Cryptography, Security and the Future

 

From e-mail to cellular communications, from secure Web access to digital cash, cryptography is an essential part of today's information systems. Cryptography helps provide accountability, fairness, accuracy, and confidentiality. It can prevent fraud in electronic commerce and assure the validity of financial transactions. It can protect your anonymity or prove your identity. It can keep vandals from altering your Web page and prevent industrial competitors from reading your confidential documents. And in the future, as commerce and communications continue to move to computer networks, cryptography will become more and more vital.

从e-mail到蜂窝通讯系统，从安全网页到数字现金，加密算法已经是当今信息系统不可或缺的一部分。密码学使得加密保护，公平交易，问责称为可能。它能够很好的防止电子商务里的造假行为，并使得远程交易成为可能；它能够保护你的隐私；它还能够保护你的网页不被修改，并保护你的机密文档不被窃取。将来，商务和交流原来越依靠网络，密码学将会越来越重要。

 

But the cryptography now on the market doesn't provide the level of security it advertises. Most systems are not designed and implemented by cryptographers, but by engineers who think cryptography is like any other computer technology. It's not. You can't make systems secure by tacking on cryptography as an afterthought. You have to know what you are doing every step of the way, from conception through installation.

当时现在市面上的密码学产品并不能够提供它们标榜的安全性。许多的系统的设计者是一些对密码学不了解的工程师，而不是密码学家，这些工程师通常认为密码学和计算机的其他科学没什么分别。单靠密码学不足以保证系统安全性，一个安全的系统的每一步都必须是安全的。

 

Billions of dollars are spent on computer security, and most of it is wasted on insecure products. After all, weak cryptography looks the same on the shelf as strong cryptography. Two e-mail encryption products may have almost the same user interface, yet one is secure while the other permits eavesdropping. A comparison chart may suggest that two programs have similar features, although one has gaping security holes that the other doesn't. An experienced cryptographer can tell the difference. So can a thief.

据统计计算机安全产业目前已经花费了几十亿美金，但是许多钱都被浪费在不安全的产品上。毕竟，用户无法判断加密算法的安全性。两个邮件加密系统的用户界面可能完全相同，但是可能一个是安全的，另一个却允许窃听。也许两个加密算法看起来差不多，但是其中一个也许就有漏洞。如果一个经验丰厚的密码学家能够发现这个漏洞，黑客高手也能。

 

The people who break cryptographic systems don't follow rules; they cheat. They can attack a system using techniques the designers never thought of. Art thieves have burgled homes by cutting through the walls with a chain saw. Home security systems, no matter how expensive and sophisticated, won't stand a chance against this attack. Computer thieves come through the walls too. They steal technical data, bribe insiders, modify software, and collude. The odds favor the attacker: defenders have to protect against every possible vulnerability, but an attacker only has to find one security flaw to compromise the whole system.

破解加密系统的人通常不按常理出牌。欺骗，从系统设计者没考虑到的技术，就好像有些小偷可能会在墙上打洞来盗窃，那么无论哪种防盗系统都不可能防范这种方式。计算机世界的小偷也可能采用这种方式，它们盗窃技术文档，行贿内部人员，修改软件等等。防守方总是需要防范任何一个可能的攻击行为，而攻击者只需在整个系统里找到一个安全漏洞即可。

 

 

Present-day computer security is a house of cards; it may stand for now, but it can't last. Many insecure products have not yet been broken because they are still in their infancy. But when these products are widely used, they will become tempting targets for criminals. The press will publicize the attacks, undermining public confidence in these systems. Ultimately, products will win or lose in the marketplace depending on the strength of their security.

目前的许多安全产品就像温室里的花朵，它们现在还没有被攻破，并不代表以后不会被攻破。许多安全产品没有被攻击的原因就是它们的市场份额还比较少，一但它们的产品被广泛应用，它们可能马上成为攻击者的目标。甚至可以这么说，产品的安全性和它的市场份额成反比。

 

No one can guarantee 100% security. But we can work toward 100% risk acceptance. Fraud exists in current commerce systems: cash can be counterfeited, checks altered, credit card numbers stolen. Yet these systems are still successful because the benefits and conveniences outweigh the losses. Privacy systems -- wall safes, door locks, curtains -- are not perfect, but they're often good enough. A good cryptographic system strikes a balance between what is possible and what is acceptable.

没人能够保证100%的安全，但是我们的目标是100%的风险验收。现实世界中的商务行为中就存在欺骗：假币，修改支票，伪装信用卡等；当这一商务系统依然存在，因为它带来的收益和方便远远高与损失。隐私保护系统—墙，锁，窗帘—这些都不完美，当时它们却足以保护我们的隐私。一个好的安全系统需要平衡两个关系，投入和产出。

 

Strong cryptography can withstand targeted attacks up to a point -- the point at which it becomes easier to get the information some other way. A computer encryption program, no matter how good, will not prevent an attacker from going through someone's garbage. But it can prevent data-harvesting attacks absolutely; no attacker can go through enough trash to find every AZT user in the country.

高强度算法只能够将攻击者转向其他攻击方式，一个完美的计算机加密软件也无法抵御攻击者通过收集垃圾来了解被保护人的信息。但是它可以保护信息不被直接窃取。我想任何一个攻击者都无法找出美国所有的AZT用户。

 

The good news about cryptography is that we already have the algorithms and protocols we need to secure our systems. The bad news is that that was the easy part; implementing the protocols successfully requires considerable expertise. The areas of security that interact with people -- key management, human/computer interface security, access control -- often defy analysis. And the disciplines of public-key infrastructure, software security, computer security, network security, and tamper-resistant hardware design are very poorly understood.

 

密码学的一个好消息是我们已经有能够保证系统安全的的算法和协议。而坏消息是：正确使用这些协议需要相当的经验。在安全系统与使用者互动的区域，例如密码管理，人/机互动安全，接入点控制—这些通常是弱点。公钥体制，软件安全，计算机安全，网络安全，以及硬件抗破坏设计都令人难以理解。

 

Laws are no substitute for engineering. The U.S. cellular phone industry has lobbied for protective laws, instead of spending the money to fix what should have been designed corectly the first time. It's no longer good enough to install security patches in response to attacks. Computer systems move too quickly; a security flaw can be described on the Internet and exploited by thousands. Today's systems must anticipate future attacks. Any comprehensive system designed today is likely to remain in use for five years or more. It must be able to withstand the future: smarter attackers, more computational power, and greater incentives to subvert a widespread system. There won't be time to upgrade them in the field.

法律也是一个问题。美国蜂窝电话产业联盟就在游说政府建立保护法令，而不是花钱来修补过去遗留的问题。发现攻击行为后设计补丁并不是长久之计。计算机世界信息传输的太快了，发现一个安全漏洞的消息会立刻传遍整个internet。因此今天的系统设计者需要考虑到明天的攻击方式。一个综合系统应该能够抵御未来5年的攻击。将来我们将会面对更为聪明的攻击者，更强大的机器，更好的传播方式，那时发现一个漏洞后，我们可能根本来不及打补丁。

 

History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did.

历史教育我们：有些人为了破解一个安全系统是不惜代价的。往最坏的方向向问题不是一件坏事。如果假设攻击者缺乏某种能力，那么科学的发展将会让他们具备这种能力。充分考虑可能的错误，将你的系统设计的比需要更安全，那么当意想不到的事情发生是，你就不会措手不及。