----------------------------
strongSwan - Configuration
----------------------------
Contents
--------
1. Overview
2. Quickstart
2.1 Site-to-Site case
2.2 Host-to-Host case
2.3 Four Tunnel case
2.4 Four Tunnel case the elegant way with source routing (NEW)
2.5 Roadwarrior case
2.6 Roadwarrior case with virtual IP (NEW)
3. Generating X.509 certificates and CRLs with OpenSSL
3.1 Generating a CA certificate
3.2 Generating a host or user certificate
3.3 Generating a CRL
3.4 Revoking a certificate
4. Configuring the connections - ipsec.conf
4.1 Configuring my side
4.2 Multiple certificates
4.3 Configuring the peer side using CA certificates
4.4 Handling Virtual IPs and wildcard subnets
4.5 Protocol and port selectors
4.6 IPsec policies based on wildcards
4.7 IPsec policies based on CA certificates
4.8 Sending certificate requests
5. Configuring certificates and CRLs
5.1 Installing CA certificates
5.2 Installing optional Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
5.3 Dynamic update of certificates and CRLs
5.4 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
5.5 CRL policy
5.6 Configuring the peer side using locally stored certificates
6. Configuring the private keys - ipsec.secrets
6.1 Loading private key files in PKCS#1 format
6.2 Entering passphrases interactively
6.3 Multiple private keys
7. Configuring CA properties - ipsec.conf
8. Smartcard support
8.1 Configuring a smartcard-based connection
8.2 Entering the PIN code
8.3 Configuring a smartcard using pkcs15-init
9. Configuring the clients
9.1 strongSwan
9.2 PGPnet
9.3 Safenet/Soft-Remote
9.4 SSH Sentinel
9.5 Windows 2000/XP
10. Monitoring functions
11. Firewall support functions
11.1 Environment variables in the updown script
11.2 Sample updown script for iptables
12. Authentication with raw RSA public keys
13. Authentication with OpenPGP certificates
13.1 OpenPGP certificates
13.2 OpenPGP private keys
13.3 Monitoring functions
13.4 Suppression of certificate request messages
14. Additional features
14.1 Authentication and encryption algorithms
14.2 NAT traversal
14.3 Dead peer detection (NEW)
15. Copyright statement and acknowledgements
1. Overview
--------
strongSwan is an OpenSource IPsec solution for the Linux operating system
and currently supports the following features:
* runs both on Linux 2.4 (KLIPS) and Linux 2.6 (native IPsec) kernels.
* strong 3DES, AES, Serpent, Twofish, or Blowfish encryption.
* Authentication based on X.509 certificates or preshared secrets.
* Powerful IPsec policies based on wildcards or intermediate CAs.
* Retrieval of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) via HTTP or LDAP.
* Full support of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP, RFC 2560).
* CA management functions including OCSP and CRL URIs and default LDAP server.
* Optional storage of RSA private keys on smartcards or USB crypto tokens
* NAT-Traversal and support of Virtual IPs.
* Support of Delete SA and informational Notification messages.
Compatibility has successfully been tested with peers running the following
IPsec clients:
FreeS/WAN, Openswan, PGPnet, SafeNet/Soft-PK, SafeNet/SoftRemote, SonicWALL
Global ××× Client, SSH Sentinel, The GreenBow, Microsoft Windows 2000/XP
Furthermore, interoperability with the following ××× gateways
has been demonstrated during the IPsec 2001 Conference in Paris:
Cisco IOS Routers, Cisco PIX firewall, Cisco ×××3000,
Nortel Contivity ××× Switch, NetScreen (FreeS/WAN as responder only),
OpenBSD with isakmpd, Netasq, Netcelo, and 6WIND.
Potentially any IPsec implementation with X.509 certificate support can
be made to cooperate with strongSwan. The latest addition has been the successful
interoperability with the Check Point ×××-1 NG gateway.
2. Quickstart
----------
In the following examples we assume for reasons of clarity that left designates
the local host and that right is the remote host. Certificates for users, hosts
and gateways are issued by a ficticious Kool CA. How to generate private keys
and certificates using OpenSSL will be explained in section 3. The CA certificate
"caCert.pem" must be present on all ××× end points in order to be able to
authenticate the peers.
2.1 Site-to-site case
-----------------
In this scenario two security gateways east and west will connect the
two subnets west-net and east-net with each other through a ××× tunnel
set up between the two gateways:
10.1.0.0/16 -- | 11.22.33.44 | === | 55.66.77.88 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
west-net west east east-net
Configuration on gateway west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/westCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
left=%defaultroute
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=55.66.77.88
rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=east.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
Configuration on gateway east:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/eastCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA eastKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
left=%defaultroute
leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
leftcert=eastCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
2.2 Host-to-host case
-----------------
This is a setup between two single hosts which don't have a subnet behind
them. Although IPsec transport mode would be sufficient for host-to-host
connections we will use the default IPsec tunnel mode.
| 11.22.33.44 | === | 55.66.77.88 |
west east
Configuration on host west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/westCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn host-host
left=%defaultroute
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=55.66.77.88
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=east.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
Configuration on host east:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/eastCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA eastKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn host-host
left=%defaultroute
leftcert=eastCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
2.3 Four Tunnel case
----------------
In a site-to-site setup a system administrator logged into the local gateway
often would like to access the peer gateway or a server in the subnet behind
the peer gateway over a secure IPsec tunnel.Since IP packets leaving a gateway
via the outer network interface carry the IP address of this NIC, four IPsec
Security Associations (SAs) must be set up to achieve full connectivity. The
example below shows how this can be done without much additional typing work ,
using the "also" macro which includes connection definitions defined farther
down in the ipsec.conf file.
10.1.0.0/16 -- | 11.22.33.44 | === | 55.66.77.88 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
west-net west east east-net
Configuration on gateway west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/westCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
also host-host
conn net-host
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
also host-host
conn host-net
rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
also host-host
conn host-host
left=%defaultroute
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=55.66.77.88
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=east.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
Configuration on gateway east:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/eastCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA eastKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
also=host-host
conn net-host
leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
also=host-host
conn host-net
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
also=host-host
conn host-host
left=%defaultroute
leftcert=eastCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
2.4 The four tunnel case the elegant way with source routing
--------------------------------------------------------
As you certainly agree, the full four tunnel case described in the previous
section becomes quite complex. If we could force the source address of the
IP packets leaving the gateway through the outer interface to take on the
IP address of the inner interface then we could use the single subnet-to-subnet
tunnel from section 2.1. Such a setup becomes possible if we use the
source routing capabilites of the ip route command that is already used
by strongSwan's updown scripts.
10.1.0.0/16 -- | 11.22.33.44 | === | 55.66.77.88 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
west-net west east east-net
If we assume that the inner IP address of gateway west is 10.1.0.1
and the inner IP address of gateway east is 10.2.0.1 then the
insertion of the parameter
leftsourceip=10.1.0.1
in the connection definition of west and
leftsourceip=10.2.0.1
on east, respectively, will install source routing on both gateways.
As a result the command
ping 10.2.0.1
executed on west will leave the gateway with a source address of
10.1.0.1 and will therefore take the net-net IPsec tunnel.
Configuration on gateway west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/westCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
left=%defaultroute
leftsourceip=10.1.0.1
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=55.66.77.88
rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=east.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
Configuration on gateway east:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/eastCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA eastKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn net-net
left=%defaultroute
leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
leftsourceip=10.2.0.1
leftcert=eastCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
2.5 Roadwarrior case
----------------
This is a very common case where a strongSwan gateway serves an arbitrary number
of remote ××× clients usually having dynamic IP addresses.
10.1.0.0/16 -- | 11.22.33.44 | === | x.x.x.x |
west-net west rw-x
Configuration on gateway west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/homeCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn rw
left=%defaultroute
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=%any
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=add
Configuration on host rw-x:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/rwCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA rwKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn home
left=%defaultroute
leftcert=rw-xCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
2.6 Roadwarrior case with virtual IP
--------------------------------
Roadwarriors usually have dynamic IP addresses assigned by the ISP they are
currently attached to. In order to simplify the routing from west-net back
to the remote access client it would be desirable if the roadwarrior had
an inner IP address chosen from a pre-assigned pool.
10.1.0.0/16 -- | 11.22.33.44 | === | x.x.x.x | -- 10.3.0.1
west-net west rw-x virtual IP
This virtual IP address can be assigned to a strongSwan roadwarrior by adding
the parameter
leftsourceip=10.3.0.1
to the roadwarrior's ipsec.conf. Of course the virtual IP of each roadwarrior
must be distinct. In our example it is chosen from the address pool
rightsubnetwithin=10.3.0.0/16
which can be added to the gateway's ipsec.conf so that a single connection
definition can handle multiple roadwarriors.
Configuration on gateway west:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/homeCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA westKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn rw
left=%defaultroute
leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
leftcert=westCert.pem
right=%any
rightsubnetwithin=10.3.0.0/16
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=add
Configuration on host rw-x:
/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/caCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.d/certs/rwCert.pem
/etc/ipsec.secrets:
: RSA rwKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
/etc/ipsec.conf:
conn home
left=%defaultroute
leftsourceip=10.3.0.1
leftcert=rw-xCert.pem
right=11.22.33.44
rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
rightid="C=CH, O=Kool, CN=west.kool.net"
rightrsasigkey=%cert
auto=start
3. Generating certificates and CRLs with OpenSSL
---------------------------------------------
This section is not a full-blown tutorial on how to use OpenSSL. It just lists
a few points that are relevant if you want to generate your own certificates
and CRLs for use with strongSwan.
3.1 Generating a CA certificate
---------------------------
The OpenSSL statement
openssl req -x509 -days 1460 -newkey rsa:2048
-keyout caKey.pem -out caCert.pem
creates a 2048 bit RSA private key caKey.pem and a self-signed CA certificate
caCert.pem with a validity of 4 years (1460 days).
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
lists the properties of a X.509 certificate cert.pem. It allows you to verify
whether the configuration defaults in openssl.cnf have been inserted correctly.
If you prefer the CA certificate to be in binary DER format then the following
command achieves this transformation:
openssl x509 -in caCert.pem -outform DER -out caCert.der
The directory /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts contains all required CA certificates either
in binary DER or in base64 PEM format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto
"automagically" determines the correct format.
3.2 Generating a host or user certificate
-------------------------------------
The OpenSSL statement
openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout hostKey.pem
-out hostReq.pem
generates a 1024 bit RSA private key hostKey.pem and a certificate request
hostReq.pem which has to be signed by the CA.
If you want to add a subjectAltName field to the host certificate you must edit
the OpenSSL configuration file openssl.cnf and add the following line in the
[ usr_cert ] section:
subjectAltName=DNS:soggy.strongsec.com
if you want to identify the host by its Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN ), or
subjectAltName=IP:160.85.22.3
if you want the ID to be of type IPV4_ADDR. Of course you could include both
ID types with
subjectAltName=DNS:soggy.strongsec.com,IP:160.85.22.3
but the use of an IP address for the identification of a host should be
discouraged anyway.
For user certificates the appropriate ID type is USER_FQDN which can be
specified as
subjectAltName=email:ewa@strongsec.com
or if the user's e-mail address is part of the subject's distinguished name
subjectAltName=email:copy
Now the certificate request can be signed by the CA with the command
openssl ca -in hostReq.pem -days 730 -out hostCert.pem -notext
If you omit the -days option then the default_days value (365 days) specified
in openssl.cnf is used. The -notext option avoids that a human readable
listing of the certificate is prepended to the base64 encoded certificate
body.
If you want to use the dynamic CRL fetching feature described in section 4.7
then you may include one or several crlDistributionPoints in your end
certificates. This can be done in the [ usr_cert ] section of the openssl.cnf
configuration file:
crlDistributionPoints= @crl_dp
[ crl_dp ]
URI.1="http://www.strongsec.com/ca/cert.crl"
URI.2="ldap://ldap.strongsec.com/o=strongSec GmbH, c=CH
?certificateRevocationList?base?(objectClass=certificationAuthority)"
If you have only a single http distribution point then the short form
crlDistributionPoints="URI:http://www.strongsec.com/ca/cert.crl"
also works. Due to a known bug in OpenSSL this notation fails with ldap URIs.
Usually a Windows-based ××× client needs its private key, its host or
user certificate, and the CA certificate. The most convenient way to load
this information is to put everything into a PKCS#12 file:
openssl pkcs12 -export -inkey hostKey.pem
-in hostCert.pem -name "soggy"
-certfile caCert.pem -caname "Root CA"
-out hostCert.p12
3.3 Generating a CRL
----------------
An empty CRL that is signed by the CA can be generated with the command
openssl ca -gencrl -crldays 15 -out crl.pem
If you omit the -crldays option then the default_crl_days value (30 days)
specified in openssl.cnf is used.
If you prefer the CRL to be in binary DER format then this conversion
can be achieved with
openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out cert.crl
The directory /etc/ipsec.d/crls contains all CRLs either in binary DER
or in base64 PEM format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto
"automagically" determines the correct format.
3.4 Revoking a certificate
----------------------
A specific host certificate stored in the file host.pem is revoked with the
command
openssl ca -revoke host.pem
Next the CRL file must be updated
openssl ca -gencrl -crldays 60 -out crl.pem
The content of the CRL file can be listed with the command
openssl crl -in crl.pem -noout -text
in the case of a base64 CRL, or alternatively for a CRL in DER format
openssl crl -inform DER -in cert.crl -noout -text
4. Configuring the connections - ipsec.conf
----------------------------------------
4.1 Configuring my side
-------------------
Usually the local side is the same for all connections. Therefore it makes
sense to put the definitions characterizing the strongSwan security gateway into
the conn %default section of the configuration file /etc/ipsec.conf. If we
assume throughout this document that the strongSwan security gateway is left and
the peer is right then we can write
conn %default
# use RSA based authentication with certificates
authby=rsasig
rightrsasigkey=%cert
# my side is left - the freeswan security gateway
left=160.85.22.2
leftcert=pulpoCert.pem
# load connection definitions automatically
auto=add
The X.509 certificate by which the strongSwan security gateway will authenticate
itself by sending it in binary form to its peers as part of the Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) is specified in the line
leftcert=pulpoCert.pem
The certificate can either be stored in base64 PEM-format or in the binary
DER-format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto "automagically" determines
the correct format. Therefore
leftcert=pulpoCert.der
or
leftcert=pulpoCert.cer
would also be valid alternatives.
When using relative pathnames as in the examples above, the certificate files
must be stored in in the directory /etc/ipsec.d/certs. In order to distinguish
strongSwan's own certificates from locally stored trusted peer certificates
(see section 5.5 for details), they could also be stored in a subdirectory
below /etc/ipsec.d/certs as e.g. in
leftcert=mycerts/pulpoCert.pem
Absolute pathnames are also possible as in
leftcert=/usr/ssl/certs/pulpoCert.pem
As an ID for the ××× gateway we recommend the use of a Fully Qualified Domain
Name (FQDN) of the form
conn rw
right=%any
leftid=@pulpo.strongsec.com
Important: When an FQDN identifier is used it must be explicitly included as a
so called subjectAltName of type dnsName (DNS:) in the certificate indicated
by leftcert. For details on how to generate certificates with subjectAltNames,
please refer to section 7.2.
If you don't want to mess with subjectAltNames, you can use the certificate's
Distinguished Name (DN) instead, which is an identifier of type DER_ASN1_DN
and which can be written e.g. in the LDAP-type format
conn rw
right=%any
leftid="C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=pulpo.strongsec.com"
Since the subject's DN is part of the certificate, the leftid does not have to
be declared explicitly. Thus the entry
conn rw
right=%any
automatically assumes the subject DN of leftcert to be the host ID.
4.2 Multiple certificates
---------------------
strongSwan supports multiple local host certificates and corresponding
RSA private keys:
conn rw1
right=%any
rightid=@peer1.domain1
leftcert=myCert1.pem
# leftid is DN of myCert1
conn rw2
right=%any
rightid=@peer2.domain2
leftcert=myCert2.pem
# leftid is DN of myCert2
When peer1 initiates a connection then strongSwan will send myCert1 and will
sign with myKey1 defined in /etc/ipsec.secrets (see section 6.2) whereas
myCert2 and myKey2 will be used in a connection setup started from peer2.
4.3 Configuring the peer side using CA certificates
-----------------------------------------------
Now we can proceed to define our connections. In many applications we might
have dozens of mostly Windows-based road warriors connecting to a central
strongSwan security gateway. The following most simple statement:
conn rw
right=%any
defines the general roadwarrior case. The line right=%any literally means that
any IPSec peer is accepted, regardless of its current IP source address and its
ID, as long as the peer presents a valid X.509 certificate signed by a CA the
strongSwan security gateway puts explicit trust in. Additionally the signature
during IKE main mode gives proof that the peer is in possession of the private
RSA key matching the public key contained in the transmitted certificate.
The ID by which a peer is identifying itself during IKE main mode can by any of
the ID types IPV4_ADDR, FQDN, USER_FQDN or DER_ASN1_DN. If one of the first
three ID types is used, then the accompanying X.509 certificate of the peer
must contain a matching subjectAltName field of the type ipAddress (IP:),
dnsName (DNS:) or rfc822Name (email:), respectively. With the fourth type
DER_ASN1_DN the identifier must completely match the subject field of the
peer's certificate. One of the two possible representations of a
Distinguished Name (DN) is the LDAP-type format
rightid="C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=wroclaw.strongsec.com"
Additional whitespace can be added everywhere as desired since it will be
automatically eliminated by the X.509 parser. An exception is the single
whitespace between individual words , like e.g. in strongSec GmbH, which is
preserved by the parser.
The Relative Distinguished Names (RDNs) can alternatively be separated by a
slash '/' instead of a comma ','
rightid="/C=CH/O=strongSec GmbH/CN=wroclaw.strongsec.com"
This is the representation extracted from the certificate by the OpenSSL
command line option
openssl x509 -in wroclawCert.pem -noout -subject
The following RDNs are supported by strongSwan
+-----------------------------------------------+
| DC Domain Component |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| C Country |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| ST State or province |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| L Locality or town |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| O Organisation |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| OU Organisational Unit |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| CN Common Name |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| ND NameDistinguisher, used with CN |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| N Name |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| G Given name |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| S Surname |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| I Initials |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| T Personal title |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| E E-mail |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| Email E-mail |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| emailAddress E-mail |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| SN Serial number |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| serialNumber Serial number |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| D Description |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| ID X.500 Unique Identifier |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| UID User ID |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| TCGID [Siemens] Trust Center Global ID |
+-----------------------------------------------+
With the roadwarrior connection definition listed above, an IPsec SA for
the strongSwan security gateway pulpo.strongsec.com itself can be established.
If any roadwarrior should be able to reach e.g. the two subnets 10.0.1.0/24
and 10.0.3.0/24 behind the security gateway then the following connection
definitions will make this possible
conn rw1
right=%any
leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24
conn rw3
right=%any
leftsubnet=10.0.3.0/24
If not all peers in possession of a X.509 certificate signed by a specific
certificate authority shall be given access to the Linux security gateway,
then either a subset of them can be barred by listing the serial numbers of
their certificates in a certificate revocation list (CRL) as specified in
section 5.2 or as an alternative, access can be controlled by explicitly
putting a roadwarrior entry for each eligible peer into ipsec.conf:
conn soggy
right=%any
rightid=@soggy.strongsec.com
conn ewa
right=%any
rightid=ewa@strongsec.com
conn wroclaw
right=%any
rightid="C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=wroclaw.strongsec.com"
When the IP address of a peer is known to be stable, it can be specified as
well. This entry is mandatory when the strongSwan host wants to act as the
initiator of an IPSec connection.
conn soggy
right=160.85.22.3
rightid=@soggy.strongsec.com
conn ewa
right=160.85.22.8
rightid=ewa@strongsec.com
conn wroclaw
right=160.85.22.8
rightid="C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=wroclaw.strongsec.com"
conn frosch
right=160.85.22.5
In the last example the ID types FQDN, USER_FQDN, DER_ASN1_DN and IPV4_ADDR,
respectively, were used. Of course all connection definitions presented so far
have included the lines in the conn %defaults section, comprising among other
a left and leftcert entry, as well as a rightrsasigkey parameter set to the
magic value %cert , signifying that the public key will be extracted from a
X.509 certificates sent by the peer.
4.4 Handling Virtual IPs and wildcard subnets
-----------------------------------------
Often roadwarriors are behind NAT-boxes with IPsec passthrough, which causes
the inner IP source address of an IPsec tunnel to be different from the
outer IP source address usually assigned dynamically by the ISP.
Whereas the varying outer IP address can be handled by the right=%any
construct, the inner IP address or subnet must always be declared in a
connection definition. Therefore for the three roadwarriors rw1 to rw3
connecting to a strongSwan security gateway the following entries are
required in /etc/ipsec.conf:
conn rw1
right=%any
righsubnet=10.0.1.5/32
conn rw2
right=%any
rightsubnet=10.0.1.5.47/32
conn rw3
right=%any
rightsubnet=10.0.1.128/28
With the wildcard parameter rightsubnetwithin these three entries can be
reduced to the single connection definition
conn rw
right=%any
rightsubnetwithin=10.0.1.0/24
Any host will be accepted (of course after successful authentication based on
the peer's X.509 certificate only) if it declares a client subnet lying totally
within the brackets defined by the wildcard subnet definition (in our example
10.0.1.0/24). For each roadwarrior a connection instance tailored to the
subnet of the particular client will be created,based on the generic
rightsubnetwithin template.
This strongSwan feature can also be helpful with ××× clients getting a
dynamically assigned inner IP from a DHCP server located on the NAT router box.
4.5 Protocol and Port Selectors
---------------------------
strongSwan offer the possibility to restrict the protocol and optionally the
ports in an IPsec SA using the rightprotoport and leftprotoport parameters.
Some examples:
conn icmp
right=%any
rightprotoport=icmp
left=%defaultroute
leftid=@pluto.strongsec.com
leftprotoport=icmp
conn http
right=%any
rightprotoport=6
left=%defaultroute
leftid=@pluto.strongsec.com
leftprotoport=6/80
conn l2tp # with port wildcard for Mac OS X Panther interoperability
right=%any
rightprotoport=17/%any
left=%defaultroute
leftid=@pluto.strongsec.com
leftprotoport=17/1701
conn dhcp
right=%any
rightprotoport=udp/bootpc
left=%defaultroute
leftid=@pluto.strongsec.com
leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0 #allows DHCP discovery broadcast
leftprotoport=udp/bootps
rekey=no
keylife=20s
rekeymargin=10s
auto=add
Protocols and ports can be designated either by their numerical values
or by their acronyms defined in /etc/services.
ipsec auto --status
shows the following connection definitions:
"icmp": 160.85.106.10[@pulpo.strongsec.com]:1/0...%any:1/0
"http": 160.85.106.10[@pulpo.strongsec.com]:6/80...%any:6/0
"l2tp": 160.85.106.10[@pulpo.strongsec.com]:17/1701...%any:17/%any
"dhcp": 0.0.0.0/0===160.85.106.10[@pulpo.strongsec.com]:17/67...%any:17/68
Based on the protocol and port selectors appropriate eroutes will be set
up, so that only the specified payload types will pass through the IPsec
tunnel.
4.6 IPsec policies based on wildcards
---------------------------------
In large ×××-based remote access networks there is often a requirement that
access to the various parts of an internal network must be granted selectively,
e.g. depending on the group membership of the remote access user. strongSwan
makes this possible by applying wildcard filtering on the ××× user's
distinguished name (ID_DER_ASN1_DN).
Let's make a practical example:
An organization has a sales department (OU=Sales) and a research group
(OU=Research). In the company intranet there are separate subnets for Sales
(10.0.0.0/24) and Research (10.0.1.0/24) but both groups share a common web
server (10.0.2.100). The ××× clients use Virtual IP addresses that are either
assigned statically or via DHCP-over-IPsec. The sales and research departments
use IP addresses from separate DHCP address pools (10.1.0.0/24) and (10.1.1.0/24),
respectively. An X.509 certificate is issued to each employee, containing in its
subject distinguished name the country (C=CH), the company (O=ACME),
the group membership(OU=Sales or OU=Research) and the common name (e.g.
CN=Bart Simpson).
The IPsec policy defined above can now be enforced with the following three
IPsec security associations:
conn sales
right=%any
rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Sales, CN=*"
rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/24 # Sales DHCP range
leftsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # Sales subnet
conn research
right=%any
rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Research, CN=*"
rightsubnetwithin=10.1.1.0/24 # Research DHCP range
leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 # Research subnet
conn web
right=%any
rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=*, CN=*"
rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/23 # Remote access DHCP range
leftsubnet=10.0.2.100/32 # Web server
rightprotoport=tcp # TCP protocol only
leftprotoport=tcp/http # TCP port 80 only
Of course group specific tunneling could be implemented on the
basis of the Virtual IP range specified by the rightsubnetwithin
parameter alone, but the wildcard matching mechanism guarantees that
only authorized user can access the corresponding subnets.
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