记一次某APK的恶意WIFI攻击

最新推荐文章于 2022-11-29 19:43:56 发布

zhangge3663

最新推荐文章于 2022-11-29 19:43:56 发布

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分类专栏： Web安全

原文链接：https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/GZMN0sYsJc9LCsbc5Q3vBA?st=ED69AEF80D895EBB7414A6381626FEF7413FF925DB4DE76CF6A7A2A4217C6AF40D04A551B7844ABEBE0C1C5955F3BAE0B2756AB276CA474B2CBAED36060D34D7F5F152810B1651B550770E5734F58FB4FE178BBBFD56C45721D0844B8B5BA52F4FAE2012EA

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用户接入恶意WIFI即打开某APP，泄露用户cookie，攻击者可以通过token获取用户手机号、收藏、收货地址等

漏洞详情

查看manifest.xml有如下deeplink activity

"com.xxxx.client.android.modules.deeplink.ParseDeepLinkActivity" android:noHistory="true" android:theme="@style/Transparent" android:windowSoftInputMode="0x10">
      <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="com.xxxx.client.android.activity.HomeActivity"/>
      </intent-filter>
      <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>
        <data android:scheme="scheme"/>
      </intent-filter>
</activity>

逆向ParseDeepLinkActivity代码

@Override // android.app.Activity
public void onCreate(Bundle arg13) {
    String v0;
    e v13;
    Intent v1_2;
    String frompage;
    String v3 = "";
    super.onCreate(arg13);
    if (s.i()) {
        try {
            this.uri = this.getIntent().getData();
            if (this.uri == null) {
                this.finish();
                return;
            }

            e.e.b.a.n.a.d.b();
            jb.b("CT_TAG", "uri = " + this.uri);
            v3 = this.uri.getQuery();
            if (TextUtils.isEmpty(v3)) {
                goto label_61;
            } else {
                this.schemabean = g.SCHEME_GETURLJSON(v3);
                v3 = this.schemabean;
                if (((SchemeBean)v3) == null) {
                        goto label_61;
                    }

                    boolean v3_1 = TextUtils.isEmpty(this.schemabean.getFrompage());
                    goto label_37;
                }

                goto label_62;
            }
            catch(Exception v1) {
                goto label_174;
            }
..

会从查询参数中获取并反序列json，得到结构SchemaBean，之后会根据bean的内容进行派发。

if(bean1 != null) {
                if(g.a(v1, bean1, v6)) {
                    return;
                }

                String v7_1 = bean.getChannelName();
                int v8 = -1;
                switch(v7_1.hashCode()) {
                    case -2034194897: {
                        boolean v7_2 = v7_1.equals("fenlei_detail");
                        if(v7_2) {
                            v8 = 18;
                        }

                        break;
                    }
                    case 3322092: {
                        if(v7_1.equals("live")) {
                            v8 = 0;
                        }

                        break;
                    }
                    case 1288290882: {
                        if(v7_1.equals("wiki_all_product")) {
                            v8 = 40;
                        }

                        break;
                    }
                    case 1843825908: {
                        if(v7_1.equals("taskreward")) {
                            v8 = 23;
                        }

                        break;
                    }
                    case 1991869741: {
                        if(v7_1.equals("pinpai_detail")) {
                            v8 = 17;
                        }

                        break;
                    }
...
case 3277: {
                        if(v7_1.equals("h5")) {
                            v8 = 60;
                        }

                        break;
                    }

渠道非常多，h5表示要打开h5页面，如下代码会通过路由寻找跳转到对应的activity

case 60: {
                        if(("1".equals(bean.getLogin())) && !e.e.b.a.b.c.Ya()) {
                            Ea.a(v1, 0x392FC);
                            return;
                        }

                        b v3_19 = e.a().a("path_activity_zdm_web_browser", "group_route_browser");
                        v3_19.putstring("url", bean.getLinkVal());
                        v3_19.putstring("sub_type", "h5");
                        v3_19.putstring("from", e.e.b.a.u.h.a(v6));
                        v3_19.t();
                        goto label_1102;
                    }

逆向路由注册代码，loadInto为路由统一注册接口，找到对应的activity为HybridActivity

public class o implements b {
    @Override  // com.xxxx.android.router.api.e.b
    public void loadInto(Map arg8) {
        arg8.put("path_activity_zdm_web_browser", a.a(e.e.a.c.a.a.a.ACTIVITY, HybridActivity.class, "path_activity_zdm_web_browser", "group_route_browser", null, -1, 0x80000000));
    }
}

分析HybridActivity的onCreate方法，里面初始化webview并且loadUrl

@Override  // com.xxxx.client.android.base.BaseActivity
    protected void onCreate(Bundle arg5) {
        super.onCreate(arg5);
        this.A = new HybridPresenter(this, this.za(), this.getIntent().getStringExtra("link_type"), this.getIntent().getStringExtra("sub_type"));
        if(com.xxxx.client.android.hybrid.b.a.a.TRANSPARENT == this.P().h()) {
            int v5 = Build.VERSION.SDK_INT;
            if(v5 >= 21) {
                int v0 = 0x500;
                if(v5 >= 23 && this.P().l() == 1) {
                    v0 = 0x2500;
                }

                this.getWindow().getDecorView().setSystemUiVisibility(v0);
                this.getWindow().setStatusBarColor(ContextCompat.getColor(this.getContext(), 0x106000D));
            }
        }

        this.getLifecycle().a(this.A);
        if(2 == this.A.b(this.getIntent())) {
            return;
        }

        this.La();
        this.y = this.init_webview();
        this.A.a(this.getIntent());//这里会同步cookie
}

遍历webview加载的jsBridge，发现并没有什么可利用的js接口，暂且不表。回到上文的同步cookie的代码

public static void syncCookie(String arg1) {
        ia.syncCookie(arg1, false);
    }

    public static void syncCookie(String url, boolean arg9) { //arg9固定为false
        if(!TextUtils.isEmpty(url) && ((arg9) || (url.contains(".xxxx.com")))) {
            try {
                jb.b("Nat: webView.syncCookie.url", url);
                CookieManager v9 = CookieManager.getInstance();
                String oldcookie = v9.getCookie(url);
                if(oldcookie != null) {
                    jb.b("Nat: webView.syncCookie.oldCookie", oldcookie);
                }

                v9.setAcceptCookie(true);
                HashMap v2_1 = Na.a(true);
                if(v2_1 != null) {
                    if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v2_1.get("sess")))) {
                        v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", "sess=;");
                    }

                    if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v2_1.get("ab_test")))) {
                        v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", "ab_test=;");
                    }

                    if(ia.isContain_smzdm_com(url)) {
                        Iterator v2_2 = v2_1.entrySet().iterator();
                        while(true) {
                            boolean v3 = v2_2.hasNext();
                            if(!v3) {
                                break;
                            }

                            Object v3_1 = v2_2.next();
                            Map.Entry v3_2 = (Map.Entry)v3_1;
                            v9.setCookie(".yying.com", ((String)v3_2.getKey()) + "=" + Na.a(((String)v3_2.getValue())) + ";");
                            v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", ((String)v3_2.getKey()) + "=" + Na.a(((String)v3_2.getValue())) + ";");
                        }

                        v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", "f=" + Na.a("android"));
                        v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", "v=" + Na.a("9.9.10"));
                        v9.setCookie(".xxxx.com", "coupon_h5=" + com.xxxx.client.base.utils.b.c().a("coupon_h5") + ";");
                        v9.setCookie("go.xxxx.com", "scene=" + Na.a(Aa.b) + ";");
                    }
                }

                String v8_1 = v9.getCookie(url);
                if(v8_1 != null) {
                    jb.b("Nat: webView.syncCookie.newCookie", v8_1);
                    return;
                }
            }
            catch(Exception v8) {
                jb.b("Nat: webView.syncCookie failed", v8.toString());
                return;
            }
        }
}

以上代码的意义是为.xxxx.com和.yying.com设置cookie，如果URL的域名是其子域名，那么webview在访问该URL时会自动带上cookie。但是并没有校验URL是否为HTTPS，这里可以是HTTP，可以构造DNS劫持。

攻击过程

搭建恶意WIFI
虚拟机安装kali，再通过apt安装hostapd、dnsmasq和nginx，硬件使用USB无线网卡tplink WN722N。
1、启动热点
在hostapd.conf设置SSID为SZ Airport Free，无认证，这个名字拿到机场相信一定会有所收获

2、搭建本地DNS
在dnsmasq.conf中设置DHCP及DNS，将域名a.xxxx.com解析到我的外网VPS，该VPS上设置nginx的access_log记录cookie。
3、设置captive-portal-login
华为手机进行网络评估时，会访问connectivitycheck.platform.hicloud.com。因此配置DNS使connectivitycheck.platform.hicloud.com解析为192.168.1.1，并在192.168.1.1上设置nginx使其返回302：