[Computer Security : Art and Science] Chapter_1 1.1 基础部分

1.1 基础部分

  计算机安全建立在保密性,完整性和可用性的基础之上。对于这三个方面的解释各不相同,它们发生的环境也各不相同。一个方面在给定环境下的解释是由个人、风俗习惯和特定组织的法律需要而定的。

1.1.1 保密性

  保密性是指信息和资源的隐蔽性。保持信息机密性的需要源于在敏感领域中的计算机的使用(如政府和工业领域)。如军用和民用机构往往对需要这些信息的人限制信息的获取。计算机安全的第一个正式的工作是由军方试图实施控制的,以执行“need to know”原则。这一原则也使用于工业企业,这些企业用这一原则来保持其专有设计的安全性以免他们的竞争对手抢走他们的设计。举一个更进一步的例子,所有类型的机构都要保持其人事记录的保密性。

访问控制机制支持保密性。保持一个访问控制系统的保密性的方法是运用加密系统,其将数据打乱使数据变的无法理解。加密密匙控制加密前数据的访问,但随后加密密匙本身变为另外一个需要被保护的数据。

示例:一个加密的所得税申报表禁止任何人阅读。如果该拥有人需要读此申报表,它必须被破译。只有密匙的持有者可以将其输入一个解密程序进行解密。但是,如果当它被输入到解密程序时其他人读到了密匙,税收报表的保密性就受到了破坏。

其他与系统相关的机制可以防止信息的非法访问。与加密数据不同,当控制失败或者被控制机制被绕过时,仅仅使用这种控制所保护的数据就会被读取。然后将其优点与其相应的一个缺点相抵消,然后综合来看,我们可以看出这种方式与加密数据相比,其可以更完全的保持了数据的保密性。但是如果这种方式失效或者被避过了,数据就变的可见。

保密性也适用于数据的存在性,这有时比数据本身更容易暴露。不信任一个政客的确切人数与知道该调查是由该政客的工作人员所做的这一信息相比可能就不那么重要了。一个特定的政府机构如果骚扰其国家的公民与知道发生了这样的骚扰相比可能也不那么重要了。访问控制机制有时候也隐藏了数据的存在,以免数据本身的存在透漏出一些应该被保护的信息。

资源隐藏是保密性的另一个重要方面,网站经常希望隐藏他们的配置以及他们所使用的系统。一些机构可能并不希望别人知道他们的专用设备(因为那些设备可以在没有授权的情况下或者以不恰当的方式使用),而公司租用服务供应商的服务时可能不想让别人知道它使用什么资源。访问控制机制也可以提供这些功能。

所有执行保密性的机制都需要系统的支持服务。其假设是,安全服务可以依靠内核以及其他代理来提供正确的数据。因此该假设及信任是保密机制的基础。

1.1.2 完整性

完整性是指数据或者资源的可信任度,并且其通常在防止非法错误或者非法变更的时候使用。完整性包括数据完整性(信息内容)和来源完整性(数据的来源,通常称为认证)。信息源可以承担它的准确性和可信度以及人们对信息的信任。这种一分为二的对完整性的解释规则说明可信性是一个系统正常运作的中心。当讨论恶意逻辑时我们将回到这个问题。

示例:一家报纸可以印刷出从白宫获得的泄露的信息,但要将其归结于错误的来源。被印刷出来的信息与接收到的信息一致(保持数据的完整性),但其来源是不正确的(破坏了来源完整性)

完整性机制分为两类:防范机制和检测机制。

防范机制通过阻止任何未经授权的改变数据的尝试以及阻止通过未经授权的方式试图改变数据的行为来保持数据的完整性。这两种类型的行为之间的区别是很重要的。前者是指这种情况:用户试图改变数据但是她并没有权利去改变数据。后者是指:用户被授权对数据进行特定的改变但用户却尝试用其他的方法来改变数据。例如,假设一个计算机上的会计系统。有人侵入系统并试图修改账单数据,这时未授权用户已试图破坏此系统数据库的完整性。但是如果由该公司聘请的一个会计师试图通过将钱发送到海外并且隐藏这笔交易来侵吞这笔钱并且令账簿保持原样,用户(会计师)已试图通过未经授权的方式(将钱移动到瑞士银行账户)来改变数据(会计系统的数据)。适当的认证和访问控制通常会停止来自外部的闯入,但防止第二种类型的尝试需要非常特殊的控制。

检测机制并不试图阻止对于完整性的破坏行为;他们只是做一个简单的报告:数据的完整性不再值得信赖。监测机制可以分析系统事件(用户或者系统行为)以检测问题或者(更经常)可以分析数据本身来看需要或者期望的限制是否还继续保持。该机制可能会报告完整性破坏(一个文件的特定部分被修改)的真正原因,或者其可能只是简单的报告该文件现在已损坏。

完整性工作不同于机密性工作。机密性,数据要么失密要么没有,但完整性包括数据的正确性和可信度。数据的来源(数据是从哪得到的以及怎样得到的),当数据到达当前机器之前是如何进行保护的,以及数据在当前机器上是如何进行保护的都影响数据的完整性。因此,完整性的评估通常是很困难的,因为它依赖于对数据来源的假设以及对数据来源信任的假设——安全性的两个支柱(常常被忽视)。

1.1.3 可用性

可用性是指使用所需的信息或资源的能力。可用性是可靠性和系统设计的一个重要方面,因为一个不可用的系统和没有系统相比,至少是和没有系统的情况一样坏的。与安全方面相关的可用性是指,有人可能故意通过使其不可用来拒绝访问数据或服务。系统设计通常假定一个统计模型来分析所使用的预期模式,并且当统计模型成立时,假定一个机制来确保可用性。有人可能能够操作使用(或控制使用的参数,如网络传输)以使统计模型的假设不再有效。这意味着用于保持资源或数据可用性的机制在一种他们没有设计的环境下工作。其结果是,他们往往会失败。

示例:假设安妮损害了一个银行的辅助系统服务器,该服务器提供账户余额。当别人询问该服务器一些信息时,安妮能够提供任何她想提供的信息。商人通过联系银行的主平衡服务器进行验证检查。如果一个商人得不到响应,辅助服务器会被要求提供数据。安妮的同伙阻止商人与主平衡服务器进行联系。因此,所有商户查询到的都是辅助服务器提供的信息。安妮将永远不会拒绝一个检查(?)不管她实际的账户余额。请注意,如果银行只有一台服务器(主平衡服务器),这种方案是行不通的。商人将无法验证检查。

试图破坏可用性称为服务攻击拒绝,这可能是最不易察觉的。因为分析师必须判断不同寻常的访问模式是否归因于刻意的资源或环境的操作。将这种判断复杂化是统计模型的性质。即使模型准确的描述了环境,非典型事件只是有助于统计的性质。复议试图使资源不可用可能只是看起来像或者是非典型事件。在某些环境中,甚至可能并不会出现非典型事件。

 

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本书详尽地介绍了计算机安全的理论与实践,阐释了该领域最基本和最普遍的知识,包括计算机安全的本质和面临的挑战,策略与安全的关系,密码学的角色与应用,策略实现机制,保障技术和方法学,脆弱性分析和入侵检测等。同时把计算机系统、网络、人为因素和密码学等概念融为一体,本书可作为信息安全、计算机等相关专业本科生、研究生的教科书和学习参考书,也可作为维护网络和计算机系统安全的管理人员、信息安全技术开发人员的工具书和参考书。 The importance of computer security has increased dramatically during the past few years. Bishop provides a monumental reference for the theory and practice of computer security. This is a textbook intended for use at the advanced undergraduate and introductory graduate levels, non-University training courses, as well as reference and self-study for security professionals. Comprehensive in scope, this covers applied and practical elements, theory, and the reasons for the design of applications and security techniques. Bishop treats the management and engineering issues of computer. Excellent examples of ideas and mechanisms show how disparate techniques and principles are combined (or not) in widely-used systems. Features a distillation of a vast number of conference papers, dissertations and books that have appeared over the years, providing a valuable synthesis. This book is acclaimed for its scope, clear and lucid writing, and its combination of formal and theoretical aspects with real systems, technologies, techniques, and policies. Preface Goals Philosophy Organization Roadmap Dependencies Background UndergraduateLevel GraduateLevel Practitioners SpecialAcknowledgment Acknowledgments PART1:INTRODUCTION ChapterIAnOverviewofComputerSecurity 1.1TheBasicComponents 1.2Threats 1.3PolicyandMechanism 1.4AssumptionsandTrust 1.5Assurance 1.6OperationalIssues 1.7HumanIssues 1.8TyingItAllTogether 1.9Summary 1.10ResearchIssues 1.11FurtherReading 1.12Exercises PART2:FOUNDATIONS Chapter2AccessControlMatrix 2.1ProtectionState 2.2AccessControlMatrixModel 2.3ProtectionStateTransitions 2.4Copying,Owning,andtheAttenuationofPrivilege 2.5Summary 2.6ResearchIssues 2.7FurtherReading 2.8Exercises Chapter3FoundationalResults 3.1TheGeneralQuestion 3.2BasicResults 3.3TheTake-GrantProtectionModel 3.4ClosingtheGap 3.5ExpressivePowerandtheModels 3.6Summary 3.7ResearchIssues 3.8FurtherReading 3.9Exercises PART3:POLICY Chapter4SecurityPolicies 4.1SecurityPolicies 4.2TypesofSecurityPolicies 4.3TheRoleofTrust 4.4TypesofAccessControl 4.5PolicyLanguages 4.6Example:AcademicComputerSecurityPolicy 4.7SecurityandPrecision 4.8Summary 4.9ResearchIssues 4.10FurtherReading 4.11Exercises Chapter5ConfidentialityPolicies 5.1GoalsofConfidentialityPolicies 5.2TheBell-LaPadulaModel 5.3Tranquility 5.4TheControversyovertheBell-LaPadulaModel 5.5Summary 5.6ResearchIssues 5.7FurtherReading 5.8Exercises Chapter6IntegrityPolicies 6.1Goals 6.2BibaIntegrityModel 6.3Lipner'sIntegrityMatrixModel 6.4Clark-WilsonIntegrityModel 6.5Summary 6.6ResearchIssues 6.7FurtherReading 6.8Exercises Chapter7HybridPolicies 7.1ChineseWallModel 7.2ClinicalInformationSystemsSecurityPolicy 7.3OriginatorControlledAccessControl 7.4Role-BasedAccessControl 7.5Summary 7.6ResearchIssues 7.7FurtherReading 7.8Exercises Chapter8NoninterferenceandPolicyComposition 8.1TheProblem 8.2DeterministicNoninterference 8.3Nondeducibility 8.4GeneralizedNoninterference 8.5Restrictiveness 8.6Summary 8.7ResearchIssues 8.8FurtherReading 8.9Exercises PART4:IMPLEMENTATIONI:CRYPTOGRAPHY Chapter9BasicCryptography 9.1WhatIsCryptography? 9.2ClassicalCryptosystems 9.3PublicKeyCryptography 9.4CryptographicChecksums 9.5Summary 9.6ResearchIssues 9.7FurtherReading 9.8Exercises Chapter10KeyManagement 10.1SessionandInterchangeKeys 10.2KeyExchange 10.3KeyGeneration 10.4CryptographicKeyInfrastructures 10.5StoringandRevokingKeys 10.6DigitalSignatures 10.7Summary 10.8ResearchIssues 10.9FurtherReading 10.10Exercises Chapter11CipherTechniques 11.1Problems 11.2StreamandBlockCiphers 11.3NetworksandCryptography 11.4ExampleProtocols 11.5Summary 11.6ResearchIssues 11.7FurtherReading 11.8Exercises Chapter12Authentication 12.1AuthenticationBasics 12.2Passwords 12.3Challenge-Response 12.4Biometrics 12.5Location 12.6MultipleMethods 12.7Summary 12.8ResearchIssues 12.9FurtherReading 12.10Exercises PART5:IMPLEMENTATIONII:SYSTEMS Chapter13DesignPrinciples 13.1Overview 13.2DesignPrinciples 13.3Summary 13.4ResearchIssues 13.5FurtherReading 13.6Exercises Chapter14RepresentingIdentity 14.1WhatIsIdentity? 14.2FilesandObjects 14.3Users 14.4GroupsandRoles 14.5NamingandCertificates 14.6IdentityontheWeb 14.7Summary 14.8ResearchIssues 14.9FurtherReading 14.10Exercises Chapter15AccessControlMechanisms 15.1AccessControlLists 15.2Capabilities 15.3LocksandKeys 15.4Ring-BasedAccessControl 15.5PropagatedAccessControlLists 15.6Summary 15.7ResearchIssues 15.8FurtherReading 15.9Exercises Chapter16InformationFlow 16.1BasicsandBackground 16.2NonlatticeInformationFlowPolicies 16.3Compiler-BasedMechanisms 16.4Execution-BasedMechanisms 16.5ExampleInformationFlowControls 16.6Summary 16.7ResearchIssues 16.8FurtherReading 16.9Exercises Chapter17ConfinementProblem 17.1TheConfinementProblem 17.2Isolation 17.3CovertChannels 17.4Summary 17.5ResearchIssues 17.6FurtherReading 17.7Exercises PART6:ASSURANCEContributedbyElisabethSullivan Chapter18IntroductiontoAssurance 18.1AssuranceandTrust 18.2BuildingSecureandTrustedSystems 18.3Summary 18.4ResearchIssues 18.5FurtherReading 18.6Exercises Chapter19BuildingSystemswithAssurance 19.1AssuranceinRequirementsDefinitionandAnalysis 19.2AssuranceDuringSystemandSoftwareDesign 19.3AssuranceinImplementationandIntegration 19.4AssuranceDuringOperationandMaintenance 19.5Summary 19.6ResearchIssues 19.7FurtherReading 19.8Exercises Chapter20FormalMethods 20.1FormalVerificationTechniques 20.2FormalSpecification 20.3EarlyFormalVerificationTechniques 20.4CurrentVerificationSystems 20.5Summary 20.6ResearchIssues 20.7FurtherReading 20.8Exercises Chapter21EvaluatingSystems 21.1GoalsofFormalEvaluation 21.2TCSEC:1983-1999 21.3InternationalEffortsandtheITSEC:1991-2001 21.4CommercialInternationalSecurityRequirements:1991 21.5OtherCommercialEfforts:Early1990s 21.6TheFederalCriteria:1992 21.7FIPS140:1994-Present 21.8TheCommonCriteria:1998-Present 21.9SSE-CMM:1997-Present 21.10Summary 21.11ResearchIssues 21.12FurtherReading 21.13Exercises PART7:SPECIALTOPICS Chapter22MaliciousLogic 22.1Introduction 22.2TrojanHorses 22.3ComputerViruses 22.4ComputerWorms 22.5OtherFormsofMaliciousLogic 22.6TheoryofMaliciousLogic 22.7Defenses 22.8Summary 22.9ResearchIssues 22.10FurtherReading 22.11Exercises Chapter23VulnerabilityAnalysis 23.1Introduction 23.2PenetrationStudies 23.3VulnerabilityClassification 23.4Frameworks 23.5GuptaandGligor'sTheoryofPenetrationAnalysis 23.6Summary 23.7ResearchIssues 23.8FurtherReading 23.9Exercises Chapter24Auditing 24.1Definitions 24.2AnatomyofanAuditingSystem 24.3DesigninganAuditingSystem 24.4APosterioriDesign 24.5AuditingMechanisms 24.6Examples:AuditingFileSystems 24.7AuditBrowsing 24.8Summary 24.9ResearchIssues 24.10FurtherReading 24.11Exercises Chapter25IntrusionDetection 25.1Principles 25.2BasicIntrusionDetection 25.3Models 25.4Architecture 25.5OrganizationofIntrusionDetectionSystems 25.6IntrusionResponse 25.7Summary 25.8ResearchIssues 25.9FurtherReading 25.10Exercises PART8:PRACTICUM Chapter26NetworkSecurity 26.1Introduction 26.2PolicyDevelopment 26.3NetworkOrganization 26.4AvailabilityandNetworkFlooding 26.5AnticipatingAttacks 26.6Summary 26.7ResearchIssues 26.8FurtherReading 26.9Exercises Chapter27SystemSecurity 27.1Introduction 27.2Policy 27.3Networks 27.4Users 27.5Authentication 27.6Processes 27.7Files 27.8Retrospective 27.9Summary 27.10ResearchIssues 27.11FurtherReading 27.12Exercises Chapter28UserSecurity 28.1Policy 28.2Access 28.3FilesandDevices 28.4Processes 28.5ElectronicCommunications 28.6Summary 28.7ResearchIssues 28.8FurtherReading 28.9Exercises Chapter29ProgramSecurity 29.1Introduction 29.2RequirementsandPolicy 29.3Design 29.4RefinementandImplementation 29.5CommonSecurity-RelatedProgrammingProblems 29.6Testing,Maintenance,andOperation 29.7Distribution 29.8Conclusion 29.9Summary 29.10ResearchIssues 29.11FurtherReading 29.12Exercises PART9:ENDMATTER Chapter30Lattices 30.1Basics 30.2Lattices 30.3Exercises Chapter31TheExtendedEuclideanAlgorithm 31.1TheEuclideanAlgorithm 31.2TheExtendedEuclideanAlgorithm 31.3Solvingaxmodn=1 31.4Solvingaxmodn=b 31.5Exercises Chapter32EntropyandUncertainty 32.1ConditionalandJointProbability 32.2EntropyandUncertainty 32.3JointandConditionalEntropy 32.4Exercises Chapter33VirtualMachines 33.1VirtualMachineStructure 33.2VirtualMachineMonitor 33.3Exercises Chapter34SymbolicLogic 34.1PropositionalLogic 34.2PredicateLogic 34.3TemporalLogicSystems 34.4Exercises Chapter35ExampleAcademicSecurityPolicy 35.1UniversityofCaliforniaE-mailPolicy 35.2TheAcceptableUsePolicyfortheUniversityofCalifomia,Davis Bibliography Index
Product Description The importance of computer security has increased dramatically during the past few years. Bishop provides a monumental reference for the theory and practice of computer security. This is a textbook intended for use at the advanced undergraduate and introductory graduate levels, non-University training courses, as well as reference and self-study for security professionals. Comprehensive in scope, this covers applied and practical elements, theory, and the reasons for the design of applications and security techniques. Bishop treats the management and engineering issues of computer. Excellent examples of ideas and mechanisms show how disparate techniques and principles are combined (or not) in widely-used systems. Features a distillation of a vast number of conference papers, dissertations and books that have appeared over the years, providing a valuable synthesis. This book is acclaimed for its scope, clear and lucid writing, and its combination of formal and theoretical aspects with real systems, technologies, techniques, and policies. From the Back Cover "This is an excellent text that should be read by every computer security professional and student." —Dick Kemmerer, University of California, Santa Barbara. "This is the most complete book on information security theory, technology, and practice that I have encountered anywhere!" —Marvin Schaefer, Former Chief Scientist, National Computer Security Center, NSA This highly anticipated book fully introduces the theory and practice of computer security. It is both a comprehensive text, explaining the most fundamental and pervasive aspects of the field, and a detailed reference filled with valuable information for even the most seasoned practitioner. In this one extraordinary volume the author incorporates concepts from computer systems, networks, human factors, and cryptography. In doing so, he effectively demonstrates that computer security is an art as well as a science. Computer Security: Art and Science includes detailed discussions on: # The nature and challenges of computer security # The relationship between policy and security # The role and application of cryptography # The mechanisms used to implement policies # Methodologies and technologies for assurance # Vulnerability analysis and intrusion detection Computer Security discusses different policy models, and presents mechanisms that can be used to enforce these policies. It concludes with examples that show how to apply the principles discussed in earlier sections, beginning with networks and moving on to systems, users, and programs. This important work is essential for anyone who needs to understand, implement, or maintain a secure network or computer system.

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