企业的性质：诺奖得主科斯经典原文翻译及解读2

罗纳德·哈里·科斯（Ronald H.  Coase），著名经济学家，新制度经济学鼻祖。科斯因发现并阐明了交易成本和产权在经济组织和制度结构中的重要性及其在经济活动中的作用而获得1991年诺贝尔经济学奖。科斯在其1937年发表的文章《企业的性质》一文中，首次创造性地提出了“交易费用”的概念，并以此来解释企业存在的原因以及企业扩展的边界问题。该篇文章也成为新制度经济学的开山之作。笔者打算通过几篇博文的内容来对《企业的性质》进行详细解读，本文是系列中的第二篇。

II
Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at ah in a specialized exchange economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of resources) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept less in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be a very important reason, for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of “being one's own master;”15 0f course, if the desire was not to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might be willing to give Up something in order to direct others; that is, they would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases.16 Firms might also exist if purchasers preferred commodities which are produced by firms to those not 50 produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world.17 Therefore there must be other elements involved.

【译文】

①我们的任务是试图发现企业在一个专业化的交换经济中出现的根本原因。价格机制（单纯从资源导向的方面考虑）可以被替代，假如替代价格机制的关系正是其自身所期望的话。②例如，如果一些人愿意在其他一些人的指挥下工作，这一情形就会出现。这些个人为了能在某个人手下工作会接受低报酬，企业便由此自然而然地出现了，但这不能成为企业出现的一个非常重要的理由，似乎更确切地说，还有一种相对立的倾向在起作用，如人们通常趋向于寻求“成为自己的主人”的好处。自然，如果这种愿望不是被人控制，而是控制别人和指挥别人，那么，人们为了能指挥别人可能会愿意放弃某些东西，那就是，他们将愿意支付给别人多于这些人在价格机制下所能得到的报酬，目的是为了能指挥这些人。但这意味着他们是为了能指挥别人而付钱，而不是以指挥别人而赚钱，在大多数情形下这显然是不真实的。如果购买者较之于以其他方式生产的商品更偏爱由企业生产的商品，企业也可能存在；可是，即使在这种偏好（假如它们存在的话）的重要性可以忽略不计的范畴内，③在现实世界中企业仍然存在。因此，必定存在其他相关的因素。（讨论原有经济理论认为企业产生的原因是不成立的）

【注解】5：

①科斯在向那个方向努力呢？科斯的这种努力有效吗？我们从科斯第二章节一开始中看到，科斯是在探寻企业产生原因，就企业产生原因来讲是由多种条件构成的，科斯在此说明他的研究是从“在一个专业化的交换经济”条件下组织研究的。

②科斯在阐述企业的产生时先是采用否定式，第一，否定了企业的产生是由于某些人为了愿意跟随他们喜欢的人，接受更低的报酬，在这种情况下企业便产生了；第二，否定了企业的产生是由于某些人愿意指挥别人，为了能够指挥别人支付给他们相应的报酬，在这种情况下企业便产生了；第三，否定了企业的产生是由于消费者十分偏爱企业的产品，愿意购买他们的商品，在这种情况下企业便产生了。

③上述三种情况都在现实世界中存在，但又都不是导致企业产生的直接原因，可是企业也仍然存在，那么，导致企业产生的直接原因是什么呢？科斯认为可定存在“其他的相关因素”。

 

The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.18 This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.19 Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce ex-changes, a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage, it is important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.20 The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur; Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.

【译文】

①建立企业有利可图的主要原因似乎是，利用价格机制是有成本的。通过价格机制“组织”生产的最明显的成本就是所有发现相对价格的工作。（相对价格）②随着出卖这类信息的专门人员的出现，这种成本有可能减少，但不可能消除。（形成相对价格因素之一）③市场上发生的每一笔交易的谈判和签约的费用也必须考虑在内。（交易费用内涵）再者，在某些市场中（如农产品交易）可以设计出一种技术使契约的成本最小化，但不可能消除这种成本。（形成相对价格因素之二）确实，当存在企业时，契约不会被取消，但却大大减少了。某一生产要素（或它的所有者）不必与企业内部同他合作的一些生产要素签订一系列的契约。当然，如果这种合作是价格机制起作用的一个直接结果，一系列的契约就是必需的。一系列的契约被一个契约替代了。④在此阶段，重要的是注意契约的特性，即注意企业中被雇佣的生产要素是如何进入的。通过契约，生产要素为获得一定的报酬（它可以是固定的也可以是浮动的）同意在一定限度内服从企业家的指挥。契约的性质在于它限定了企业家的权力范围。只有在限定的范围内，他才能指挥其他生产要素。（企业产生原因1。相对价格的发现；2.一系列契约被一个契约替代3.契约特性和性质）

【注解】6：

①通过上述的探讨，科斯得出了一个结论，导致企业产生的直接原因就是利润。他将这个利润描述成：利用价格机制是有成本的，以社会方面利用价格机制是绝对成本，以组织方面利用价格机制可以获得相对成本，绝对成本趋向高，相对成本趋向低，二者之间产生差异，这种差异就是利润。同时，我们还要注意到科斯提出了又一个概念，就是“相对价格”。

②能够形成“相对价格”的原因是第一，市场信息提供者的出现，可以减少价格机制的成本；第二，因为市场交易中存在交易费用，又因为市场上设计出了降低这种交易费用的技术。第三，这种技术就是一个企业不再与他的所有合作者签订一系列契约，而只是签订一个契约，这样就降低了交易费用。

③科斯在这里阐述了交易费用的概念，他认为无论市场上还是企业内都存在着交易费用，这些费用包含谈判费用、签约费用，合为契约费用，契约费用在市场上呈现的要多，而在企业中呈现的要低。

④这里科斯又明确了契约的特性、契约的性质和契约的作用。

There are, however, other disadvantages - or costs - of using the price mechanism. It may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing to the risk attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather than a short-term contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take. Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the limits to what the persons supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained.21 A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short-term contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case of services -labor-than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance.

We may sum Up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market transactions which he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do this.

The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to the study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight, who make the mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm - fixed incomes being guaranteed to some of those engaged in production by a person who takes the residual, and fluctuating, income-would appear to be introducing a point which is irrelevant to the problem we are considering. One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits.22 The significant question would appear to be why the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price mechanism.

【译文】

①然而，利用价格机制也存在着其他方面的不利因素（或成本）。为某种物品或劳务的供给签订长期的契约可能是期望的。（在价格机制条件下签订长期契约不能实现）这可能缘于这样的事实：如果签订一个较长期的契约以替代若干个较短期的契约，那么，签订每一个契约的部分费用就将被节省下来。或者，由于人们注重避免风险，他们可能宁愿签订长期契约而不是短期契约。（实际情况是人们愿意签订长期契约一是可以节省费用，二是可以规避风险）②现在的问题是，由于预测方面的困难，有关物品或劳务供给的契约期越长，实现的可能性就越小，从而买方也越不愿意明确规定出要求缔约对方干些什么。对于供给者来说，通过几种方式中的哪一种来进行物品或劳务的供给，并没有多大差异，可对于物品或劳务的购买者来说就不是如此。但由于购买者不知道供给者的几种方式中哪一种是他所需要的，因此，将来要提供的劳务只是以一般条款规定一下，而具体细节则留待以后解决。契约中的所有陈述是要求供给者供给物品或劳务的范围，而要求供给者所做的细节在契约中没有阐述，是以后由购买者决定的。（描述在价格机制条件下长期契约为什么实现的原因）当资源的流向（在契约规定的范围内）变得以这种方式依赖于买方时，我称之为“企业”的那种关系就流行起来了。（人们为了实现长期契约的签订希望有一种组织提供保障）因此，企业或许就是在期限很短的契约不令人满意的情形下出现的。（这样情况下企业就出现了）购买劳务--劳动的情形显然比购买物品的情形具有更为重要的意义。在购买物品时，主要项目能够预先说明而其中细节则以后再决定的意义并不大。（在契约中人们对物品契约实现长期契约期限不是很迫切，对劳务契约是非常迫切的）③我们可以将这一节的讨论总结一下。市场的运行是有成本的，通过形成一个组织，并允许某个权威（一个“企业家”）来支配资源，就能节约某些市场运行成本。④企业家不得不在低成本状态下行使他的职能，这是鉴于如下的事实：他可以以低于他所替代的市场交易的价格得到生产要素，因为如果他做不到这一点，通常也能够再回到公开市场。（企业的基本定义）不确定性问题常常被认为是与对企业均衡的研究密切相关的。如果没有不确定性，企业的出现似乎是不可思议的。（企业产生的原因）⑤但是，那些认为支付方式是企业的特征的人（如奈特教授），一个接受剩余的和浮动的收入的人保证那些参加生产的人有固定的收入，似乎提出一个与我们所考虑的问题无关的观点。一个企业家可以将他的劳务出售给另一个企业家以获得一定的货币收入，而他支付给雇员的钱则主要或完全是其利润的一部分。重要的问题看来是，资源的配置为什么没有直接通过价格机制来完成。

Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sales tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of organization"-by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur-such a regulation would bring into existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d'être. It would furnish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy. 0f course, to the extent that firms already exist, such a measure as a sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be. Similarly, quota schemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advantages to those who organize within the firm and flot through the market, necessarily encourage the growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such as have been mentioned in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence. Such measures would, however, tend to have this result if they did not exist for other reasons.

These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is "organized" by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur;

【译文】

⑥另一个应该注意的因素是，有管制力量的政府或其他机构常常对市场交易和在企业内部组织同样的交易区别对待。如果我们考察一下销售税的课征就会看到，显然，它是一种有关市场交易而不是在企业内部组织的同样交易的税收。既然现在有两种不同的可供选择的“组织”方法，通过价格机制或通过企业家，那么这样的政府管制便会导致企业的存在，不然企业的存在就没有任何理由和目的。（企业产生的条件是因为不同销售税）这为在一个专业化的交换经济中企业的出现提供了一个理由。⑦当然，对于企业已经存在的情形而言，诸如销售税这样的措施只不过会使企业变得比原来更大。同样，意味着定量配给的配额和价格控制的办法对于那些为自己生产产品的企业是没有作用的，这等于给那些在企业内部组织生产而不通过市场的企业以好处，必然鼓励企业规模的扩大。但是，上述这些作为监督、管理的措施会导致企业的出现，这一点是令人难以置信的。然而，如果企业的存在没有其他理由，那么这些措施会产生这样的结果。（政府这种做法是鼓励企业将规模扩大）

因此，以上这些就是在一个通常被假定由价格机制“组织”资源分配的专业化交换经济中，诸如企业这类组织存在的原因。所以，当资源的导向依赖于企业家时，由一些关系系统构成的企业就开始出现了。（做出企业产生原因的结论）

【注解】7：

①明确了长期性契约比短期性契约更能够节省交易费用。

②讨论长期契约对于购买方和供应方存在不同的态度，在什么情况下容易形成长期契约，在什么情况下能够形成短期契约的理由。

③在这里最为关键的话是：“市场运行是有成本的，┄┄┄就能节约某些市场运行成本。”这段话阐明了企业的性质，其性质就是企业运行成本低于市场运行成本，从中企业可以得到应有的利润。

④那么企业利润是如何形成的呢？科斯总结为企业家需要也是必须在低成本原则下行使他们的职能，这种职能直接表现为“他可以以低于他所替代的市场交易的价格得到生产要素。”

⑤奈特：详见【注】2：⑩奈特注解，奈特将企业的性质归结为企业的劳务输出和输入之间费用支出的差异，科斯对此并不认同，他讲：“重要的问题看来是，资源的配置为什么没有直接通过价格机制来完成。”

⑥我们从上面的这段话中可以看出，导致企业的产生因素还有一种是政府征收的营业税，在资本主义制度条件下，政府向市场上征收的税金要比向企业征收的税金要高，这也形成企业有利可图。

⑦在这里科斯又提出了关于企业规模的问题，他在讨论企业规模为什么扩大的原因时说明，“诸如销售税这样的措施只不过会使企业变得比原来更大”，因为政府在销售税方面给与企业更多优惠的原因，可以使企业获得更大的利益而发展的更快。

The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or smaller. A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions. The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the forces which determine the size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more?

【译文】

①这种初具轮廓的观念看来会有助于对企业规模扩大或缩小的含义作出科学的解释。当追加的交易（它可以是通过价格机制协调的交易）由企业家来组织时，企业就变大；当企业家放弃对这些交易的组织时，企业就变小。②由此产生的问题是，研究决定企业规模的力量是否有可能。为什么企业家不少组织点或多组织点交易呢？

It is interesting to note that Professor Knight considers that: the relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory, being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible general principles. But the question is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset by some equally powerful one making for decreased efficiency (in the production of money income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is to exist. 23

【译文】

③注意一下奈特教授的观点是有意义的：“效率与规模之间的关系是最严肃的理论问题之一，从性质上讲，就一个工厂的效率与规模之间的关系而言，其在相当程度上与其说是取决于智力的一般原理，不如说是取决于个人人格和历史机遇。但这个问题是至关重要的，因为垄断收益的可能性对企业不断的和无限的扩张提供了强有力的激励，而这种力量必然被随着企业规模的增大而使效率下降（在货币收入的生产中）的一些同样强有力的力量所抵销，所有这些即使在有限竞争时也存在。”

Professor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm developed above, this task will now be attempted.

It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existence of marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all?24 Why is not all production carried on by one big firm? There would appear to be certain possible explanations.

【译文】

奈特教授似乎认为科学地分析企业规模的决定是不可能的。现在，我们将在上述企业概念的基础上，试图完成这个任务。

④前已论及，企业的引入基本上是由于市场运行成本的存在。一个与此相关问题是（远非奈特教授所提出的垄断问题），既然通过组织能消除一定的成本，而且事实上减少了生产成本，那么为什么市场交易仍然存在呢？为什么所在生产不由一个大企业去进行呢？对这一向题，看来确有某种可能的解释。

First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise.25 Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market, or; to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secondly, it may be that as the transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or to the loss if the transaction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the "other advantages" of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm.26 0f course, the actual point where the expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists' phrase of "diminishing returns to management."27

【译文】

⑤首先，当企业扩大时，对企业家的功能来说，收益可能会减少，也就是说，在企业内部组织追加交易的成本可能会上升。自然，企业的扩大必须达到这一点，即在企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本等于在公开市场上完成这笔交易所需的成本，或者等于由另一个企业家来组织这笔交易的成本。其次，当组织的交易增加时，或许企业家不能成功地将生产要素用在它们价值最大的地方，也就是说，不能导致生产要素的最佳使用。再者，交易增加必须达到这一点，即资源浪费带来的亏损等于在公开市场上进行交易的成本，或者等于由另一个企业家组织这笔交易的亏损。最后，一种或多种生产要素的供给价格可能会上升，因为小企业的“其他优势”大于大企业。⑥当然，企业扩张的实际停止点可能由上述各因素共同决定。前两个原因最有可能对应于经济学家们的“管理收益递减”的论点。

【注解】8：

①在这里科斯重点研究的是企业规模问题，对于政府税金能够导致企业规模变大变小的分析，科斯认为只是一种轮廓的描述，不是很全面和深刻。

②对于交易量的大小能否决定企业规模大小这个问题上，科斯提出了一个“假设”条件下的容易解决的条件，以此来提出研究决定企业规模变大变小的力量是否有可能的问题。进而设定假如企业规模是有交易量决定的，那么，“为什么企业家不少组织点或多组织点交易呢？”。

③科斯在这里又一次提到奈特教授的观点，那么奈特教授的观点是如何呢？奈特从效率与规模角度分析的，奈特把企业效率与规模之间的关系归结为人格和历史机遇，同时垄断竞争为企业规模的扩张提供了条件，在这种前提下企业规模越大其效率越低，即使在有限竞争条件下这种关系也是一样的。

④科斯针对奈特的观点提出既然企业能够消除一定的成本，那么市场交易为什么还存在？为什么生产不交给一个更大的企业来完成？这样两问题。

⑤科斯企业规模扩张论（暂且按这种提法）：第一种情况是，企业规模扩大会导致交易费用上升，企业成本加大，但是，企业扩大的条件应当是企业内部交易费用与市场上交易费用相等，在这种条件下企业规模才能扩大，（交易费用等于零）；第二种情况是，由于企业规模扩大，产生经济效率降低，使企业成本加大；第三种情况是，企业规模扩大必须是企业出现的亏损，形成企业成本，而这种成本必须与市场上的交易成本相等；第四种情况是，由于生产要素价格上升，企业规模扩大没有优势，而企业规模变小才有优势。

⑥科斯指出企业规模扩大可能是由上述多种条件决定的，至于第一种情况和第二种情况正是当时经济学家们认同的观点，即“管理收益递减”的观点。

The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below the costs of marketing in the open market and at a point equal to the costs of organizing in another firm, in most cases (excluding the case of "combination"28), this will imply that there is a market transaction between these two procedures, each of whom could organize it at less than the actual marketing costs. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an example the reason for this will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and that both A and B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B, we can assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the processes of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over ail the processes of production, a market transaction will still remain, although it is a different product that is bought. But we have previously assumed that as each producer expands he becomes less efficient; the additional costs of organizing extra transactions increase. It is probable that A's cost of organizing the transactions previously organized by B will be greater than B's costs of doing the same thing. A therefore will take over the whole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing B's work is not greater than B's cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an exchange transaction on the open market. But once it becomes economical to have a market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.

【译文】

①上文已经指出这样一点：企业将倾向于扩张直到在企业内部组织一笔额外交易的成本，等于通过在公开市场上完成同一笔交易的成本或在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本为止。②但如果企业在低于公开市场上的交易成本这一点上或在等于在另一个企业中组织同样交易的成本这一点上停止其扩张，在大多数情况下（“联合”的情况除外），这将意味着在这两个生产者之间存在着市场交易，其中每一方都能在低于实际市场运行成本的水平上组织生产。如何解决这个悖论呢？③为了便于说明，我们来举一个例子。假定A向B购买产品，且A和B都能在低于其现在成本的条件下组织市场交易。我们可以假定，B不是组织生产的一个过程或阶段，而是组织许多个。假如A由此希望避免市场交易，那他将不得不接管所有由B控制的生产过程。除非A接管了所有生产过程，否则市场交易将依然存在，尽管市场上交易的是不同的产品。④但我们前面已经假定，每一个生产者的扩张会导致效率降低；组织一笔额外交易的附加成本会上升。A组织先前由B组织的交易的成本可能会大于B做这件事的成本。只有当A组织B的工作的成本不大于B的成本且数量上等于公开市场上完成同样交易的成本时，A才会由此接管B的所有组织。⑤可一旦市场交易变得经济时，以这样的方式将生产分开也要付出代价，即在每一个企业中组织一笔额外交易的成本是一样的。

Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place through the price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more diverse than the actual transactions which take place in our modem world. This would seem to imply that the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organizing these transactions within the firm. It seems therefore possible that quite apart from the question of diminishing returns the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open market. This would necessarily imply that there were exchange transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that there would have to be more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economic
system where the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism could be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem to be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether "diminishing returns to management" or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more important.
Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:
a. the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organized.
b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.
c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size.

【译文】

⑥直到现在我们一直假定通过价格机制发生的市场交易是同质的。⑦事实上，没有一件事能够比我们现代社会中发生的实际交易更多样化了。这似乎意味着通过价格机制完成交易的成本是彼此差异很大的，而在企业内部组织交易的成本亦如此。因此，即使撇开收益递减问题，在企业内部组织某些交易的成本似乎也有可能大于在公开市场上完成交易的成本。这必然意味着通过价格机制完成的交易是存在的，但这意味着必须存在一个以上的企业吗？⑧显然不是，因为在经济体制中，凡是资源导向不直接依赖于价格机制的所有领域，都能被组织到一个企业中去。本文早先讨论的因素看来很重要，尽管难以断言“管理收益递减”或要素供给价格上升是否看起来更为重要。

所以，当其他条件相同时，企业在如下情况下将趋于扩大：

1.组织成本愈少，随着被组织的交易的增多，成本上升得愈慢。

2.企业家犯错误的可能性愈小，随着被组织的交易的增多，失误增加得愈少。

3.企业规模愈大，生产要素的供给价格下降得愈大（或上升得愈小）。

【注解】9：

①企业在积极的扩张中并不是无止境的，那么，企业在什么时候扩张停止呢？科斯回答：企业内部交易成本与市场交易成本相等时候企业扩张就停止了。

②当企业内部交易成本低于市场交易成本时候，就会存在另一个企业以同样低于市场交易成本在市场上组织交易，这样就在同一个市场上存在两个企业共同组织生产，此时企业扩张又是如何变化呢？

③科斯用一个案例来解释这样情况，在同一个市场上，为了避免两个企业同时在市场上组织生产和组织交易，只有由一个企业购买或接管另一个企业的全部生产和交易，否则，同时在市场上交易的现象不可避免。

④同时科斯给出一个企业购买或接管另一个企业的条件，这个条件就是想要购买或接管另一个企业的企业，他必须是为了购买或接管这个企业后所生产的成本低于原有企业所生产的成本，并且新的企业产生的成本与当时市场交易成本相等，才能完成购买或接管。

⑤当市场交易成本低于企业成本时候，企业将会分开，回归原有的状态。

⑥上面所有的讨论都是依据一个“假设”的前提条件，即“通过价格机制发生的市场交易是同质”（同质：企业内部交易成本与市场交易成本相等）的情况下讨论企业规模扩大问题。

⑦实际情况是企业内部交易成本与市场交易成本之间是不相等同的，二者之间存在较大差异，这是事实。更有可能的是企业内部交易成本会大于市场交易成本，这也是事实，当这样的情况出现，科斯进一步问道：市场上还必须出现一个以上的企业吗？

⑧科斯自己回答：“显然不是”，不是的原因是因为资本主义制度下的市场体制，价格机制涉及到的所有领域对资源配置失去作用和控制，所以社会资源可以被组织到一个企业中去。

Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices.29 As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places. This furnishes an additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets larger. Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution, tend to increase the size of the firm.30 Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.31/32

It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used to give more precise meanings to the terms "combination" and "integration."33 There is a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more entrepreneurs become organized by one. This becomes integration when it involves the organization of transactions which were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. The whole of the "structure of competitive industry" becomes tractable by the ordinary technique of economic analysis.

【译文】

①对不同规模的企业而言，除了生产要素的供给价格千差万别外，随着被组织的交易的空间分布、交易的差异性和相对价格变化的可能性的增加，组织成本和失误带来的亏损似乎也会增加。②当更多的交易由一个企业家来组织时，交易似乎将倾向于既有不同的种类也有不同的位置。这为企业扩大时效率将趋于下降提供了一个附加原因。③倾向于使生产要素结合得更紧和分布空间更小的创新，将导致企业规模的扩大。④倾向于降低空间组织成本的电话和电报的技术变革将导致企业规模的扩大。⑤一切有助于提高管理技术的变革都将导致企业规模的扩大。

⑥应该注意到，上面给出的企业的定义能被用于对“联合”和“一体化”作出精确的解释。当先前由两个或更多个企业家组织的交易变成由一个企业家组织时，便出现了联合。当所涉及的先前由企业家之间在市场上完成的交易被组织起来时，这便是一体化。⑦企业能以这两种方式中的一种或同时以这两种方式进行扩张。⑧整个“竞争性产业的结构”便能用通常的经济分析方法来处理了。

【注解】10：

①因为企业的规模不同，在考虑生产要素供应价格变化的同时，导致企业内部交易成本的变动和由于管理上的失误而出现亏损的另外三种原因是，其一，企业地理位置分布；其二，企业交易差异性；其三，相对价格的变化。

②使企业规模扩大化速度减慢的原因是由于更多交易由一个企业来组织完成时，交易的种类增加和处理来自不同地理位置的交易，或者说交易量的增加既能促使企业规模扩大化，但也促使企业效率低下趋势形成；交易地理位置扩大同样也能促使企业规模扩大化，但也会促使企业效率降低，这是一对矛盾。

③鉴于上述的分析，企业倾向于生产要素结合更为紧密和交易地理位置的空间变小，这样将会促使企业规模能过扩大化。

④企业倾向于降低企业内部的成本和费用，这样也会促使企业规模扩大化。

⑤企业加强或提高生产技术和管理技术，也能够促使企业规模的扩大化。

⑥科斯在此处对企业的横向联合与纵向一体化进行精确的描述，横向联合科斯描述为”当先前由两个或更多个企业家组织的交易变成由一个企业家组织时，便出现了联合。”纵向一体化科斯描述为“当所涉及的先前由企业家之间在市场上完成的交易被组织起来时，这便是一体化”。

⑦科斯同时指明企业规模扩张的三种形式，第一种是横向联合扩张；第二种是纵向一体化扩张；第三种是即横向联合又实施纵向一体化扩张。

⑧ 利用企业产生理论、企业性质理论、企业相对价格理论、企业交易费用理论、企业规模扩张理论等就能够完全解释资本主义制度下整体带有竞争性的产业结构。

【评注】

Part 2：提出交易成本论

• 科斯首先探寻企业产生原因，就企业产生原因来讲是由多种条件构成的，科斯在阐述企业的产生原因时先是采用否定式：

                - 第一，否定了企业的产生是由于某些人为了愿意跟随他们喜欢的人，接受更低的报酬，在这种情况下企业便产生了；
                - 第二，否定了企业的产生是由于某些人愿意指挥别人，为了能够指挥别人支付给他们相应的报酬，在这种情况下企业便产               生了；
                - 第三，否定了企业的产生是由于消费者十分偏爱企业的产品，愿意购买他们的商品，在这种情况下企业便产生了。

• 企业产生——企业能够获取利润和规避风险

                - 相对价格的发现 ：相对价格比绝对价格低
                - 契约的数量方面 ：一系列契约被一个契约所替代
                - 契约的期限：短期契约成本高，长期契约成本低
                - 契约的风险方面 ：人们需要一种组织对契约提供长期保障

• 我们可以将这一节的讨论总结一下。市场的运行是有成本的，通过形成一个组织，并允许某个权威（一个“企业家”）来支配资源，就能节约某些市场运行成本。

• 企业家不得不在低成本状态下行使他的职能，这是鉴于如下的事实：他可以以低于他所替代的市场交易的价格得到生产要素，因为如果他做不到这一点，通常也能够再回到公开市场。
  

• 接下来，科斯重点研究企业规模的问题，关于企业规模扩大或缩小的结论：

                - 当追加的交易由企业家来组织时，企业就变大；
                - 当企业家放弃对这些交易的组织时，企业就变小。

• 但是企业家为什么不组织更多或更少的交易呢，奈特教授认为科学地研究决定企业规模的因素是不可能的。

• 科斯针对奈特的观点提出既然企业能够消除一定的成本，那么市场交易为什么还存在？为什么生产不交给一个更大的企业来完成？

• 科斯分析了四点可能的原因。

• 企业在积极的扩张中并不是无止境的，那么，企业在什么时候扩张停止呢？科斯回答：企业内部交易成本与市场交易成本相等时候企业扩张就停止了。

• 当其他条件相同时，企业在如下情况下将趋于扩大：

                - 组织成本愈少，随着被组织的交易的增多，成本上升得愈慢。

                - 企业家犯错误的可能性愈小，随着被组织的交易的增多，失误增加得愈少。

                - 企业规模愈大，生产要素的供给价格下降得愈大（或上升得愈小）。

• 对不同规模的企业而言，除了生产要素的供给价格千差万别外，随着被组织的交易的空间分布、交易的差异性和相对价格变化的可能性的增加，组织成本和失误带来的亏损似乎也会增加。当更多的交易由一个企业家来组织时，交易似乎将倾向于既有不同的种类也有不同的位置。这为企业扩大时效率将趋于下降提供了一个附加原因。

• 鉴于上述的分析——

                - 企业倾向于生产要素结合更为紧密和交易地理位置的空间变小，这样将会促使企业规模能过扩大化。
                - 企业倾向于降低企业内部的成本和费用，这样也会促使企业规模扩大化。
                - 企业加强或提高生产技术和管理技术，也能够促使企业规模的扩大化。

（未完，待续...）