简单小木马脱壳

最新推荐文章于 2024-05-03 04:10:40 发布

dalixux

最新推荐文章于 2024-05-03 04:10:40 发布

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分类专栏：脱壳文章标签：解密 header c image 虚拟机脚本

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一个小木马脱壳请虚拟机下调试相关文件见附件未知壳相当简单但是典型有stolen code和overlay 只是练习脱壳所以没有分析木马
初次实战一路F8
载入：
00410336 > $ 57 PUSH EDI
00410337 . 8BFC MOV EDI,ESP
00410339 . 83EC 26 SUB ESP,26
0041033C . C74424 0E 000>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+E],0
00410344 > C74424 06 FB6>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],DC8A65FB ;解密key
0041034C . C74424 02 000>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2],0
00410354 . BE D5034100 MOV ESI,1.004103D5 ;解密起始地址
00410359 . 897424 12 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+12],ESI
0041035D > EB 00 JMP SHORT 1.0041035F
0041035F > BE 7A210000 MOV ESI,217A
00410364 . 03F7 ADD ESI,EDI
00410366 . 2BF4 SUB ESI,ESP ;esi + esp + (esp-26h) = esi + 26h
00410368 . 397424 0E CMP DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+E],ESI ;[esp+e]计数器
0041036C . 74 02 JE SHORT 1.00410370
0041036E . EB 0C JMP SHORT 1.0041037C
00410370 > 8B7424 12 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+12] ;[esp+e] == esi时才开始解密
00410374 . 8A6424 06 MOV AH,BYTE PTR SS:[ESP+6]
00410378 . 2826 SUB BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],AH
0041037A . EB 00 JMP SHORT 1.0041037C
0041037C > 834424 12 01 ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+12],1
00410381 . C16C24 06 02 SHR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],2
00410386 . C16C24 06 02 SHR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],2
0041038B . C16C24 06 02 SHR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],2
00410390 . C16C24 06 02 SHR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],2 ;右移8位即右移一个字节
00410395 . 834424 02 01 ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2],1
0041039A . 837C24 02 04 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2],4
0041039F . 75 10 JNZ SHORT 1.004103B1
004103A1 . C74424 06 FB6>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6],DC8A65FB
004103A9 . C74424 02 000>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2],0
004103B1 > BE 98064100 MOV ESI,1.00410698 ;解密终止地址
004103B6 . 397424 12 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+12],ESI
004103BA .^ 72 A1 JB SHORT 1.0041035D
004103BC . FF4424 0E INC DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+E]
004103C0 . 817C24 0E 332>CMP DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+E],2333
004103C8 .^ 0F86 76FFFFFF JBE 1.00410344
//整个解密过程简单但是干扰性极大 [esp+e]为21A0时解密才开始解密过程的key为DC8A65FB 变换过程循环右移一个字节
00410407 |. 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
00410409 |. 8B0424 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP] ;kernel里的一个地址送eax
0041040C |. 66:33C0 XOR AX,AX
0041040F |. 68 FFFF0000 PUSH 0FFFF ;函数名HASH值入栈
00410414 |. 68 B674755D PUSH 5D7574B6 ;GetProcAddress
00410419 |. 68 2207E471 PUSH 71E40722 ;LoadLibraryA
0041041E |. 68 80EFF815 PUSH 15F8EF80 ;VirtualProtect
00410423 |. 68 EC5863D6 PUSH D66358EC ;ExitProcess
00410428 |. 8BFC MOV EDI,ESP ;EDI 用来定位堆栈
0041042A |> 66:8138 4D5A /CMP WORD PTR DS:[EAX],5A4D ;PE
0041042F |. 75 13 |JNZ SHORT 1.00410444
00410431 |. 8B50 3C |MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]
00410434 |. 81FA 00100000 |CMP EDX,1000
0041043A |. 77 08 |JA SHORT 1.00410444
0041043C |. 66:813C10 504>|CMP WORD PTR DS:[EAX+EDX],4550 ;MZ
00410442 |. 74 07 |JE SHORT 1.0041044B
00410444 |> 2D 00000100 |SUB EAX,10000 ; UNICODE "ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:/Documents and Settings/All Users"
00410449 |.^ EB DF /JMP SHORT 1.0041042A
//寻找kernel 基址
0041044B |> /50 PUSH EAX ; kernel32.7C800000
0041044C |. 8B7410 78 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+EDX+78] ; 定位到DataDirectory[0].VirtualAddress
00410450 |. 03F0 ADD ESI,EAX ; 定位到导出表
00410452 |. 83C6 18 ADD ESI,18 ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.NumberOfNames
00410455 |. 93 XCHG EAX,EBX
00410456 |. AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00410457 |. 50 PUSH EAX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.NumberOfNames入栈
00410458 |. AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00410459 |. 50 PUSH EAX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfFunctions入栈
0041045A |. AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
0041045B |. 50 PUSH EAX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNames入栈
0041045C |. 03C3 ADD EAX,EBX
0041045E |. 50 PUSH EAX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNames+ImageBase入栈
0041045F |. AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00410460 |. 50 PUSH EAX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNameOrdinals入栈
00410461 |. 8BEC MOV EBP,ESP ;EBP指向IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNameOrdinals
00410463 |> 8B4D 10 /MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10] ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.NumberOfNames
00410466 |. 33D2 |XOR EDX,EDX
00410468 |> 8B75 04 |/MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4] ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNames+ImageBase
0041046B |. 8B36 ||MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI] ;ESI 为函数名的起始地址RVA
0041046D |. 03F3 ||ADD ESI,EBX ;得到函数名地址VA
0041046F |. 33C0 ||XOR EAX,EAX
00410471 |. 50 ||PUSH EAX
00410472 |> C1C8 07 ||/ROR EAX,7
00410475 |. 310424 |||XOR DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX
00410478 |. AC |||LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00410479 |. 84C0 |||TEST AL,AL
0041047B |.^ 75 F5 ||/JNZ SHORT 1.00410472 ;函数名HASH
0041047D |. 58 ||POP EAX
0041047E |. 57 ||PUSH EDI
0041047F |> 813F FFFF0000 ||/CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EDI],0FFFF ;函数是否地址都找到找到就跳
00410485 |. 74 09 |||JE SHORT 1.00410490
00410487 |. 3B07 |||CMP EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI] ;比较函数名HASH值
00410489 |. 74 0F |||JE SHORT 1.0041049A
0041048B |. 83C7 04 |||ADD EDI,4
0041048E |.^ EB EF ||/JMP SHORT 1.0041047F
00410490 |> 5F ||POP EDI
00410491 |. 8345 04 04 ||ADD DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4],4 ;移到下一个函数名起始地址
00410495 |. 42 ||INC EDX
00410496 |.^ E2 D0 |/LOOPD SHORT 1.00410468
00410498 |. EB 2C |JMP SHORT 1.004104C6
0041049A |> D1E2 |SHL EDX,1
0041049C |. 8B4D 00 |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP] ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNameOrdinals
0041049F |. 03CB |ADD ECX,EBX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNameOrdinals+IMAGEBASE
004104A1 |. 03CA |ADD ECX,EDX ;得到特定函数序号地址
004104A3 |. 8B09 |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX] ;得到函数序号
004104A5 |. 81E1 FFFF0000 |AND ECX,0FFFF
004104AB |. 8B55 0C |MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C] ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfFunctions
004104AE |. 03D3 |ADD EDX,EBX ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfFunctions+IAMGEBASE
004104B0 |. C1E1 02 |SHL ECX,2
004104B3 |. 03D1 |ADD EDX,ECX
004104B5 |. 8B12 |MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]
004104B7 |. 03D3 |ADD EDX,EBX ;得到函数VA
004104B9 |. 8917 |MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI],EDX ;存放函数地址
004104BB |. 8B4D 08 |MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
004104BE |. 03CB |ADD ECX,EBX
004104C0 |. 894D 04 |MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+4],ECX
004104C3 |. 5F |POP EDI
004104C4 |.^ EB 9D /JMP SHORT 1.00410463
//想起failwest的shellcode。。。。。
004104C6 |> /83EF 04 SUB EDI,4
004104C9 |. 8BE7 MOV ESP,EDI
004104CB |. 8B5C24 08 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8]
004104CF |. 8BFC MOV EDI,ESP
004104D1 |. 83EF 04 SUB EDI,4
004104D4 |. 57 PUSH EDI
004104D5 |. 6A 40 PUSH 40 ;PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
004104D7 |. 68 00100000 PUSH 1000
004104DC |. 68 00004000 PUSH 1.00400000
004104E1 |. FFD3 CALL EBX ; VirtualProtect修改PE头属性为可读可写可执行
004104E3 |. BF 00004000 MOV EDI,1.00400000 ;IMAGEBASE
004104E8 |. 037F 3C ADD EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+3C] ;IMAGE_NT_HEADER
004104EB |. C787 A0000000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+A0],12000 ;重定位表IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC.VirtualAddress
004104F5 |. C787 A4000000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+A4],11E4 ;IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC.Size
004104FF |. C787 80000000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+80],0 ;IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT.VirtualAddress清空了导入表偏移
00410509 |. C787 84000000>MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+84],0 ;IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT.Size
00410513 |. 8BD7 MOV EDX,EDI ;IMAGE_NT_HEADER
00410515 |. 83C2 18 ADD EDX,18 ;IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32
00410518 |. 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX
0041051A |. 66:8B4F 14 MOV CX,WORD PTR DS:[EDI+14] ;SizeOfOptionalHeader
0041051E |. 03D1 ADD EDX,ECX ;定位到节表IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
00410520 |. 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX
00410522 |> 8B72 0C /MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+C] ;IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.VirtualAddress
00410525 |. 81C6 00004000 |ADD ESI,1.00400000 ;IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.VirtualAddress+IMAGEBASE
0041052B |. 60 |PUSHAD
0041052C |. 8BFC |MOV EDI,ESP
0041052E |. 83EF 04 |SUB EDI,4
00410531 |. 57 |PUSH EDI
00410532 |. 6A 40 |PUSH 40
00410534 |. FF72 08 |PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+8] ;IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.VirtualSize
00410537 |. 56 |PUSH ESI
00410538 |. FFD3 |CALL EBX ;VirtualProtect
0041053A |. 61 |POPAD
0041053B |. 83C2 28 |ADD EDX,28
0041053E |. 41 |INC ECX
0041053F |. 81F9 03000000 |CMP ECX,3
00410545 |.^ 72 DB /JB SHORT 1.00410522 ;将PE文件前3个节属性变为可读可写可执行
00410547 |. 83EA 28 SUB EDX,28 ;定位到第3个节的节表
0041054A |. 8B42 0C MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+C] ;IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.VirtualAddress
0041054D |. 0342 10 ADD EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+10] ;+ IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.SizeOfRawData
00410550 |. 05 00004000 ADD EAX,1.00400000 ;定位到节空隙
00410555 |. 83C0 64 ADD EAX,64
00410558 |. 60 PUSHAD
00410559 |. 8BF8 MOV EDI,EAX
0041055B |. BE D5034100 MOV ESI,1.004103D5 ;首次解密的起始地址
00410560 |. B9 98064100 MOV ECX,1.00410698 ;首次解密的终止地址
00410565 |. 2BCE SUB ECX,ESI
00410567 |. F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
;将壳代码复制到节表间隙中去想写插入型病毒的可以参考这里怎样定位的
00410569 |. 61 POPAD
0041056A |. 68 FB658ADC PUSH DC8A65FB
0041056F |. FFE0 JMP EAX ;跳
00413667 . B9 FB658ADC MOV ECX,DC8A65FB ;注意上面入栈的再看看这里该壳有多种变形壳但是都是通过比较一个DWORD 来确定运行流程
0041366C . 3B0C24 CMP ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
0041366F . 0F84 8B010000 JE 1.00413800 ;跳到壳的第二部分
00413675 . B8 00000000 MOV EAX,0
00413800 > /5E POP ESI
00413801 . 05 98064100 ADD EAX,1.00410698
00413806 . 2D D5034100 SUB EAX,1.004103D5 ;重定位壳代码的结束地址
0041380B . 8BD8 MOV EBX,EAX
0041380D . 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
0041380F . B8 03000000 MOV EAX,3
00413814 . 48 DEC EAX
00413815 . 6BC0 28 IMUL EAX,EAX,28
00413818 . 2BD0 SUB EDX,EAX ;定位到第1个节的IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
0041381A . 33C9 XOR ECX,ECX
0041381C > 8B72 0C MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+C] ;IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER[0].VirtualAddress
0041381F . 81C6 00004000 ADD ESI,1.00400000 ;+IMAGEBASE
00413825 . 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
00413827 . 8A06 MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[ESI] ;每个节的开始都有一个结构
00413829 . 03F0 ADD ESI,EAX
0041382B . 60 PUSHAD
0041382C . 8BFB MOV EDI,EBX
0041382E . E8 1F000000 CALL 1.00413852 ;解压CALL跟进去看看
{
00413852 /$ 60 PUSHAD
00413853 |. BB D218CF1F MOV EBX,1FCF18D2
00413858 |. B9 00000000 MOV ECX,0
0041385D |. BA 00000000 MOV EDX,0
00413862 |> 281E /SUB BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],BL
00413864 |. C1EB 08 |SHR EBX,8
00413867 |. 41 |INC ECX
00413868 |. 83F9 04 |CMP ECX,4
0041386B |. 75 0A |JNZ SHORT 1.00413877
0041386D |. BB D218CF1F |MOV EBX,1FCF18D2
00413872 |. B9 00000000 |MOV ECX,0
00413877 |> 46 |INC ESI
00413878 |. 42 |INC EDX
00413879 |. 83FA 08 |CMP EDX,8
0041387C |.^ 7C E4 |JL SHORT 1.00413862
0041387E |. 7F 05 |JG SHORT 1.00413885 ;EDX为8时才解密
00413880 |. 8B46 FC |MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI-4] ;解密后的[ESI-4]代表需解压的代码终止地址
00413883 |. 03C6 |ADD EAX,ESI
00413885 |> 3BF0 |CMP ESI,EAX
00413887 |.^ 7C D9 /JL SHORT 1.00413862
00413889 |. 61 POPAD
//下面是解压过程代码不贴了
}
每个节的第1个字节代表需解密的代码在节中偏移，解密后的代码的第2个DWORD值代表需解压的代码的大小
导入表在第3个节中第3次解压将导入表破坏
00413833 . 8B0E MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00413835 . 8BFE MOV EDI,ESI
00413837 . 2BF8 SUB EDI,EAX
00413839 . 8BF3 MOV ESI,EBX
0041383B . F3:A4 REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI];将解压后的代码复制回原地
0041383D . 61 POPAD
0041383E . 83C2 28 ADD EDX,28
00413841 . 41 INC ECX
00413842 . 81F9 03000000 CMP ECX,3
00413848 .^ 72 D2 JB SHORT 1.0041381C ;循环解压3个节
0041384A . B8 2D704000 MOV EAX,1.0040702D
0041384F . FFD0 CALL EAX ;进入OEP
00413851 . C3 RETN
简便方法：该壳在最后解压3个节并破坏原IAT 所以在原IAT 下硬件写入断点就可停在0041383B 往下再走几步就到
OEP了
修复IAT:整个壳虽然清0了导入表偏移并破坏了导入表结构但是该导入表是伪导入表无论是壳还是木马本身都跟该导入表中函数无关 dump后 importfix 检测到导入表但是无导入函数直接运行后错误所以仔细跟了下是堆栈引起的写了个脚本修复了下运行后 dump 可以直接运行
脚本:
var iataddress
var mem
var xxx
var org_esp
var oep
var yyy
gmi eip, IDATATABLE
mov iataddress, $RESULT
bphws iataddress, "w"
run
bphwcall
findop eip, #ffd0#
bp $RESULT
run
bc eip
sti
msg "到达oep,开始修补堆栈,修补后会改变OEP"
mov oep, eip
alloc 1000
mov mem, $RESULT
mov xxx, mem
mov org_esp, esp
@continue:
add esp, 4
cmp [esp], 0000ffff
jnz @continue
@next:
mov [xxx], #68#,1
inc xxx
mov [xxx], [esp]
sub esp,4
add xxx,4
cmp esp, org_esp
jae @next
mov [xxx], #ff25#, 2
add xxx, 2
mov [xxx], iataddress
add xxx, 4
sub xxx, mem
mov [iataddress], oep
add iataddress, 4
mov eip, iataddress
mov yyy, mem
@orz:
cmp xxx, 0
je @exit
mov [iataddress], [yyy], 1
inc iataddress
inc yyy
dec xxx
jmp @orz
@exit:
msg "修补完成,可以dump"
free mem
ret
overlay处理:直接把原文件的overlay贴到脱壳后的文件末尾就可以了
注意下:
1：我的虚拟机里XP版本过老木马运行后系统崩溃
可能是XP版本问题，换了个新版本的XP 运行正常但是因为新版本的XP 没有弄测试
环境所以不能肯定
2：在某个系统下调试就不要换其它系统，修复堆栈里存放的函数地址是直接从堆栈中读取的而不是自己写动态获取过程得到的所以肯定不能跨系统版本运行脚本运行过程中会有个断点下在数据段的警告确定就可以了
3：木马有危险，切记虚拟机下调试稍微看了下没有新技术以后有时间再仔细分析字符串都是加密的不停的拷贝自身。。
附件下载：http://bbs.pediy.com/showthread.php?t=79532