of candidate hash functions, it is important to observe the
	following two properties of the HMAC construction and its secure use
	for message authentication:
	1. The construction is independent of the details of the particular
	hash function H in use and then the latter can be replaced by any
	other secure (iterative) cryptographic hash function.
	2. Message authentication, as opposed to encryption, has a
	"transient" effect. A published breaking of a message authentication
	scheme would lead to the replacement of that scheme, but would have
	no adversarial effect on information authenticated in the past. This
	is in sharp contrast with encryption, where information encrypted
	today may suffer from exposure in the future if, and when, the
	encryption algorithm is broken.
	The strongest attack known against HMAC is based on the frequency of
	collisions for the hash function H ("birthday attack") [PV,BCK2], and
	is totally impractical for minimally reasonable hash functions.
	As an example, if we consider a hash function like MD5 where the
	output length equals L=16 bytes (128 bits) the attacker needs to
	acquire the correct message authentication tags computed (with the
	_same_ secret key K!) on about 2**64 known plaintexts. This would
	require the processing of at least 2**64 blocks under H, an
	impossible task in any realistic scenario (for a block length of 64
	bytes this would take 250,000 years in a continuous 1Gbps link, and
	without changing the secret key K during all this time). This attack
	could become realistic only if serious flaws in the collision
	behavior of the function H are discovered (e.g. collisions found
	after 2**30 messages). Such a discovery would determine the immediate
	replacement of the function H (the effects of such failure would be
	far more severe for the traditional uses of H in the context of
	digital signatures, public key certificates, etc.).
	Note: this attack needs to be strongly contrasted with regular
	collision attacks on cryptographic hash functions where no secret key
	is involved and where 2**64 off-line parallelizable (!) operations
	suffice to find collisions. The latter attack is approaching
	feasibility [VW] while the birthday attack on HMAC is totally
	impractical. (In the above examples, if one uses a hash function
	with, say, 160 bit of output then 2**64 should be replaced by 2**80.)
	Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 6]
	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	A correct implementation of the above construction, the choice of
	random (or cryptographically pseudorandom) keys, a secure key
	exchange mechanism, frequent key refreshments, and good secrecy
	protection of keys are all essential ingredients for the security of
	the integrity verification mechanism provided by HMAC.
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	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	Appendix -- Sample Code
	For the sake of illustration we provide the following sample code for
	the implementation of HMAC-MD5 as well as some corresponding test
	vectors (the code is based on MD5 code as described in [MD5]).
	/*
	** Function: hmac_md5
	*/
	void
	hmac_md5(text, text_len, key, key_len, digest)
	unsigned char* text; /* pointer to data stream */
	int text_len; /* length of data stream */
	unsigned char* key; /* pointer to authentication key */
	int key_len; /* length of authentication key */
	caddr_t digest; /* caller digest to be filled in */
	{
	MD5_CTX context;
	unsigned char k_ipad[65]; /* inner padding -
	* key XORd with ipad
	*/
	unsigned char k_opad[65]; /* outer padding -
	* key XORd with opad
	*/
	unsigned char tk[16];
	int i;
	/* if key is longer than 64 bytes reset it to key=MD5(key) */
	if (key_len > 64) {
	MD5_CTX tctx;
	MD5Init(&tctx);
	MD5Update(&tctx, key, key_len);
	MD5Final(tk, &tctx);
	key = tk;
	key_len = 16;
	}
	/*
	* the HMAC_MD5 transform looks like:
	*
	* MD5(K XOR opad, MD5(K XOR ipad, text))
	*
	* where K is an n byte key
	* ipad is the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
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	* opad is the byte 0x5c repeated 64 times
	* and text is the data being protected
	*/
	/* start out by storing key in pads */
	bzero( k_ipad, sizeof k_ipad);
	bzero( k_opad, sizeof k_opad);
	bcopy( key, k_ipad, key_len);
	bcopy( key, k_opad, key_len);
	/* XOR key with ipad and opad values */
	for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
	k_ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
	k_opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
	}
	/*
	* perform inner MD5
	*/
	MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 1st
	* pass */
	MD5Update(&context, k_ipad, 64) /* start with inner pad */
	MD5Update(&context, text, text_len); /* then text of datagram */
	MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 1st pass */
	/*
	* perform outer MD5
	*/
	MD5Init(&context); /* init context for 2nd
	* pass */
	MD5Update(&context, k_opad, 64); /* start with outer pad */
	MD5Update(&context, digest, 16); /* then results of 1st
	* hash */
	MD5Final(digest, &context); /* finish up 2nd pass */
	}
	Test Vectors (Trailing '\0' of a character string not included in test):
	key = 0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
	key_len = 16 bytes
	data = "Hi There"
	data_len = 8 bytes
	digest = 0x9294727a3638bb1c13f48ef8158bfc9d
	key = "Jefe"
	data = "what do ya want for nothing?"
	data_len = 28 bytes
	digest = 0x750c783e6ab0b503eaa86e310a5db738
	key = 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
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	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	key_len 16 bytes
	data = 0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
	..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
	..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
	..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD...
	..DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
	data_len = 50 bytes
	digest = 0x56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
	Acknowledgments
	Pau-Chen Cheng, Jeff Kraemer, and Michael Oehler, have provided
	useful comments on early drafts, and ran the first interoperability
	tests of this specification. Jeff and Pau-Chen kindly provided the
	sample code and test vectors that appear in the appendix. Burt
	Kaliski, Bart Preneel, Matt Robshaw, Adi Shamir, and Paul van
	Oorschot have provided useful comments and suggestions during the
	investigation of the HMAC construction.
	References
	[ANSI] ANSI X9.9, "American National Standard for Financial
	Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale)," American
	Bankers Association, 1981. Revised 1986.
	[Atk] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, August
	1995.
	[BCK1] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
	"Keyed Hash Functions and Message Authentication",
	Proceedings of Crypto'96, LNCS 1109, pp. 1-15.
	(http://www.research.ibm.com/security/keyed-md5.html)
	[BCK2] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk,
	"Pseudorandom Functions Revisited: The Cascade Construction",
	Proceedings of FOCS'96.
	[Dobb] H. Dobbertin, "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
	RSA Labs' CryptoBytes, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 1996.
	http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/cryptobytes.html
	[PV] B. Preneel and P. van Oorschot, "Building fast MACs from hash
	functions", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'95 Proceedings,
	Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag Vol.963,
	1995, pp. 1-14.
	[MD5] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",
	RFC 1321, April 1992.
	Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 10]
	RFC 2104 HMAC February 1997
	[MM] Meyer, S. and Matyas, S.M., Cryptography, New York Wiley,
	1982.
	[RIPEMD] H. Dobbertin, A. Bosselaers, and B. Preneel, "RIPEMD-160: A
	strengthened version of RIPEMD", Fast Software Encryption,
	LNCS Vol 1039, pp. 71-82.
	ftp://ftp.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/COSIC/bosselae/ripemd/.
	[SHA] NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995.
	[Tsu] G. Tsudik, "Message authentication with one-way hash
	functions", In Proceedings of Infocom'92, May 1992.
	(Also in "Access Control and Policy Enforcement in
	Internetworks", Ph.D. Dissertation, Computer Science
	Department, University of Southern California, April 1991.)
	[VW] P. van Oorschot and M. Wiener, "Parallel Collision
	Search with Applications to Hash Functions and Discrete
	Logarithms", Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conf. Computer and
	Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1994.
	Authors' Addresses
	Hugo Krawczyk
	IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
	P.O.Box 704
	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
	EMail: hugo@watson.ibm.com
	Mihir Bellare
	Dept of Computer Science and Engineering
	Mail Code 0114
	University of California at San Diego
	9500 Gilman Drive
	La Jolla, CA 92093
	EMail: mihir@cs.ucsd.edu
	Ran Canetti
	IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
	P.O.Box 704
	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
	EMail: canetti@watson.ibm.com
	Krawczyk, et. al. Informational [Page 11]

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