数字身份 和 iot
This piece is the first installment of a series on digital identity called “Please Allow Me to Introduce Myself: The Past, Present, and Future of Digital Identity.” This series aims to explore the evolution of digital identity, the state of self-sovereign identity today, and its use cases.
这是关于数字身份的系列文章的第一部分,该系列名为“请允许我自我介绍:数字身份的过去,现在和未来。” 本系列旨在探讨数字身份的演变,当今自我主权身份的状态及其 使用案例 。
Think back to the last time you called your bank’s customer service line, only to have to recall obscure facts about your elementary school to authenticate yourself. Or that scramble to see if your personal information was compromised when your usual fitness app or airline gets hacked (looking at you, MyFitnessPal and British Airways). Or the hassle of setting up yet another account on yet another e-commerce site, not knowing if they are secure enough to store your personal email ID. Digital identity underpins our every step on the internet, and yet — despite decades of evolution — problems still abound.
回想一下您上次致电银行客户服务专线时,只需要回想起有关小学的晦涩事实,即可对自己进行身份验证。 或是在您平时使用的健身应用或航空公司遭到黑客入侵(看着您,MyFitnessPal和British Airways)时争先恐后地查看您的个人信息是否受到威胁。 或在另一个电子商务站点上设置另一个帐户的麻烦,却不知道它们是否足够安全来存储您的个人电子邮件ID。 数字身份支撑着我们在互联网上迈出的每一步,然而,尽管经过数十年的发展,问题仍然比比皆是。
The notion of identity is arguably our most intrinsic characteristic — it’s our answer to “Who are you?”. However, in the online realm, figuring out who is who is a more complex process. Who assigns names? Who ensures that names are unique? Can we trust the entity in charge of all our IDs? Our answers to these questions have evolved just as the Internet has, and in this essay, I will talk about the long road of identity solutions we’ve walked down, where we are now, and where we could be headed in the future.
身份概念可以说是我们最固有的特征-这是我们对“你是谁?”的回答。 但是,在在线领域,找出谁是谁是一个更复杂的过程。 谁分配名字? 谁确保名字唯一? 我们可以信任负责所有ID的实体吗? 正如互联网一样,我们对这些问题的答案也在不断发展。在本文中,我将讨论我们走过的身份验证解决方案的漫长道路,我们现在所处的位置以及未来的发展方向。
过去的身份模型 (Identity Models of the Past)
早期:ARPANET和DNS (The Early Days: ARPANET and DNS)
The very first days of the “internet” introduced us to the most basic model of storing identities: the humble database. ARPANET, a precursor to the Internet created by the Department of Defense, involved each computer having a numeric address. In order to make more intuitive to navigate and communicate, each computer could create a “hostname”, which essentially could serve as a nickname to make communication easier. However, who kept track of the nicknames for each of these nicknames and which numeric addresses each nickname corresponded to? That responsibility fell to the Stanford Research Institute (the SRI).[1] The SRI maintained one central database simply known as hosts.txt, containing each hostname and corresponding addresses. In order to add a new hostname to this host.txt, users would have to call the SRI (only during business hours, of course!) and manually add the file.
“互联网”的最初几天向我们介绍了存储身份的最基本模型:不起眼的数据库。 ARPANET是美国国防部创建的Internet的前身,涉及的每台计算机都有一个数字地址。 为了使导航和通信更加直观,每台计算机都可以创建一个“主机名”,该主机名实际上可以用作昵称以简化通信。 但是,谁跟踪这些昵称的昵称以及每个昵称对应的数字地址呢? 这项责任由斯坦福研究所(SRI)承担。 [1] SRI维护了一个中央数据库,简称为hosts.txt,其中包含每个主机名和相应的地址。 为了向此host.txt添加新的主机名,用户将必须调用SRI(当然,仅在工作时间内!)并手动添加文件。
Clearly, this solution doesn’t scale. This approach may have been okay in the ’70s, when there weren’t that many computers on the network, however the hassle of manually maintaining this meant that people quickly searched for an alternative. Moreover, imagine the chaos if someone from the SRI made a typo while noting the hostname or corresponding address! Quickly, there began a searched for an automated system. From here, DNS was born. DNS comprises a part of the internet protocol suite, sometimes referred to as TCP/IP, two fundamental protocols within the suite. The premise behind it is that navigating the internet through IP addresses is cumbersome and unintuitive; instead, a much better system would be to assign pseudonyms as was done for hostnames earlier! This allows us to simply look up websites by going to www.r3.com instead of a more convoluted IP address to access R3’s website. Unlike the previous approach that needed to be updated by hand, the DNS system runs on a distributed database. The main authority in charge of domain registration is the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers, a non-profit. DNS thus served as the first step towards a more robust digital identity.
显然,此解决方案无法扩展。 当网络上没有那么多计算机时,这种方法在70年代可能还不错,但是手动维护此方法的麻烦意味着人们很快就开始寻找替代方法。 此外,想象一下,如果SRI中的某人在记下主机名或相应地址的同时打错了字! 很快,人们开始寻找自动化系统。 DNS从这里诞生。 DNS包含Internet协议套件的一部分,有时称为TCP / IP,这是套件中的两个基本协议。 其背后的前提是,通过IP地址浏览互联网既麻烦又不直观。 取而代之的是,更好的系统是像先前对主机名所做的那样分配假名! 这使我们可以通过访问www.r3.com来简单地查找网站,而不是使用更复杂的IP地址来访问R3的网站。 与以前需要手动更新的方法不同,DNS系统在分布式数据库上运行。 负责域名注册的主要机构是非营利组织互联网名称与数字地址分配机构(Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers)。 DNS因此成为迈向更强大的数字身份的第一步。
And now, as with most tech discussions nowadays, we must take a detour to talk about public-key cryptography.
现在,与当今大多数技术讨论一样,我们必须绕道而行,谈论公钥加密。
数字签名和认证机构 (Digital Signatures and Certifying Authorities)
When you were first introduced to cryptography, you were probably given a metaphor involving a lock and a key. I have a message, I lock it with my key, and then if you have the same key then you can open the lock. Public-key cryptography is a little more complicated, as there are two linked keys — a public key and a private key. If a message is encrypted with a public key, it can be decrypted with a private key, and vice versa. While the two keys work hand-in-hand, one cannot be deduced from the other, allowing us to freely disseminate a public key. The way this is used for encryption is to encrypt a message using a public key, allowing it to be decrypted by only the person holding the private key. However, another application of this is to do the reverse. On the face of it, it makes little sense to encrypt something with a private key. After all, to encrypt a message with a private key means that anyone with a public key (readily available) can decrypt the message, right? While that is true, “encrypting” a message with a private key serves another purpose — it serves as a digital signature. The idea here is that only the holder of the private key (you) could encrypt a message in such a way that it is decryptable with your public key. Applications of this abound — from signing contracts to financial services.
当您第一次接触密码学时,可能会得到一个涉及锁和钥匙的比喻。 我收到一条消息,我用我的钥匙将其锁定,然后,如果您具有相同的钥匙,则可以打开锁。 公用密钥加密稍微复杂一点,因为有两个链接的密钥-公用密钥和专用密钥。 如果消息是用公钥加密的,则可以用私钥解密,反之亦然。 虽然两个密钥是并行的,但不能从另一个密钥中推论出一个密钥,这使我们能够自由地分发公共密钥。 用于加密的方式是使用公共密钥对消息进行加密,从而仅允许拥有私有密钥的人对其进行解密。 但是,这的另一个应用是相反的操作。 从表面上看,用私钥加密某些东西几乎没有意义。 毕竟,使用私钥加密消息意味着任何拥有公钥(易于使用)的人都可以解密该消息,对吗? 确实如此,使用私钥“加密”消息有另一个目的-它充当数字签名。 这里的想法是,只有私钥(您)的持有者才能加密消息,以使消息可以用您的公钥解密。 从签定合同到金融服务,这方面的应用比比皆是。
However, we can take the concept of digital signatures one level further. Using digital signatures, all we can really identify is the public key associated with the owner of the message. To link a public key to an actual identity, we need a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). A common approach to PKI is having a third-party Certificate Authority (CA) that validates and certifies the relationship between a public key and an actual entity or identity. However, the implicit assumption here is that the CA can be trusted; if the CA isn’t trusted by either the owner of the public key or the person seeking to verify the identity, then this model doesn’t work.
但是,我们可以将数字签名的概念再上一层。 使用数字签名,我们真正能识别出的只是与消息所有者关联的公共密钥。 要将公钥链接到实际身份,我们需要一个公钥基础结构(PKI)。 PKI的常见方法是拥有第三方证书颁发机构(CA),以验证和证明公共密钥与实际实体或身份之间的关系。 但是,这里的隐含假设是可以信任CA。 如果公钥所有者或寻求验证身份的人不信任CA,则此模型不起作用。
自下而上的方法:信任的网络和“很好的隐私” (Bottom-Up Approaches: Webs of Trust and “Pretty Good Privacy”)
The digital signature and CA system seemed to be a good system, however it resulted in a great amount of centralization because of the CAs. This concentration of trust in the CAs made people start to look for alternative, decentralized solutions. The most notable example here is Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP, an attempt to use public-key cryptography to secure emails. The idea behind PGP was to have people verify other people they knew or whose identity they had verified, thus creating a P2P “Web of Trust”, as discussed further in this paper. In principle, this does accomplish the goal of eliminating a central certificate authority to definitively link public keys to real identities, however it is not without its drawbacks. Ultimately, adoption didn’t take off on a large scale for a number of factors. Most significantly, e-mail is highly centralized by design; emails are definitionally under the control of the institutions offering the service (Google, Yahoo and the like). This, coupled with clunky, hard-to-use software, meant that the only real examples of web-of-trust models come from highly technical and niche domains. — one example of this is the Debian operating system.
数字签名和CA系统似乎是一个很好的系统,但是由于CA,它导致了大量的集中化。 对CA的这种信任集中使人们开始寻找替代的分散式解决方案。 这里最著名的示例是“漂亮隐私”(PGP),它是尝试使用公共密钥密码术保护电子邮件的安全。 PGP背后的想法是让人们确认他们知道其他人或者其身份,他们已经证实,因此形成了P2P“信任网”,在进一步讨论这个文件 。 原则上,这确实实现了消除中央证书颁发机构以将公钥最终链接到真实身份的目标,但是这样做并非没有缺点。 最终,由于多种因素,采用率并没有大幅度提高。 最重要的是,电子邮件在设计上是高度集中的。 电子邮件在定义上受提供服务的机构(Google,Yahoo等)的控制。 加上笨拙的,难以使用的软件,这意味着信任网络模型的唯一真实示例来自技术含量高的领域。 —例如Debian操作系统。
Now that we have reviewed a range of historical approaches to digital identity, let’s turn to some popular options today.
现在,我们已经回顾了一系列有关数字身份的历史方法,现在让我们转向一些流行的选择。
当今的身份模型 (Identity Models Today)
In this section, I shall explore identity models used today, broadly bifurcating them into siloed identity solutions and federated identities.
在本节中,我将探讨当今使用的身份模型,将其大致分为孤立的身份解决方案和联合身份。
常规(独立)身份 (Conventional (Siloed) Identities)
A sad reality today is that one of the most common approaches to digital identity is the siloed model we saw in ARPANET: massive, clunky databases holding customer identities and information. Consider the time you bought something on a small e-commerce site and it asked you to set up a username and password to sign in. This probably means that your information is stored in one such database. What’s the problem here?
今天令人悲哀的现实是,最常见的数字身份验证方法之一是我们在ARPANET中看到的孤立模型:拥有客户身份和信息的庞大笨拙的数据库。 考虑一下您在小型电子商务网站上购买商品的时间,它要求您设置用户名和密码来登录。这可能意味着您的信息存储在一个这样的数据库中。 这是什么问题
Unfortunately, the strength of your identity online is only as strong as the weakest link. It only takes one breach to have information like your payment details and address (continuing the e-commerce example) exposed. The more accounts you have, the more likely it is for any one of those accounts to be compromised, ultimately hurting your identity. The reason this seemingly poor method is so commonly adopted is because it is easy to implement and allows firms to gather data on its users. However, more and more firms are realizing that having extensive data on its users could be a liability just as it is an asset. With greater customer data comes a greater risk of being the target of a hack, which could substantially hurt the trust users place in the app.
不幸的是,您在线身份的实力仅与最薄弱的环节一样强大。 只需暴露一次即可使您的付款明细和地址(如电子商务示例)之类的信息公开。 您拥有的帐户越多,这些帐户中的任何一个就越有可能遭到破坏,最终损害您的身份。 这种看似糟糕的方法之所以如此普遍被采用,是因为它易于实施,并且允许公司收集其用户的数据。 但是,越来越多的公司意识到,拥有大量用户数据可能是一种负债,就像资产一样。 客户数据越多,被黑客攻击的风险就越大,这可能会严重损害用户对应用程序的信任。
Perhaps the most substantial drawback is the fact that users in this model need to keep track of a slew of logins and passwords, massively hurting convenience. An important takeaway from the PGP section — reinforced countless times by academics — is that convenience remains of the utmost priority in consumer security products. A better solution would be to have a single identity solution that can be used in multiple places, bringing us to our next ID solution.
也许最大的缺点是,该模型中的用户需要跟踪大量的登录名和密码,这极大地损害了便利性。 PGP部分的一个重要收获-学术界无数次地加强了-便利性仍然是消费者安全产品中的重中之重。 更好的解决方案是拥有一个可以在多个地方使用的单一身份解决方案,从而使我们进入下一个ID解决方案。
联合身份和身份提供者(又名“使用Google登录”) (Federated Identity and Identity Providers (aka “Log In With Google”))
![Image for post](https://i-blog.csdnimg.cn/blog_migrate/c1e8299a7d2f799c8e7bc7000f909a34.png)
If you’ve ever encountered a “Log In With Google” page, then you’ve encountered a federated identity solution before. The main goal of federated identity (FID) is to avoid the duplication of identities that happens in the traditional siloed model, thereby minimizing the possibility of a weak link getting compromised. While this is undeniably convenient, a number of challenges exist. For starters, federated identity involves placing a substantial amount of trust in the identity provider (IDP), such as Google in the example above. A common criticism is that a change in Google’s Terms of Service (for instance, the imposition of geographical restrictions on use) could lock you out of all linked accounts.
如果您曾经遇到过“使用Google登录”页面,那么您之前曾遇到过联合身份解决方案。 联邦身份(FID)的主要目标是避免传统孤立模型中发生的身份重复,从而最大程度地减少弱链接受到损害的可能性。 尽管这无疑是方便的,但仍然存在许多挑战。 对于初学者来说,联合身份涉及对身份提供者(IDP)的信任,例如上面示例中的Google。 普遍的批评是,Google服务条款的变更(例如,对使用地域施加了限制)可能使您无法访问所有关联帐户。
数字身份的未来:自我主权身份 (The Future of Digital Identity: Self-Sovereign Identity)
While I certainly don’t have a crystal ball, I do believe that the next evolution of digital identity is Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI). For the uninitiated, SSI is an identity solution that most commonly uses credentials held in a mobile wallet, very much akin to how cryptocurrencies are held in a wallet. These credentials — given by the same organizations we use today like the government — can then be queried by anyone who wants to verify your identity, say a bar that wants to check if you are of legal drinking age.
虽然我当然没有水晶球,但我确实相信数字身份的下一个发展是自我主权身份(SSI)。 对于初学者来说,SSI是一种身份解决方案,最常使用移动钱包中保存的凭据,这与钱包中保存加密货币的方式非常相似。 然后,想要验证您身份的任何人都可以查询这些凭据(由我们今天使用的相同组织,如政府提供),例如一家酒吧,它想检查您的法定饮酒年龄。
While the mechanics of SSI are for another blog post, I thought it would be worthwhile to conclude with a seminal post by Christopher Allen where he lays out the “Ten Principles of Self-Soverign Identity”.[2]
虽然SSI的技巧是在另一篇博客文章中发表,但我认为值得以克里斯托弗·艾伦(Christopher Allen)的开创性文章作为结尾,他在文章中提出“自我主权的十项原则”。 [2]
Existence. Users must have an independent existence.
存在。 用户必须具有独立的存在。
Control. Users must control their identities.
控制。 用户必须控制其身份。
Access. Users must have access to their own data.
访问。 用户必须有权访问自己的数据。
Transparency. Systems and algorithms must be transparent.
透明度 。 系统和算法必须透明。
Persistence. Identities must be long-lived.
坚持不懈。 身份必须长期存在。
Portability. Information and services about identity must be transportable.
可移植性。 有关身份的信息和服务必须是可传输的。
Interoperability. Identities should be as widely usable as possible.
互操作性。 身份应尽可能广泛地使用。
Consent. Users must agree to the use of their identity.
同意。 用户必须同意使用其身份。
Minimalization. Disclosure of claims must be minimized.
最小化。 索赔的披露必须最小化。
Protection. The rights of users must be protected.
保护。 用户的权利必须得到保护。
These core tenets, specifically control, consent and transparency, have been substantially lacking in current identity approaches today. The advent of SSI stands to let users get greater security and control over their identities online, allowing for increased convenience for everything from proving your age at a restaurant to completing Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements.
这些核心原则,特别是控制,同意和透明,在当今的身份认证方法中已大大缺乏。 SSI的出现使用户可以在线上获得更大的安全性和对其身份的控制,从而为从证明您在餐厅的年龄到满足“了解客户”(KYC)的各种要求提供了更多的便利。
Digital identity has come a long way from manually updated .txt files, driven by great innovations like DNS and public-key cryptography. However, in the process, identities have either become duplicated ad nauseam or deeply centralized. Earlier on, trust was centralized due to the Certificate Authority; nowadays, that trust has migrated social networks and other similar IDPs. Self-Sovereign Identity has the potential to fundamentally alter the way we view identity, eliminating the need to trust a single entity and returning control back to the user.
在DNS和公钥加密等重大创新的推动下,数字身份已与手动更新的.txt文件相距甚远。 但是,在此过程中,身份已成为重复的恶心或高度集中的身份。 早期,由于证书颁发机构的缘故,信任是集中的。 如今,这种信任已迁移到社交网络和其他类似的IDP。 自主权身份有可能从根本上改变我们查看身份的方式,从而无需信任单个实体并将控制权交还给用户。
Read the next installment here: Part 2: Self-Sovereign Identity: Under the Hood
在这里阅读下一部分: 第2部分:自我认同:内幕
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[1] https://ns1.com/resources/dns-protocol
[1] https://ns1.com/resources/dns-protocol
[2] http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html
[2] http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2016/04/the-path-to-self-soverereign-identity.html
翻译自: https://medium.com/inside-r3/the-past-present-and-future-of-digital-identity-3c590dfe96f3
数字身份 和 iot