AKA简单翻译认证与密钥协商

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本文档详细介绍了使用AKA（Authentication and Key Agreement）在HTTP Digest访问认证中的实现，作为一次性密码生成机制。AKA是一种基于挑战-响应的对称加密机制，适用于UMTS网络中的用户认证和会话密钥分发。内容涵盖AKA机制概述、Digest AKA的规范、安全考虑等多个方面，旨在提供互联网社区的信息，但不指定任何互联网标准。

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Network Working Group                                           A. Niemi
Request for Comments: 3310                                         Nokia
Category: Informational                                         J. Arkko
                                                             V. Torvinen
                                                                Ericsson
                                                          September 2002

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication
Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Abstract

   This memo specifies an Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) based
   one-time password generation mechanism for Hypertext Transfer
   Protocol (HTTP) Digest access authentication. The HTTP
   Authentication Framework includes two authentication schemes: Basic
   and Digest. Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for
   access authentication. The AKA mechanism performs user
   authentication and session key distribution in Universal Mobile
   Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. AKA is a challenge-
   response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography.

Niemi, et. al. Informational [Page 1]

RFC 3310 HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA September 2002

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
   1.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   1.2 Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   2. AKA Mechanism Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3. Specification of Digest AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   3.1 Algorithm Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   3.2 Creating a Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   3.3 Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   3.4 Synchronization Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   3.5 Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   4. Example Digest AKA Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.1 Authentication of Clients using Digest AKA . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.2 Limited Use of Nonce Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.3 Multiple Authentication Schemes and Algorithms . . . . . . . . 14
   5.4 Online Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.5 Session Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.6 Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.7 Improvements to AKA Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.1 Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

1. Introduction and Motivation

   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Framework,
   described in RFC 2617 [2], includes two authentication schemes: Basic
   and Digest. Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for
   access authentication. The Basic scheme is inherently insecure in
   that it transmits user credentials in plain text. The Digest scheme
   improves security by hiding user credentials with cryptographic
   hashes, and additionally by providing limited message integrity.

   The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) [6] mechanism performs
   authentication and session key distribution in Universal Mobile
   Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. AKA is a challenge-
   response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography. AKA is
   typically run in a UMTS IM Services Identity Module (ISIM), which
   resides on a smart card like device that also provides tamper
   resistant storage of shared secrets.

Niemi, et. al. Informational [Page 2]

RFC 3310 HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA September 2002

   This document specifies a mapping of AKA parameters onto HTTP Digest
   authentication. In essence, this mapping enables the usage of AKA as
   a one-time password generation mechanism for Digest authentication.

   As the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [3] Authentication Framework
   closely follows the HTTP Authentication Framework, Digest AKA is
   directly applicable to SIP as well as any other embodiment of HTTP
   Digest.

1.1 Terminology

This chapter explains the terminology(术语) used in this document.

   AKA
      Authentication and Key Agreement.
      认证与键协议。

   AuC
      Authentication Center. The network element in mobile networks
      that can authorize users either in GSM or in UMTS networks.
      认证中心，在GSM和UMTS网络中用于验证用户。

   AUTN
      Authentication Token. A 128 bit value generated by the AuC, which
      together with the RAND parameter authenticates the server to the
      client.
      网络认证令牌。由认证中心产生的128位数值，并从服务器传输给客户的；认证令牌携带着RAND.

   AUTS
      Authentication Token. A 112 bit value generated by the client
      upon experiencing an SQN synchronization failure.
      认证令牌。由客户生成的112位数值。

   CK
      Cipher Key. An AKA session key for encryption.
      密钥。

   IK
      Integrity Key. An AKA session key for integrity check.
      完整性校验密钥。

ISIM
IP Multimedia Services Identity Module.

   PIN
      Personal Identification Number. Commonly assigned passcodes for
      use with automatic cash machines, smart cards, etc.
      个人识别号。

   RAND
      Random Challenge. Generated by the AuC using the SQN.
      随机口令。认证中心根据SQN产生。

   RES
      Authentication Response. Generated by the ISIM.
      认证响应。客户端产生的。

Niemi, et. al. Informational [Page 3]

RFC 3310 HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA September 2002

   SIM
      Subscriber Identity Module. GSM counter part for ISIM.
      用户ID
   SQN
      Sequence Number. Both AuC and ISIM maintain the value of the SQN.

   UMTS
      Universal Mobile Telecommunications System.
      通用移动电信系统

   XRES
      Expected Authentication Response. In a successful authentication
      this is equal to RES.
      期望认证响应。期望认证响应是保存在服务其端的。如果期望认证响应等于认证响应，则成功认证。

1.2 Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [1].

2. AKA Mechanism Overview

This chapter describes the AKA operation in detail:

   1. A shared secret K is established beforehand between the ISIM and
      the Authentication Center (AuC). The secret is stored in the
      ISIM, which resides on a smart card like, tamper resistant device.
      共享密钥K是根据ISIM和AUC预先定义的。他存储于ISIM中，ISIM保存在智能卡中。

   2. The AuC of the home network produces an authentication vector AV,
      based on the shared secret K and a sequence number SQN. The
      authentication vector contains a random challenge RAND, network
      authentication token AUTN, expected authentication result XRES, a
      session key for integrity check IK, and a session key for
      encryption CK.
      认证中心根据共享密钥K和序列号产生认证矢量(AV)。认证矢量包含一下信息：
      随机口令(RAND)、网络认证令牌(AUTN)、期望认证响应(XRES)、密钥(CK)和完整性密钥(IK)。

3. The authentication vector is downloaded to a server. Optionally,
the server can also download a batch of