我们的平台正在燃烧——诺基亚CEO史蒂芬·艾洛普（中英对照）

大家好：

有这样一个故事：一个人在北海油田的钻井平台上工作。一天晚上，他在剧烈的爆炸声中惊醒，发现自己已被火焰包围。整个平台已经着火了。他奋力从浓烟和火焰中冲出，来到平台的边缘。他望向平台之外的地方，却只能看到黑暗、冰冷、可怕的北大西洋。

火焰越逼越近，他只有几秒钟的时间作出反应。他可以选择站在平台上，然后葬身火海；也可以选择跳下平台，陷入冰冷海水的30米深处。他所处的是一个正在燃烧的平台。

他决定跳下。这是出乎意料的举动。在通常情况下，他绝不会考虑跳到冰水中。然而这不是“通常情况”：他的平台着火了。他经受了从高处跌下和海水的煎熬，并获救了。他后来提到，“着火的平台”使他的行为有了极大改变。

我们现在也站在一个“着火的平台”上，必须决定该怎样改变我们的行为。

过去几个月间，我已经与你们分享了我从股东、运营商、开发人员、供应商及你们自己听来的言论。今天，我将与大家分享我的观点和态度。

我认为，我们正站在一个着火的平台上。

我们经受的也不止一次爆炸——我们已处在多个着火点的包围中。

例如，我们的竞争对手正在施加越来越大的压力，其发展速度超过预期。苹果重新定义了智能手机，并将开发人员纳入一个封闭但极为强大的生态系统，彻底摧毁了原有市场格局。

2008 年，苹果在300美元以上价位手机市场的份额仅为25%；到2010年，这一数字已猛增至61%。2011财年第一季度，苹果净利润同 比增长 78%。它的成功表明，如果设计得当，消费者愿意购买一款用户体验优异的高价手机，而开发人员将负责应用程序。苹果改变了游戏规则；如今，它已经掌控高端 手机市场。

此外，谷歌Android平台仅仅诞生2年，即已吸引大量开发人员、服务提供商和硬件厂商加入。Android系统首先针对高端手机市场，目前已打入中端市场，未来还将进军100美元以下价位的低端市场。谷歌已成为“万有引力”，大量吸纳科技产业的创新能力。

不要忘记低端手机市场。2008年，联发科提供了一整套手机芯片参考设计方案，中国深圳的手机厂商开始以不可思议的速度制造产品。一些统计数据显示，这一生态系统生产的手机占全球总产量的三分之一以上。诺基亚在新兴市场的市场份额被大量抢占。

在竞争对手“火上浇油”的同时，诺基亚在做些什么呢？我们落后了，我们错过了主要潮流，我们丧失了时间优势。在当时，我们认为自己在做正确的决定；但如今，我们却发现已落后数年之久。

第一代iPhone于2007年发布；而直到今天，我们还没有一款产品具有与之接近的用户体验。大约2年前，Android手机首次亮相；本周，它已经超越诺基亚，坐上智能机市场的头把交椅。这令人难以置信。

诺基亚拥有创新能力，却不能将创新产品足够快地推向市场。我们曾认为MeeGo手机操作系统将统治高端智能机市场。然而，按照当前的研发速度，到2011年年底，我们或许只能推出一款搭载该系统的机型。

在中端市场，我们拥有塞班系统。事实已经证明，它在北美等领先市场毫无竞争力。此外，该系统的应用研发难度越来越大，难以满足不断膨胀的消费者需求，拖累了产品研发，也无法利用新的硬件平台。如果我们仍然维持现状，诺基亚与其他竞争对手的差距将越来越大。

在低端市场，中国的OEM(原始设备制造商)厂商正以惊人速度制造出大量手机。一名诺基亚雇员曾半开玩笑地说：“他们制造手机所需要的时间，仅仅相当于我们制作一份PPT文档。”这些厂商动作迅速，产品价格低廉，正对我们构成挑战。

真正令人费解的是，我们甚至没有选对武器。我们仍在试图以一种“设备对设备”的方式，在每一级别的市场上展开竞争。

如今，设备之间的竞争已经演变为生态系统之间的竞争。生态系统不仅包括设备的软硬件，还包括开发人员、应用、电子商务、广告、搜索、社交应用、 地理位置服务、统一通信及其他许多内容 。我们的竞争对手并非通过设备抢占市场份额，而是通过一个完整的生态系统 。这意味着，我们将不得不决定建立、促成或 加入一个生态系统。

这是我们需要做出的决定之一。与此同时，我们已经失去了市场份额、注意力份额(mind share)和时间。

周二，标准普尔通知我们，将诺基亚的长期信贷评级调整为A级，短期信贷评级调整为A-1级。穆迪公司上周采取了类似举动。这意味着，未来几周内，他们将对诺基亚进行分析，并有可能调低信贷评级。这些信贷机构为什么要这样做？因为他们对诺基亚的竞争力感到担忧。

消费者对于诺基亚的偏好在全球范围内陷入衰退。在英国，我们的品牌偏好度下滑至20%，比去年同期低8%。这意味着，5个英国人中，只有1个更喜欢诺基亚产品。在俄罗斯、德国、印度尼西亚、阿联酋及其他许多国家，诺基亚曾长期占据优势，如今却也陷入衰退。

我们是怎样陷入如此境地的？在全世界都在进化时，我们为什么会落后？

这就是我一直想弄明白的。我认为，至少有一部分原因是诺基亚内部的态度。我们将燃料倾倒在自己的已经着火的平台上。我们缺乏凝聚和引领这家公司走出困境的可信度和领导力 。我们接连错过机遇。我们未能尽快推出创新产品。我们内部未能实现协作。

诺基亚，我们的平台正在燃烧 。

我们正致力于一条发展之路——一条能够重建市场领导地位的道路。2月11日，我们将披露新的战略，它将是诺基亚改革的一项重大努力。我认为，团结起来，我们就能够面对未来的挑战，就能够把握我们的未来。

钻井平台上的那个人重新认识了自己，改变了自己的行为，并向不确定的未来迈出勇敢一步 。如今，我们也有同样机遇，去做一样的事情。

史蒂芬

 

Hello there,

There is a pertinent story about a man who was working on an oil platform in the North Sea. He woke up one night from a loud explosion, which suddenly set his entire oil platform on fire. In mere moments, he was surrounded by flames. Through the smoke and heat, he barely made his way out of the chaos to the platform's edge. When he looked down over the edge, all he could see were the dark, cold, foreboding Atlantic waters.

As the fire approached him, the man had mere seconds to react. He could stand on the platform, and inevitably be consumed by the burning flames . Or, he could plunge 30 meters in to the freezing waters. The man was standing upon a "burning platform ," and he needed to make a choice.

He decided to jump. It was unexpected. In ordinary circumstances, the man would never consider plunging into icy waters. But these were not ordinary times - his platform was on fire. The man survived the fall and the waters. After he was rescued, he noted that a "burning platform " caused a radical change in his behaviour.

We too, are standing on a "burning platform," and we must decide how we are going to change our behaviour.

Over the past few months, I've shared with you what I've heard from our shareholders, operators, developers, suppliers and from you. Today, I'm going to share what I've learned and what I have come to believe.

I have learned that we are standing on a burning platform .

And, we have more than one explosion - we have multiple points of scorching heat that are fuelling a blazing fire around us.

For example, there is intense heat coming from our competitors, more rapidly than we ever expected. Apple disrupted the market by redefining the smartphone and attracting developers to a closed, but very powerful ecosystem.

In 2008, Apple's market share in the $300+ price range was 25 percent; by 2010 it escalated to 61 percent. They are enjoying a tremendous growth trajectory with a 78 percent earnings growth year over year in Q4 2010. Apple demonstrated that if designed well, consumers would buy a high-priced phone with a great experience and developers would build applications. They changed the game, and today, Apple owns the high-end range.

And then, there is Android. In about two years, Android created a platform that attracts application developers, service providers and hardware manufacturers. Android came in at the high-end, they are now winning the mid-range, and quickly they are going downstream to phones under €100. Google has become a gravitational force, drawing much of the industry's innovation to its core.

Let's not forget about the low-end price range. In 2008, MediaTek supplied complete reference designs for phone chipsets, which enabled manufacturers in the Shenzhen region of China to produce phones at an unbelievable pace. By some accounts, this ecosystem now produces more than one third of the phones sold globally - taking share from us in emerging markets.

While competitors poured flames on our market share, what happened at Nokia? We fell behind, we missed big trends, and we lost time. At that time, we thought we were making the right decisions; but, with the benefit of hindsight, we now find ourselves years behind.

The first iPhone shipped in 2007, and we still don't have a product that is close to their experience. Android came on the scene just over 2 years ago, and this week they took our leadership position in smartphone volumes. Unbelievable.

We have some brilliant sources of innovation inside Nokia, but we are not bringing it to market fast enough. We thought MeeGo would be a platform for winning high-end smartphones. However, at this rate, by the end of 2011, we might have only one MeeGo product in the market.

At the midrange, we have Symbian. It has proven to be non-competitive in leading markets like North America. Additionally, Symbian is proving to be an increasingly difficult environment in which to develop to meet the continuously expanding consumer requirements , leading to slowness in product development and also creating a disadvantage when we seek to take advantage of new hardware platforms. As a result, if we continue like before, we will get further and further behind, while our competitors advance further and further ahead.

At the lower-end price range, Chinese OEMs are cranking out a device much faster than, as one Nokia employee said only partially in jest, "the time that it takes us to polish a PowerPoint presentation." They are fast, they are cheap, and they are challenging us.

And the truly perplexing aspect is that we're not even fighting with the right weapons. We are still too often trying to approach each price range on a device-to-device basis.

The battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystems, where ecosystems include not only the hardware and software of the device, but developers, applications, ecommerce, advertising, search, social applications, location-based services, unified communications and many other things. Our competitors aren't taking our market share with devices; they are taking our market share with an entire ecosystem. This means we're going to have to decide how we either build, catalyse or join an ecosystem.

This is one of the decisions we need to make. In the meantime, we've lost market share, we've lost mind share and we've lost time.

On Tuesday, Standard & Poor's informed that they will put our A long term and A-1 short term ratings on negative credit watch. This is a similar rating action to the one that Moody's took last week. Basically it means that during the next few weeks they will make an analysis of Nokia, and decide on a possible credit rating downgrade. Why are these credit agencies contemplating these changes? Because they are concerned about our competitiveness.

Consumer preference for Nokia declined worldwide. In the UK, our brand preference has slipped to 20 percent, which is 8 percent lower than last year. That means only 1 out of 5 people in the UK prefer Nokia to other brands. It's also down in the other markets, which are traditionally our strongholds: Russia, Germany, Indonesia, UAE, and on and on and on.

How did we get to this point? Why did we fall behind when the world around us evolved?

This is what I have been trying to understand. I believe at least some of it has been due to our attitude inside Nokia. We poured gasoline on our own burning platform. I believe we have lacked accountability and leadership to align and direct the company through these disruptive times. We had a series of misses. We haven't been delivering innovation fast enough. We're not collaborating internally.

Nokia, our platform is burning.

We are working on a path forward -- a path to rebuild our market leadership. When we share the new strategy on February 11, it will be a huge effort to transform our company. But, I believe that together, we can face the challenges ahead of us. Together, we can choose to define our future.

The burning platform , upon which the man found himself, caused the man to shift his behaviour, and take a bold and brave step into an uncertain future. He was able to tell his story. Now, we have a great opportunity to do the same.

Stephen.

转自http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2011-02-09/13035161197.shtml

http://cn.engadget.com/2011/02/09/nokia-ceo-stephen-elop-rallies-troops-in-brutally-honest-burnin/