linux读conf文件格式,syslog.conf配置文件详解

LINUX保存了系统中所发生事件的详细记录,这些记录称作日志文件或消息文件.可以查阅日志文件来确定系统当前状态,观察入侵者踪迹,寻找某特定程序(或事件)相关的数据.

syslogd与klogd(监控linux内核提交的消息)守护进程负责记录,发送系统或工具产生的信息,二者的配置文件都是/etc/syslog.conf.当系统内核或工具产生信息时,通过调用相关函数将信息发送到syslogd或klogd守护进程.syslogd与klogd守护进程会根据/etc/syslog.conf中的配置信息,对消息的去向作出处理.

说明:

syslog.conf是syslogd进程的配置文件,将在程序启动时读取,默认位置是/etc/syslog.conf.这个配置文件中的空白行和以"#"开头的行将被忽略."facility.level"部分也被称为选择符(seletor). seletor和action之间使用一个或多个空白分隔.它指定了一系列日志记录规则.规则的格式如下:

seletor(facility.level)    action

选择符(seletor)(选择符由 facility 和 level 两部分组成,之间用一个句点(.)连接)

A.facility 指定了产生日志的子系统,可以是下面的关键字之一:

关键字              值       解释

kern                0        内核信息,首先通过 klogd 传递.

user                1        由用户程序生成的信息.

mail                2        与电子邮件有关的信息.

daemon              3        与 inetd 守护进程有关的信息.

auth                4        由 pam_pwdb 报告的认证活动.

syslog              5        由 syslog 生成的信息.

lpr                 6        与打印服务有关的信息.

news                7        来自新闻服务器的信息.

uucp                8        由 uucp 生成的信息.(uucp = unix to unix copy)

cron                9        与 cron 和 at 有关的信息.

authpriv           10        包括私有信息(如用户名)在内的认证活动

ftp                11        与 FTP 有关的信息.

12-15        系统保留

local0 ~ local7  16-23        由自定义程序使用,例如使用 local5 做为 ssh 功能

mark                         syslog内部功能用于生成时间戳.

*                            通配符代表除了 mark 以外的所有功能

在大多数情况下,任何程序都可以通过任何facility发送日志消息,但是一般都遵守约定俗成的规则.比如,只有内核才能使用"kern"facility.

B.level指定了消息的优先级,可以是下面的关键字之一(降序排列,严重性越来越低):

关键字               值        解释

emerg                0        系统不可用

alert                1        需要立即被修改的条件

crit                 2        (临界)阻止某些工具或子系统功能实现的错误条件

err                  3        阻止工具或某些子系统部分功能实现的错误条件

warning              4        预警信息

notice               5        具有重要性的普通条件

info                 6        提供信息的消息

debug                7        不包含函数条件或问题的其他信息

none                          (屏蔽所有来自指定设备的消息)没有优先级,通常用于排错

*                             除了none之外的所有级别

facility部分可以是用逗号(,)分隔的多个子系统,而多个seletor之间也可以通过分号(;)组合在一起.

注意:多个组合在一起的选择符,后面的会覆盖前面的,这样就允许从模式中排除一些优先级.

默认将对指定级别以及更严重级别的消息进行操作,但是可以通过下面2个操作符进行修改.

等于操作符(=)表示仅对这个级别的消息进行操作,不等操作符(!)表示忽略这个级别以及更严重级别的消息.这两个操作符可以同时使用,不过"!"必须出现在"="的前面.

动作(action)

动作确定了syslogd与klogd守护进程将日志消息发送到什么地方去.有以下几种选择:

普通文件        使用文件的绝对路径来指明日志文件所在的位置,例如:/var/log/cron.

终端设备        终端可以是/dev/tty0~/dev/tty6,也可以为/dev/console.

用户列表        例如动作为“root hackbutter”,将消息写入到用户root与hackbutter的计算机屏幕上.

远程主机        将信息发往网络中的其他主机的syslogd守护进程,格式为”.

配置文件的语法说明

(1)    *用作设备或优先级时,可以匹配所有的设备或优先级.

(2)    *用作动作时,将消息发送给所有的登录用户.

(3)    多个选择器可在同一行中,并使用分号分隔开,且后面的会覆盖前面的.如,uucp,news.crit.

(4)    关键字none用作优先级时,会屏蔽所有来自指定设备的消息.

(5)    通过使用相同的选择器和不同的动作,同一消息可以记录到多个位置.

(6)    syslog.conf文件中后面的配置行不会覆盖前面的配置行,每一行指定的动作都独立的运作.

实例详解:

//将info或更高级别的消息送到/var/log/messages,除了mail,authpriv,cron以外.

//其中*是通配符,代表任何设备;none表示不对任何级别的信息进行记录.

*.info;mail.none;authpriv.none;cron.none                /var/log/messages

//将mail设备中的任何级别的信息记录到/var/log/maillog文件中,这主要是和电子邮件相关的信息.

mail.*                                                  -/var/log/maillog

//将authpirv设备的任何级别的信息记录到/var/log/secure文件中,这主要是一些和权限使用相关的信息.

authpriv.*                                              /var/log/secure

//将cron设备中的任何级别的信息记录到/var/log/cron文件中,这主要是和系统中定期执行的任务相关的信息.

cron.*                                                  /var/log/cron

//将任何设备的emerg(系统不可用)级别的信息发送给所有正在系统上的用户.

*.emerg                                                 *

//将uucp和news设备的crit(临界)级别的信息记录到/var/log/spooler文件中.

uucp,news.crit                                          /var/log/spooler

//将和系统启动相关的信息记录到/var/log/boot.log文件中.

local7.*                                                /var/log/boot.log

详细情况可参见:RFC3164

附RFC3164:

Network Working Group                                         C. Lonvick

Request for Comments: 3164                                 Cisco Systems

Category: Informational                                      August 2001

The BSD syslog Protocol

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does

not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this

memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

This document describes the observed behavior of the syslog protocol.

This protocol has been used for the transmission of event

notification messages across networks for many years.  While this

protocol was originally developed on the University of California

Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) TCP/IP system implementations,

its value to operations and management has led it to be ported to

many other operating systems as well as being embedded into many

other networked devices.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction....................................................2

1.1 Events and Generated Messages..................................3

1.2 Operations of the Message Receivers............................5

2. Transport Layer Protocol........................................5

3. Definitions and Architecture....................................5

4. Packet Format and Contents......................................7

4.1 syslog Message Parts...........................................8

4.1.1 PRI Part.....................................................8

4.1.2 HEADER Part of a syslog Packet..............................10

4.1.3 MSG Part of a syslog Packet.................................11

4.2 Original syslog Packets Generated by a Device.................12

4.3 Relayed syslog Packets........................................12

4.3.1 Valid PRI and TIMESTAMP.....................................13

4.3.2 Valid PRI but no TIMESTAMP or invalid TIMESTAMP.............13

4.3.3 No PRI or Unidentifiable PRI................................14

5. Conventions....................................................14

5.1 Dates and Times...............................................15

5.2 Domain Name and Address.......................................15

5.3 Originating Process Information...............................15

5.4 Examples......................................................16

6. Security Considerations........................................18

6.1 Packet Parameters.............................................19

6.2 Message Authenticity..........................................19

6.2.1 Authentication Problems.....................................19

6.2.2 Message Forgery.............................................20

6.3 Sequenced Delivery............................................20

6.3.1 Single Source to a Destination..............................20

6.3.2 Multiple Sources to a Destination...........................21

6.3.3 Multiple Sources to Multiple Destinations...................21

6.3.4 Replaying...................................................22

6.4 Reliable Delivery.............................................22

6.5 Message Integrity.............................................22

6.6 Message Observation...........................................22

6.7 Message Prioritization and Differentiation....................23

6.8 Misconfiguration..............................................24

6.9 Forwarding Loop...............................................24

6.10 Load Considerations..........................................25

7. IANA Considerations............................................25

8. Conclusion and Other Efforts...................................25

Acknowledgements..................................................26

References........................................................27

Author's Address..................................................28

Full Copyright Statement..........................................29

1. Introduction

Since the beginning, life has relied upon the transmission of

messages.  For the self-aware organic unit, these messages can relay

many different things.  The messages may signal danger, the presence

of food or the other necessities of life, and many other things.  In

many cases, these messages are informative to other units and require

no acknowledgement.  As people interacted and created processes, this

same principle was applied to societal communications.  As an

example, severe weather warnings may be delivered through any number

of channels - a siren blowing, warnings delivered over television and

radio stations, and even through the use of flags on ships.  The

expectation is that people hearing or seeing these warnings would

realize their significance and take appropriate action.  In most

cases, no responding acknowledgement of receipt of the warning is

required or even desired.  Along these same lines, operating systems,

processes and applications were written to send messages of their own

status, or messages to indicate that certain events had occurred.

These event messages generally had local significance to the machine

operators.  As the operating systems, processes and applications grew

ever more complex, systems were devised to categorize and log these

diverse messages and allow the operations staff to more quickly

differentiate the notifications of problems from simple status

messages.  The syslog process was one such system that has been

widely accepted in many operating systems.  Flexibility was designed

into this process so the operations staff have the ability to

configure the destination of messages sent from the processes running

on the device.  In one dimension, the events that were received by

the syslog process could be logged to different files and also

displayed on the console of the device.  In another dimension, the

syslog process could be configured to forward the messages across a

network to the syslog process on another machine. The syslog process

had to be built network-aware for some modicum of scalability since

it was known that the operators of multiple systems would not have

the time to access each system to review the messages logged there.

The syslog process running on the remote devices could therefore be

configured to either add the message to a file, or to subsequently

forward it to another machine.

In its most simplistic terms, the syslog protocol provides a

transport to allow a machine to send event notification messages

across IP networks to event message collectors - also known as syslog

servers.  Since each process, application and operating system was

written somewhat independently, there is little uniformity to the

content of syslog messages.  For this reason, no assumption is made

upon the formatting or contents of the messages.  The protocol is

simply designed to transport these event messages.  In all cases,

there is one device that originates the message.  The syslog process

on that machine may send the message to a collector.  No

acknowledgement of the receipt is made.

One of the fundamental tenets of the syslog protocol and process is

its simplicity.  No stringent coordination is required between the

transmitters and the receivers.  Indeed, the transmission of syslog

messages may be started on a device without a receiver being

configured, or even actually physically present.  Conversely, many

devices will most likely be able to receive messages without explicit

configuration or definitions.  This simplicity has greatly aided the

acceptance and deployment of syslog.

1.1 Events and Generated Messages

The writers of the operating systems, processes and applications have

had total control over the circumstances that would generate any

message.  In some cases, messages are generated to give status. These

can be either at a certain period of time, or at some other interval

such as the invocation or exit of a program.  In other cases, the

messages may be generated due to a set of conditions being met.  In

those cases, either a status message or a message containing an alarm

of some type may be generated.  It was considered that the writers of

the operating systems, processes and applications would quantify

their messages into one of several broad categories.  These broad

categories generally consist of the facility that generated them,

along with an indication of the severity of the message.  This was so

that the operations staff could selectively filter the messages and

be presented with the more important and time sensitive notifications

quickly, while also having the ability to place status or informative

messages in a file for later perusal.   Other options for displaying

or storing messages have been seen to exist as well.

Devices MUST be configured with rules for displaying and/or

forwarding the event messages.  The rules that have been seen are

generally very flexible.  An administrator may want to have all

messages stored locally as well as to have all messages of a high

severity forwarded to another device.  They may find it appropriate

to also have messages from a particular facility sent to some or all

of the users of the device and displayed on the system console.

However the administrator decides to configure the disposition of the

event messages, the process of having them sent to a syslog collector

generally consists of deciding which facility messages and which

severity levels will be forwarded, and then defining the remote

receiver.  For example, an administrator may want all messages that

are generated by the mail facility to be forwarded to one particular

event message collector.  Then the administrator may want to have all

kernel generated messages sent to a different syslog receiver while,

at the same time, having the critically severe messages from the

kernel also sent to a third receiver.  It may also be appropriate to

have those messages displayed on the system console as well as being

mailed to some appropriate people, while at the same time, being sent

to a file on the local disk of the device.  Conversely, it may be

appropriate to have messages from a locally defined process only

displayed on the console but not saved or forwarded from the device.

In any event, the rules for this will have to be generated on the

device.  Since the administrators will then know which types of

messages will be received on the collectors, they should then make

appropriate rules on those syslog servers as well.

The contents of a message have also been at the discretion of its

creator.  It has been considered to be good form to write the

messages so that they are informative to the person who may be

reading them.  It has also been considered good practice to include a

timestamp and some indication of the sending device and the process

that originated it in the messages.  However, none of those are

stringently required.

It should be assumed that any process on any device might generate an

event message.  This may include processes on machines that do not

have any local storage - e.g., printers, routers, hubs, switches, and

diskless workstations.  In that case, it may be imperative that event

messages are transported to a collector so that they may be recorded

and hopefully viewed by an operator.

1.2 Operations of the Message Receivers

It is beyond the scope of this document to specify how event messages

should be processed when they are received.  Like the operations

described in Section 1.1, they generally may be displayed to the

appropriate people, saved onto disk, further forwarded, or any

combination of these.  The rules for determining the disposition of

received messages have been seen to be identical to the rules for

determining the disposition of locally generated messages.

As a very general rule, there are usually many devices sending

messages to relatively fewer collectors.  This fan-in process allows

an administrator to aggregate messages into relatively few

repositories.

2. Transport Layer Protocol

syslog uses the user datagram protocol (UDP) [1] as its underlying

transport layer mechanism.  The UDP port that has been assigned to

syslog is 514.  It is RECOMMENDED that the source port also be 514 to

indicate that the message is from the syslog process of the sender,

but there have been cases seen where valid syslog messages have come

from a sender with a source port other than 514.  If the sender uses

a source port other than 514 then it is RECOMMENDED and has been

considered to be good form that subsequent messages are from a single

consistent port.

3. Definitions and Architecture

The following definitions will be used in this document.

A machine that can generate a message will be called a

"device".

A machine that can receive the message and forward it to

another machine will be called a "relay".

A machine that receives the message and does not relay it to

any other machines will be called a "collector".  This has been

commonly known as a "syslog server".

Any device or relay will be known as the "sender" when it sends

a message.

Any relay or collector will be known as the "receiver" when it

receives the message.

The architecture of the devices may be summarized as follows:

Senders send messages to relays or collectors with no knowledge

of whether it is a collector or relay.

Senders may be configured to send the same message to multiple

receivers.

Relays may send all or some of the messages that they receive

to a subsequent relay or collector.  In the case where they do

not forward all of their messages, they are acting as both a

collector and a relay.  In the following diagram, these devices

will be designated as relays.

Relays may also generate their own messages and send them on to

subsequent relays or collectors.  In that case it is acting as

a device.  These devices will also be designated as a relay in

the following diagram.

The following architectures shown in Diagram 1 are valid while the

first one has been known to be the most prevalent.  Other

arrangements of these examples are also acceptable.  As noted above,

in the following diagram relays may pass along all or some of the

messages that they receive along with passing along messages that

they internally generate.

+------+         +---------+

|Device|---->----|Collector|

+------+         +---------+

+------+         +-----+         +---------+

|Device|---->----|Relay|---->----|Collector|

+------+         +-----+         +---------+

+------+     +-----+            +-----+     +---------+

|Device|-->--|Relay|-->--..-->--|Relay|-->--|Collector|

+------+     +-----+            +-----+     +---------+

+------+         +-----+         +---------+

|Device|---->----|Relay|---->----|Collector|

|      |-\       +-----+         +---------+

+------+  \

\      +-----+         +---------+

\-->--|Relay|---->----|Collector|

+-----+         +---------+

+------+         +---------+

|Device|---->----|Collector|

|      |-\       +---------+

+------+  \

\      +-----+         +---------+

\-->--|Relay|---->----|Collector|

+-----+         +---------+

+------+         +-----+            +---------+

|Device|---->----|Relay|---->-------|Collector|

|      |-\       +-----+         /--|         |

+------+  \                     /   +---------+

\      +-----+      /

\-->--|Relay|-->--/

+-----+

Diagram 1.  Some Possible syslog Architectures

4. Packet Format and Contents

The payload of any IP packet that has a UDP destination port of 514

MUST be treated as a syslog message.  There MAY be differences

between the format of an originally transmitted syslog message and

the format of a relayed message.  In essence, it is RECOMMENDED to

transmit a syslog message in the format specified in this document,

but it is not required.  If a relay is able to recognize the message

as adhering to that format then it MUST retransmit the message

without making any changes to it.  However, if a relay receives a

message but cannot discern the proper implementation of the format,

it is REQUIRED to modify the message so that it conforms to that

format before it retransmits it.  Section 4.1 will describe the

RECOMMENDED format for syslog messages.  Section 4.2 will describe

the requirements for originally transmitted messages and Section 4.3

will describe the requirements for relayed messages.

4.1 syslog Message Parts

The full format of a syslog message seen on the wire has three

discernable parts.  The first part is called the PRI, the second part

is the HEADER, and the third part is the MSG.  The total length of

the packet MUST be 1024 bytes or less.  There is no minimum length of

the syslog message although sending a syslog packet with no contents

is worthless and SHOULD NOT be transmitted.

4.1.1 PRI Part

The PRI part MUST have three, four, or five characters and will be

bound with angle brackets as the first and last characters.  The PRI

part starts with a leading "   number, which is followed by a ">" ('greater-than' character). The

code set used in this part MUST be seven-bit ASCII in an eight-bit

field as described in RFC 2234 [2].  These are the ASCII codes as

defined in "USA Standard Code for Information Interchange" [3].  In

this, the "   (ABNF) %d60, and the ">" character has ABNF value %d62.  The number

contained within these angle brackets is known as the Priority value

and represents both the Facility and Severity as described below.

The Priority value consists of one, two, or three decimal integers

(ABNF DIGITS) using values of %d48 (for "0") through %d57 (for "9").

The Facilities and Severities of the messages are numerically coded

with decimal values.  Some of the operating system daemons and

processes have been assigned Facility values.  Processes and daemons

that have not been explicitly assigned a Facility may use any of the

"local use" facilities or they may use the "user-level" Facility.

Those Facilities that have been designated are shown in the following

table along with their numerical code values.

Numerical             Facility

Code

0             kernel messages

1             user-level messages

2             mail system

3             system daemons

4             security/authorization messages (note 1)

5             messages generated internally by syslogd

6             line printer subsystem

7             network news subsystem

8             UUCP subsystem

9             clock daemon (note 2)

10             security/authorization messages (note 1)

11             FTP daemon

12             NTP subsystem

13             log audit (note 1)

14             log alert (note 1)

15             clock daemon (note 2)

16             local use 0  (local0)

17             local use 1  (local1)

18             local use 2  (local2)

19             local use 3  (local3)

20             local use 4  (local4)

21             local use 5  (local5)

22             local use 6  (local6)

23             local use 7  (local7)

Table 1.  syslog Message Facilities

Note 1 - Various operating systems have been found to utilize

Facilities 4, 10, 13 and 14 for security/authorization,

audit, and alert messages which seem to be similar.

Note 2 - Various operating systems have been found to utilize

both Facilities 9 and 15 for clock (cron/at) messages.

Each message Priority also has a decimal Severity level indicator.

These are described in the following table along with their numerical

values.

Numerical         Severity

Code

0       Emergency: system is unusable

1       Alert: action must be taken immediately

2       Critical: critical conditions

3       Error: error conditions

4       Warning: warning conditions

5       Notice: normal but significant condition

6       Informational: informational messages

7       Debug: debug-level messages

Table 2. syslog Message Severities

The Priority value is calculated by first multiplying the Facility

number by 8 and then adding the numerical value of the Severity. For

example, a kernel message (Facility=0) with a Severity of Emergency

(Severity=0) would have a Priority value of 0.  Also, a "local use 4"

message (Facility=20) with a Severity of Notice (Severity=5) would

have a Priority value of 165.  In the PRI part of a syslog message,

these values would be placed between the angle brackets as <0> and

<165> respectively.  The only time a value of "0" will follow the "   is for the Priority value of "0". Otherwise, leading "0"s MUST NOT be

used.

4.1.2 HEADER Part of a syslog Packet

The HEADER part contains a timestamp and an indication of the

hostname or IP address of the device.  The HEADER part of the syslog

packet MUST contain visible (printing) characters.  The code set used

MUST also be seven-bit ASCII in an eight-bit field like that used in

the PRI part.  In this code set, the only allowable characters are

the ABNF VCHAR values (%d33-126) and spaces (SP value %d32).

The HEADER contains two fields called the TIMESTAMP and the HOSTNAME.

The TIMESTAMP will immediately follow the trailing ">" from the PRI

part and single space characters MUST follow each of the TIMESTAMP

and HOSTNAME fields.  HOSTNAME will contain the hostname, as it knows

itself.  If it does not have a hostname, then it will contain its own

IP address.  If a device has multiple IP addresses, it has usually

been seen to use the IP address from which the message is

transmitted.  An alternative to this behavior has also been seen.  In

that case, a device may be configured to send all messages using a

single source IP address regardless of the interface from which the

message is sent.  This will provide a single consistent HOSTNAME for

all messages sent from a device.

The TIMESTAMP field is the local time and is in the format of "Mmm dd

hh:mm:ss" (without the quote marks) where:

Mmm is the English language abbreviation for the month of the

year with the first character in uppercase and the other two

characters in lowercase.  The following are the only acceptable

values:

Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec

dd is the day of the month.  If the day of the month is less

than 10, then it MUST be represented as a space and then the

number.  For example, the 7th day of August would be

represented as "Aug  7", with two spaces between the "g" and

the "7".

hh:mm:ss is the local time.  The hour (hh) is represented in a

24-hour format.  Valid entries are between 00 and 23,

inclusive.  The minute (mm) and second (ss) entries are between

00 and 59 inclusive.

A single space character MUST follow the TIMESTAMP field.

The HOSTNAME field will contain only the hostname, the IPv4 address,

or the IPv6 address of the originator of the message.  The preferred

value is the hostname.  If the hostname is used, the HOSTNAME field

MUST contain the hostname of the device as specified in STD 13 [4].

It should be noted that this MUST NOT contain any embedded spaces.

The Domain Name MUST NOT be included in the HOSTNAME field.  If the

IPv4 address is used, it MUST be shown as the dotted decimal notation

as used in STD 13 [5].  If an IPv6 address is used, any valid

representation used in RFC 2373 [6] MAY be used.  A single space

character MUST also follow the HOSTNAME field.

4.1.3 MSG Part of a syslog Packet

The MSG part will fill the remainder of the syslog packet.  This will

usually contain some additional information of the process that

generated the message, and then the text of the message.  There is no

ending delimiter to this part.  The MSG part of the syslog packet

MUST contain visible (printing) characters.  The code set

traditionally and most often used has also been seven-bit ASCII in an

eight-bit field like that used in the PRI and HEADER parts.  In this

code set, the only allowable characters are the ABNF VCHAR values

(%d33-126) and spaces (SP value %d32).  However, no indication of the

code set used within the MSG is required, nor is it expected.  Other

code sets MAY be used as long as the characters used in the MSG are

exclusively visible characters and spaces similar to those described

above.  The selection of a code set used in the MSG part SHOULD be

made with thoughts of the intended receiver.  A message containing

characters in a code set that cannot be viewed or understood by a

recipient will yield no information of value to an operator or

administrator looking at it.

The MSG part has two fields known as the TAG field and the CONTENT

field.  The value in the TAG field will be the name of the program or

process that generated the message.  The CONTENT contains the details

of the message.  This has traditionally been a freeform message that

gives some detailed information of the event.  The TAG is a string of

ABNF alphanumeric characters that MUST NOT exceed 32 characters.  Any

non-alphanumeric character will terminate the TAG field and will be

assumed to be the starting character of the CONTENT field.  Most

commonly, the first character of the CONTENT field that signifies the

conclusion of the TAG field has been seen to be the left square

bracket character ("["), a colon character (":"), or a space

character.  This is explained in more detail in Section 5.3.

4.2 Original syslog Packets Generated by a Device

There are no set requirements on the contents of the syslog packet as

it is originally sent from a device.  It should be reiterated here

that the payload of any IP packet destined to UDP port 514 MUST be

considered to be a valid syslog message.  It is, however, RECOMMENDED

that the syslog packet have all of the parts described in Section 4.1

- PRI, HEADER and MSG - as this enhances readability by the recipient

and eliminates the need for a relay to modify the message.

For implementers that do choose to construct syslog messages with the

RECOMMENDED format, the following guidance is offered.

If the originally formed message has a TIMESTAMP in the HEADER

part, then it SHOULD be the local time of the device within its

timezone.

If the originally formed message has a HOSTNAME field, then it

will contain the hostname as it knows itself.  If it does not

have a hostname, then it will contain its own IP address.

If the originally formed message has a TAG value, then that

will be the name of the program or process that generated the

message.

4.3 Relayed syslog Packets

When a relay receives a packet, it will check for a valid PRI.  If

the first character is not a less-than sign, the relay MUST assume

that the packet does not contain a valid PRI.  If the 3rd, 4th, or

5th character is not a right angle bracket character, the relay again

MUST assume that the PRI was not included in the original message.

If the relay does find a valid PRI part then it must check for a

valid TIMESTAMP in the HEADER part.  From these rules, there will be

three general cases of received messages.  Table 3 gives the general

characteristics of these cases and lists the subsequent section of

this document that describes the handling of that case.

Case                                         Section

Valid PRI and TIMESTAMP                            4.3.1

Valid PRI but no TIMESTAMP or invalid TIMESTAMP    4.3.2

No PRI or unidentifiable PRI                       4.3.3

Table 3. Cases of Received syslog Messages

4.3.1 Valid PRI and TIMESTAMP

If the relay does find a valid PRI and a valid TIMESTAMP, then it

will check its internal configuration.  Relays MUST be configured to

forward syslog packets on the basis of their Priority value.  If the

relay finds that it is configured to forward the received packet,

then it MUST do so without making any changes to the packet.  To

emphasize the point one more time, it is for this reason that it is

RECOMMENDED that the syslog message originally transmitted adhere to

the format described in Section 4.1.

It should be noted here that the message receiver does not need to

validate the time in the TIMESTAMP field.  The assumption may be made

that a device whose date has not been correctly set will still have

the ability to send valid syslog messages.  Additionally, the relay

does not need to validate that the value in the HOSTNAME field

matches the hostname or IP address of the device sending the message.

A reason for this behavior may be found in Section 4.1.2.

4.3.2 Valid PRI but no TIMESTAMP or invalid TIMESTAMP

If a relay does not find a valid TIMESTAMP in a received syslog

packet, then it MUST add a TIMESTAMP and a space character

immediately after the closing angle bracket of the PRI part.  It

SHOULD additionally add a HOSTNAME and a space character after the

TIMESTAMP.  These fields are described here and detailed in Section

4.1.2.  The remainder of the received packet MUST be treated as the

CONTENT field of the MSG and appended.  Since the relay would have no

way to determine the originating process from the device that

originated the message, the TAG value cannot be determined and will

not be included.

The TIMESTAMP will be the current local time of the relay.

The HOSTNAME will be the name of the device, as it is known by the

relay.  If the name cannot be determined, the IP address of the

device will be used.

If the relay adds a TIMESTAMP, or a TIMESTAMP and HOSTNAME, after the

PRI part, then it MUST check that the total length of the packet is

still 1024 bytes or less.  If the packet has been expanded beyond

1024 bytes, then the relay MUST truncate the packet to be 1024 bytes.

This may cause the loss of vital information from the end of the

original packet.  It is for this reason that it is RECOMMENDED that

the PRI and HEADER parts of originally generated syslog packets

contain the values and fields documented in Section 4.1.

4.3.3 No PRI or Unidentifiable PRI

If the relay receives a syslog message without a PRI, or with an

unidentifiable PRI, then it MUST insert a PRI with a Priority value

of 13 as well as a TIMESTAMP as described in Section 4.3.2.  The

relay SHOULD also insert a HOSTNAME as described in Section 4.3.2.

The entire contents of the received packet will be treated as the

CONTENT of the relayed MSG and appended.

An example of an unidentifiable PRI would be "<00>", without the

double quotes.  It may be that these are the first 4 characters of

the message.  To continue this example, if a relay does receive a

syslog message with the first four characters of "<00>", then it will

consult its configuration.  If it is configured to forward syslog

messages with a Priority value of 13 to another relay or collector,

then it MUST modify the packet as described above.  The specifics of

doing this, including the RECOMMENDED insertion of the HOSTNAME, are

given below.

Originally received message

<00>...

Relayed message

<13>TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME <00>...

If the relay adds a TIMESTAMP, or a TIMESTAMP and HOSTNAME, after the

PRI part, then it MUST check that the total length of the packet is

still 1024 bytes or less.  If the packet has been expanded beyond

1024 bytes, then the relay MUST truncate the packet to be 1024 bytes.

This may cause the loss of vital information from the end of the

original packet.  It is for this reason that it is RECOMMENDED that

the PRI and HEADER parts of originally generated syslog packets

contain the values and fields documented in Section 4.1.

5. Conventions

Although Section 4 of this document specifies all requirements for

the syslog protocol format and contents, certain conventions have

come about over time for the inclusion of additional information

within the syslog message.  It must be plainly stated that these

items are not mandated but may be considered by implementers for

completeness and to give the recipient some additional clues of their

origin and nature.

5.1 Dates and Times

It has been found that some network administrators like to archive

their syslog messages over long periods of time.  It has been seen

that some original syslog messages contain a more explicit time stamp

in which a 2 character or 4 character year field immediately follows

the space terminating the TIMESTAMP.  This is not consistent with the

original intent of the order and format of the fields.  If

implementers wish to contain a more specific date and time stamp

within the transmitted message, it should be within the CONTENT

field.  Implementers may wish to utilize the ISO 8601 [7] date and

time formats if they want to include more explicit date and time

information.

Additional methods to address this desire for long-term archiving

have been proposed and some have been successfully implemented.  One

such method is that the network administrators may choose to modify

the messages stored on their collectors.  They may run a simple

script to add the year, and any other information, to each stored

record.  Alternatively, the script may replace the stored time with a

format more appropriate for the needs of the network administrators.

Another alternative has been to insert a record into the file that

contains the current year.  By association then, all other records

near that informative record should have been received in that same

year.  Neither of these however, addresses the issue of associating a

correct timezone with each record.

5.2 Domain Name and Address

To readily identify the device that originated the message, it may be

a good practice to include its fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and

its IP address within the CONTENT field.  Traditionally, however,

only the hostname has been included in the HOSTNAME field.

5.3 Originating Process Information

It has also been considered to be a good practice to include some

information about the process on the device that generated the

message - if that concept exists.  This is usually the process name

and process id (often known as the "pid") for robust operating

systems.  The process name is commonly displayed in the TAG field.

Quite often, additional information is included at the beginning of

the CONTENT field.  The format of "TAG[pid]:" - without the quote

marks - is common.  The left square bracket is used to terminate the

TAG field in this case and is then the first character in the CONTENT

field.  If the process id is immaterial, it may be left off.

In that case, a colon and a space character usually follow the TAG.

This would be displayed as "TAG: " without the quotes.  In that case,

the colon is the first character in the CONTENT field.

5.4 Examples

As examples, these are valid messages as they may be observed on the

wire between two devices.  In the following examples, each message

has been indented, with line breaks inserted in this document for

readability.

Example 1

<34>Oct 11 22:14:15 mymachine su: 'su root' failed for lonvick

on /dev/pts/8

This example shows an authentication error in an attempt to acquire

additional privileges.  It also shows the command attempted and the

user attempting it.  This was recorded as an original message from

the device called mymachine.  A relay receiving this would not make

any changes before sending it along as it contains a properly

formatted PRI part and TIMESTAMP field in the HEADER part.  The TAG

value in this example is the process "su".  The colon has terminated

the TAG field and is the first character of the CONTENT field.  In

this case, the process id (pid) would be considered transient and

anyone looking at this syslog message would gain no useful

information from knowing the pid.  It has not been included so the

first two characters of the CONTENT field are the colon and a space

character.

Example 2

Use the BFG!

While this is a valid message, it has extraordinarily little useful

information.  This message does not have any discernable PRI part. It

does not contain a timestamp or any indication of the source of the

message.  If this message is stored on paper or disk, subsequent

review of the message will not yield anything of value.

This example is obviously an original message from a device.  A relay

MUST make changes to the message as described in Section 4.3 before

forwarding it.  The resulting relayed message is shown below.

<13>Feb  5 17:32:18 10.0.0.99 Use the BFG!

In this relayed message, the entire message has been treated as the

CONTENT portion of the MSG part.  First, a valid PRI part has been

added using the default priority value of 13.  Next, a TIMESTAMP has

been added along with a HOSTNAME in the HEADER part.  Subsequent

relays will not make any further changes to this message.  It should

be noted in this example that the day of the month is less than 10.

Since single digits in the date (5 in this case) are preceded by a

space in the TIMESTAMP format, there are two spaces following the

month in the TIMESTAMP before the day of the month.  Also, the relay

appears to have no knowledge of the host name of the device sending

the message so it has inserted the IPv4 address of the device into

the HOSTNAME field.

Example 3

<165>Aug 24 05:34:00 CST 1987 mymachine myproc[10]: %% It's

time to make the do-nuts.  %%  Ingredients: Mix=OK, Jelly=OK #

Devices: Mixer=OK, Jelly_Injector=OK, Frier=OK # Transport:

Conveyer1=OK, Conveyer2=OK # %%

This message does have a valid PRI part with a Priority value

indicating that it came from a locally defined facility (local4) with

a severity of Notice.  The HEADER part has a proper TIMESTAMP field

in the message.  A relay will not modify this message before sending

it.  However, the HOSTNAME and TAG fields are not consistent with the

definitions in Section 4.  The HOSTNAME field would be construed to

be "CST" and the beginning of the MSG part would be "1987".

It should be noted that the information contained in the CONTENT of

this example is not telemetry data, nor is it supervisory control or

data acquisition information.  Due to the security concerns listed in

Section 6 of this document, information of that nature should

probably not be conveyed across this protocol.

Example 4

<0>1990 Oct 22 10:52:01 TZ-6 scapegoat.dmz.example.org 10.1.2.3

sched[0]: That's All Folks!

This example has a lot of extraneous information throughout.  A human

or sufficiently adaptable automated parser would be able to determine

the date and time information as well as a fully qualified domain

name (FQDN) [4] and IP address.  The information about the nature of

the event is, however, limited.  Due to the indicated severity of the

event, the process may not have been able to gather or send anything

more informative.  It may have been fortunate to have generated and

sent this message at all.

This example is obviously an original message from a device.  Since

the first field in the HEADER part is not a TIMESTAMP in the format

defined in Section 4.1.2, it MUST be modified by a relay.  A relay

will add a TIMESTAMP and SHOULD add a HOSTNAME as follows and will

treat the entire received packet after the PRI part from the original

packet as the CONTENT field of the new packet.  The value used in the

HOSTNAME field is only the hostname without the domain name as it is

known by the relay.  A TAG value will not be added to the relayed

packet.  While the inclusion of the domain name and IPv4 address in

the original message is a noble endeavor, it is not consistent with

the use of the field as described in Section 4.1.2.

<0>Oct 22 10:52:12 scapegoat 1990 Oct 22 10:52:01 TZ-6

scapegoat.dmz.example.org 10.1.2.3 sched[0]: That's All Folks!

6. Security Considerations

An odor may be considered to be a message that does not require any

acknowledgement.  People tend to avoid bad odors but are drawn to

odors that they associate with good food.  The acknowledgement of the

receipt of the odor or scent is not required and indeed it may be the

height of discretion to totally ignore some odors.  On the other

hand, it is usually considered good civility to acknowledge the

prowess of the cook merely from the ambiance wafting from the

kitchen.  Similarly, various species have been found to utilize odors

to attract mates.  One species of moth uses this scent to find each

other.  However, it has been found that bolas spiders can mimic the

odor of the female moths of this species.  This scent will then

attract male moths, which will follow it with the expectation of

finding a mate.  Instead, when they arrive at the source of the

scent, they will be eaten [8].  This is a case of a false message

being sent out with inimical intent.

In its local use, the syslog process places event notification

messages into files on that system.  This relies upon the integrity

of the system for the protection of the messages.  The subsequent

configuration of the syslog process to use the syslog protocol to

transport the messages to a remote collector was an extension of the

delivery of event notification messages and it exhibits the same

trust of the network.  There are several security consequences of the

fundamental simplicity of syslog and there are some concerns about

the applicability of this protocol in situations that require robust

delivery.  Along the lines of the analogy, computer event messages

may be sent accidentally, erroneously and even maliciously. At the

time of this writing, however, there have not been any reports of any

networked device consuming any other device.

6.1 Packet Parameters

As was described above, the message length MUST NOT exceed 1024

bytes.  Attacks have seen where syslog messages are sent to a

receiver that have message lengths greater than 1024 bytes.  In some

older versions of syslog, the receipt of syslog packets that had a

message greater than 1024 bytes caused problems.  syslog message

receivers must not malfunction upon the receipt of packets where the

message length is greater than 1024 bytes.  Various behaviors have

been seen on receivers that do receive messages greater than 1024

bytes.  Some have been seen to log the entire contents of the

message, while others have been seen to log only portions of the

message.  Still others have been known to discard the message

altogether.  Devices MUST NOT retransmit messages whose received

length exceeds 1024 bytes.

Similarly, the receiver must rigidly enforce the correctness of the

message body.  syslog collectors must not malfunction if received

messages do not have the less-than and greater-than characters around

a valid Priority value.  They MUST treat these messages as the

unformatted CONTENT as was described in Section 4.3.3 if they relay

it.

Also, received messages must contain printable text in the message as

was described throughout Section 4.  Devices must not malfunction if

they receive a message containing characters other than the

characters described above.

6.2 Message Authenticity

The syslog delivery mechanism does not strongly associate the message

with the message sender.  The receiver of that packet will not be

able to ascertain that the message was indeed sent from the reported

sender, or if the packet was sent from another device.  It should be

noted here that the message receiver does not need to verify that the

HOSTNAME in the HEADER part match the name of the IP address

contained in the Source Address field of the IP packet.

6.2.1 Authentication Problems

One possible consequence of this behavior is that a misconfigured

machine may send syslog messages to a collector representing itself

as another machine.  The administrative staff may become confused

that the status of the supposed sender of the messages may not be

accurately reflected in the received messages.  The administrators

may not be able to readily discern that there are two or more

machines representing themselves as the same machine.

It should also be noted that some cases of filling the HOSTNAME field

in the HEADER part might only have local significance and that may

only be ephemeral.  If the device had obtained an IP address from a

DHCP pool, then any association between an identifier and an actual

source would not always hold true.  The inclusion of a fully

qualified domain name in the CONTENT may give the administrators the

best chance of identifying the source of each message if it can

always be associated with an IP address or if it can always be

associated with a unique machine.

6.2.2 Message Forgery

Malicious exploits of this behavior have also been noted.  An

attacker may transmit syslog messages (either from the machine from

which the messages are purportedly sent or from any other machine) to

a collector.  In one case, an attacker may hide the true nature of an

attack amidst many other messages.  As an example, an attacker may

start generating forged messages indicating a problem on some

machine.  This may get the attention of the system administrators who

will spend their time investigating the alleged problem.  During this

time, the attacker may be able to compromise a different machine, or

a different process on the same machine.  Additionally, an attacker

may generate false syslog messages to give untrue indications of

status or of events.  As an example, an attacker may stop a critical

process on a machine, which may generate a notification of exit.  The

attacker may subsequently generate a forged notification that the

process had been restarted.  The system administrators may accept

that misinformation and not verify that the process had indeed been

restarted.

6.3 Sequenced Delivery

As a general rule, the forensics of a network anomaly rely upon

reconstructing the sequence of events.  In a perfect world, the

messages would be received on the syslog collector in the order of

their generation from the other devices and anyone looking at these

records would have an accurate picture of the sequence of events.

Unfortunately, the syslog process and protocol do not ensure ordered

delivery.  This section details some of the problems that may be

encountered from this.

6.3.1 Single Source to a Destination

The syslog records are usually presented (placed in a file, displayed

on the console, etc.) in the order in which they are received.  This

is not always in accordance with the sequence in which they were

generated.  As they are transported across an IP network, some out of

order receipt should be expected.  This may lead to some confusion as

messages may be received that would indicate that a process has

stopped before it was started.  This may be somewhat rectified if the

originating process had timestamped or numbered each of the messages

before transmission.  In this, the sending device should utilize an

authoritative time source.  It should be remembered, however, that

not all devices are capable of receiving time updates, and not all

devices can timestamp their messages.

6.3.2 Multiple Sources to a Destination

In syslog, there is no concept of unified event numbering.  Single

devices are free to include a sequence number within the CONTENT but

that can hardly be coordinated between multiple devices.  In such

cases, multiple devices may report that each one is sending message

number one.  Again, this may be rectified somewhat if the sending

devices utilize a timestamp from an authoritative source in their

messages.  As has been noted, however, even messages from a single

device to a single collector may be received out of order.  This

situation is compounded when there are several devices configured to

send their syslog messages to a single collector.  Messages from one

device may be delayed so the collector receives messages from another

device first even though the messages from the first device were

generated before the messages from the second.  If there is no

timestamp or coordinated sequence number, then the messages may be

presented in the order in which they were received which may give an

inaccurate view of the sequence of actual events.

6.3.3 Multiple Sources to Multiple Destinations

The plethora of configuration options available to the network

administrators may further skew the perception of the order of

events.  It is possible to configure a group of devices to send the

status messages -or other informative messages- to one collector,

while sending messages of relatively higher importance to another

collector.  Additionally, the messages may be sent to different files

on the same collector.  If the messages do not contain timestamps

from the source, it may be difficult to order the messages if they

are kept in different places.  An administrator may not be able to

determine if a record in one file occurred before or after a record

in a different file.  This may be somewhat alleviated by placing

marking messages with a timestamp into all destination files.  If

these have coordinated timestamps, then there will be some indication

of the time of receipt of the individual messages.

6.3.4 Replaying

Without any sequence indication or timestamp, messages may be

recorded and replayed at a later time.  An attacker may record a set

of messages that indicate normal activity of a machine.  At a later

time, that attacker may remove that machine from the network and

replay the syslog messages to the collector.  Even with a TIMESTAMP

field in the HEADER part, an attacker may record the packets and

could simply modify them to reflect the current time before

retransmitting them.  The administrators may find nothing unusual in

the received messages and their receipt would falsely indicate normal

activity of the machine.

6.4 Reliable Delivery

As there is no mechanism within either the syslog process or the

protocol to ensure delivery, and since the underlying transport is

UDP, some messages may be lost.  They may either be dropped through

network congestion, or they may be maliciously intercepted and

discarded.  The consequences of the drop of one or more syslog

messages cannot be determined.  If the messages are simple status

updates, then their non-receipt may either not be noticed, or it may

cause an annoyance for the system operators.  On the other hand, if

the messages are more critical, then the administrators may not

become aware of a developing and potentially serious problem.

Messages may also be intercepted and discarded by an attacker as a

way to hide unauthorized activities.

6.5 Message Integrity

Besides being discarded, syslog messages may be damaged in transit,

or an attacker may maliciously modify them.  In the case of a packet

containing a syslog message being damaged, there are various

mechanisms built into the link layer as well as into the IP [9] and

UDP protocols which may detect the damage.  An intermediary router

may discard a damaged IP packet [10].  Damage to a UDP packet may be

detected by the receiving UDP module, which may silently discard it.

In any case, the original contents of the message will not be

delivered to the collector.  Additionally, if an attacker is

positioned between the sender and collector of syslog messages, they

may be able to intercept and modify those messages while in-transit

to hide unauthorized activities.

6.6 Message Observation

While there are no strict guidelines pertaining to the event message

format, most syslog messages are generated in human readable form

with the assumption that capable administrators should be able to

read them and understand their meaning.  Neither the syslog protocol

nor the syslog application have mechanisms to provide confidentiality

of the messages in transit.  In most cases passing clear-text

messages is a benefit to the operations staff if they are sniffing

the packets off of the wire.  The operations staff may be able to

read the messages and associate them with other events seen from

other packets crossing the wire to track down and correct problems.

Unfortunately, an attacker may also be able to observe the human-

readable contents of syslog messages.  The attacker may then use the

knowledge gained from those messages to compromise a machine or do

other damage.

6.7 Message Prioritization and Differentiation

While the processes that create the messages may signify the

importance of the events through the use of the message Priority

value, there is no distinct association between this value and the

importance of delivery of the packet.  As an example of this,

consider an application that generates two event messages.  The first

is a normal status message but the second could be an important

message denoting a problem with the process.  This second message

would have an appropriately higher Severity value associated with the

importance of that event.  If the operators had configured that both

of these messages be transported to a syslog collector then they

would, in turn, be given to UDP for transmission.  Under normal

conditions, no distinction would be made between them and they would

be transmitted in their order.

Again, under normal circumstances, the receiver would accept syslog

messages as they are received.  If many devices are transmitting

normal status messages, but one is transmitting an important event

message, there is no inherent mechanism within the syslog protocol to

prioritize the important message over the other messages.

On a case-by-case basis, device operators may find some way to

associate the different levels with the quality of service

identifiers.  As an example, the operators may elect to define some

linkage between syslog messages that have a specific Priority value

with a specific value to be used in the IPv4 Precedence field [9],

the IPv6 Traffic Class octet [11], or the Differentiated Services

field [12].  In the above example, the operators may have the ability

to associate the status message with normal delivery while

associating the message indicating a problem with a high reliability,

low latency queue as it goes through the network.  This would have

the affect of prioritizing the essential messages before the normal

status messages.  Even with this hop-by-hop prioritization, this

queuing mechanism could still lead to head of line blocking on the

transmitting device as well as buffer starvation on the receiving

device if there are many near-simultaneous messages being sent or

received.  This behavior is not unique to syslog but is endemic to

all operations that transmit messages serially.

There are security concerns for this behavior.  Head of line blocking

of the transmission of important event messages may relegate the

conveyance of important messages behind less important messages.  If

the queue is cleared appropriately, this may only add seconds to the

transmission of the important message.  On the other hand, if the

queue is not cleared, then important messages may not be transmitted.

Also at the receiving side, if the syslog receiver is suffering from

buffer starvation due to large numbers of messages being received

near-simultaneously, important messages may be dropped

indiscriminately along with other messages.  While these are problems

with the devices and their capacities, the protocol security concern

is that there is no prioritization of the relatively more important

messages over the less important messages.

6.8 Misconfiguration

Since there is no control information distributed about any messages

or configurations, it is wholly the responsibility of the network

administrator to ensure that the messages are actually going to the

intended recipient.  Cases have been noted where devices were

inadvertently configured to send syslog messages to the wrong

receiver.  In many cases, the inadvertent receiver may not be

configured to receive syslog messages and it will probably discard

them.  In certain other cases, the receipt of syslog messages has

been known to cause problems for the unintended recipient [13].  If

messages are not going to the intended recipient, then they cannot be

reviewed or processed.

6.9 Forwarding Loop

As it is shown in Figure 1, machines may be configured to relay

syslog messages to subsequent relays before reaching a collector. In

one particular case, an administrator found that he had mistakenly

configured two relays to forward messages with certain Priority

values to each other.  When either of these machines either received

or generated that type of message, it would forward it to the other

relay.  That relay would, in turn, forward it back.  This cycle did

cause degradation to the intervening network as well as to the

processing availability on the two devices.  Network administrators

must take care to not cause such a death spiral.

6.10 Load Considerations

Network administrators must take the time to estimate the appropriate

size of the syslog receivers.  An attacker may perform a Denial of

Service attack by filling the disk of the collector with false

messages.  Placing the records in a circular file may alleviate this

but that has the consequence of not ensuring that an administrator

will be able to review the records in the future. Along this line, a

receiver or collector must have a network interface capable of

receiving all messages sent to it.

Administrators and network planners must also critically review the

network paths between the devices, the relays, and the collectors.

Generated syslog messages should not overwhelm any of the network

links.

7. IANA Considerations

The syslog protocol has been assigned UDP port 514.  This port

assignment will be maintained by IANA exclusively for this protocol.

The syslog protocol provides for the definition of named attributes

to indicate the Severity of each message and the Facility that

generated the message as described in Section 4.  The name space

identifiers for these attributes are defined as numbers.  The

protocol does not define the specific assignment of the name space

for these numbers; the application developer or system vendor is

allowed to define the attribute, its semantics, and the associated

numbers.  This name space will not be controlled to prevent

collisions as systems are expected to use the same attributes,

semantics and associated numbers to describe events that are deemed

similar even between heterogeneous devices.

8. Conclusion and Other Efforts

The syslog protocol may be effectively used to transport event

notification messages across a network.  In all cases, it is

important that the syslog message receiver embody the principle of

"be liberal in what you accept".  It is highly recommended that the

network operators who choose to use this understand the

characteristics of the protocol and its security implications.

There have been attempts in the past to standardize the format of the

syslog message.  The most notable attempt culminated in a BOF at the

Fortieth Internet Engineering Task Force meeting in 1997.  This was

the Universal Logging Protocol (ulp) BOF and the minutes of their

meeting are on-line at the IETF Proceedings web site [14].

Many good thoughts came from that effort and interested implementers

may want to find some of the notes or papers produced from that

effort.

At the time of this writing, efforts are underway to allow the usage

of international character sets in applications that have been

traditionally thought of as being text-only.  The HOSTNAME and

TIMESTAMP fields described above are representative of this.  Also,

the entire CONTENT field has traditionally been printing characters

and spaces in the code set known as US-ASCII.  It is hoped that the

proponents of these internationalization efforts will find a suitable

way to allow the use of international character sets within syslog

messages without being disruptive.  It should also be hoped that

implementers will allow for the future acceptance of additional code

sets and that they may make appropriate plans.  Again, it must be

cautioned that the simplicity of the existing system has been a

tremendous value to its acceptance.  Anything that lessens that

simplicity may diminish that value.

Acknowledgements

The following people provided content feedback during the writing of

this document:

Jon Knight <>

Magosanyi Arpad <>

Balazs Scheidler <>

Jon Callas <>

Eliot Lear <>

Petter Reinholdtsen <>

Darren Reed <>

Alfonso De Gregorio <>

Eric Allman <>

Andrew Ross <>

George Maslyar <>

Albert Mietus <>

Russ Allbery <>

Titus D. Winters <>

Edwin P. Boon <>

Jeroen M. Mostert <>

Eric Allman is the original inventor and author of the syslog daemon

and protocol.  The author of this memo and the community at large

would like to express their appreciation for this work and for the

usefulness that it has provided over the years.

A large amount of additional information about this de-facto standard

operating system feature may usually be found in the syslog.conf file

as well as in the man pages for syslog.conf, syslog, syslogd, and

logger, of many Unix and Unix-like devices.

References

1  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, August 1980.

2  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax

Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.

3  USA Standard Code for Information Interchange, USASI X3.4-1968

4  Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities", STD 13,

RFC 1034, November 1987.

5  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - Implementation and

Specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

6  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture",

RFC 2373, July 1998.

7  Data elements and interchange formats - Information exchange -

Representation of dates and times, International Organization for

Standardization, Reference number ISO 8601 : 1988 (E), 1988

8  Stowe, M., et al, "Chemical Mimicry: Bolas Spiders Emit Components

of Moth Prey Species Sex Pheromones", Science, 1987

9  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981.

10 Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", RFC 1812, June

1995.

11 Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)

Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

12 Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F. and D. Black, "Definition of the

Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6

Headers", RFC 2474, December 1998.

13 Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT),

"Field Notice: Cisco IOS(r) Syslog Crash", January 11, 1999

14 Walker, D., IETF Secretariat, "Proceedings of the Fortieth

Internet Engineering Task Force, Washington, DC, USA, December 8-

12, 1997

Author's Address

Chris Lonvick

Cisco Systems

12515 Research Blvd.

Austin, TX, USA

Phone:  +1.512.378.1182

EMail:

Full Copyright Statement

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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any

kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are

included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this

document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing

the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other

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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than

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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be

revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an

"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING

TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING

BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION

HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF

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Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the

Internet Society.

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