johnny_jiang的专栏

Security Models Access Control Model Access Control Matrix Capabilities Authorization Policies

ABSTRACT The SELinux mandatory access control (MAC) policy has recently added a multi-level security (MLS) model which is able to express a fine granularity of control over a subject’s access rights. The problem is that the richness of this policy makes it impractical to verify, by hand, that a given policy has certain important information flow properties or is compliant with another policy. To address this, we have modeled the SELinux MLS policy using a logical specification and implemented that specification in the Prolog language. Furthermore, we have developed some analyses for testing the properties of a given policy as well an algorithm to determine whether one policy is compliant with another. We have implemented these analyses in Prolog and compiled our implementation into a tool for SELinux MLS policy analysis, called PALMS. Using PALMS, we verified some important properties of the SELinux MLS reference policy, namely that it satisfies the simple security condition and ?-property defined by Bell and LaPadula [2].

IT证据管理的指导准则 HB 171—2003 Preface This handbook has been prepared by Committee IT/012, Information Systems, Security and Identification Technology. It is intended for use as a reference document by a variety of audiences, including— a) executives and Boards responsible for ensuring the existence of records that can be used in protecting the interests of their organization by initiating or defending legal proceedings or in their fulfilling a social responsibility as a witness; b) personnel who are responsible for designing/acquiring information technology systems that produce and/or store records and the staff responsible for their use and operation; c) personnel conducting an investigation or enquiry involving electronic records; and d) adjudicators who base their decision, at least partially on IT evidence (e.g. judiciary, tribunal members, administrative management). The authors recognize the cross-disciplinary nature of the management of IT evidence, involving as it does business, legal and information technology professionals. As far as possible, the handbook has been written in “plain English” minimizing both legal and technical jargon. Qualification This handbook does not purport to provide legal advice. Compliance with this handbook does not guarantee the legal admissibility of electronic records—it is a statement of best practice. Organizations are encouraged to seek both legal and other expert advice when implementing information technology systems that create, store, process or transmit documents of significant evidentiary value. Acknowledgements Standards Australia would like to acknowledge Ajoy Ghosh’s efforts in drafting this handbook, authorship of which was sponsored jointly by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department and the Australian Federal Police. The following organizations have contributed to the writing of this handbook: AusCERT Australian Federal Police Australasian Centre for Policing Research Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Australian Securities and Investment Commission Australian Taxation Office Action Group on E-Commerce Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department Deacons Defence Signals Directorate Standards Australia sub-committee IT/012/04 (Security Techniques)

TKS系列仿真器快速入门手_TKS 系列仿真器的技术优势 TKS 系列仿真器是广州致远电子有限公司推出的高性能实时在线仿真器可以实时在线仿真PHILIPS 半导体公司的80C51 系列单片机的同时还能够实时在线仿真ATMEL HY Winbond 等公司的兼容MCS-51 内核的标准80C51 单片机彻底解决80C51 开发中仿真工具的瓶颈问题 TKS 系列仿真器在硬件上采用了PHILIPS 授权的HOOKS/Bondout 仿真技术并加以改进几乎支持所 有的80C51 系列单片机的实时仿真能保证用户更加方便的操作和更加真实的仿真效果并能直接或通过 简单的升级支持仿真PHILIPS 陆续推出的全系列80C51 内核单片机每种型号的仿真器均能支持多种不同 型号80C51 单片机的仿真我们将能得到世界第一大80C51 内核单片机供应商PHILIPS 半导体公司详尽的 技术支持并为用户提供准确可靠真实的仿真性能 购买正版软件请与德国 Keil 公司签约商业合作伙伴广州周立功单片机发展有限公司联系与此同时 Keil 公司将全面支持我们的仿真器开发TKS 系列仿真器除使用自主版权的调试环境和编译软件外还可 以同Keil 调试软件无缝嵌接并能得到Keil 公司的强力技术援助具备强大调试功能Keil 的IDE 环境将全 面提升TKS 系列仿真器的操作性能

ABSTRACT This contribution describes how Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) is enabled on a Nokia 770 Internet Tablet. It will refer to a procedure done under a Debian [1] Testing (Etch) Environment. The procedure will also be possible under other Linux distributions but since Maemo is built upon Debian, this approach is the most preferrable way to extend Maemo Linux. An SELinux enabled device will provide the possibility of a convenient configuration of the device. Different stakeholders can define detailled access control to the components they maintain. This ensures the interests of the stakeholders by providing the benefits of a Linux based embedded device. Keywords selinux, security, embedded system

This Standard provides a generic guide for managing risk. This Standard may be applied to a very wide range of activities, decisions or operations of any public, private or community enterprise, group or individual. While the Standard has very broad applicability, risk management processes are commonly applied by organizations or groups and so, for convenience, the term ‘organization’ has been used throughout this Standard. This Standard specifies the elements of the risk management process, but it is not the purpose of this Standard to enforce uniformity of risk management systems. It is generic and independent of any specific industry or economic sector. The design and implementation of the risk management system will be influenced by the varying needs of an organization, its particular objectives, its products and services, and the processes and specific practices employed. This Standard should be applied at all stages in the life of an activity, function, project, product or asset. The maximum benefit is usually obtained by applying the risk management process from the beginning. Often a number of discrete studies are carried out at different times, and from strategic and operational perspectives. The process described here applies to the management of both potential gains and potential losses.

This Standard was prepared by the Joint Standards Australia/Standards New Zealand Committee IT-012, Information Systems, Security and Identification Technology and supersedes AS/NZS 4444.1:1999, Information security management, Part 1: Code of practice for information security management. It is identical with ISO/IEC 17799:2000, Information technology—Code of practice for information security management and differs in only very minor editorial details from AS/NZS 4444.1:1999. However the Standard number has been changed to that of the international Standard (ISO/IEC 17799) to minimize any confusion when it is used by organizations internationally. The objective of this Standard is to give recommendations for information security management for use by those who are responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining security in their organization. It is intended to provide a common basis for developing organizational security standards and effective security management practice and to provide confidence in inter-organizational dealings. This Standard is complementary to AS/NZS 4444.2:2000, Information security management, Part 2: Specification for information security management systems (redesignated in Amendment 2 as AS/NZS 7799.2:2000) and HB 231:2000, Information security risk management guidelines. As this Standard is reproduced from an International Standard, the following applies: (a) In the source text ‘this International Standard’ should read ‘this Australian/New Zealand Standard’. (b) A full point should be substituted for a comma when referring to a decimal marker. Information is a vital asset in any organization. The protection and security of information is of prime importance to many aspects of an organization’s business. It is therefore important that an organization implements a suitable set of controls and procedures to achieve information security and manages them to retain that level of security once it is achieved. This Standard is intended for use by managers and employees who are responsible for initiating, implementing and maintaining information security within their organization and it may be considered as a basis for developing organizational security standards. A comprehensive set of controls comprising the best information security practices currently in use is provided in this Standard. This guidance is intended to be as comprehensive as possible. It is intended to serve as a single reference point for identifying the range of controls needed for most situations where information systems are used in industry and commerce and can therefore be applied by large, medium and small organizations. With increasing electronic networking between organizations there is a clear benefit in having a common reference document for information security management. It enables mutual trust to be established between networked information systems and trading partners and provides a basis for the management of these systems between users and service providers. Not all the controls described in this Standard will be relevant to every situation. It cannot take account of local environmental or technological constraints, or be present in a form that suits every potential user in an organization. Consequently this Standard might need to be supplemented by further guidance. It can be used as a basis from which, for example, a corporate policy or an inter-company trading agreement can be developed. The guidance and recommendations provided throughout this Standard should not be quoted as if they were specifications. In particular, care should be taken to ensure that claims of compliance are not misleading. It has been assumed in the drafting of this Standard that the execution of its recommendations is entrusted to suitably qualified and experienced people.

Preface The IT Baseline Protection Manual contains standard security safeguards, implementation advice and aids for numerous IT configurations which are typically found in IT systems today. This information is intended to assist with the rapid solution of common security problems, support endeavours aimed at raising the security level of IT systems and simplify the creation of IT security policies. The standard security safeguards collected together in the IT Baseline Protection Manual are aimed at a protection requirement which applies to most IT systems. For the majority of IT systems, this considerably facilitates the task of drawing up a security policy, hitherto a labour-intensive process, by eliminating the need for extensive, and often complex, analyses of threats and probabilities of occurrence. If the manual is used, all that is required to identify security shortcomings and specify appropriate security measures is to compare the target safeguards presented here with the actual safeguards in operation. The IT Baseline Protection Manual has been created so that it can be continuously updated and extended. It is revised every six months to incorporate suggestions for improvements, additional material and reflect the latest IT developments. I would like to thank those users of the IT Baseline Protection Manual who have contributed to this version. Dr. Udo Helmbrecht

信息安全风险管理指导准则 AS HB231 Preface The vulnerability of today’s information society is still not sufficiently realised: Businesses, administrations and society depend to a high degree on the efficiency and security of modern information technology. In the business community, for example, most of the monetary transactions are administered by computers in the form of deposit money. Electronic commerce depends on safe systems for money transactions in computer networks. A company’s entire production frequently depends on the functioning of its data-processing system. Many businesses store their most valuable company secrets electronically. Marine, air, and space control systems, as well as medical supervision, rely to a great extent on modern computer systems. Computers and the Internet also play an increasing role in the education and leisure of minors. International computer networks are the nerves of the economy, the public sector and society. The security of these computer and communication systems is therefore of essential importance. European Commission 1998 Ever more powerful personal computers, converging technologies and the widespread use of the Internet have replaced what were modest, stand-alone systems in predominantly closed networks. Today, participants are increasingly interconnected and the connections cross national borders. In addition, the Internet supports critical infrastructures such as energy, transportation and finance and plays a major part in how companies do business, how governments provide services to citizens and enterprises and how individual citizens communicate and exchange information. The nature and type of technologies that constitute the communications and information infrastructure also have changed significantly. The number and nature of infrastructure access devices have multiplied to include fixed, wireless and mobile devices and a growing percentage of access is through “always on” connections. Consequently, the nature, volume and sensitivity of information that is exchanged has expanded substantially. As a result of increasing interconnectivity, information systems and networks are now exposed to a growing number and a wider variety of threats and vulnerabilities. OECD 2002 Information security risk management forms the basis for an assessment of an organization’s information security framework. With increasing electronic networking between organizations for a very wide range of applications, which impacts on most aspects of life in our society, there is a clear benefit in having a common set of reference documents for information security management. This enables mutual trust to be established between networked sites and trading partners and provides a basis for management of facilities between information users and service providers. Security for information systems is an essential requirement at organizational, national and international levels. This handbook was revised in 2003 to be consistent with AS/NZS 7799.2:2003. This Joint Australia/New Zealand Handbook has been prepared by Committee IT-012, Information Systems, Security and Identification Technology. This publication extends the generic work done by Committee OB/7, Risk Management to specifically address the area of information security management. Information security risk management guidelines issued by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as ISO/IEC TR 13335, Information technology— Guidelines for the management of IT security have been adapted to align with the Australian and New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360, Risk management. AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799 establishes a code of practice for selecting information security controls (or equivalently treating information security risks). AS/NZS 7799.2 (BS 7799.2) specifies an information security management system. Both documents require that a risk assessment process is used as the basis for selecting controls (treating risks). This Handbook complements these Standards by providing additional guidance concerning management of information security risks. The guidance in this Handbook is not intended to be a comprehensive schedule of information security threats and vulnerabilities. It is intended to serve as a single reference point describing an information security risk management process suitable for most situations encountered in industry and commerce and therefore can be applied by a wide range of organizations. Not all of the steps described in the handbook are relevant to every situation, nor can they take account of local environmental or technological constraints, or be presented in a form that suits every potential user in an organization. Safety critical applications in particular will require additional consideration of factors specific to the circumstances and relevant Standards should be consulted in such cases. Consequently, these guidelines may require to be augmented by further guidance before they can be used as a basis (for example) for corporate policy or an inter-company trading agreement. It has been assumed in the drafting of these guidelines, that the execution of their provisions is entrusted to appropriately qualified and experienced people.

这个就是前不久被暴露极易被黑的WPS 一键设置网络的技术详解。这个本来应该带来安全的快速介入方法，成了最不安全的协议。只因为几乎所有网络路由器供应商没有设定Lockup 锁定功能。造成居然可以被野蛮攻击。另：它的算法导致密码空间大小缩小到几个小时内能试一遍。

Wireless LAN Security Outline • Introduction: – Base-station / Ad-hoc • Standards – 802.11 / HiperLAN / HomeRF • 802.11 – WEP / WPA / 802.11i • WEP – Authentication / Confidentiality / Integrity • WPA / 802.11i – 4-way Handshake Protocol / TKIP / AES-CCMP / Upperlayer Authentication

澳新信息安全标准13335——2003 / ISO标准13335——1997 第四部分：安全保障的选择 Australian Standard™ Information technology—Guidelines for the management of IT Security Part 4: Selection of safeguards

Prof. Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing Macquarie University Security Policies Trust Security Layer Design Security Services Placement of Security Layer Transparency / Integration / Commercial Reality Management of Security Services Management Information Base Security Management Protocols Secure Signaling Trusted Authorities Infrastructure Certification Authorities

Prof. Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing Macquarie University Distributed Computing Client Server Model Distributed Authentication Kerberos Authorization Middleware Security DCE Security CORBA Security Web Services Security

Guidelines for the management of IT Security Part 1: Concepts and models for IT Security

澳新信息安全标准13335——2003 / ISO标准13335——1997 第五部分：网络安全管理指导 Australian Standard™ Information technology—Guidelines for the management of IT Security Part 5: Management guidance on network security

Executive Summary COBIT

CRYPTOGRAPHY Prof. Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing Director: Information and Networked System Security Research Group Venkat Balakrishnan Research Scholar, INSS Research Group Macquarie University

Prof. Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing Macquarie University Overview Security Models Access Control Access Policies Information Flow Model Multilevel Security Model Secure System Verification Access Control in Operating Systems Security Evaluation Criteria

把上学时的课件拉出来晒晒。 Prof. Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing, Australia Macquarie University

Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium Washington, D.C., USA August 4–8, 2003

为了换取一点积分，把上学时的课件拿来和大家分享。

澳新信息安全标准13335——2003 / ISO标准13335——1997 第二部分：管理与计划IT安全 Information technology—Guidelines for the management of IT Security Part 2: Managing and planning IT Security

澳新信息安全标准13335——2003 / ISO标准13335——1997 第三部分：IT安全管理技术 Guidelines for the management of IT Security Part 3: Techniques for the management of IT Security

Framework COBIT Framework is the basis of the COBIT approach and the foundation for all the other COBIT elements. The process model is organized into four domains: Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor and Evaluate.

Key Management and Authentication Symmetric Key Management Public Key Management Authentication Exchange Certification

Security Architecture Vijay Varadharajan Professor and Microsoft Chair in Computing Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Traditional Views Discretionary Access Users at their discretion specify who can access what Mandatory Access Subjects and Objects have fixed security attributes that are used by the System to determine access Users cannot modify security attributes System (Sec. Admin) decides

Zaobin Gan, Jiufei Tang and Ping Wu College of Computer Science and Technology Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, P.R. China Email: zhgan@hust.edu.cn Vijay Varadharajan Department of Computing, Macquarie University NSW 2109, Sydney, Australia Email: vijay@ics.mq.edu.au Abstract Quantitative security risk evaluation of information systems is increasingly drawing more and more attention. This paper extends the attack tree model, and proposes a new quantitative risk evaluation method .While the risk value of the leaf node (atomic attack) is quantified, the multiattribute utility theory is adopted. All algorithms are presented for each steps of this new evaluation method. In addition, a worked example is also experimented in this paper. The experimental result shows that the novel method can not only make the evaluation result more reasonable and objective, but also offer a good foundation for the implementation of the automatic evaluation tool.1