Virtual rule of law

• 3. Virtual rule of law

Michael Risch*

• 1. INTRODUCTION

The rule of law generally requires that governments announce and follow the laws of land. This allows citizens to know what to expect from their government and to make investments accordingly. Entrepreneurs want to know what activities are legal, whether the government can interfere in business, whether agreements are enforceable, and whether harmful actions by others will be stopped.

For this reason, many consider the rule of law a catalyst for economic development, and there is reason to believe that it will be equally important in virtual economies, despite their differences with the real world. As more people turn to virtual worlds for both fun and livelihood, the rule of law will become prominent in encouraging investments in virtual business.1 2

This chapter considers whether virtual worlds provide a rule of law that sets expectations for virtual life. It is not surprising that—for the most part—they do not; virtual worlds currently lack many of the elements of the rule of law. Which aspects fail is more surprising, however. Provider agreements and computer software, the sources of regulation that are most often criticized as “antiuser,” provide the best theoretical hope for achieving the rule of law, even if they currently fail in practice. On the contrary, widely proposed “reforms,” such as community norms, self-regulation, and importation of real world law, face both theoretical and practical barriers to implementation of the rule of law in virtual worlds.

These conclusions follow from a four-step analysis. Section 2 is a brief introduction to virtual worlds. Virtual worlds allow their users nearly unlimited choices in their actions and interactions with other users and the virtual environment. As a result, business and social interactions permeate virtual worlds just as they do elsewhere. If a user can deliver something of value, other users will trade something else of value (including real money) for it.

Section 3 introduces the rule of law and its importance. However, the analysis does not attempt to determine just how important the rule of law might be; virtual worlds are not conducive to such normative determinations. Instead, this part examines the literature and abstracts a generalized positivist test of ten rule of law indicia. Rule by law must be: (1) nonarbitrary, (2) stable, (3) public, (4) nondiscretionary, (5) comprehensible, (6) prospective, (7) attainable, (8) consistently enforced, (9) impartially applied, and (10) adjudicated in a factually neutral way.

These indicia, however, do not include traditional notions of “liberal” rule of law, including democracy and personal rights. Just as normative measurements of the rule of law’s impact on virtual business are unhelpful, so too is an examination of liberal ideals in the context of virtual worlds. Technical limitations and user preferences render notions such as democracy and legitimacy difficult to apply in virtual worlds. Furthermore, to the extent that setting expectations is the most important feature with respect to business, liberal values are less important. Thus, the analysis is descriptive and formalistic, such that providers and users can objectively determine whether the rule of law is present in a world and make decisions based on such determinations.

Section 4 examines law and sovereignty in virtual worlds. The four primary sources of law follow from general cyberlaw principles developed by Professor Lessig and others. Law is a constraint on behavior, and such constraints are imposed by four sources: the market (such as provider agreements), code (the virtual world software), norms (community defined rules), and real-world law (legislation and case law). Three potential sovereigns impose this law: real government, the virtual-world provider, and the virtual community. Further, the law is imposed on both the user and her online persona—her avatar.

While these dimensions imply that law may come in 24 different flavors, this part narrows the consideration down to a single question: “How does the law, from whatever source, affect the end user?” This analysis focuses on human, rather than avatar, wellbeing.

Section 5 draws upon the previous discussion to critically examine the rule of law in virtual worlds. The chapter argues that agreements and code offer the best possibilities for implementing the rule of law in virtual worlds, even though they currently fall short. Provider agreements and code can exhibit all of the indicia of the rule of law. They can be nonarbi-trary, stable, and public. However, these sources often fail in practice. Agreements are not consistently enforced, and amendments might be arbitrary or retroactive. Code, on the other hand, is perfectly enforced but is frequently hidden and potentially arbitrary and unstable.

Other sources, such as norms and real-world laws, are unlikely to provide the rule of law in virtual worlds either in theory or in practice. Community norms are often unwritten, unspoken, and partial. The very nature of community enforcement is based on vigilan-tism, the antithesis of rule by law. The application of real-world rules is also unlikely to fulfill the indicia, especially in the short run. The nonphysical nature of virtual conduct, as well as game rules that allow activity that would certainly be disallowed if perpetrated among humans, means that determining which laws should apply is impossible. Many have suggested looking to sports rules for the answer, but the analogy is too attenuated to provide hope that the rule of law will be present in theory or in practice.

Based on the general finding that the rule of law is currently absent but theoretically achievable in virtual worlds, the chapter concludes with some suggestions about how the rule of law might be enhanced. The suggestions focus on some of the key shortcomings that might practically be changed, such as neutral factfinding, more detailed in-game rules with finely tuned penalties, and contract enforcement by users. It may be, however, that time may best improve the rule of law. As more disputes are resolved, a body of law will grow that can apply more faithfully to conduct in virtual worlds.

• 2. VIRTUAL WORLDS

For the uninitiated, a virtual world is an interactive computer software program running on a central server (in modern times, over the internet). Many human users control characters—called “avatars”—in the game software from any computer attached to the network. Participating in a virtual world is like playing a video game, except that the other characters are also humans who control their own avatars.3 A more recent version of such worlds is “augmented” reality worlds, in which computer-generated elements overlay real ones.

Virtual worlds allow avatars to do a range of things: walk, fly, build virtual buildings on virtual real estate, and otherwise interact. Figure 3.1 shows several avatars enjoying a live concert played by another avatar in the virtual world Second Life.4 Second Life's software allows users to transmit live or prerecorded performances to the virtual world, which are then broadcast to other avatars in the same virtual location. And children

Figure 3.1 Virtual concert in Second Life

everywhere play Minecraft, a pixelated world where a primary goal is to build and destroy structures.

Many worlds have some form of virtual money. Many allow avatars to obtain virtual property and to transfer that property to others. Many also incorporate varying levels of social status, especially worlds that involve combat with computer-controlled enemies; the more enemies killed the higher the “level” an avatar might achieve. Rarer property and higher levels are valuable to those who do not want to spend their own time appropriating them.

Virtual worlds are home to serious business.5 One study suggests that virtual economies may reach the size of small countries.6 Businesses are varied, from mining virtual gold to real gambling and anything inbetween.7

As a brief example, the concert depicted in Figure 3.1 might include a few types of businesses. A concert promotion business might pay the virtual land owner for the right to use the space for a concert. A fledgling musician might pay the promotion company for the right to play a show—advertising for real-world music. Conversely, the promotion company might pay an established musician to play in the venue, so that the patrons might pay for the right to listen to the music. All of these payments are made using either real money or virtual money (which can be exchanged for real money or other items of value).

• 3. THE RULE OF LAW AND VIRTUAL ECONOMIES

  • 3.1 The Tie between Law and Virtual Business

It is relatively well settled that economies thrive under the rule of law.8 Some commentators go further, arguing that economies will fail without the rule of law.9 Regardless of how strong the tie may actually be, governments throughout the world favor the rule of law as a harbinger of economic stability.10

Virtual economies are no different in theory, and the rule of law will become more important as virtual commerce expands.11 When planning business investments, every entrepreneur will ask questions: Can I operate this business now? Will I be able to do so in the future? What are the penalties if I break a rule? Will the rules be enforced against others? How do I ensure that my customers follow the rules? Professor Post adds:

How many people are going to give their hard-earned money—real money!—to Chiaretta Charron [a virtual banker] without some assurance that she (or he, or it) will behave reasonably with it? How many people will extend credit to anyone else without some way to enforce the obligation? How many people will invest large amounts of time or effort or money in any substantial undertaking—building a law school, say, or organizing a recording studio—without some assurance that it won’t be destroyed by other participants in the “game,” or by the operators of the virtual world themselves, for “no good reason” at all.12

The presence (or absence) of the rule of law helps answer these questions.13

However, this chapter is unconcerned with just how important the rule of law might be in a given virtual economy, because there are so many to choose from. Virtual-world providers are free to establish the type of system they deem best. Providers have done so—there are hundreds of virtual worlds, ranging from free-for-all worlds targeted at fraud and fighting to tightly controlled worlds targeted at children.

Similarly, users are not burdened with any particular world by birth and may choose which virtual world to join, if at all. User wellbeing is determined in large part by individual happiness-maximizing choices in the market, of which only a small portion might relate to business income.14 Thus, users choose worlds based on their own perception of the rule of law, among other things.15 As a result, normative considerations about the level of rule of law have no place in this particular discussion, for four reasons.16

First, users might well prefer a lawless virtual society for many reasons, including the reckless abandon that comes with shedding real-world risks. These users should not be told that their choices are morally wrong or socially nonoptimal,17 nor should the virtual-world provider be criticized for offering lawless outlets.18

Second, in this market context, it is difficult if not impossible to normatively balance the needs of users and providers.19 One author, for example, argues that—for the good of the world—providers must have carte blanche to change game rules and code at any time, and with retroactive effect.20 This suggestion is contrary to the rule of law, but may be normatively superior for worlds that harbor the goals the author discusses, namely world evolution, user achievement, and exclusion of the real world.21

Further, while efficiency-maximizing economic analysis might yield normative answers about the entire market, such analysis is less helpful in assessing whether the rule of law in any particular world is normatively justified.22 Similarly, use of the rule of law to further moral rights is difficult in virtual worlds. For example, the formal rule of law described below might be present in authoritarian regimes where some rights are impinged.23 As discussed below, many—and perhaps most—virtual-world providers might be considered rights-limiting authoritarians.

However, stripping providers of the right or ability to act authoritatively in the name of moral rights might mean that certain worlds close or never even open. Whether user “rights” outweigh the moral good that comes from the ability to be users in the first place is an unanswerable question.

Third, a little lawlessness may be a preferable way to encourage innovation and improve wellbeing in virtual worlds. Schumpeter, for example, argued that innovation thrives with disruptive activities by entrepreneurs.24 Presumably, some lawlessness and breaking of pre-existing norms encourages Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.” For example, lawbreaking can create efficiencies and help identify unjust and inefficient rules.25 Further, use of others’ creative work can increase creativity as a whole.26 Because lawlessness may have a positive effect on entrepreneurship, categorical normative pronouncements about the rule of law would be incomplete.27

Fourth, in any event, there is no consensus about which aspects of the rule of law are normatively superior.28 In some societies, for example, preannounced rules may not be normatively superior.29

Therefore, this chapter focuses on the positive, rather than normative, aspects of the rule of law in virtual worlds.30 The question is not whether the rule of law should be implemented, but rather whether the rule of law is implemented. Armed with that information, providers, users, legislators, and judges can make their own choices.31

• 3.2 Defining the Rule of Law

There are innumerable ways to define the “rule of law.” Some formulations require more than others do, and some conflict with each other.32 Thus, defining the rule of law is the subject of many books. One commentator recently noted: “Read any set of chapters discussing the rule of law, and the concept emerges looking like the proverbial blind man’s elephant—a trunk to one person, a tail to another.”33

The analysis here begins with the trunk and the tail—two possible definitions of the rule of law: (1) government must follow the law, or (2) rules must be announced beforehand and applied nonarbitrarily.34

While one could argue for either of these two formulations, among others, this chapter opts for the latter, for two reasons. First, examination of rulemaking provides for a richer examination with respect to virtual worlds. Second, focus on rules arguably incorporates the requirement that the government follow those rules. Hayek describes the combination:

Stripped of all technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.35

• 3.3 Indicators of the Rule of Law

Hayek’s combined definition is a blunt instrument; the most insignificant failure would technically negate the rule of law. Indeed, any sweeping definition is insufficient to fully consider the presence or absence of the rule of law.36

Fortunately, many have identified elements of the rule of law that might contribute to an analytical scalpel. Unfortunately, this chapter cannot examine every element, nor can it resolve every conflict between political philosophers about which elements are most important.

Thus, the chapter aggregates several points of view, treating a variety of considerations as indicators of legal rule. The analysis thus assumes that no single element is either necessary or sufficient to prove that law rules in a virtual world. Rather, the more indicators, the more a virtual world is governed by law.37 38 Multifactored analysis makes intuitive sense as well; many readers might be surprised by the absence of several factors in their own countries that were previously thought to follow the rule of law.

While there are theoretically dozens of indicators, the following ten provide a reasonable foundation for examining virtual worlds:

• (1) Nonarbitrary:31 Laws should not be arbitrary or contradictory.39 Methods of measuring arbitrariness will differ from person to person,40 but rules should usually be general rather than ad hoc.41 For example, bills of attainder directed at a single person or small group have no place in a sovereignty governed by the rule of law.

• (2)  Stable: Changes should be infrequent; frequent changes render laws arbitrary.42

• (3)  Public: The rules must be publicly available and, in modern times, written.43

• (4)  Nondiscretionary: Further, laws must be applied with minimal discretion.44

• (5)  Comprehensible: Regulations must be discernable and understandable.45

• (6)  Prospective: The sovereign must not punish an offense without a law proscribing that offense, and new laws should not be applied retroactively.46

• (7)  Attainable: The law must not require more than the affected parties have the power to accomplish.47

• (8)  Consistent Enforcement: Laws must be enforced regularly, accurately, and in accordance with their text.48

• (9)  Impartial Application: Regulations must be applied impartially, such that similar circumstances are treated similarly.49

• (10) Neutral Factfinding: A neutral arbiter of the truth should determine when the law has been broken. Some argue this indicator requires an independent judiciary,50 but the minimum is an independent and impartial factfinder.51

• 3.4 Liberty and the Rule of Law

Missing from the foregoing ten traditional indicators of the rule of law are several values52 that many have come to associate with the rule of law. The following are five concepts that this chapter does not consider part of the rule of law:53

• (1) Democracy: Dictators can—though they often do not—live by the rule of law;54 the Magna Carta shows that a nonelected sovereign can obey the law.55 Further, Madison’s “tyranny of the majority” implies that democracy does not equal rule of law.56 As de Tocqueville pointed out:

A majority taken collectively is only an individual, whose opinions, and frequently whose interests, are opposed to those of another individual, who is styled a minority. If it be admitted that a man possessing absolute power may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should not a majority be liable to the same reproach?57

Finally, the definition of democracy itself is slippery. Federalist voting concepts such as the US Senate and the winner-take-all Electoral College might seem highly undemocratic to citizens of a parliamentary state. Parliamentary systems are undemocratic to those who desire direct democracy. If democracy is ambiguous, then laws emanating from a democracy might be considered arbitrary, but no one takes the view that the US is lawless for this reason.58

• (2)  Freedom: Rules that violate personal autonomy might still satisfy the rule of law.59 Of the rights guaranteed by the US Bill of Rights,60 most are about personal freedom,61 not about whether the sovereign preannounces and follows rules.62 A country could make, for example, a law allowing search warrants to issue upon any application by law enforcement.63 So long as all knew the law and the government undertook no search without an application, the rule of law would be satisfied despite the abandonment of probable cause.

• (3)  Legitimacy: That the lawmaker has the consent of the governed is helpful for enforcement and political stability,64 but the rule of law might persist without legitimacy.65 Further, the rule of law does not necessarily follow from the legitimacy of lawmakers. As Hayek notes: “The fact that someone has the full legal authority to act in the way he does gives no answer to the question whether the law gives him power to act arbitrarily or whether the law prescribes unequivocally how he has to act.”66

• (4)  N oncoerciveness: Even if everyone follows the law, the sovereign could—and, some would argue, should—still have coercive machinery.67

• (5) Happiness: Laws need not improve citizen welfare.68 Every country that purports to follow the rule of law has a variety of laws that might hinder the welfare of some part of the population.69

These five points fly in the face of a rule of law interpretation that incorporates a requirement of liberty.70 This is a modern and decidedly Western view of the rule of law.71 Many countries have varying levels of civil liberties, yet still govern by preannounced and impartially applied rules.72

This is not to say that the liberal rule of law is normatively bad; it is certainly morally good in most cases, including in virtual worlds.73 Take, for example, the termination of Peter Ludlow’s account because of his blog “newspaper” in The Sims Online. The newspaper reported the abuse of community norms, such as new users cheated out of their cyberproperty and purportedly underage users running cyberbrothels.74 Such reporting provided important information to users, and the authoritarian world provider did not want such information disseminated because it discouraged users from joining. From a rule of law perspective, a rule banning all newspapers might satisfy the rule of law despite the moral good associated with the press. However, to the extent that banning this particular user was arbitrary and not in accordance with existing rules,75 the action would violate the rule of law.

The newspaper example might imply that liberal rule of law should be a goal for virtual worlds.76 Nonetheless, applying liberal democratic principles to virtual worlds is infeasible for four reasons.

First, gameplay in the virtual world may not lend itself to freedoms.77 For example, many worlds are dedicated to player versus player combat, and concepts such as “citizen happiness” depend on who wins the battle. Also, the computer sees all—and indeed must do so in order for the software to work properly. As a result, guarantees that the provider (as sovereign) will not “search” a user’s virtual possessions are pointless.78

Second, requirements of democracy and legitimacy cannot apply because virtual worlds are democratic dictatorships.79 Providers are in power by fiat,80 because they invest in the hardware and software to build the world.81 They gain sovereign rights only by attracting subscribers who vote with their feet and their wallets.82 While providers may listen to input provided by their users,83 the laws providers impose are not, with few exceptions,84 put in place by majority vote or any other form of democratic representation.85 Further, users cannot revolt to depose the provider’s rule if they disagree with how they are regulated.86 Thus, subscribers choose to have their avatars be subject to dictatorial laws.87

Third, freedom is further limited because virtual lives and property are not portable.88 Once an avatar lives in a world, it cannot leave except by death.89 The democratic choice of a particular dictatorship is locked in, and the more time and effort one spends in a world, the more it hurts to vote for another world.90 While some have suggested mandatory portability of virtual possessions as a way to improve avatar rights,91 at present these complications make analysis of modern liberal ideals virtually impossible in this context.92

Fourth, to the extent that the rule of law fosters investment by setting expectations, liberal ideals are less important. So long as expectations are fixed, users can allocate time, attention, and investments appropriately. Of course, liberal governance may maximize total wealth as compared to nonliberal governance, but given the other limitations discussed previously, fixed expectations are the most that can be achieved.

• 4. DEFINING “LAW” IN RULE OF LAW

The two primary components of the rule of law—sovereigns and rules—take on new meaning in the context of virtual worlds. For example, just who is the sovereign? Is it the virtual-world provider or the real-world government? Both? What are the rules? Are they set by contract? Through user democracy? By real-world legislatures?

Answering these questions must precede consideration of the rule of law.93

• 4.1 Sources of Law and Sovereignty

As Professor Lessig and others have pointed out, four different forces regulate behavior in virtual worlds:94

• (1)  Market: The demand for services offered by and uses for each virtual world will affect what users can do in that world. Contracts thus define many of the rules that provide the basic framework for conduct in and relating to the virtual world.95 If consumers want a particular set of rules, they will flock to worlds that provide the preferred combination and away from worlds that do not.96 If providers attempt to change the rules, users may leave, or just threaten to do so.97 For example, with respect to the concert depicted in Figure 3.1, the Second Life terms of service do not forbid the playing of live music. However, if Linden Lab ever modified the agreement to ban live music, users might leave for another world.

• (2)  Architecture (Code): The ability for virtual world providers to control what avatars can and cannot do by fiat is a perfectly enforceable regulation.98 As Professor Lessig notes, “Code is law.”99 Code provides private parties with a previously unavailable coercive force.100 For example, Linden Lab may disable the software that allows for transmission of live music to the Second Life servers.

• (3)  Law: These are rules announced by and enforced by some sovereign with coercive power. Unlike code, enforcement may not be perfect. For example, copyright laws may forbid the public performance of someone else’s musical work in Second Life.

• (4)  Norms: These are rules, written and unwritten, followed by avatars in a particular community.101 Other users may or may not enforce the rules, and the sovereign may even enforce them.102 For example, gatherings with live music are unlikely events in worlds featuring player versus player combat.

Each of these sources of regulation can theoretically come from two sovereigns—the real and the virtual—both of which can effectively regulate behavior.103 Even though community is not really a sovereign, community-based enforcement of norms might constitute an additional source of regulation.

Of course, some types of regulation go together more naturally with a particular sovereign. It is unlikely that providers will pass any binding legislation, just as it is unlikely that the United States will write software code. However, overlap is not as farfetched as it may sound. A government could set, for example, default rules about required or banned contract terms and software functionality. Furthermore, a virtual world might enforce the laws of a government (for example, exacting in-world punishment for defamation).

Thus, there are potentially 12 sources of enforced rules in any given world: three sovereigns (including the community) multiplied by four sources. These enforced rules might have an effect on both real users and virtual avatars, bringing the total number of potential applications to 24.

Table 3.1 The dimensions of real / virtual law and real / virtual sovereignty

	Real sovereign	Virtual sovereign
Real law	Fraud	Penalty for defamation
Virtual law	Breach of contract	Penalty for rule violation

• 4.2 Simplifying the Analysis

Despite apparent complexity, these 24 combinations can be simplified in two steps. First, they can be categorized in two dimensions. Second, the two dimensions can be collapsed into one test.

• 4.2.1  Two dimensions

The combination of sovereigns and sources might be expressed as two dimensions: Real/ Virtual Law and Real/Virtual Sovereignty. Table 3.1 illustrates how these two dimensions work to create four possible applications of the rule of law. Each sovereign has the potential ability to enforce each type of law:

The case of a Japanese Maple Story virtual-world user illustrates these dimensions.104 Distraught about the “divorce” of her and her virtual spouse’s avatars, she decided to exact revenge by logging into the virtual world using her virtual spouse’s username and password and deleting the spouse’s account.

The deletion of the avatar potentially falls under all four combinations.105 First, the deleted avatar ceased to exist in-game, and thus a virtual murder was committed in the virtual world, even if no human was injured. Second, assuming that such virtual murder violates the provider agreement, a real sovereign might enforce virtual law in a breach of contract suit. Third, the unauthorized account access and destruction of (presumably) valuable electronic assets violates a real law enforced by the real sovereign. Fourth, to the extent that the provider agreement bars unauthorized account access, then the virtual sovereign would be enforcing real law.

There are subtle differences between the second and fourth combinations. In the second (virtual murder enforced in real courts), the “law” that is broken is in-game—the virtual murder. In the fourth (real tampering enforced by the virtual sovereign), the “law” that is broken is outside the game; further, even though the provider might need to sue for breach of contract in a real court, in this abstraction the real-world law is still being imposed by the virtual sovereign rather than by a real-world government.

• 4.2.2  Collapsing the dimensions

It is tempting to consider each of the 24 or even four possible permutations with respect to the rule of law, but, in the end, such complexity is neither warranted nor fruitful. Because the law applies to individual entities, it should be examined from the standpoint of individual entities. For example, when considering the rule of law in America, we consider the effect of state and federal law together, even though laws of one jurisdiction are often enforced in the courts of the other, and even if the laws might conflict. What matters is the cumulative effect of the law on its subjects.

Thus, this chapter considers a projection, to continue the geometric metaphor, of multiple dimensions into one question: “What constraints are imposed on real people in their activities relating to virtual worlds?” These constraints are surely overlapping, such that questions of conflict and preemption must be considered to determine which regulations will govern the user.106

A focus on the user is consistent with the effect of the rule of law, or lack thereof, on digital entrepreneurship.107 Humans are a better focus than avatars for three reasons. First, humans, not avatars, make decisions based on rules.108 Even automated decision processes must be initially programmed by humans. As a result, humans direct much of the debate and political deliberation about virtual worlds both inside and outside the virtual world. Inside the world, avatars perform protests, while outside they complain to customer service (and threaten to take their business elsewhere).109 The observation that most of the “democratic” discussion about what users want in their virtual world occurs in the real world reinforces a human focus.110

Second, human wellbeing is more important than virtual wellbeing,111 though perhaps some might disagree.112 As a society, we care about what happens to people, not what happens to their avatars.113 If Linden Lab closed Second Life, millions of avatars would “die.” Their owners might be unhappy, but their wellbeing would suffer little more than losing at a video game.114 If, however, such a shutdown meant that real people would lose real money (and productive time) invested in Second Life, then those negative effects are worth considering.115

Third, humans might control several avatars, in the same or multiple virtual worlds.116 The rule of law in one world might counteract lawlessness in another, and the net effect on the user (and the user’s choice to participate in multiple worlds) is the important and interesting point of study.

Thus, if code, norms, law, or markets exert control on real people, then this chapter questions whether the rule of law governs those controls.

• 5. VIRTUAL RULE OF LAW

The foregoing background provides a foundation to consider the rule of law in virtual worlds. As a starting point, the fact that regulation comes from multiple sources should not alone vitiate the rule of law. Given the complexity of virtual worlds, regulation from multiple sovereigns is to be expected.117 Real-world jurisdictions are subject to multiple levels of jurisdiction as well; US residents are subject to federal laws, federal administrative regulations, state laws, state administrat