2017linux漏洞统计,CVE-2017-1000367 in Sudo's get_process_ttyname() for Linux

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Contents

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Analysis

Exploitation

Example

Acknowledgments

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Analysis

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We discovered a vulnerability in Sudo's get_process_ttyname() for Linux:

this function opens "/proc/[pid]/stat" (man proc) and reads the device

number of the tty from field 7 (tty_nr). Unfortunately, these fields are

space-separated and field 2 (comm, the filename of the command) can

contain spaces (CVE-2017-1000367).

For example, if we execute Sudo through the symlink "./ 1 ",

get_process_ttyname() calls sudo_ttyname_dev() to search for the

non-existent tty device number "1" in the built-in search_devs[].

Next, sudo_ttyname_dev() calls the function sudo_ttyname_scan() to

search for this non-existent tty device number "1" in a breadth-first

traversal of "/dev".

Last, we exploit this function during its traversal of the

world-writable "/dev/shm": through this vulnerability, a local user can

pretend that his tty is any character device on the filesystem, and

after two race conditions, he can pretend that his tty is any file on

the filesystem.

On an SELinux-enabled system, if a user is Sudoer for a command that

does not grant him full root privileges, he can overwrite any file on

the filesystem (including root-owned files) with his command's output,

because relabel_tty() (in src/selinux.c) calls open(O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK)

on his tty and dup2()s it to the command's stdin, stdout, and stderr.

This allows any Sudoer user to obtain full root privileges.

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Exploitation

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To exploit this vulnerability, we:

- create a directory "/dev/shm/_tmp" (to work around

/proc/sys/fs/protected_symlinks), and a symlink "/dev/shm/_tmp/_tty"

to a non-existent pty "/dev/pts/57", whose device number is 34873;

- run Sudo through a symlink "/dev/shm/_tmp/ 34873 " that spoofs the

device number of this non-existent pty;

- set the flag CD_RBAC_ENABLED through the command-line option "-r role"

(where "role" can be our current role, for example "unconfined_r");

- monitor our directory "/dev/shm/_tmp" (for an IN_OPEN inotify event)

and wait until Sudo opendir()s it (because sudo_ttyname_dev() cannot

find our non-existent pty in "/dev/pts/");

- SIGSTOP Sudo, call openpty() until it creates our non-existent pty,

and SIGCONT Sudo;

- monitor our directory "/dev/shm/_tmp" (for an IN_CLOSE_NOWRITE inotify

event) and wait until Sudo closedir()s it;

- SIGSTOP Sudo, replace the symlink "/dev/shm/_tmp/_tty" to our

now-existent pty with a symlink to the file that we want to overwrite

(for example "/etc/passwd"), and SIGCONT Sudo;

- control the output of the command executed by Sudo (the output that

overwrites "/etc/passwd"):

. either through a command-specific method;

. or through a general method such as "--\nHELLO\nWORLD\n" (by

default, getopt() prints an error message to stderr if it does not

recognize an option character).

To reliably win the two SIGSTOP races, we preempt the Sudo process: we

setpriority() it to the lowest priority, sched_setscheduler() it to

SCHED_IDLE, and sched_setaffinity() it to the same CPU as our exploit.

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Example

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We will publish our Sudoer-to-root exploit

(Linux_sudo_CVE-2017-1000367.c) in the near future:

[john@...alhost ~]$ head -n 8 /etc/passwd

```

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin

daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin

adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin

lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin

sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync

shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown

halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt

```

`

[john@...alhost ~]$ sudo -l

```

[sudo] password for john:

...

User john may run the following commands on localhost:

(ALL) /usr/bin/sum

```

[john@...alhost ~]$ ./Linux_sudo_CVE-2017-1000367 /usr/bin/sum $'--\nHELLO\nWORLD\n'

`[sudo] password for john:`

[john@...alhost ~]$ head -n 8 /etc/passwd

```

/usr/bin/sum: unrecognized option '--

HELLO

WORLD

'

Try '/usr/bin/sum --help' for more information.

ogin

adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin

lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin

```

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Acknowledgments

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We thank Todd C. Miller for his great work and quick response, and the

members of the distros list for their help with the disclosure of this

vulnerability.