the poison oracle,How to fix TNS Poison Vulnerability Issue (CVE-2012-1675) for 11g Express Edition

That depends......and “SECURE_REGISTER_LISTENER = (IPC)” work-around...

Using the IPC workaround should NOT interrupt "normal" client connections. Did you also set the IPC keyname in listener.ora AND listener_local database server init.ora parameter?

Before any changes, I successfully registered a remote windows XE db to a linux XE db listener, showing my linux db was vulnerable to the poison attack.

(lsnrctl services on the linux db server showed a "REMOTE SERVER" entry).

Applying the following changes stopped the exploit from being carried out:

listener.ora of 11.2 linux XE db to disallow remote db registering:# listener.ora Network Configuration File:SID_LIST_LISTENER =  (SID_LIST =    (SID_DESC =      (SID_NAME = PLSExtProc)      (ORACLE_HOME = /u01/app/oracle/product/11.2.0/xe)      (PROGRAM = extproc)    )  )LISTENER =  (DESCRIPTION_LIST =    (DESCRIPTION =      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = IPC)(KEY = EXTPROC_FOR_XE))      (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = oraserver)(PORT = 1512))    )  )DEFAULT_SERVICE_LISTENER = (XE)SECURE_REGISTER_LISTENER = (IPC)

I bounced the listener (lsnrctl stop,... lsnrctl start)

Then configured linux xe db local_listener parameter:SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET local_listener='(DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS=(PROTOCOL=IPC)(KEY=EXTPROC_FOR_XE)))' SCOPE=BOTH;system altered

...and tried to re-register windows XE db...SQL> ALTER SYSTEM SET remote_listener ='...' SCOPE=MEMORY;system alteredSQL> ALTER SYSTEM REGISTER;system altered

Checked linux XE listener.log... and it had19-JAN-2017 16:03:28 * service_register_NSGR * 1194TNS-01194: The listener command did not arrive in a secure transport

showing failed register attempts from a "remote" db. Also running "lsnrctl services" on the linux server, there was no "REMOTE SERVER" listed.

Also tested a remote client connection via sqlplus:F:\> sqlplus name/[email protected]> select * from v$version;BANNER--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Oracle Database 11g Express Edition Release 11.2.0.2.0 - 64bit ProductionPL/SQL Release 11.2.0.2.0 - ProductionCORE    11.2.0.2.0      ProductionTNS for Linux: Version 11.2.0.2.0 - ProductionNLSRTL Version 11.2.0.2.0 - Production

In conclusion, the above steps worked for me in securing an Oracle 11 XE db from the poison attack whilst still allowing normal client connections

I can only surmise you didn't follow the steps correctly to set up the IPC "work around".

Cheers,

Gaz.

  • 0
    点赞
  • 0
    收藏
    觉得还不错? 一键收藏
  • 0
    评论
Poison frogs! targeted clean-label poisoning attacks on neural networks”这是一个关于对神经网络进行有针对性的干净标签中毒攻击的研究项目。在这种攻击中,研究人员通过修改训练数据集中的特定标签,以欺骗神经网络模型以误分类输入样本。 干净标签中毒攻击是一种隐蔽的攻击方式,因为攻击者不需要修改图像本身或添加任何可见的攻击标记。相反,他们通过对训练数据集进行精心设计的修改,使神经网络在应用中出现错误分类。这种攻击方法可能会导致严重后果,例如在自动驾驶汽车或安全系统中造成事故或功能失效。 这个项目的目的是研究这种攻击方法的可行性和效果,并提出对抗这种攻击的解决方案。研究人员首先对训练数据集进行修改,以使特定类别的图像被误分类为其他类别。然后,他们使用已经训练好的神经网络模型,通过修改训练数据集中的特定图像标签,使模型在测试阶段错误地将这些特定图像分类为不同的类别。 结果表明,即使在高性能的神经网络上进行干净标签中毒攻击也是可行的。这些攻击可以在不影响模型在其他正常输入上性能的情况下,误导模型对特定图像的分类。这使得攻击者能够操纵模型的行为,甚至可能导致系统的安全漏洞和错误决策。 为了对抗这种攻击,研究人员提出了一种改进的训练策略,称为“防御机制”。这种方法可以增强模型对干净标签中毒攻击的鲁棒性,并提供了一种有效的方法来检测和解决这种攻击。 总体而言,这个项目揭示了干净标签中毒攻击在神经网络中的潜在威胁,并提供了对抗这种攻击的解决方案。这有助于进一步加强神经网络模型在面临安全挑战时的鲁棒性,并推动相关领域的研究和技术发展。
评论
添加红包

请填写红包祝福语或标题

红包个数最小为10个

红包金额最低5元

当前余额3.43前往充值 >
需支付:10.00
成就一亿技术人!
领取后你会自动成为博主和红包主的粉丝 规则
hope_wisdom
发出的红包
实付
使用余额支付
点击重新获取
扫码支付
钱包余额 0

抵扣说明:

1.余额是钱包充值的虚拟货币,按照1:1的比例进行支付金额的抵扣。
2.余额无法直接购买下载,可以购买VIP、付费专栏及课程。

余额充值