计算机系统与网络安全,计算机系统与网络安全 Computer System and Network Security

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Security does not end when the system is completed. Its operation affects security. A secure system can be breached by improper operation (for example, when accounts with no passwords are created). The question is how to assess the effect of operational issues on security.Cost-Benefit Analysis: this weighs the cost of protecting data and resources with the costs associated with losing the data. Among the considerations are the overlap of mechanisms effects (one mechanism may protect multiple services, so its cost is amortized), the non-technical aspects of the mechanism (will it be impossible to enforce), and the ease of use (if a mechanism is too cumbersome, it may cost more to retrofit a decent user interface than the benefits would warrant).Risk Analysis: what happens if the data and resources are compromised? This tells you what you need to protect and to what level. Cost-benefit analyses help determine the risk here, but there may be other metrics involved (such as customs).Laws and Customs: these constrain what you can do. Encryption used to be the biggie here, as the text indicates. How much that has changed is anybodys guess. Customs involve non-legislated things, like the use of urine specimens to determine identity. That is legal, at least in the US in some cases; but it would never be widely accepted as an alternative to a password.Organizations: the key here is that those responsible for security have the power to enforce security. Otherwise there is confusion, and the architects need not worry if the system is secure because they wont be blamed if someone gets in. This arises when system administrators, for example, are responsible for security, but only security officers can make the rules. Preventing this problem (power without responsibility, or vice versa) is tricky and requires capable management. Whats worse is that security is not a direct financial incentive for most companies because it doesnt bring in revenue. It merely prevents the loss of revenue obtained from other sources.People problems are by far the main source of security problems. Outsiders are attackers from without the organization; insiders are people who have authorized access to the system and, possibly, are authorized to access data and resources, but use the data or resources in unauthorized ways. It is speculated that insiders account for 80-90% of all security problems, but the studies generally do not disclose their methodology in detail, so it is hard to know how accurate they are. (Worse, there are many slightly different definitions of the term insider, causing the studies to measure slightly different things!) Social engineering, or lying, is quite effective, especially if the people gulled are inexperienced in security (possibly because they are new, or because they are tired).See Table 1.4 for details of the 5 Security Service categories and the 14 specific services.

see Table 1.5 for details of these mechanisms, and Table 1.6 for the relationship between services and mechanisms.

The specific security mechanisms are protocol layer specific, whilst the pervasive security mechanisms are not.

Will meet some of these mechanisms in much greater detail later.

Snooping : an example is passive wiretapping, where the attacker monitors communications.Modification: an example is active wiretapping, where the attacker injects something into a communication or modifies parts of the communication. Modification is sometimes called alteration.Spoofing: delegation is basically authorized spoofing. The difference is that the ones to which authority is delegated does not impersonate the delegator; she simply asserts authority to act as an agent for the delegator.Delay: Denial of service: this may not be due to an attack, but due to limits of resources. However, the effect here is critical. If you define security in terms of what users need to access, the inability to access is a security problem regardless of whether the reason is intentional (an attack) or unintentional (not an attack).