After the discovery of the Iraqi and North Korean undeclared nuclear activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards procedures were strengthened considerably. Earlier it was suggested that observations from commercial remote sensing satellites could enhance the Agency’s safeguards procedures [1]. After a number of studies on the use of such imageries in the safeguards procedures [2, 3, 4] the IAEA is now using this technique [5] to check declared and to look for undeclared nuclear facilities. For an effective use of satellite imageries, it is important to determine whether there are identifiable signatures related to nuclear facilities that could be used in the identification and interpretation of such imageries. Initially, in this study only nuclear power reactors were examined to determine if any identifiable common features emerge which then could be used:
in algorithms developed to detect automatically facilities in a satellite image;
to see if within different types of power reactors, common features could be identified;
to verify efficiently information provided by a Member State, thus reducing onsite inspections; and
to build, for example, databases on facilities in States where onsite inspections are not possible because they have not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) and/or the IAEA’s safeguards agreements. This capability is important if further proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be minimised.
It is recognised that under the new extended safeguards agreement, Member States are obliged to give detailed information on their nuclear activities. Such information is verified by extensive onsite inspections but they tend to be costly and time consuming. Satellite imageries could not only minimise such problems but also contribute effectively in planning for inspections and identification of any changes in the facilities that may occur.