剑桥推荐书单II 02 Philosophy of mind

II 02 Philosophy of mind

Preliminary Reading

Crane, Tim, The Mechanical Mind. 2nd ed.
Crane, Tim, Elements of Mind
Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds., Folk Psychology
Cassam, Quassim, ed., Self-Knowledge
Kenny, Anthony, Action, Emotion and Will

General Books

Chalmers, David, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
Gertler, Brie, and Larry Shapiro, eds., Arguing About the Mind
Block, Ned, et al., eds., The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates
McLaughlin, Brian, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

Epistemology of Mind

Knowledge of one’s own mind: first-person thought

*Frege, Gottlob, ‘Thoughts’, in his Collected Papers
*Kaplan, David, ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals’, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds., Themes from Kaplan
*Mellor, D.H., ‘I and Now’
*Perry, John, ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’
Boër, Stephen E., and W.G. Lycan, ‘Who, Me?’
Evans, Gareth, ‘Self-Identification’, in Q. Cassam, ed., Self-Knowledge
Lewis, David, ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’
Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere
Reichenbach, Hans, Elements of Symbolic Logic
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books

Knowledge of one’s own mind: first-person authority

*Burge, Tyler, ‘Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge’
*Cassam, Quassim, ed., Self-Knowledge
*Smithies, Declan, and Daniel Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciousness
Heal, Jane, ‘On ‘First Person Authority’’
Moran, Richard,Authority and Estrangement
Schwitzgebel, Eric, ‘The Unreliability of Naive Introspection’

Consciousness

Varieties of consciousness

*Block, Ned, ‘On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness’
*Dennett, Daniel, ‘Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness’, in his Brainstorms
*Phillips, Ian, ‘Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show’
*Rosenthal, David, ‘Two Concepts of Consciousness’
Hill, Christopher, Consciousness
Shoemaker, Sydney, ‘Qualia and Consciousness’
Siewert, Charles, The Significance of Consciousness

The explanatory gap

*Akins, Kathleen, ‘What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?’ in B. Dahlbom, ed.,Dennett and His Critics. 2nd ed.
*Chalmers, David, The Conscious Mind
*Jackson, Frank, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’
*Lewis, David, 'What Experience Teaches
*Nagel, Thomas, ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’
Alter, Torin, and Sven Walter, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
Johnston, Mark, ‘Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds’
Ludlow, Peter, ed., There’s Something About Mary
Papineau, David, Thinking About Consciousness

Intentional theories of consciousness

*Block, Ned, ‘Inverted Earth’
*Dretske, Fred, Naturalizing the Mind
*Harman, Gilbert, ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’
*Kind, Amy, ‘Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness’
*Tye, Michael, Ten Problems of Consciousness
Byrne, A., ‘Intentionalism Defended’
Crane, Tim, ‘Intentionalism’
*Dretske, Fred, ‘Conscious Experience’
*Rosenthal, David M., ‘The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality’
Carruthers, Peter, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Lycan, William G., Consciousness and Experience
Rosenthal, David M., ‘Explaining Consciousness’

Unity of consciousness

*Hume, David, Treatise of Human NatureBook 1, part iv, sect. 6.
Bayne, Tim, and David Chalmers, ‘What Is the Unity of Consciousness?’ in A. Cleeremans, ed., The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, Dissociation
Broad, C.D., The Mind and Its Place in Nature
Hill, Christopher S., Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism
Nagel, Thomas, ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’
Tye, Michael, ‘The Problem of Common Sensibles’

Intentionality and Mental Representation

The nature of intentionality

Anscombe, G.E.M., ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in R.J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy. 2nd Series
Brentano, Franz, ‘The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena’, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
Crane, Tim, Elements of Mind, chap 1
Dennett, Daniel, Content and Consciousness
Fodor, Jerry, ‘Propositional Attitudes’
Forbes, Graeme, Attitude Problems
Frege, Gottlob, ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’
Prior, A.N., Objects of Thought
Searle, John, Intentionality

Intentional objects

*McGinn, Colin, Logical Properties
*Quine, W.V.O., ‘On What There Is’
Cartwright, Richard, ‘Negative Existentials’
Chisholm, Roderick, 'Intentional Inexistence
Crane, Tim, ‘What Is the Problem of Non-Existence?’
Donnellan, Keith, ‘Speaking of Nothing’
Kripke, Saul, Reference and Existence
Priest, Graham, Towards Non-Being
Quine, W.V.O., ‘Existence and Quantification’
Russell, Bertrand, ‘On Denoting’
Sainsbury, R.M., Reference without Referents
Salmon, Nathan, ‘Existence’
Van Inwagen, Peter, ‘McGinn on Existence’

Reductive theories of content

*Cummins, Robert, Meaning and Mental Representation
*Dennett, Daniel, ‘Intentional Systems’
*Field, Hartry, ‘Mental Representation’
*Loewer, Barry, and Georges Rey, eds., Meaning in Mind
*Millikan, Ruth Garrett, ‘Biosemantics’
Block, Ned, ‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’
Dretske, Fred, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes
Fodor, Jerry, Psychosemantics
Fodor, Jerry, A Theory of Content and Other Essays
Harman, Gilbert, ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’
Millikan, Ruth Garrett, ‘Thoughts without Laws: Cognitive Science with Content’
Stalnaker, Robert, Inquiry
Stampe, Dennis, ‘Towards a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation’
Sterelny, Kim, The Representational Theory of Mind, chap 6

Externalism and internalism

*Burge, Tyler, ‘Individualism and the Mental’
*Farkas, Katalin, ‘What Is Externalism?’
*Fodor, Jerry, ‘Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology’
*Fodor, Jerry, Psychosemantics
*Putnam, Hilary, 'The Meaning of ‘Meaning’
Blackburn, Simon, Spreading the Word
Burge, Tyler, ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Woodfield, ed., Thought and Object
Burge, Tyler, ‘Two Thought Experiments Reviewed’
Evans, Gareth, The Varieties of Reference
McDowell, John, ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’
McKinsey, Michael, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’
Noonan, Harold, 'Russellian Thoughts and Methodological Solipsism
Segal, Gabriel, A Slim Book About Narrow Content
Sterelny, Kim, The Representational Theory of Mind, chap 5

Mental Faculties

Intention and the will

*Bratman, Michael, ‘Two Faces of Intention’
*Broome, John, ‘Are Intentions Reasons’
*Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events
*Holton, Richard, ‘How Is Strength of Will Possible?’ in S. Stroud and C. Tappolet, eds., Weakness of the Will and Practical Irrationality
*Holton, Richard, ‘Intention and Weakness of Will’
*Kavka, Gregory, ‘The Toxin Puzzle’
Ainslie, George, ‘A Selectionist Model of the Ego: Implications for Self-Control’, in N. Sebanz and W. Prinz, eds., Disorders of Volition
Anscombe, G.E.M., Intention. 2nd ed.
Baumeister, Roy, et al., ‘Ego-Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?’
Gollwitzer, Peter, and Veronika Brandstätter, ‘Implementation Intentions and Effective Goal Pursuit’
Holton, Richard, and Kent Berridge, ‘Addiction between Compulsion and Choice’
Robinson, Terry, and Kent Berridge, ‘Addiction’

Imagination

Currie, Gregory, and Ian Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology
Doggett, Tyler, and Andy Egan, ‘Wanting Things You Don’t Want’
Kind, Amy, ‘The Heterogeneity of the Imagination’
Kind, Amy, ‘Putting the Image Back in Imagination’
Kind, Amy, ‘The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire’
Langland-Hassan, Peter, ’ Imaginative Attitudes’
Langland-Hassan, Peter, ‘Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory’
Langland-Hassan, Peter, ‘What It Is to Pretend’
Liao, Shen-Yi, and Tyler Doggett, ‘The Imagination Box’
Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen Stich, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Pretense’
Nichols, Shaun, and Stephen Stich, Mindreading
Schellenberg, Susanna, ‘Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion’
Tye, Michael, The Imagery Debate
Walton, Kendall, ‘Fearing Fictions’
Gendler, Tamar Szabó, ‘Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment’
Kind, Amy, and Peter Kung, eds., Knowledge through Imagination

Mind-reading

*Carruthers, Peter, and Peter Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind
*Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds., Folk Psychology, introduction and essays 1-3 and 5
*Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, ‘Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse’
*Lewis, David, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification’,
Gordon, Robert, ‘Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You’,in M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications
Heal, Jane, ‘Understanding Other Minds from the Inside’, in A. O’Hear, ed., Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind
Stich, Stephen, and Shaun Nichols, ‘Second Thoughts on Simulation’, in M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications
*Coplan, Amy, and Peter Goldie, eds., Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives Vol. 16
De Vignemont, Frederique, and Tania Singer, ‘The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why?’

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