sshd-修改后可完全调试的代码

/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.516 2018/09/21 12:23:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
 *                    All rights reserved
 * This program is the ssh daemon.  It listens for connections from clients,
 * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
 * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
 * connection.  This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
 * authentication agent connections.
 *
 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
 * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
 *
 * SSH2 implementation:
 * Privilege Separation:
 *
 * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "includes.h"

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>

#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>

#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif

#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
#endif

#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"

#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
int allow_severity;
int deny_severity;
#endif /* LIBWRAP */

/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)

extern char *__progname;

/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;

/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;

/*
 * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
 * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
 * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
 * the first connection.
 */
int debug_flag = 0;

/*
 * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
 * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
 * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
 * "-C" flag.
 */
int test_flag = 0;

/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
int inetd_flag = 0;

/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
int no_daemon_flag = 0;

/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
int log_stderr = 0;

/* Saved arguments to main(). */
char **saved_argv;
int saved_argc;

/* re-exec */
int rexeced_flag = 0;
int rexec_flag = 1;
int rexec_argc = 0;
char **rexec_argv;

/*
 * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
 * signal handler.
 */
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
int num_listen_socks = 0;

/*
 * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
 * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
 */
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;

/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
int have_agent = 0;

/*
 * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
 * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
 * that the pages do not get written into swap.  However, there are some
 * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
 * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
 * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
 */
struct
{
	struct sshkey **host_keys;		   /* all private host keys */
	struct sshkey **host_pubkeys;	   /* all public host keys */
	struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
	int have_ssh2_key;
} sensitive_data;

/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;

/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];

/* same for ssh2 */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;

/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX + 1;

/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
int *startup_pipes = NULL;
int startup_pipe; /* in child */

/* variables used for privilege separation */
int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;

/* global authentication context */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;

/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;

/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;

/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;

/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;

/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);

/*
 * Close all listening sockets
 */
static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
		close(listen_socks[i]);
	num_listen_socks = -1;
}

static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
	int i;

	if (startup_pipes)
		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
				close(startup_pipes[i]);
}

/*
 * Signal handler for SIGHUP.  Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
 * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
 * the server key).
 */

/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
	int save_errno = errno;

	received_sighup = 1;
	errno = save_errno;
}

/*
 * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
 * Restarts the server.
 */
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
	if (options.pid_file != NULL)
		unlink(options.pid_file);
	platform_pre_restart();
	close_listen_socks();
	close_startup_pipes();
	alarm(0);				 /* alarm timer persists across exec */
	signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
	logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
		  strerror(errno));
	exit(1);
}

/*
 * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
 */
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
	received_sigterm = sig;
}

/*
 * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will then
 * reap any zombies left by exited children.
 */
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
	int save_errno = errno;
	pid_t pid;
	int status;

	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
		   (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
		;
	errno = save_errno;
}

/*
 * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
 */
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
		kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);

	/*
	 * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
	 * keys command helpers.
	 */
	if (getpgid(0) == getpid())
	{
		signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
		kill(0, SIGTERM);
	}

	/* Log error and exit. */
	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
		   ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
}

static void
sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
	u_int i;
	int remote_major, remote_minor;
	char *s;
	char buf[256];			  /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
	char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */

	xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
			  PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
			  options.debian_banner ? SSH_RELEASE : SSH_RELEASE_MINIMUM,
			  *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
			  options.version_addendum);

	/* Send our protocol version identification. */
	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
				 strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string))
	{
		logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d",
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
		cleanup_exit(255);
	}

	/* Read other sides version identification. */
	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++)
	{
		if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1)
		{
			logit("Did not receive identification string "
				  "from %s port %d",
				  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
			cleanup_exit(255);
		}
		if (buf[i] == '\r')
		{
			buf[i] = 0;
			/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
			if (i == 12 &&
				strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
				break;
			continue;
		}
		if (buf[i] == '\n')
		{
			buf[i] = 0;
			break;
		}
	}
	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
	client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);

	/*
	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
	 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
	 */
	if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
			   &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
	{
		s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
		(void)atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
		logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
			  "from %s port %d",
			  client_version_string,
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
		close(sock_in);
		close(sock_out);
		cleanup_exit(255);
	}
	debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
		  remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);

	ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);

	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0)
	{
		logit("probed from %s port %d with %s.  Don't panic.",
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
			  client_version_string);
		cleanup_exit(255);
	}
	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0)
	{
		logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s.  Don't panic.",
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
			  client_version_string);
		cleanup_exit(255);
	}
	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
	{
		logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
			  "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys",
			  remote_version);
	}

	chop(server_version_string);
	debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);

	if (remote_major != 2 &&
		!(remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99))
	{
		s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
		(void)atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
		close(sock_in);
		close(sock_out);
		logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: "
			  "%.200s vs. %.200s",
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
			  server_version_string, client_version_string);
		cleanup_exit(255);
	}
}

/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
	u_int i;

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
		{
			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
		}
		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])
		{
			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
		}
	}
}

/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
	struct sshkey *tmp;
	u_int i;
	int r;

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
		{
			if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
					 sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
				fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s",
					  sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]),
					  ssh_err(r));
			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
		}
		/* Certs do not need demotion */
	}
}

static void
reseed_prngs(void)
{
	u_int32_t rnd[256];

#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
	RAND_poll();
#endif
	arc4random_stir();				  /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */

#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
	/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
	if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
		fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif

	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}

static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
	gid_t gidset[1];

	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
	privsep_challenge_enable();

#ifdef GSSAPI
	/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
	ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif

	reseed_prngs();

	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
	demote_sensitive_data();

	/* Demote the child */
	if (privsep_chroot)
	{
		/* Change our root directory */
		if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
			fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
				  strerror(errno));
		if (chdir("/") == -1)
			fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));

		/* Drop our privileges */
		debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
			   (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
		gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
		if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
			fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
		permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
	}
}

static int
privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
	int status, r;
	pid_t pid;
	struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;

	/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
	pmonitor = monitor_init();
	/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
	pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex;

	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
	pid = fork();
	if (pid == -1)
	{
		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
	}
	else if (pid != 0)
	{
		debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);

		pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
		if (have_agent)
		{
			r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
			if (r != 0)
			{
				error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
					  ssh_err(r));
				have_agent = 0;
			}
		}
		if (box != NULL)
			ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
		monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);

		/* Wait for the child's exit status */
		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
		{
			if (errno == EINTR)
				continue;
			pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
			fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
		}
		privsep_is_preauth = 0;
		pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
		if (WIFEXITED(status))
		{
			if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
				fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
					  __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
		}
		else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
			fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
				  __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
		if (box != NULL)
			ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
		return 1;
	}
	else
	{
		/* child */
		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);

		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);

		privsep_preauth_child();
		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
		if (box != NULL)
			ssh_sandbox_child(box);

		return 0;
	}
}

static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
	if (1)
	{
#else
	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0)
	{
#endif
		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
		use_privsep = 0;
		goto skip;
	}

	/* New socket pair */
	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);

	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0)
	{
		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
		sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
		monitor_clear_keystate(pmonitor);
		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);

		/* NEVERREACHED */
		exit(0);
	}

	/* child */

	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;

	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
	demote_sensitive_data();

	reseed_prngs();

	/* Drop privileges */
	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw, authctxt->role);

skip:
	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
	monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);

	/*
	 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
	 * this information is not part of the key state.
	 */
	packet_set_authenticated();
}

static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
	int r;

	if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1)
	{
		debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
			   __func__, s);
		return;
	}
	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}

static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
	struct sshbuf *b;
	struct sshkey *key;
	char *ret;
	u_int i;

	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
		if (key == NULL)
			key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
		if (key == NULL)
			continue;
		switch (key->type)
		{
		case KEY_RSA:
			/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
			append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
			append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
			/* FALLTHROUGH */
		case KEY_DSA:
		case KEY_ECDSA:
		case KEY_ED25519:
		case KEY_XMSS:
			append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
			break;
		}
		/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
		key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
		if (key == NULL)
			continue;
		switch (key->type)
		{
		case KEY_RSA_CERT:
			/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
			append_hostkey_type(b,
								"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
			append_hostkey_type(b,
								"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
			/* FALLTHROUGH */
		case KEY_DSA_CERT:
		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
		case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
		case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
			append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
			break;
		}
	}
	if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
	sshbuf_free(b);
	debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret);
	return ret;
}

static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	u_int i;
	struct sshkey *key;

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		switch (type)
		{
		case KEY_RSA_CERT:
		case KEY_DSA_CERT:
		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
		case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
		case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
			key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
			break;
		default:
			key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
			if (key == NULL && !need_private)
				key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
			break;
		}
		if (key != NULL && key->type == type &&
			(key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
			return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
	}
	return NULL;
}

struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}

struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}

struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
	if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
		return (NULL);
	return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}

struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
		return (NULL);
	return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}

int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
	u_int i;

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
		{
			if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
				(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
				 sshkey_equal(key,
							  sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
				return (i);
		}
		else
		{
			if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
				(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
				 sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
				return (i);
			if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
				(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
				 sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
				return (i);
		}
	}
	return (-1);
}

/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
	struct sshbuf *buf;
	struct sshkey *key;
	u_int i, nkeys;
	int r;
	char *fp;

	/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
		return;

	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
	for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
		if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
			sshkey_is_cert(key))
			continue;
		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
								SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
		debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
			   sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
		free(fp);
		if (nkeys == 0)
		{
			packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
			packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com");
			packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */
		}
		sshbuf_reset(buf);
		if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
			fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
				  __func__, i, ssh_err(r));
		packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
		nkeys++;
	}
	debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
	if (nkeys == 0)
		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
	packet_send();
	sshbuf_free(buf);
}

/*
 * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
 * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
 * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
 * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
 */
static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
	int p, r;

	if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
		return 0;
	if (startups >= options.max_startups)
		return 1;
	if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
		return 1;

	p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
	p += options.max_startups_rate;
	r = arc4random_uniform(100);

	debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}

static void
usage(void)
{
	fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
			SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
			SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
#else
			"without OpenSSL"
#endif
	);
	fprintf(stderr,
			"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
			"            [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
			"            [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n");
	exit(1);
}

static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
	struct sshbuf *m;
	int r;

	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
		   sshbuf_len(conf));

	/*
	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
	 *	string	configuration
	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
	 */
	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));

#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
	rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif

	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);

	sshbuf_free(m);

	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}

static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
	struct sshbuf *m;
	u_char *cp, ver;
	size_t len;
	int r;

	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);

	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
	if (ver != 0)
		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
	rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
#endif

	free(cp);
	sshbuf_free(m);

	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}

/* Accept a connection from inetd */
static void
server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
{
	int fd;

	startup_pipe = -1;
	if (rexeced_flag)
	{
		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
		*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
		if (!debug_flag)
		{
			startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
		}
	}
	else
	{
		*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
		*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
	}
	/*
	 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
	 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
	 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
	 */
	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1)
	{
		dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
		dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
		if (!log_stderr)
			dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
		if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
			close(fd);
	}
	debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
}

/*
 * Listen for TCP connections
 */
static void
listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
	int ret, listen_sock;
	struct addrinfo *ai;
	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];

	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next)
	{
		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
			continue;
		if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
			fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
				  "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
							   ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
							   NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
		{
			error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
				  ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
			continue;
		}
		/* Create socket for listening. */
		listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
							 ai->ai_protocol);
		if (listen_sock < 0)
		{
			/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
			continue;
		}
		if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1)
		{
			close(listen_sock);
			continue;
		}
		if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
		{
			verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
			close(listen_sock);
			continue;
		}
		/* Socket options */
		set_reuseaddr(listen_sock);
		if (la->rdomain != NULL &&
			set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1)
		{
			close(listen_sock);
			continue;
		}

		/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
			sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);

		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);

		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0)
		{
			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
				  strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
			close(listen_sock);
			continue;
		}
		listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
		num_listen_socks++;

		/* Start listening on the port. */
		if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
			fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
				  ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
		logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.",
			  ntop, strport,
			  la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
			  la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain);
	}
}

static void
server_listen(void)
{
	u_int i;

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++)
	{
		listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]);
		freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs);
		free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain);
		memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0,
			   sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i]));
	}
	free(options.listen_addrs);
	options.listen_addrs = NULL;
	options.num_listen_addrs = 0;

	if (!num_listen_socks)
		fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}

/*
 * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
 * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
 */
static void
server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
	fd_set *fdset;
	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
	int startups = 0;
	int startup_p[2] = {-1, -1};
	struct sockaddr_storage from;
	socklen_t fromlen;
	pid_t pid;
	u_char rnd[256];

	/* setup fd set for accept */
	fdset = NULL;
	maxfd = 0;
	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
		if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
			maxfd = listen_socks[i];
	/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
	startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
	for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
		startup_pipes[i] = -1;

	/*
	 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
	 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
	 */
	for (;;)
	{
		if (received_sighup)
			sighup_restart();
		free(fdset);
		fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
						sizeof(fd_mask));

		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
			FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
				FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);

		/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
		ret = select(maxfd + 1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
		if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
			error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
		if (received_sigterm)
		{
			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
				  (int)received_sigterm);
			close_listen_socks();
			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
				unlink(options.pid_file);
			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
		}
		if (ret < 0)
			continue;

		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
				FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset))
			{
				/*
				 * the read end of the pipe is ready
				 * if the child has closed the pipe
				 * after successful authentication
				 * or if the child has died
				 */
				close(startup_pipes[i]);
				startup_pipes[i] = -1;
				startups--;
			}
		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
		{
			if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
				continue;
			fromlen = sizeof(from);
			*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
							  (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
			if (*newsock < 0)
			{
				if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
					errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
					error("accept: %.100s",
						  strerror(errno));
				if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
					usleep(100 * 1000);
				continue;
			}
			if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1)
			{
				close(*newsock);
				continue;
			}
			if (drop_connection(startups) == 1)
			{
				char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock);
				char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock);

				verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d "
						"on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups",
						startups,
						raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock),
						laddr, get_local_port(*newsock));
				free(laddr);
				free(raddr);
				close(*newsock);
				continue;
			}
			if (pipe(startup_p) == -1)
			{
				close(*newsock);
				continue;
			}

			if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
										 SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1)
			{
				error("reexec socketpair: %s",
					  strerror(errno));
				close(*newsock);
				close(startup_p[0]);
				close(startup_p[1]);
				continue;
			}

			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1)
				{
					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
					if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
						maxfd = startup_p[0];
					startups++;
					break;
				}

			/*
			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
			 * we are in debugging mode.
			 */
			if (debug_flag)
			{
				/*
				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
				 * socket, and start processing the
				 * connection without forking.
				 */
				debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
				close_listen_socks();
				*sock_in = *newsock;
				*sock_out = *newsock;
				close(startup_p[0]);
				close(startup_p[1]);
				startup_pipe = -1;
				pid = getpid();
				if (rexec_flag)
				{
					send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
					close(config_s[0]);
				}
				break;
			}

			/*
			 * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and have
			 * the child process the connection. The
			 * parent continues listening.
			 */
			platform_pre_fork();
			if ((pid = fork()) == 0)
			{
				/*
				 * Child.  Close the listening and
				 * max_startup sockets.  Start using
				 * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
				 * logging (since our pid has changed).
				 * We break out of the loop to handle
				 * the connection.
				 */
				platform_post_fork_child();
				startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
				close_startup_pipes();
				close_listen_socks();
				*sock_in = *newsock;
				*sock_out = *newsock;
				log_init(__progname,
						 options.log_level,
						 options.log_facility,
						 log_stderr);
				if (rexec_flag)
					close(config_s[0]);
				break;
			}

			/* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */
			platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
			if (pid < 0)
				error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
			else
				debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);

			close(startup_p[1]);

			if (rexec_flag)
			{
				send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
				close(config_s[0]);
				close(config_s[1]);
			}
			close(*newsock);

			/*
			 * Ensure that our random state differs
			 * from that of the child
			 */
			arc4random_stir();
			arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
			RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
			if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
				fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
		}

		/* child process check (or debug mode) */
		if (num_listen_socks < 0)
			break;
	}
}

/*
 * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
 * return an error if any are found).  Basically we are worried about
 * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
 * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
 * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
 * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
 * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
 * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security.  So we
 * exit here if we detect any IP options.
 */
static void
check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
	int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
	struct sockaddr_storage from;
	u_char opts[200];
	socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
	char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];

	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
	if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
					&fromlen) < 0)
		return;
	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
		return;
	/* XXX IPv6 options? */

	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
				   &option_size) >= 0 &&
		option_size != 0)
	{
		text[0] = '\0';
		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
			snprintf(text + i * 3, sizeof(text) - i * 3,
					 " %2.2x", opts[i]);
		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
			  ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
	}
	return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}

/* Set the routing domain for this process */
static void
set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
	if (name == NULL)
		return; /* default */

	if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0)
	{
		/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
		if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
			return;
	}
	/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
	return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
	int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
	const char *errstr;

	if (name == NULL)
		return; /* default */

	if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0)
	{
		/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
		if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
			return;
	}

	rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
	if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
		fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
	if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
		fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
			  rtable, strerror(errno));
	debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable);
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
	fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
#endif
}

static void
accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
							  const struct sshkey *key)
{
	static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
	u_char *hash;
	size_t len;
	struct sshbuf *buf;
	int r;

	if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
	if (key == NULL)
	{ /* finalize */
		/* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */
		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg),
							  sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0)
			fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
		len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
		hash = xmalloc(len);
		if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0)
			fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__);
		options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash);
		freezero(hash, len);
		ssh_digest_free(ctx);
		ctx = NULL;
		return;
	}
	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__);
	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0)
		fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r));
	if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0)
		fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
	sshbuf_reset(buf);
	sshbuf_free(buf);
}

/*
 * Main program for the daemon.
 */
int main(int ac, char **av)
{
	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
	extern char *optarg;
	extern int optind;
	int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port;
	int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
	const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
	char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
	int config_s[2] = {-1, -1};
	u_int i, j;
	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
	mode_t new_umask;
	struct sshkey *key;
	struct sshkey *pubkey;
	int keytype;
	Authctxt *authctxt;
	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;

	ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);

	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
	saved_argc = ac;
	rexec_argc = ac;
	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
	for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
	saved_argv[i] = NULL;

	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));

	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
	sanitise_stdfd();

	/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
	initialize_server_options(&options);

	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
	options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
	options.address_family = AF_INET;
	debug_flag = 1;
	config_file_name = "./sshd_config";

	closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
	sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;

	/* Fetch our configuration */
	if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);

	load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, cfg, NULL);

	seed_rng();

	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
	fill_default_server_options(&options);

	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
	privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
	privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
	privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
	freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
	privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
	endpwent();

	/* load host keys */
	sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
	sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *));

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
	{
		if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
			continue;
		r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", &key, NULL);
		r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], &pubkey, NULL);
		if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
			r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey);

		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;

		if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent)
		{
			keytype = pubkey->type;
		}
		else if (key != NULL)
		{
			keytype = key->type;
			accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key);
		}
		else
		{
			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
			sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
			continue;
		}

		sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
	}

	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
	sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(struct sshkey *));

	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
		sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;

	setgroups(0, NULL);

	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
	(void)umask(new_umask);

	log_stderr = 1;
	already_daemon = daemonized();

	chdir("/");
	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
	platform_pre_listen();
	server_listen();
	signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
	signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
	signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);

	server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s);
	setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
	fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
	fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);

	alarm(0);
	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
	signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
	signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
	signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
	signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
	signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);

	packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
	packet_set_server();
	ssh = active_state; /* XXX */

	check_ip_options(ssh);
	channel_init_channels(ssh);
	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);

	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
	packet_connection_is_on_socket();
	setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on));
	remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh);
	remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
	rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
	free(laddr);
	signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
	sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
	packet_set_nonblocking();

	authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
	authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
	the_authctxt = authctxt;

	auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults();
	loginmsg = sshbuf_new();
	auth_debug_reset();
	if (use_privsep)
	{
		if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) //等待login
			goto authenticated;
	}

	do_ssh2_kex();
	do_authentication2(authctxt);
	if (use_privsep)
	{
		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
		packet_clear_keys();
		exit(0);
	}

authenticated:
	alarm(0);
	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
	authctxt->authenticated = 1;
	if (use_privsep)
	{
		privsep_postauth(authctxt);
	}

	packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max);
	notify_hostkeys(ssh);
	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); //调用了 do_authenticated2->server_loop2
	packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
	packet_close();
	if (use_privsep)
		mm_terminate();

	exit(0);
}

int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey,
					  u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
					  const char *alg, u_int flag)
{
	int r;

	if (privkey)
	{
		if (PRIVSEP(sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
								alg, datafellows)) < 0)
			fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
	}
	else if (use_privsep)
	{
		if (mm_sshkey_sign(pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
						   alg, datafellows) < 0)
			fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
	}
	else
	{
		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp,
								data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0)
			fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
				  __func__, ssh_err(r));
	}
	return 0;
}

/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
do_ssh2_kex(void)
{
	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {KEX_SERVER};
	struct kex *kex;
	int r;

	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
		options.kex_algorithms);
	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
		options.ciphers);
	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
		options.ciphers);
	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;

	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE)
	{
		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
			myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
	}

	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
		packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
								options.rekey_interval);

	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
		list_hostkey_types());

#ifdef GSSAPI
	{
		char *orig;
		char *gss = NULL;
		char *newstr = NULL;
		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];

		/* 
	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
	 * the other key exchange algorithms
	 */

		if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
			orig = NULL;

		if (options.gss_keyex)
			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
		else
			gss = NULL;

		if (gss && orig)
			xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
		else if (gss)
			newstr = gss;
		else if (orig)
			newstr = orig;

		/* 
	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
  	 * host key algorithm we support
	 */
		if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
			myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";

		if (newstr)
			myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
		else
			fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
	}
#endif

	/* start key exchange */
	if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
		fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
	kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
#endif
	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
#ifdef GSSAPI
	if (options.gss_keyex)
	{
		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
	}
#endif
	kex->server = 1;
	kex->client_version_string = client_version_string;
	kex->server_version_string = server_version_string;
	kex->load_host_public_key = &get_hostkey_public_by_type;
	kex->load_host_private_key = &get_hostkey_private_by_type;
	kex->host_key_index = &get_hostkey_index;
	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;

	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);

	session_id2 = kex->session_id;
	session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;

#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
	packet_put_cstring("markus");
	packet_send();
	packet_write_wait();
#endif
	debug("KEX done");
}

/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void cleanup_exit(int i)
{
	struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */

	if (the_authctxt)
	{
		do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt);
		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
			pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1)
		{
			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
				errno != ESRCH)
				error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
					  pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
		}
	}
	_exit(i);
}