创业企业控制权模式选择及配置研究

创新是引领发展的第一动力，是建设现代化经济体系的战略支撑。创业企业（En）
是坚持创新驱动战略的组成细胞，细胞生命力与活力的顽强程度及市场化程度，依赖于风
险投资机构（VC）的支持力度和资源优化配置水平。VC 投入En 资金后，En 原有的控制
权模式及配置在很大程度上会做出调整，由于各自的立场不同、占有的信息也不对等，且
都想保护自己的利益，解决好这其中的矛盾，控制权的分配成为双方合作谈判的重要筹码，
又因为控制权高度依赖于企业经营绩效等状态变量的好坏，双方在以企业所有权为基础的
控制权分配过程中形成了不断博弈的格局，即不同的控制权模式。控制权模式的不同与控
制权行为主体的差异往往又使创业企业的绩效有显著的不同，进而形成不同的配置。因此，
在风险资本介入后，高新技术创业企业控制权模式如何形成？以及怎样的配置对提高创业
企业的创业绩效最有效便构成了本文要研究的主要内容。
本文按照如下研究思路展开，首先，从我国VC 运作与En 治理的实际出发，在对国
内外研究文献综述与分析的基础上，通过对创业企业特征的分析，构建创业企业控制权模
式及配置过程分析框架，并对控制权模式及配置形成关键影响因素进行了探索性分析。其
次，基于演化博弈理论与方法的视角，在关系契约与扩展不完全契约理论基础上，加入风
险投资家的战略目标与表征风险投资特征的变量、引入控制权共享收益与私人收益，通过
对双方风险偏好假设的扩展，分析了创业企业控制权模式选择及配置机理。再次，企业绩
效作为信号（第三方可证实的可观测变量）、以VC 与En 为博弈主体，分析联合控制与
相机控制模式下，创业企业两类控制权（剩余控制权与特定控制权）动态配置机理。最后，
本文运用清科数据库中700 个真实的样本数据与matlab 软件，对控制权模式及配置的模
型分析结论进行了实证及数值模拟检验。
论文的主要工作和创新点如下：
1）建立了创业企业控制权模式选择及配置“企业家与投资家谈判--控制权策略选择--
企业经营绩效显示--剩余控制权安排”的理论分析框架，提取了影响创业企业控制权模式
及配置形成的七个关键因素。分析显示，创业企业作为不完全契约与关系契约的综合体，
是一类具有特殊产权结构与治理结构的企业门类。本文依照控制权的自然形成过程建立了
从控制权策略选择到控制权模式及配置的形成分析架构，即形成“企业家与投资家谈判--
控制权策略选择—企业经营绩效显示--剩余控制权安排”的理论分析框架，有效地弥补了
西安理工大学博士学位论文
II
不完全契约理论的不足，同时，基于本文的分析框架，运用文献疏理、实地调研以及因子
分析提取了创业企业控制权模式及配置形成的七个关键因素，即创业企业家收益、创业企
业经营绩效、风险投资家投入与成本、创业企业家人力资本、风险投资家风险态度、风险
投资家收益。
2）基于演化博弈（EG）理论和方法构建了创业企业家和风险投资家群体争取控制
权的演化博弈模型。在Georg Gebhardt & Klaus M. Schmidt(2006)和Jean-Etienne(2008)模
型基础上，基于关系契约与扩展不完全契约的视角，引入可观测变量且第三方可证实的企
业绩效( )作为信号、加入风险投资家的战略目标(F)与风险投资家风险规避度( vc  )变量，
构建了创业企业家和风险投资家群体争取控制权的演化博弈模型，分析有限理性条件下风
险投资家与创业企业家的动态学习与重复博弈对控制权配置格局的作用机制，揭示控制权
的配置方式随创业过程变化的演变路径及实现均衡的条件。通过理论模型研究发现：控制
权的最优配置是以双方期望收益最大化下风险投资家与创业企业家双方反复动态博弈的
结果，博弈各方之间仅存在着两种最优控制权配置方式，即相机控制与联合控制；具体而
言，当经营状态（φg）较好时、创业企业收益（π）较高时，控制权的最优控制模式趋向
相机控制。而随着清算价值（T）、项目成功概率（PH）创业企业家私人收益（B）、风
险投资家战略收益（F）的增加，控制权的最优控制模式趋向联合控制。该结论修正了
Gebhard & Schmidt (2006)及燕志雄(2007)认为联合控制权模式是最优控制权模式的结论，
证明了联合控制或相机控制在一定条件下是严格优于其它控制权模式。
3）构建了联合控制及相机控制两类控制权模式下特定控制权与剩余控制权动态配置
理论模型。构建了创业企业共享收益函数V，分别分析两类控制模式下各变量对剩余控制
权、特定控制权配置的影响，扩展了不完全契约的分析框架。建模分析结果表明：（1）
在联合控制模式下，EN 获得融资额、VC 监督与干预成本、风险规避度分别与λ1、λ2 呈正
向、负向关系；EN 的清算价值、EN 的收益、VC 获得的剩余索取权、VC 所投资的项目
成功概率分别与λ1、λ2 呈负向、正向关系；创业企业共享收益与λ1 的关系需要满足特定条
件，而与λ2 呈正向关系；EN 的私人收益、VC 的战略收益与λ1、λ2 需要满足特定的条件时
才能反映其变化关系而并不是简单的正向或负向关系。（2）在相机控制模式情景下，各
变量与λ1、λ2 的关系基本相同，与联合控制模式下存在不同的配置机理是存在参数R（创
业企业获得的固定收益）和φg（创业企业经营状态）的影响作用，即R 与λ1 正相关关系，
R 与呈λ2 负相关关系，而当φg 满足特定的条件时，才能反映φg 与λ1 和λ2 的变化关系。
【关键词】创业企业；控制权模式；控制权配置；演化博弈；
【论文类型】应用基础研究
Abstract
I
Title: Research on the mode selection and configuration of the
control right of the enterprise
Major：Management Science and Engineering
Name：Tao Chen Signature：
Supervisor：Prof．Xinghua Dang Signature：
Abstract
Innovation is the first driving force for development and the strategic support for building
a modern economic system. EN is a constituent cell of the innovation driven strategy, the
tenacious degree and the market degree of the vitality and vitality of the cell depend on the
support of the venture capital organization (VC) and the level of the optimal allocation of
resources. After VC's investment in EN, the original control structure of EN will be adjusted to
a great extent. Because of the different positions and the information of the possession, they all
want to protect their own interests and solve the contradictions among them. The distribution of
control rights becomes the important bargaining chip of the two parties' cooperation negotiation,
and the control right is highly dependent on the right of control. In the process of business
performance and other state variables, the two sides have formed a continuous game pattern in
the process of distribution based on the ownership of enterprise ownership, that is, different
modes of control. The differences in the mode of control and the discrepancy of the subjects of
the control rights often make the performance of the enterprise significantly different, and then
form different configuration of the control right structure. Therefore, how does the structure of
control right of high-tech start-ups come into being after the intervention of venture capital?
And what kind of control structure allocation is most effective to improve entrepreneurial
performance of entrepreneurial enterprises will constitute the main content of this paper.
This paper is based on the following research ideas. First, on the basis of the review and
analysis of the domestic and foreign research literature, the analysis framework of the
entrepreneurial enterprise control right structure is built on the basis of the literature review and
analysis of domestic and foreign research, and the key influencing factors of the control right
structure are formed on the basis of the domestic and foreign research literature review and
analysis. Exploratory analysis was carried out. Secondly, based on the theory and method of
evolutionary game theory, on the basis of the relationship contract and the extended incomplete
contract theory, we add the strategic target of the venture capitalist and the variable of
西安理工大学博士学位论文
II
characterizing the characteristics of the risk investment, introduce the share of the control right
and the private income, and analyze the venture enterprise through the expansion of the
hypothesis of the good risk of both sides. The mechanism of the choice of control right structure
mode. Thirdly, as a signal (third party's verifiable observable variables) and VC and EN as the
main body of the game, the dynamic allocation mechanism of the two types of control rights
(residual control and specific control) of the enterprise under joint control and camera control is
analyzed. Finally, this paper uses 700 real sample data and MATLAB software in the Qing
Dynasty database, and carries out an empirical and numerical simulation test on the model
analysis conclusions of the control structure and its configuration.
The main work and innovation of this paper are as follows:
1) established the theoretical analysis framework of the entrepreneurial enterprise's control
structure forming "entrepreneur and investor negotiation - the choice of control right strategy --
the performance of enterprise management performance - the residual control right
arrangement", and extracted seven key factors affecting the formation of the control right
structure of the enterprise.The analysis shows that as a complex of incomplete contracts and
relational contracts, entrepreneurial enterprises are a kind of enterprises with special property
rights structure and governance structure. According to the natural process of control right, this
paper sets up an analysis framework for the formation of EN control right structure from the
choice of control right strategy to the configuration of control power structure, that is, the
theoretical analysis framework of "entrepreneur and investor negotiation - the choice of control
right strategy - enterprise management performance display - residual control arrangement" is
effectively made up. The inadequacy of incomplete contract theory, at the same time, based on
the analysis framework of this article, the seven key factors of the formation of the control right
of the venture enterprise are extracted by using the literature rationale, field investigation and
factor analysis, namely, the profit of the entrepreneur, the performance of the enterprise, the
investment and the cost of the venture capital, the manpower of the entrepreneur. Capital,
venture capitalist's risk attitude and venture capitalist's income.
2) based on evolutionary game (EG) theory and method, the evolutionary game model of
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists for controlling power is constructed. On the basis of Georg
Gebhardt & Klaus M. Schmidt (2006) and Jean-Etienne (2008) model, based on the perspective
of relation contract and extended incomplete contract, we introduce the observable variable and
third party's verifiable enterprise performance () as the signal, join the venture investor's
strategic target (F) and risk investment home risk evasion degree () variable. The evolutionary
game model of the entrepreneurial entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists for the control
rights is analyzed. The mechanism of the learning dynamics and the repeated game of the
Abstract
III
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs under the limited rational condition is analyzed, and the
evolution path of the control right allocation method with the change of the entrepreneurial
process is revealed and the equilibrium is realized. Conditions. It is found that the optimal
allocation of control right is the result of dynamic game between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs. There are only two kinds of optimal control right allocation methods, that is
camera control and joint control. In particular, when the operating state (g) is better, the profit
of the venture is higher (PI). The optimal control mode of control tends to camera control. With
the increase of T, PH, B and F, the optimal control mode of control tends to be jointly controlled.
To a certain extent, the conclusions of this study have corrected Aghion& Bolton (1992),
Gebhard & Schmidt (2006) and Yan Zhixiong and fifang domain (2007). The joint control right
arrangement is dominant in the arrangement of single control rights or the control right of the
camera. It is proved that joint control or camera control is strictly superior to other controls
under certain conditions. That's the way.
3) a theoretical model of the dynamic allocation of specific control rights and residual
control rights under two types of control structures, namely, joint control and camera control, is
constructed. The share income function V of the enterprise is constructed, and the influence of
the variables on the residual control and the specific control allocation under the two types of
control mode is analyzed, and the analysis framework of incomplete contract is extended. The
results of modeling analysis show that: (1) under the joint control model, the financing amount
of EN, the cost of VC supervision and intervention and the degree of risk aversion are positive
and negative relations with lambda 1 and [lambda] 2 respectively; the liquidation value of EN,
the income of EN, the residual claim obtained by VC and the project achievement probability of
the project invested by VC are negative and positive, respectively, with lambda and [lambda] 2,
respectively. Relationship; the relationship between share income and lambda 1 of the
enterprise needs to meet certain conditions, but it has a positive relationship with lambda 2; the
private income of EN, the strategic income of VC and lambda 1 and lambda 2 need to meet
certain conditions to reflect their relationship but not a simple positive or negative relationship.
(2) under the scene of camera control, the relations between the variables and lambda 1 and
lambda 2 are basically the same. The different configuration mechanism under the joint control
mode is the influence of the parameter R (the fixed income obtained by the venture enterprise)
and the G (business enterprise state), that is, the positive correlation between the R and the
lambda 1, and the negative correlation between the R and the x 2. And when G satisfies certain
conditions, it can reflect the change relationship between G and lambda 1 and lambda 2.
【Key Words】Enterprises;Control mode;Allocation of control rights;Evolutionary
game;Evolutionary game.

原文地址：

http://www.hongfu951.info/file/resource-detail.do?id=5276a1c1-f778-40d1-a801-788996602a80