博弈论pdf_西工大博弈论与人工智能团队博士生李洋在SCI期刊Physical Review E发表论文...

西工大博弈论与人工智能团队博士生李洋在SCI期刊《Physical Review E》发表论文“Evolutionary public goods game on the bi-random geometric graph”。

论文简介

为了研究空间公共品博弈中合作的演变，本文建立了一个双随机几何图，将分别代表参与者和公共品的两种类型的节点放置在单位正方形的随机位置。每个公共物品都有一个影响范围，并且属于同一范围的个人参与同一个公共物品博弈。与仅由一种类型的节点组成的经典网络模型相比，双随机几何图提供了一种自然的方式来描述个人和公共资源彼此独立的情况。数值模拟表明，当群体规模和每个人参加的平均群体数量相对较小时，可以显著促进合作，这与方格网络上的仿真结果不同，但与Ostrom和Olson等人的大量实证研究相一致。对演化过程的分析表明，合作涌现的主要原因在于可以有效抵抗背叛者入侵的合作团体的形成。

期刊简介

《Physical Review E》是高质量的交叉学科期刊，中科院分区：数学物理领域二区，目前影响因子2.353。

英文摘要

Abstract：To investigate the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, this paper establishes a bi-random geometric graph, in which two types of nodes, representing players and public goods respectively, are placed at random locations in the unit square. Each public good has a limit influence range and the individuals that fall into the same range engage in a public good game. In contrast to the classical network models consisting of only one type of nodes, the bi-random geometric graph provides a natural way to describe the scenarios where individuals and public resources are independent of each other. Numerical simulations reveal that cooperation can be significantly promoted when the group size and the average number of groups that each player participates in are relatively small, which is at odds with the results on the square lattice, but is consistent with a body of empirical evidence reported by Ostrom and Olson et al. Analysis of the evolutionary process suggests that the facilitation of cooperation is due primarily to the formation of the cooperative clusters, which can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors.

论文链接

https://journals.aps.org/pre/pdf/10.1103/PhysRevE.101.042303

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