WEB
爬虫协议
robots.txt
一路访问过去就行了
MISC
packet
查找flag
追踪流
base64解密即可
缺失的数据
给了字典,解密即可
看给的脚本lose.py,有加水印也有解水印代码。仿写
lose.py
class WaterMarkDWT:
def __init__(self, origin: str, watermark: str, key: int, weight: list):
self.key = key
self.img = cv2.imread(origin)
self.mark = cv2.imread(watermark)
self.coef = weight
def arnold(self, img):
r, c = img.shape
p = np.zeros((r, c), np.uint8)
a, b = 1, 1
for k in range(self.key):
for i in range(r):
for j in range(c):
x = (i + b * j) % r
y = (a * i + (a * b + 1) * j) % c
p[x, y] = img[i, j]
return p
def deArnold(self, img):
r, c = img.shape
p = np.zeros((r, c), np.uint8)
a, b = 1, 1
for k in range(self.key):
for i in range(r):
for j in range(c):
x = ((a * b + 1) * i - b * j) % r
y = (-a * i + j) % c
p[x, y] = img[i, j]
return p
def get(self, size: tuple = (1200, 1200), flag: int = None):
img = cv2.resize(self.img, size)
img1 = cv2.cvtColor(img, cv2.COLOR_RGB2GRAY)
img2 = cv2.cvtColor(self.mark, cv2.COLOR_RGB2GRAY)
c = pywt.wavedec2(img2, 'db2', level=3)
[cl, (cH3, cV3, cD3), (cH2, cV2, cD2), (cH1, cV1, cD1)] = c
d = pywt.wavedec2(img1, 'db2', level=3)
[dl, (dH3, dV3, dD3), (dH2, dV2, dD2), (dH1, dV1, dD1)] = d
a1, a2, a3, a4 = self.coef
ca1 = (cl - dl) * a1
ch1 = (cH3 - dH3) * a2
cv1 = (cV3 - dV3) * a3
cd1 = (cD3 - dD3) * a4
waterImg = pywt.waverec2([ca1, (ch1, cv1, cd1)], 'db2')
waterImg = np.array(waterImg, np.uint8)
waterImg = self.deArnold(waterImg)
kernel = np.ones((3, 3), np.uint8)
if flag == 0:
waterImg = cv2.erode(waterImg, kernel)
elif flag == 1:
waterImg = cv2.dilate(waterImg, kernel)
cv2.imwrite('水印.png', waterImg)
return waterImg
if __name__ == '__main__':
img = 'a.png'
k = 20
xs = [0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.4]
W1 = WaterMarkDWT(img, waterImg, k, xs)
改写:
import cv2
import pywt
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
class WaterMarkDWT:
def __init__(self, origin: str, watermark: str, key: int, weight: list):
self.key = key
self.img = cv2.imread(origin)
self.mark = cv2.imread(watermark)
self.coef = weight
def arnold(self, img):
r, c = img.shape
p = np.zeros((r, c), np.uint8)
a, b = 1, 1
for k in range(self.key):
for i in range(r):
for j in range(c):
x = (i + b * j) % r
y = (a * i + (a * b + 1) * j) % c
p[x, y] = img[i, j]
return p
def deArnold(self, img):
r, c = img.shape
p = np.zeros((r, c), np.uint8)
a, b = 1, 1
for k in range(self.key):
for i in range(r):
for j in range(c):
x = ((a * b + 1) * i - b * j) % r
y = (-a * i + j) % c
p[x, y] = img[i, j]
return p
def get(self, size: tuple = (1200, 1200), flag: int = None):
img = cv2.resize(self.img, size)
img1 = cv2.cvtColor(img, cv2.COLOR_RGB2GRAY)
img2 = cv2.cvtColor(self.mark, cv2.COLOR_RGB2GRAY)
c = pywt.wavedec2(img2, 'db2', level=3)
[cl, (cH3, cV3, cD3), (cH2, cV2, cD2), (cH1, cV1, cD1)] = c
d = pywt.wavedec2(img1, 'db2', level=3)
[dl, (dH3, dV3, dD3), (dH2, dV2, dD2), (dH1, dV1, dD1)] = d
a1, a2, a3, a4 = self.coef
ca1 = (cl - dl) * a1
ch1 = (cH3 - dH3) * a2
cv1 = (cV3 - dV3) * a3
cd1 = (cD3 - dD3) * a4
waterImg = pywt.waverec2([ca1, (ch1, cv1, cd1)], 'db2')
waterImg = np.array(waterImg, np.uint8)
waterImg = self.deArnold(waterImg)
kernel = np.ones((3, 3), np.uint8)
if flag == 0:
waterImg = cv2.erode(waterImg, kernel)
elif flag == 1:
waterImg = cv2.dilate(waterImg, kernel)
cv2.imwrite('水印.png', waterImg)
return waterImg
if __name__ == '__main__':
img = 'C:\\Users\\57139\\Desktop\\2024蓝桥杯\\misc\\缺失的数据\\a.png'
k = 20
# xs = [0.2, 0.2, 0.5, 0.4]
# W1 = WaterMarkDWT(img, waterImg, k, xs)
newImg = 'C:\\Users\\57139\\Desktop\\2024蓝桥杯\\misc\\缺失的数据\\newImg.png'
_coef = [5, 5, 1, 2]
W2 = WaterMarkDWT(img, newImg, k, _coef)
wmark = W2.get()
Crypto
cc
直接用cyberchef反过来解密即可
Theorem
from Cryptodome.Util.number import long_to_bytes
import gmpy2
n = 94581028682900113123648734937784634645486813867065294159875516514520556881461611966096883566806571691879115766917833117123695776131443081658364855087575006641022211136751071900710589699171982563753011439999297865781908255529833932820965169382130385236359802696280004495552191520878864368741633686036192501791
d1 = 4218387668018915625720266396593862419917073471510522718205354605765842130260156168132376152403329034145938741283222306099114824746204800218811277063324566
d2 = 9600627113582853774131075212313403348273644858279673841760714353580493485117716382652419880115319186763984899736188607228846934836782353387850747253170850
c = 36423517465893675519815622861961872192784685202298519340922692662559402449554596309518386263035128551037586034375613936036935256444185038640625700728791201299960866688949056632874866621825012134973285965672502404517179243752689740766636653543223559495428281042737266438408338914031484466542505299050233075829
e = 65537
p = gmpy2.next_prime(gmpy2.isqrt(n))
q = n // p
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = gmpy2.invert(e, phi)
mp = pow(c, d % (p-1), p)
mq = pow(c, d % (q-1), q)
a = gmpy2.invert(p, q)
b = gmpy2.invert(q, p)
tmp1 = mp * p * a
tmp2 = mq * q * b
m = (tmp1 + tmp2) % (p * q)
print(long_to_bytes(m))
Cryptodome: pip install pycryptodomex
signature
题目内容:
椭圆曲线数字签名算法,它利用椭圆曲线密码学(ECC)对数字签名算法(DSA)进行模拟,其安全性基于椭圆曲线离散对数问题。但是当某些数值相同时会出现一些安全问题。
题目代码
分析代码可以看出,存在随机数重复使用。具体来说,这段代码中签名的过程中使用了相同的随机数 k 来对不同的消息进行签名。这种情况下,可以通过分析两个相同 k 值对应的消息签名来恢复私钥 dA。
在 ECDSA 中,每次签名过程中都会使用一个随机数 k,以确保生成唯一的签名。然而,如果相同的随机数 k 被重复使用来对不同的消息进行签名,攻击者就有可能通过数学分析和推导计算出私钥 dA。
解密脚本
import sympy
from hashlib import sha1
from Cryptodome.Util.number import long_to_bytes , bytes_to_long
def calculate_private_key(r1, s1, s2, h1, h2, n):
# 计算k值
k = ((h1 - h2) * sympy.mod_inverse(s1 - s2, n)) % n
# 计算私钥dA
dA = (sympy.mod_inverse(r1, n) * (k * s1 - h1)) % n
return dA
if __name__ == "__main__":
# 定义椭圆曲线的参数
n = 0xfffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364141
# 签名中的r1, s1, s2值
r1 = 4690192503304946823926998585663150874421527890534303129755098666293734606680
s1 = 111157363347893999914897601390136910031659525525419989250638426589503279490788
s2 = 74486305819584508240056247318325239805160339288252987178597122489325719901254
h1 = bytes_to_long(sha1(b'Hi.').digest())
h2 = bytes_to_long(sha1(b'hello.').digest())
private_key = calculate_private_key(r1, s1, s2, h1, h2, n)
print(f'flag{{{private_key}}}')