论文笔记 | Cross-border acquisitions by Chinese enterprises ：The benefits and disadvantages of political

Schweizer D , Walker T , Zhang A . Cross-border acquisitions by Chinese enterprises: The benefits and disadvantages of political connections[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017:63-85.

故事：基于“走出去”战略号召，本文讲述了在国有企业在海外并购受阻的现实，有政治关联企业是否以其“优势”和“义务”承担起海外并购的故事。作者提出了political connection trade-off theory，从高管角度研究政治关联对海外并购的影响，发现 politically connected top managers engage in “political empire building” behavior at the cost of shareholders’ wealth.

内生性问题，考虑到了股权中存在的政治关联的潜在影响，但没有发现存在关系，有一点不理解股权中的政治关联不会影响，那为什么高管的政治关联会存在这种效应呢，其动机或好处是什么，理论部分没有很好支撑？而且假设2的提出，公司治理，好像跟主题的关联度不那么密切

该文很好的一个点，在引文部分，很灵活地应用各种并购案例，接受背景，解释现实，而且层层递进

This paper explores whether and how political connections affect the likelihood of completing a cross-border M&A deal for Chinese publicly listed, but privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and the resulting firm performance. In line with our proposed political connection trade-off theory, we find that POEs with politically connected top managers are more likely to complete across-border M&A deal than POEs with no such connections, but that this comes at the cost of negative announcement returns and subsequent lower accounting performance. These findings support the idea that politically connected top managers engage in “political empire building” behavior at the cost of shareholders’ wealth.

1. Introduction

In 2006, the Chinese government also incorporated privately owned enterprises (POEs) in its go global strategy by starting to offer tax rebates and access to long-term financing at favorable terms to POEs.

Despite these efforts, however, there is (anecdotal) evidence that POEs continue to face severe limitations when conducting overseas investments today.

Despite the ongoing restrictions faced by Chinese POEs, they have been challenging the dominance of SOEs in the area of cross-border acquisitions in recent years（从国企和民企两个角度解释原因，引出政治关联企业的海外并购）

However, the fact that politically connected POEs have the incentives and means to carry out cross-border acquisitions does not necessarily imply that these acquisitions constitute sound business practice nor that they will be financially successful.（现实，政治关联企业的海外并购并不能创造价值 <–举例）

根据案例推测原因：1）a possible explanation is that politically connected top management of POEs aims to acquire strategic assets largely for political motives, trying to complete the acquisition at all costs and thereby sometimes overpaying. 2）after deal completion, Chinese POEs often find that competition in the host country is much tougher and that some business practices commonly accepted in China, such as relaxing health and safety standards, cannot be mirrored abroad

• political connection trade-off theory

2. Hypothesis development

2.1. Political connections and cross-border M&A deals

Hypothesis 1. Politically connected POEs are more likely to complete cross-border M&A deals than unconnected POEs.

2.2. Corporate governance and cross-border M&A deals

Hypothesis 2. POEs with better corporate governance are more likely to complete a cross-border M&A deal.

Hypothesis 3. Acquiring POEs with political connections have lower stock returns around the time of a cross-border M&A announcement and lower post-merger financial performance than non-politically connected POEs.

3. Data

3.1. Financial and corporate governance data
3.2. Identification of cross-border M&A transactions by Chinese POEs

3.3. Identification of political connections
3.4. Measuring corporate governance
3.5. Measuring financial performance
3.6. Control variables

4. Methodology

4.1. Political connections and cross-border M&A

4.2. Endogeneity concerns

内生性：
1）concerns about a self-selection bias, i.e. that politically connected top managers may not
be randomly distributed across POEs. For example, larger and more profitable POEs may be more capable of building political connections by hiring a chairman or CEO with a political background. （PSM解决）
2）examine whether political connections identified via a firm’s ownership structure (i.e. the presence of politically connected blockholders) influence a POE’s decision to engage in cross-border M&A activities.（控制相应变量）
3) whether the results are primarily driven by “active” acquisitive POEs, i.e. POEs that complete
more than one acquisition during our sample period.

4）用turnover的外生冲击，解决

4.3. The financial performance of Chinese POEs after cross-border M&A announcements

5. Empirical results
   5.1. Descriptive statistics
   5.2. Political connections and M&A engagement by POEs
   5.3. Corporate governance and M&A engagement by POEs
   5.4. The financial performance of multinational POEs after cross-border M&As

6. Conclusion