Karsten Nohl 利用SIM卡GSM鉴权漏洞获取用户秘钥,可以从远程操作和监视手机

昨天德国人Karsten Nohl发现了SIM卡加密鉴权漏洞,成功获得用户的加密秘钥,消息来自NYTimes。看了几个转载新闻,都没把具体东西说明白。最后在NYTimes的原网页中看到了些细节(链接如下)。

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/technology/encryption-flaw-makes-phones-possible-accomplices-in-theft.html?_r=2&


Technial Detail:

Mr. Nohl was able to derive the SIM card’s digital key by sending an SMS disguised as having been sent from the mobile operator. Carriers routinely send specially coded messages to handsets to validate customers’ identities for billing and mobile transactions.

For each message, the network and the phone verify their identities by comparing digital signatures. The message sent by Mr. Nohl deliberately used a false signature for the network. In three-quarters of messages sent to mobile phones using D.E.S. encryption, the handset recognized the false signature and ended communication.

But in a quarter of cases, the phone broke off the communication and sent an error message back to Mr. Nohl that included its own encrypted digital signature. The communication provided Mr. Nohl with enough information to derive the SIM card’s digital key.


原文如下:

Encryption Flaw Makes Phones Possible Accomplices in Theft

BERLIN — If your identity has been stolen, your phone may have been an accomplice to the crime.

Bits

A German mobile security expert says he has found a flaw in the encryption technology used in some SIM cards, the chips in handsets, that could enable cyber criminals to take control of a person’s phone.

Karsten Nohl, founder of Security Research Labs in Berlin, said the encryption hole allowed outsiders to obtain a SIM card’s digital key, a 56-digit sequence that opens the chip up to modification. With that key in hand, Mr. Nohl said, he was able to send a virus to the SIM card through a text message, which let him eavesdrop on a caller, make purchases through mobile payment systems and even impersonate the phone’s owner.

He said he had managed the whole operation in about two minutes, using a simple personal computer. He estimates as many as 750 million phones may be vulnerable to attacks.

“We can remotely install software on a handset that operates completely independently from your phone,” Mr. Nohl said. “We can spy on you. We know your encryption keys for calls. We can read your S.M.S.’s. More than just spying, we can steal data from the SIM card, your mobile identity, and charge to your account.”

Mr. Nohl is well known in security circles. In 2009, he published a software tool that computes the 64-bit key used to encrypt conversations on GSM networks, prompting the industry to adopt better safeguards. His company, Security Research Labs, advises German and U.S. multinational companies on mobile security issues.

Mr. Nohl said the flaw he had discovered was the result of an encryption method developed in the 1970s called data encryption standard, or D.E.S. After uncovering the breach, he researched the pervasiveness of the problem by testing about 1,000 SIM cards on cellphones running on mobile networks in Europe and North America over a two-year period. The phones and SIM cards were owned and used by himself and members of his research team. Mr. Nohl said that about one-quarter of the SIM cards running the older encryption technology exhibited the flaw.

D.E.S. encryption is used on about half of the about six billion cellphones in use daily. Over the past decade, most operators have adopted a stronger encryption method, called Triple D.E.S., but many SIM cards still run the old standard. The encryption is used to disguise the SIM card, and thus a mobile phone’s unique digital signature.

Mr. Nohl has shared the results of his two-year study with the GSM Association, an organization based in London that represents the mobile industry, through a process of “responsible disclosure.” On Aug. 1, he plans to present the full details of his research at the Black Hat conference, a computer hackers’ gathering, in Las Vegas.

In a statement, a GSM Association spokeswoman, Claire Cranton, said Mr. Nohl had sent the association outlines of his study, which the organization had passed along to operators and to makers of SIM cards that still relied on the older encryption standard.

“We have been able to consider the implications and provide guidance to those network operators and SIM vendors that may be impacted,” Ms. Cranton said. She added that it was likely only a minority of phones using the older standard “could be vulnerable.”

Ms. Cranton declined to comment on Mr. Nohl’s estimate that 750 million cellphones might be open to attack, saying the association would not comment until it had reviewed Mr. Nohl’s full research findings in Las Vegas. A large maker of SIM cards, the Dutch company Gemalto, said the GSM Association had told it of Mr. Nohl’s preliminary findings. A second maker of SIM cards, the German company Giesecke & Devrient, said it had “analyzed this attack scenario.”

Gemalto has been working closely with the association and other industry groups “to look into the first outline given by Mr. Nohl,” Gemalto said in a statement. The company said the GSM Association had already disseminated Mr. Nohl’s findings to group members.

Mr. Nohl was able to derive the SIM card’s digital key by sending an SMS disguised as having been sent from the mobile operator. Carriers routinely send specially coded messages to handsets to validate customers’ identities for billing and mobile transactions.

For each message, the network and the phone verify their identities by comparing digital signatures. The message sent by Mr. Nohl deliberately used a false signature for the network. In three-quarters of messages sent to mobile phones using D.E.S. encryption, the handset recognized the false signature and ended communication.

But in a quarter of cases, the phone broke off the communication and sent an error message back to Mr. Nohl that included its own encrypted digital signature. The communication provided Mr. Nohl with enough information to derive the SIM card’s digital key.

Mr. Nohl said he had advised the GSM Association and chip makers to use better filtering technology to block the kind of messages he had sent. He also advised operators to phase out SIM cards using D.E.S. encryption in favor of newer standards. He added that consumers using SIM cards more than three years old should get new cards from their carriers.

Giesecke & Devrient, in a statement, said that it had begun phasing out SIM cards using D.E.S. encryption in 2008. The German company said the unique operating system used in its SIM cards, even those running D.E.S. encryption, would prevent a phone from inadvertently sending the kind of “message authentication code” that Mr. Nohl had used to pierce the encryption.

Mr. Nohl said he was not planning to disclose the identities of the operators whose SIM cards had performed poorly in his study at the Black Hat conference in August. But he said that he planned to publish a comparative list of SIM card security by operator in December at a computer hackers’ conference in Hamburg, Germany, called the Chaos Communication Congress.


转载于:https://blog.51cto.com/backtrackx/1255308

  • 0
    点赞
  • 0
    收藏
    觉得还不错? 一键收藏
  • 0
    评论
GPS车辆监控系统设置车辆说明 硬件设置: 1、将SIM卡放入GPS终端设备,利用手机短信设置SIM卡号为设备号码。 2、利用手机短信设置GPS终端服务器IP及端口号 软件设置: 1、使用用户名sa密码1234登陆进入监控系统主页面 2、点击页面右上方“后台管理” 3、击“车辆管理---添加车辆” 4、添加车辆信息**注意保证,SIm卡号终端序列号与设备上所设置的设备号码一致: 例如:设备设置号码为:13800138000则SIm卡号与终端序列号填写为:013800138000(前面加个0为12为),点击提交资料,车辆添加成功。 5、点击用户管理—添加用户 填入用户信息 admin为管理员账号在权限分配中选上该用户所拥有的权限。 User用户为集团用户只对指定的集群有管理权限,如未选中的集群user用户不能对其进行管理。在权限分配中选上该用户所拥有的权限。 运通GPS系统服务器、客户端、数据接收程序通讯协议v2.0版 协议头:HEAD (0x11 0x12) 协议尾:FOOT(0x13 0x14) 分割苻1:S1(0x00) 分隔符2:S2(0x0e) 分割苻3:S3(0x0f) 主命令字:O1(char) 副命令字:O2(char) 车队ID:tID 车辆ID:cID 帐号ID:aID 返回结果:ret(char), 0x30(0)表示失败, 0x31(1)表示成功, 0x32(2)表示其他结果 数据内容:data 起始时间:sTime 结束时间:eTime 空字段:null 客户端请求及服务器回复: 除测试指令外,其他指令格式如下 HEAD O1 O2 data FOOT 连接相关 主命令字A 连接测试 请求: HEAD @ FOOT 测试只有一个命令字@,回复:同请求 登陆 请求: HEAD A A 类型(char) 用户名 S1 密码 FOOT 类型为车队用户时,用户名可以为tID或者车队名 类型为车辆用户时,用户名可以为cID或者车牌 回复 HEAD A A ret data FOOT 登陆失败,data为空,登陆成功data如下: 用户信息 S1 车队1信息 S1 车队2信息 S1 指令通道信息 其中,车队信息、指令通道信息详细如下 车队信息 S3 车辆1信息 S3 车队2信息 S3 车辆3信息 指令通道1 S2 指令通道2 S2 指令通道3 退出 请求: HEAD A B FOOT 回复: 无 位置信息相关 主命令字B 监控 请求: HEAD B A tID或者cID FOOT 回复: HEAD B A data FOOT data:cID + S1 + 位置信息 + cID + S1+位置信息… 停止监控 请求: HEAD B B tID或者cID或者留空 FOOT 留空表示停止所有监控 回复:无 定位 请求: HEAD B C cID FOOT 回复: HEAD B C ret 数据 FOOT ret表示失败时,data为cID 否则data为cID + S1 + 位置信息 历史轨迹 请求: HEAD B D cID S1 sTime S1 eTime FOOT 回复: HEAD B D cID S1 信息点1 S2 信息点2 S2 信息点3 … FOOT 历史报警 请求: HEAD B E cIDs S1 sTime S1 eTime FOOT cIDs格式为cID1 + S2 + cID2 + S2 + cID3… 回复: HEAD B E 报警点1 S1 报警点2 S1 报警点3 … FOOT 区域查车 请求: HEAD B F 区域 S1 sTime S1 eTime FOOT 区域格式为 点1经度+S1+点1纬度+点2经度+S1+点2纬度… 至少需要三个点 回复: HEAD B F cID1 S1 cID2 S1 … FOOT 里程查询 请求: HEAD B G cID S1 sTime S1 eTime FOOT 回复: HEAD B G cID 里程数 FOOT 自定义标注查询 请求: HEAD B H 关键字 FOOT 回复: HEAD B H data FOOT data格式为:点1名称+S2+点1经度+S2+点1纬度+S1+点2名称+S1+点2经度+S1+点2纬度… 自定义标注 请求: HEAD B I 名称 S1 经度 S1 纬度 FOOT 回复: HEAD B I ret FOOT 其他信息相关 主命令字C 获取帐号列表 请求: HEAD C A null FOOT 回复: HEAD C A ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为帐号列表数据,格式为:帐号1信息+S1+帐号2信息+S1+帐号3信息… Ret为失败时,data包含获取失败的原因 添加帐号 请求: HEAD C B 新帐号信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C B ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 修改帐号 请求: HEAD C C 帐号信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C C ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 删除帐号 请求: HEAD C D aID FOOT 回复: HEAD C D ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 添加车队 请求: HEAD C E 新车队信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C E ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 修改车队 请求: HEAD C F 车队信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C F ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 删除车队 请求: HEAD C G tID FOOT 回复: HEAD C G ret data FOOT 成功时不返回 Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 添加车辆 请求: HEAD C H 新车辆信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C H ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 修改车辆 请求: HEAD C I 车辆信息 FOOT 回复: HEAD C I ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 删除车辆 请求: HEAD C J cID FOOT 回复: HEAD C J ret data FOOT 成功时不返回 Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 设置相关 主命令字D 取得终端设置 请求: HEAD D A cID S1 设置类型 FOOT 回复: HEAD D A ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为获取的终端上传字符串 Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 发送指令 请求: HEAD D B cIDs S1 协议类型 S1 指令类型 S1 指令内容 FOOT cIDs格式为cID1 + S2 + cID2 + S2 + cID3… 回复: HEAD D B ret data FOOT Ret为成功时,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的车牌号码 设置服务状态 请求: HEAD D C cID S1 服务状态 FOOT 回复: HEAD D C ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,S1,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 设置服务日期 请求: HEAD D D cID S1 服务日期 S1 是否修改服务状态 FOOT 回复: HEAD D D ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,S1,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 设置操作提示 请求: HEAD D E cID S1 是否启用 S1 sTime S1 eTime S1 提示内容 FOOT 回复: HEAD D E ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,S1,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 报警相关 主命令字E 接警 请求: HEAD E A cID S1 接警/取消接警 FOOT 回复: HEAD E A ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,S1,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 解除报警 请求: HEAD E B cID S1 是否下发解除报警指令 FOOT 回复: HEAD E B ret cID S1 data FOOT Ret为成功时,S1,data为null Ret为失败时,data包含失败的原因 发布公告 主命令字F 给所有客户端信息 请求: HEAD F A 发言内容 FOOT 回复: 无 给管理员信息 请求: HEAD F B 发言内容 FOOT 回复: 无 给用户信息 请求: HEAD F C 发言内容 FOOT 回复: 无 查询统计 主命令字G 操作记录查询 请求: HEAD G A 查询条件 FOOT 回复: HEAD G A data FOOT 指令记录查询 请求: HEAD G B 查询条件 FOOT 回复: HEAD G B data FOOT 服务器发送更新信息到客户端 不需要回复 系统信息更新 主命令字X 添加车队: HEAD X A 新车队信息 FOOT 修改车队 HEAD X B 车队信息 FOOT 删除车队 HEAD X C tID FOOT 添加车辆 HEAD X D 新车辆信息 FOOT 修改车辆 HEAD X E 车辆信息 FOOT 删除车辆 HEAD X F cID FOOT 修改帐号信息 HEAD X G data FOOT Data内容同登陆信息,不包含指令通道信息 新报警信息 HEAD X H 新报警点信息 FOOT 报警已接警/解除 HEAD X I cID FOOT 修改服务状态 HEAD X J cID S1 服务状态 FOOT 修改服务日期 HEAD X K cID S1 服务日期 S1 服务状态 FOOT 修改操作提示 HEAD X L cID S1 开启/关闭 S1 sTime S1 eTime 提示内容 FOOT 服务器运行信息 主命令字Y 服务器普通信息 HEAD Y A 信息 FOOT 服务器警告信息 HEAD Y B 信息 FOOT 服务器错误信息 HEAD Y C 信息 FOOT 公告信息 主命令字F 服务器接到客户端的公告信息后,根据条件发送给相关客户 给所有客户端信息 HEAD F A 发言人 S1 发言内容 FOOT 给所有管理员信息 HEAD F B 发言人 S1 发言内容 FOOT 给所有用户信息 HEAD F C 发言人 S1 发言内容 FOOT 服务器与数据接收程序通讯 登陆验证 发送: HEAD A 验证码 FOOT 回复: HEAD A ret FOOT 接收和发送信息 发送: HEAD B 来源或目的 S1 信息内容 FOOT
AVR-GSM是一个设计出色的电路板,通过添加GSM蜂窝网络实现远程监控和控制功能。你想打开或者关闭山区的当地供暖系统吗?要监控最多8个远程点和距离模块最远30米的温度吗?在收到警报状态消息后,通过静音呼叫收听您家中发生的事情?那么AVR-GSM就是你最好的选择! 该AVR-GSM开发板包含一个ATmega32微控制器和一个3频段GSM GPRS模块900/1800 / 1900Mhz,其中涵盖了世界上最常用的GSM网络。GSM天线是在电路板中构建的,因此不需要任何外部昂贵的GSM天线。 AVR-GSM有两个继电器240VAC / 10A,两个光隔离输入可连接到报警传感器或只是用户操作按钮(如呼叫预加载电话号码),板载温度传感器和连接器,最多可连接8个距离模块最远30米的可寻址远程温度传感器。可以将普通电话挂钩连接到该板,以允许用户作为普通的独立蜂窝电话说话,收听,接听和拨打电话。AVR-GSM可通过其USB连接器连接到PC,它被识别为调制解调器,可用于通过GPRS向您的计算机提供互联网(想象一下,如果没有互联网但只有蜂窝网络!)。 AVR-GSM开发板实物截图: 特性: MCU:ATMega32 32KB闪存,2KB RAM,1KB EEPROM JTAG连接器,用于使用AVR-JTAG-L或AVR-JTAG-USB进行编程和调试 GSM GPRS 3-BAND MODULE 900/1800 / 1900Mhz,带有板载GSM蜂窝天线 温度传感器内置GSM模块 锂离子备用电池长达200小时的GSM模块待机(无继电器等外设有效) SIM卡座 两个继电器240VAC / 10A 两个optoisolated输入 USB接口 手机挂钩连接器 蜂鸣器(铃声) 状态LED 用于板载温度数字传感器的垫 用于远程温度传感器的连接器,距离AVR-GSM最远30米 塑料外壳(可选) 扩展26针连接器,用于所有未使用的ATMega32端口

“相关推荐”对你有帮助么?

  • 非常没帮助
  • 没帮助
  • 一般
  • 有帮助
  • 非常有帮助
提交
评论
添加红包

请填写红包祝福语或标题

红包个数最小为10个

红包金额最低5元

当前余额3.43前往充值 >
需支付:10.00
成就一亿技术人!
领取后你会自动成为博主和红包主的粉丝 规则
hope_wisdom
发出的红包
实付
使用余额支付
点击重新获取
扫码支付
钱包余额 0

抵扣说明:

1.余额是钱包充值的虚拟货币,按照1:1的比例进行支付金额的抵扣。
2.余额无法直接购买下载,可以购买VIP、付费专栏及课程。

余额充值