The security log on this system is full

当您尝试登录到运行 Windows XP 或 Windows Server 2003 的计算机时显示消息“此系统上的安全日志已满”

症状

当您试图使用不属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户登录到运行 Microsoft Windows Server 2003 或 Microsoft Windows XP 的计算机上时,可能会在“登录到 Windows”窗口中收到以下消息:
此系统上的安全日志已满,只允许管理员登录以解决问题。
通过使用属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户可以登录计算机,例如内置的 Administrator 帐户。但是,如果您远程登录计算机,则可能会收到下面的消息:
此系统上的安全日志已满

原因

发生此问题的原因是不能向计算机上的安全日志中记录任何其他事件。当无法向安全日志中写入事件时,只有属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户才能够登录到计算...
发生此问题的原因是不能向计算机上的安全日志中记录任何其他事件。当无法向安全日志中写入事件时,只有属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户才能够登录到计算机上。

解决方案
若要解决此问题,请使用属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户登录计算机。然后,执行下面的步骤以指定可以覆盖安全日志事件: 单击“开始”,指向“所有程序...
若要解决此问题,请使用属于 Administrators 组成员的帐户登录计算机。然后,执行下面的步骤以指定可以覆盖安全日志事件:

   1. 单击“开始”,指向“所有程序”,指向“管理工具”,然后单击“事件查看器”。
   2. 右键单击“安全”,然后单击“属性”。
   3. 在“安全属性”窗口的“日志大小”区域中,单击“达到日志大小上限时”下面的“按需要覆盖事件”选项。
   4. 单击“确定”。
   5. 关闭事件查看器。

 

 

 

The security log on this system is full

You usually get this error message after you have set up a computer running Windows XP computer. The computer giving this error is normally part of a network that has a Windows 2003 server or 2003 Small Business Server.

To fix the this log on issue, you must log on to the computer as an administrator and right click on My Computer. Once you right click, Select Manage and expand the event viewer. Then, you must right click on the Security directory and select Properties. Look in the area that says "Log size" and click the radio button that says "Overwrite events as needed."

Now you log off as administrator and the user will be able log on without the "The security log on this system is full" error message.

The Craft of System Security by Sean Smith; John Marchesini List of Figures 1.1 An access control matrix 7 1.2 Security and state spaces 10 2.1 Example clearance order 26 2.2 Example categories order 27 2.3 Example MLS lattice 28 2.4 The *-Property 30 2.5 The Chinese Wall 32 2.6 Functionality versus assurance 33 2.7 Object reuse with local variables 37 2.8 The Orange Book's path through the functionality/assurance space 41 4.1 Basic computer architecture 62 4.2 The memory management unit 65 4.3 Address spaces 66 4.4 System call architecture 67 5.1 LANs and WANs 89 5.2 Switched Ethernet 90 5.3 Network address translation 91 5.4 Resolution and routing in the net 93 5.5 Network ports 93 5.6 Network protocol layers 94 5.7 Network protocol stack 95 5.8 Firewall 98 5.9 BGP 103 5.10 Subnets 110 5.11 DMZ 111 5.12 Basic WLAN architecture 113 5.13 Sniffing Web traffic on WLANs 114 5.14 Sniffing e-mail traffic on WLANs 115 5.15 A common enterprise WLAN strategy 117 5.16 WLAN authorization architecture 117 6.1 A process's address space 126 6.2 Stackframe 127 6.3 Integer overflow 135 6.4 Integer overflow with signed integers 136 6.5 Errors in signed/unsigned conversion 137 6.6 Type-safety and memory-safety 146 7.1 Framing cryptography as a pair of transformations 158 7.2 Explicit privileges 159 7.3 RNG 161 7.4 PRNG 162 7.5 Symmetric cryptography 163 7.6 Stream cipher 166 7.7 Block cipher 167 7.8 Block ciphers with CBC 168 7.9 Meet-in-the-middle attack 170 7.10 Inner-CBC EDE for a block cipher in triple mode 171 7.11 Outer-CBC EDE for a block cipher in triple mode 171 7.12 CBC residue MAC 173 7.13 Public-key cryptography 175 7.14 Encrypting with public key 175 7.15 Digital signatures 176 7.16 Signatures with public key 176 7.17 Diffie-Hellman 179 7.18 The Merkle-Damgard approach 181 7.19 A Merkle tree 182 7.20 Iterated hash functions 182 7.21 Square and multiply 184 7.22 Public-key encryption, in practice 185 7.23 Digital signatures, in practice 186 8.1 The Birthday Paradox on hash values 200 8.2 The Wang attack on MD5 201 8.3 Timing attack on RSA 204 9.1 A "ladder diagram" 216 9.2 A CAPTCHA 218 9.3 Example ROC curve 219 9.4 One-time passwords based on time 227 9.5 One-time passwords based on iterated hashing 228 9.6 The small-n attack 229 9.7 The DND authentication protocol 231 9.8 Key derivation in DND 232 9.9 How the adversary can choose the challenge 232 9.10 The ISO SC27 protocol 233 9.11 Chess Grandmaster attack 234 9.12 Reflection attack 234 9.13 Using graph isomorphism for zero-knowledge authentication 236 9.14 Getting a server ticket in Kerberos 239 9.15 Getting a ticket-granting ticket in Kerberos 240 9.16 SSH 242 9.17 The Ellison triangle 245 10.1 Basic PKI architecture 251 10.2 Using a hamster to keep the CA offline 255 10.3 Cross-certification 260 10.4 Bridge CAs 261 11.1 Timeline of standards 277 12.1 Framesets 312 12.2 Server-side SSL 319 12.3 Client-side SSL 325 12.4 Devious frameset 329 12.5 JavaScript to sneakily send POSTs 330 13.1 Example sequence of letters 341 13.2 Looking at Word documents with emacs 342 13.3 Interesting relics in the binary 342 13.4 Turning Fast Save off 343 13.5 File history in the binary 343 13.6 Craptastic! 345 13.7 Memo purportedly released by Alcatel 346 13.8 A physics paper in Word format 346 13.9 Turning "Track Changes" on 347 13.10 Careful with that Distinguished Name! 350 13.11 Altering a boarding pass 354 13.12 Excel relics in PowerPoint 356 13.13 End-of-line misinterpretation 358 14.1 Secret sharing 371 14.2 Fewer than k points 372 14.3 The basic electronic token cash scheme 373 14.4 Digital timestamping 378 14.5 Renewing old timestamps 379 14.6 Multicollisions 380 14.7 Steganography 384 15.1 State transitions 393 15.2 Partial correctness 394 15.3 Propositional logic 396 15.4 First-order logic 397 15.5 Temporal logic 398 15.6 BAN logic 401 15.7 Sample bank account code 405 15.8 Promela specification for bank withdrawals 406 15.9 Spin reveals a race condition 407 15.10 Promela specification for fixed code 408 16.1 The boot-time execution sequence 428 16.2 Checking integrity at boot time 429 16.3 Separation in conventional system 437 16.4 Separation with Type I virtualization 438 16.5 Separation with Type II virtualization 441 16.6 Separation with OS-level virtualization 442 17.1 The general machine learning framework 453 17.2 A neural network 454 18.1 Conceptual models 474 18.2 A Norman door 479 18.3 ROI and security 481 A.1 A simple lattice 491 A.2 If the real numbers were countable 493 A.3 Cantor's diagonalization 494 A.4 An enumeration of Turing machines 495 A.5 An uncomputable function
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