新制度会计学研究学习笔记：Bridging Relational Networks and Markets in Emerging Economies

黄德尊教授报告的新制度会计学研究笔记

 

内容：

- Develop a comprehensive framework to understand how governance works in China（理论应用和治理的好与坏）

- Study governance mechanisms that adapt to China’s institutional  environment（本土的）

- Identify governance challenges for listed firms

亚洲金融危机---> 亚洲制度背景与西方的差异  -->金融危机爆发，仍然快速恢复--> 现有制度有好有坏--> 好在哪里，坏在何处

1. Understand why we have these governance features in China
Concentration of ownership e.g. large shareholders, family firms, etc（所有权集中）

Opaque accounting – insider-based accounting; related party transactions（不透明会计–基于内部人员的会计； 关联交易）

Political connections and corruption（政治联系与腐败）

Relationship-based transactions create a barrier for western investors (the “fault lines” in Rajan, 2011)（关联交易造成投资障碍）

“国家制度层面—市场层面—公司层面”的完整中国公司治理研究理论框架

2.relational contracting （关系性合约）

Developing a relational contracting framework：

（1）Still a top down approach

（2）Key link is relational contracting（are carried out in closednetworks, not markets）

（3）Stakeholder governance approach

关系性合约是指交易双方通过建立一种长期的信任关系，通过协商解决交易中存在的问题。这种合约包含很强的人格化因素，是长期性的，因为可以预期双方在长期的持续关系中可能会出现许多问题，而一旦出现问题都可以通过合作和其他补偿性的方法来解决。在分销、许可证、合资和雇佣关系，或者婚姻关系中都可以发现关系性合约的作用。在上述这些关系中，双方的交易关系是长期的，合约是不完全的，因而人们倾向于从长期的角度来考虑收益与成本，建立一种合作信任的关系。

参考MBA智度百科：https://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E5%85%B3%E7%B3%BB%E6%80%A7%E5%90%88%E7%BA%A6

原因：

（1）Uncertainty + opportunism will make classical contracting（古典合约） difficult

（2）When the transactions are in high frequency and idiosyncratic, the contracting cost is too high for classial contracts —> relational contracts or vertical integration (one firm)  （合同成本有时过高）

特点：

（1）Relationship-based contracts are highly specific.  合同非常具体

（2）Relationship-based contracts do not cover a discrete set of transactions or period of time.  长期的一段时间

（3）Relationship-based contracts do not need to specify the terms for contingencies; terms for contingencies are based on relationships;  不需要规定应急条件

（4）They also have a broader scope than legal-based contracts.  范围更广

好处：

Social networks can transfer private info, build trust and enforce contracts (reward and punish) – see Granovetter (1985, 2005)

 

3.Prevalence of relational contracts in China  （关系性合同在中国的流行）

（1）原因（在新兴经济体关系盛行可能的原因）：

Underdeveloped markets and legal systems（Relationships serve as an alternative contracting mechanism，关系作为补充）

Culture and social norm（社会文化环境）

Political economy

（2）Underdeveloped legal and market institutions

1）Company Law only entered China in the beginning of the twentieth century. 

2）Merchants sought private property rights protection via developng patron-client relationships with politicians

3）Business disputes were adjudicated by village leaders using informal rules
4）Business contracts were signed following ritual in the ancestral hall

5）In the absence of corporate law and the imperial recognition of a going-concern of a corporation, religious trust provided a solution to traditional China concerning incorporation without the institution of the imperial charter.

（3）Social norm
1) associate with people that have permanent relationships (close ties)  乡土社会

2）Confining business transactions in a geographic location and people with close ties leads to transaction specific investment. i.e., there is no alternative market.

（4）Political economies

1）Frequent exchanges between government and firms are assets (resources) that cannot be bought and sold in the market.

2）The exchanges are similar to giving mianzi to transfer social capital in a social network = transfer of power (public resources) in a political network.

（5）Ripple effect

“spillover” effect on contracts between two firms, one of which obtains key resources （A obtains resources from the government based on a relationship ）based on a relationship contract. B has to know how secured A’s relationship with the government in order to ensure that A has the resources.
 

4.Governance and Accounting

Governance and relational contracts Key difference in market Vs. relational economy
Relational economy: involve related stakeholders when  carrying out their most fundamentat production activities.
（Stakeholders: suppliers, customers, employees, regulators / government, and capital providers.）
Market-based economy: most of the operational activities are arm's length. 

无关系性的governance

关系性的governance

In such a relational economy, firms’ governance is not only a system to reduce the agency conflicts between the insiders and outside shareholders. It is a system set up to coordinate and protect the interests of the firms’ stakeholders so that the relational contracts are properly carried out.（is not in reducing agency problem in the JM (1976) framework. The focus is to enable / facilitate firms to engage in relational contracts with stakeholders. ）

5. Governance features  in Emerging Economies

（1）concentrated control

Power has to be concentrated in one person (or family) so that personal relationships can be fostered.

Communicate privately among stakeholders with concentrated owners
Can respond to changes quickly

This is the location of decision rights in a person with relationships. Such specific assets are inalienable so this colocation is necessary (Fama Jensen, 1983)

（2）family ownership
存在诸多家族企业的原因：

1) Relationships – specific assets – can be preserved in the family by passing down to future generations（关系（特定资产）可以通过传给后代而保留在家庭中）

2) The perpetuation of relationships can increase the value of the collateral against malfeasance

3) Grooming heirs to ensure smooth succession is key for family firms  
4) Families will intermarry to extend relationships (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2013)（通婚加大关系）

（3）Good relationship with government

Concentration control allows building political relationships，to give “mianzi” to the firms, i.e. exchange of public resources
，benefit from tax, state subsidies and bank loans (Faccio, 2006)

（4）Opacity in accounting

Accounting is opaque：rely more on private communication within network（内部网络通信）,info is proprietary and can't be disclosed publicly（专有信息），even if firms want to disclose, relationships are hard to disclose - too soft - and hard to verify（衡量），more smoothing of earnings, (Ball et al., 2000b, 2003) - protect from public scrutiny,Stakeholders want stability (Ball et al., 2000a)

（5）Balance the good and bad

需要建立最佳治理机制以促进关系交易，例如 控股股东，建立关系，不透明，收入平滑，缓解大小股东的冲突，只关注控股股东和少数股东之间的代理冲突，将使我们对这些市场的治理有非常有限且不完整的看法。

KEY: Balancing the demands of relational networks and markets
 

6. The role of embedded intermediaries

（1）扮演角色

• Embeddedness allows the intermediaries to understand the relationships. Without the knowledge, it is hard to evaluate firms’
contracts
• Market mechanisms need to be in place to alleviate malfeasance（减轻渎职）
• Network knowledge is used in by a market intermediary to bridge the info asymmetry between private networks and markets
（2）Role of analysts in relationship-based economies

Firms in emerging economies  want to raise capital with arm’s length investors (not only from families and friends)

Hard to disclose information about relational transactions because the underlying relationships are proprietary and hard to verify

（3）Mosaic theory
• Knowledge of a firm’s relationship with a key customer can help you to predict the firm’s future performance
• An immaterial piece of info to others may be v. significant to you if you have the knowledge of their relationship
• How? You are better able to verify and interpret any signals about the relational transaction.
• News about the relationship.
• Public signal about a big loss in one year may not be the end of the relationship with the customer or it may not lead to losses in future years

（4）Auditors can serve as embedded intermediaries

DeFond, Li, Wong and Wu (2019) find that China’s auditors develop locality specialization – social capital that allows them to understand the network relationships of their clients in a locality

DeFond, Li, Wong and Wu (2019) find that China’s auditors develop locality specialization – social capital that allows them to understand the network relationships of their clients in a locality
• Clients’ relational contracting requires knowledge of their network relationships
• Knowledge of relationships is specific and inalienable – not easily transferrable
• Networks relationships are local à locality-specific knowledge
• Auditors’ social capital no only giving them knowledge but collateral against malfeasance
• Auditors’ locality specialization is associated with fewer misstatements, fewer Type II errors and no increase in Type I error in MOA

7. future research

New governance mechanisms?
• What new governance mechanisms, other embedded intermediaries or other methods, can perform an effective governance role in emerging economies?
• How do we ensure embedded intermediaries perform the governance role and not engage in collusion?
• Can relationships be communicated by firms or over other platforms?

Big data and textual analysis
• Can big data and textual analysis help arm’s length investors to learn about firms’ relationships
• This will help arm’s length investors to bridge the information asymmetry

问题与观点

1.靠市场和靠关系的交易定价存在区别？
Williamson（1979）通过不确定性、交易频率和资产专用性来客户交易特征，并提出合约结构与交易特征的匹配，合约结构大概三种，市场契约、关系契约和企业契约。不同契约的区别在于市场价格在契约中被使用的程度，市场交易靠市场价格，企业中不靠市场价格靠权威，关系交易居中。关系型交易意味着双方的利益并未在一次交易中两清，因为很难两清，存在较高计量成本，计量成本过高就不在此次交易中计量，不明算账也无所谓，因为未来还有更多的交易互动，如果真是明算账，就不是关系型交易了

2.关系和市场是不同时融合，市场和关系是可以交融的？

有些交易是靠市场交易，有些是靠关系交易。有了关系的市场，和单纯的市场是不同的。

3.交易关系

关系的容忍度可能是和环境不同，随外界变化而变化。当经济下行时，政府可能主动与企业家沟通。

4.关系性交易分为三种：

基于信任（非正式制度）而交易：降低交易成本，价格还是市场化的

基于权力而交易：失之东隅收之桑榆；为了交易背后的资源

基于甲方而交易：指定交易对象，虽然是关系交易，但是还是市场化。如指定供应商

5.强关系和弱关系？

哪些情境下强关系和弱关系更好？强关系和弱关系的度量？两个网络连接在一起，更多关系线

6. 小规模可能关系是效率，但大规模是否更需要市场规范？

有哪些是法治快速替代关系

7.管制与关系？

新兴经济体的政府、社会的介入，可能会影响这种桥接关系。因为政府的学习能力越来越强，执行能力和宏观执行能力越来越顺手，又掌握着大量权力束，在法制背景下的以法治形式介入关系与市场的静态平衡。例如这次北京疫情下，三大电信供应商分享手机信令数据给政府进行防控，包括对企业复工复产的反复干扰。另外民众的主体参与意识增强后，也会产生很强的干扰。关系型契约的信息可能对政府、社会，获取信息而言会越来越容易，越来越公开。因此，对于利益相关者的理解和重要性在慢慢发生变化。

关系交易关系社会中伴随着信息不透明，会降低社会公众监督的参与度和有效性，那是不是意味着关系社会中公众监督不重要？公众应该扮演什么角色？