肯尼斯刘易斯(Kenneth Lewis)在了解华盛顿与华尔街新达成的权力平衡方面正在上艰难的一课。美国银行CEO兼首席执行长肯尼斯刘易斯这位美国银行(Bank of America Corp.)董事长兼首席执行长去年9月作出了收购证券业巨头美林公司(Merrill Lynch & Co.)的决定,美林可能正因此而避免了破产的命运。但到12月初时,美林的亏损却出现了失控。内部核算显示,在此前的两个月内,美林的亏损达到了惊人的133亿美元,而12月份的亏损情况看来更糟。刘易斯觉得自己已经受够了。据知情人士说,他于12月17日飞赴华盛顿,准备宣布他将放弃对美林的收购。政府内部人士提供的谈话记录显示,刘易斯对时任财政部长的鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)和美国联邦储备委员会(Federal Reserve)主席贝南克(Ben Bernanke)说,我需要你们明白情况有多糟。刘易斯说,美国银行放弃收购美林是有法律依据的。鲍尔森和贝南克强力敦促刘易斯不要放弃美林,他们赞扬了美国银行早些时候的合作,但同时警告说,放弃收购就等于对美林判了死刑。他们还说,放弃收购还会削弱市场和政府官员们对美国银行的信任。尽管与官方的交涉并不顺利,但美国银行的高管们还是将鲍尔森等人的言论视为政府愿意妥协的信号。但在两天后举行的一个电话会议上,联邦政府官员们却加重了语气。据听到谈话的人说,贝南克表示,美国银行没有理由抛弃美林。美联储的一位官员警告说,如果刘易斯撤销对美林的收购而美国银行今后又要求政府提供更多救助资金,那该行届时别指望政府监管机构能充分信任其管理层。据了解美国银行情况的人士说,刘易斯当时被告知,政府可能考虑要替换掉美国银行的高管和董事们。这些威胁明白无误地显示,联邦政府认为,那些自10月份以来先后获得政府注资的美国金融机构已牢牢掌握在它手里。在刘易斯与联邦政府官员举行电话会议后的四周里,联邦官员和美国银行终于达成了拯救美林收购案的交易。政府同意向美国银行额外提供200亿美元救助款,并对该行1,180亿美元不良资产所造成的损失提供担保。但美国银行也需为此付出代价。时隔6个月再看政府对美国金融业的这场大救援,华盛顿的救助行动确实提振了美国金融体系。但这场匆匆策划出来的紧急救助行动却将政府推上了有可能深深介入美国资本主义核心的风险之旅。政府官员们目前正成为美国最大一些企业的幕后决策人。批评这一救援行动的人士说,救援规则不透明,具体执行也没有一定之规,导致人们对美国金融体系迟迟无法恢复信心。一些国会议员们正匆忙采取行动,以便将救助资金导向那些被看好的放贷机构。在公开场合,联邦政府官员们对其监督从问题资产救助计划(TARP)接受资金机构的工作很少谈及。虽然政府通过注资已经获得了从摩根大通(J.P.Morgan Chase & Co.)到Saigon National Bank等一系列金融机构的控制权,但美国政府起初似乎并不愿意藉此对银行高管们指手画脚。然而政府官员与美国银行的艰苦谈判,以及联邦官员最近在金融企业高管薪酬等问题上采取的行动却暗示出,随着金融市场的进一步恶化,以及政治不满情绪的升温,政府对困境中的银行业的态度已经发生了改变。当花旗集团(Citigroup Inc.)去年10月拿到250亿美元TARP资金时,其与财政部所签注资协议中涉及高管薪酬的文字只有区区两句,且内容空泛。而花旗去年12月从政府再次获得200亿美元救助资金时所签的协议,则对该行高管2008和2009年的总奖金额作了限制,要求他们2008年奖金的大部分都需延期支付。美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)和其他政府官员最近有关银行业高管奖金待遇的强硬言论将这些管理人士搅得心神不宁。上周,花旗迫于财政部的压力取消了订购一架公务飞机的合同。该行目前正在考虑修改它与纽约Mets棒球队(New York Mets)价值近4亿美元的体育场冠名权合同。奥巴马周三公布了一系列限制高管薪酬的措施,对接受政府“特殊救助”的公司在高管工资方面将进行严格限制。有关美林困境和随后救助谈判的来龙去脉是根据对参与者的采访逐渐还原出来。事情的始末显示出,美国政府不断扩大对银行体系的控制是在一种权宜之计的基础上不断演变的。尽管政府去年10月同意向美国银行和美林注资250亿美元,但直到很晚才知道美林消耗资金的速度如此之快,因此也就无法避免第二次的出手相救了。据《华尔街日报》看到的一份内部文件显示,11月底前,也就是第四季度进入第二个月之后,美林的税前季度亏损已经累积到了133.4亿美元。知情人士说,美国银行的一些高管表达了对继续推进收购交易的担忧。在律师的建议之下,美国银行决定按原计划在12月5日举行股东投票。美林和美国银行的股东都投票批准了此项交易。在9月份收购交易公布时,在那个整个华尔街似乎都徘徊在生死边缘的一周,这被视为难得的好消息。也是在那个周末,雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.)准备申请破产保护,61岁的刘易斯发现美林董事长兼首席执行长塞恩(John Thain)有着极大的动力出售公司。塞恩担心美林可能会步雷曼兄弟的后尘。在经过了不到48个小时的尽职调查之后,美国银行与美林达成协议,同意以总价500亿美元的股票收购陷入困境的美林,相当于每股29美元。(这个交易价此后随着美国银行股价的走低而一路下滑。)刘易斯用香槟祝酒说,我期盼着与美林的伟大合作。一个月后,刘易斯同其他美国大型金融机构的8位负责人就在财政部接受了鲍尔森的召见。鲍尔森希望高管们接受一轮总价1,250亿美元的政府资金,以提振公众对银行体系的信心。据当时参加会议的一个人透露,鲍尔森解释道,说“不”并不在选项之内。刘易斯回答道,我们将这样做。他敦促其他金融机构高管们在需要获得批准的时候给董事会打电话。在说服了9大金融机构接受纳税人的钱之后,开始时政府动作有所收敛。美国银行的高管仍对收购交易充满信心。感恩节前不久,怀疑情绪开始悄悄显露。知情人士说,离第四季度结束还有一个多月的时间,美林的税前季度亏损接近90亿美元。在月底之前,税前亏损额超过了130亿美元,税后为92.9亿美元。亏损主要来自于美林的销售和交易部门。不过即便是美林利润丰厚的财富管理部门也遭受了冲击,该部门12月的收入从10月的10.8亿美元下滑至7.97亿美元。尽管如此,并非所有的损失(包括美林在汽车租赁公司Hertz Global Holdings Inc.的投资等资产上的预计冲减)都出乎美国银行的意料。知情人士说,在与美林管理层的会议上,塞恩承认发生了巨额亏损,但他说亏损规模并不比华尔街的其他竞争对手更严重,他称11月对所有公司来说都是恐怖的一个月。对于美林的亏损是否严重到足以让美国银行可根据合并协议中的“重大不利变动条款”放弃收购,美国银行的高管们展开了激烈争论。合并协议通常会明确某些“不利”情况,使收购者有权放弃交易。知情人士说,不过来自美国银行内部和外部的律师得出的结论是,公司的亏损很可能与其他公司不相上下,并建议美国银行继续收购。知情人士说,直到美林和美国银行的股东按计划要举行投票前的几天,这种讨论才结束。他说,美国银行的高管内心喜忧参半,不过人人都希望看到交易达成。12月5日,收购交易在两家公司的股东大会上都获得了通过。对于美林的问题只字未提。刘易斯在谈到交易达成时说,这把我们放到了一个完全不同的阵营里。12月8日,美林的董事会在曼哈顿举行最后一次会议。董事回忆道,塞恩说,公司面临持续亏损,不过考虑到市场的动荡局面,亏损规模并非不同寻常的大。据熟悉会议情况的人士说,次日,美国银行首席财务长普莱斯(Joe Price)在演示会上就该行的财务状况和美林四季度的问题向董事会做了详尽介绍。短短几天之内,美林的季度净亏损激增至大约140亿美元。了解美国银行的人士说,交易损失和更多的资产冲减导致损失额不断攀升。交易损失主要源于美林之前几年留下的头寸。刘易斯在一次电话会议上对美国银行的董事们说,他们或许会放弃收购,而当时的估计是交易将在两周内完成。12月中,律师事务所Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz合伙人参与安排并购谈判的哈勒伊(Edward Herlihy)联系了肯·威尔逊(Ken Wilson)。曾任职高盛的威尔逊是鲍尔森的高级副手。当时,美林的税前亏损差不多已有210亿美元,净亏损相当于150亿美元左右,美国银行一些律师认为,有充分依据用法律条款推翻交易计划。据知情人士说,长期担任美国银行顾问的哈勒伊就美林的亏损程度向威尔逊表达了担忧。威尔逊大为震惊。他当时说,快让刘易斯给鲍尔森打电话。知情人士说,在第二天(12月17日)的会上,鲍尔森和贝南克要求刘易斯给政府一些时间来考虑对策。刘易斯同意了,随后回到了夏洛特。接近塞恩的人士说,塞恩并不了解美国银行的担忧。12月19日,塞恩和家人一起登上了飞往科罗拉多州维尔的飞机。同一天,夏洛特和华盛顿两地有大约20人参加了电话会议,其中包括刘易斯和另外一些美国银行人士鲍尔森贝南克以及其他财政部和美联储人士。贝南克对刘易斯说,美联储人员研究认为,美国银行不能行使并购协议里的出现负面变故的条款来取消交易。政府官员还警告刘易斯,撤回交易计划会打乱市场,引发一系列针对该行的诉讼,长期影响它的声誉。美联储一位官员更向刘易斯进一步施压说,如果将来美国银行请求政府支持的话,政府会考虑更多地插手该行的业务。接近美国银行的人士说,政府的这一表态并无敌意,但其意思很明显。作为该行的主要监管方,如果美联储认为其管理人士行为不负责的话,它可以让他们卷铺盖走人。刘易斯的反应也很现实,他知道政府应该做它必须做的事,美国银行也是这样。当刘易斯被问到要继续这桩交易还需要什么时,刘易斯回答说,美国银行希望得到更多的资金注入,还有针对美林资产未来潜在损失的保护性措施。这与摩根大通去年三月同意接手贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns Cos.)时得到的政府保护条件一样。鲍尔森和贝南克答应继续讨论。知情人士说,接下来几天,政府官员详细审阅了美国银行和美林的帐目,讨论对哪些不良资产提供担保对这些资产应如何估价。这些人士说,有一点越来越清楚,那就是美国银行的资产负债表上也有大量将来可能会面临痛苦的价值冲减的资产。随后,谈判进程慢了下来,原因是银行方面的人对政府认购美国银行优先股提出的8%的股息要求感到担心。他们还抱怨政府强加的对管理人士的薪酬限制,虽然政府已保证并不是想惩罚美国银行。最终,美国银行同意对薪酬总额(包括奖金)加以限制,将其控制在远低于近年来薪酬额的水平。1月16日,美国银行宣布获得新的救助。该行同时还宣布美林四季度出现153亿美元净亏损。这一消息让股东们惊呆了。美国银行宣布季度净亏损为17.9亿美元。当一位分析师向刘易斯问起他决定继续进行美林交易的想法时,刘易斯回答说:我们认为,我们在做对国家有益的事。DAN FITZPATRICK / SUSANNE CRAIG / DEBORAH SOLOMON(更新完成)相关阅读美林前高管投资马多夫损失惨重 2009-01-30前美林CEO回击美国银行指责 2009-01-27美国银行受累美林 董事长职位不稳 2009-01-26美林前CEO塞恩被逐出美国银行 2009-01-23塞恩被逐 美林员工人心惶惶 2009-01-23美林前CEO塞恩辞去在美国银行职务 2009-01-23美林-美国银行交易掌舵人备受指责 2009-01-21收购美林赔本 美国银行再受重创 2009-01-16美国银行股东需要讨说法 2009-01-16 本文涉及股票或公司document.write (truthmeter('2009年02月05日13:44', 'BAC'));美国银行英文名称:Bank of America Corp.总部地点:美国上市地点:纽约证交所股票代码:BAC
Kenneth Lewis is getting a hard lesson in the new balance of power between Washington and Wall Street.The Bank of America Corp. chairman and chief executive had agreed to buy brokerage giant Merrill Lynch & Co. in September, possibly saving it from collapse. But by early December, Merrill's losses were spiraling out of control. Internal calculations showed Merrill had a horrifying pretax loss of $13.3 billion for the previous two months, and December was looking even worse.Mr. Lewis had had enough. On Wednesday, Dec. 17, he flew to Washington, ready to declare that he was through with Merrill, people close to the executive say.'I need you to know how bad the picture looks,' Mr. Lewis told then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, according to accounts of the conversation by people inside the government. Mr. Lewis said Bank of America had a legal basis to abandon the deal.Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke forcefully urged Mr. Lewis not to walk away, praising the bank's earlier cooperation -- but warning that abandoning the deal would be a death sentence for Merrill. They said the move also could undercut confidence in Bank of America, both in the markets and among government officials. Despite the blunt talk, Bank of America executives interpreted the comments as a signal that the government was willing to work out a compromise.Two days later, in a follow-up conference call, federal officials struck a harder tone. Mr. Bernanke said Bank of America had no justification for ditching Merrill, according to people who heard the remarks. A Federal Reserve official warned that if Mr. Lewis did so and needed more government money down the road, Bank of America could expect regulators to think hard about their confidence in management. Mr. Lewis was told that the government would consider ousting executives and directors, people close to the bank say.The threats left no doubt: The federal government saw itself as firmly in charge of U.S. financial institutions propped up since October by infusions of taxpayer-funded capital.During the four weeks that followed Mr. Lewis's conference call, federal officials and Bank of America hashed out a deal to salvage the Merrill takeover. The government agreed to provide $20 billion in additional aid for the Charlotte, N.C., bank, and to provide protection against losses on $118 billion in troubled assets.The money is coming at a price. Six months into the great bailout of U.S. finance, Washington's rescue attempt has helped shore up the system. But that emergency effort, planned on the fly, has taken the government on a risky journey deep into the heart of American capitalism.Bureaucrats are calling the shots behind the scenes at some of the nation's largest enterprises. Critics of the bailout program say its rules are opaque and its execution ad hoc, leading to a lingering lack of confidence in the the financial system. Some lawmakers are scrambling to steer funds to favored lenders.Federal officials have said little publicly about their oversight of the institutions that received capital from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Initially, the government seemed reluctant to use the ownership stakes it got in banks ranging from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. to Saigon National Bank as leverage over bank executives.But the tough negotiations with Bank of America, along with other recent moves by federal officials related to executive compensation and other issues, suggest that the government's attitude toward the troubled banking industry has changed, as financial markets have deteriorated further and political ire has risen.When Citigroup Inc. took $25 billion in TARP funds in October, the executive-pay section of its pact with Treasury was just two sentences long and vaguely worded. A second rescue, for $20 billion in December, limits Citigroup's executive bonus pool for 2008 and 2009, requiring that a majority of 2008 bonuses be paid on a deferred basis.Tough talk by President Barack Obama and other officials about bonuses and perks is making bank executives uncomfortable. Last week, under pressure from Treasury officials, Citigroup canceled its order for a corporate jet. The bank now is exploring its options for modifying the terms of a nearly $400 million marketing deal with the New York Mets.On Wednesday, Mr. Obama unveiled a series of executive pay curbs, including a strict limit on executive salaries for companies that receive an 'exceptional' level of government assistance.The story of Merrill Lynch's troubles and subsequent rescue negotiations, pieced together from interviews with people who participated in the process, suggests that the government's extension of control over the U.S. banking system is evolving on an makeshift basis. Despite agreeing to pump $25 billion into Bank of America and Merrill in October, the government had no idea the securities firm was hemorrhaging money until it was too late to avoid a second bailout.By the end of November, two months into the fourth quarter, Merrill had accumulated $13.34 billion in pretax quarterly losses, according to an internal document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Some Bank of America executives expressed concern about proceeding with the takeover, people close to the bank say. On the advice of their lawyers, the bank decided to go ahead with Dec. 5 shareholder votes on the deal. Shareholders of both Merrill and Bank of America gave their approval.In September, when the deal was announced, it was viewed as a rare piece of good news during a week when much of Wall Street appeared to be teetering on the brink. On the same weekend that Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. prepared to seek bankruptcy protection, the 61-year-old Mr. Lewis found a motivated seller in John Thain, Merrill's chairman and chief executive. Mr. Thain was worried that Merrill might follow Lehman down the drain.After less than 48 hours of due diligence, Bank of America struck an agreement to buy the battered securities firm for $50 billion in stock, or $29 a share. (The value of the deal has since declined along with Bank of America's share price.) 'I look forward to a great partnership with Merrill Lynch,' Mr. Lewis said, toasting the deal with a glass of champagne.A month later, Mr. Lewis was at the Treasury Department along with eight other chief executives of large U.S. financial institutions, summoned there by Mr. Paulson. The Treasury secretary wanted the executives to accept a round of government capital totaling $125 billion as a way of shoring up confidence in the banking system.Mr. Paulson explained that saying no wasn't an option, according to a person who attended the meeting.'We are going to do this,' Mr. Lewis replied, urging the other CEOs to call their boards if they needed approval.After persuading the nine financial institutions to take taxpayer money, the government, at first, refrained from flexing its muscles.Bank of America executives remained confident about the deal. Doubts began to creep in shortly before Thanksgiving. With more than a month to go until the end of the fourth quarter, the pretax quarterly losses at Merrill were approaching $9 billion, according to people familiar with the figures. By month's end, the figure had exceeded $13 billion, or $9.29 billion after taxes.Most of the losses were coming from the securities firm's sales and trading department. But business was even suffering in Merrill's lucrative wealth-management unit, which saw its revenue drop to $797 million in December, from $1.08 billion in October. Still, not all the losses, which included expected asset write-downs on assets such as Merrill's investment in rental-car company Hertz Global Holdings Inc., should have come as a surprise to Bank of America.In meetings with Merrill managers, Mr. Thain acknowledged big losses, but said they weren't any worse than those of the firm's Wall Street rivals, noting that November had been a horrible month for everyone, say people who heard his remarks.At Bank of America, executives debated whether Merrill's losses were so severe that the bank could walk away from the deal, citing the 'material adverse effect' clause in its merger agreement. Merger agreements typically specify certain 'adverse' conditions that give an acquirer the right to abandon a deal.But lawyers from inside and outside the bank concluded that the losses likely were in line with other firms, and recommended that Bank of America move forward with the purchase, according to people familiar with the discussions.The deliberations continued up until a few days before shareholders of Merrill and Bank of America were scheduled to vote, one of these people says. Senior Bank of America executives had 'mixed emotions,' this person says, but 'everyone wanted to see the deal go through.'On Dec. 5, the deal was approved at separate shareholder meetings in Charlotte and New York. Nothing was said about Merrill's problems. 'It puts us in a completely different league,' Mr. Lewis said about the deal's completion.On Dec. 8, Merrill's board gathered in Manhattan for their last meeting. Mr. Thain said the firm faced continuing losses, but they weren't unusual, given upheaval in the markets, directors recall.The next day, Bank of America Chief Financial Officer Joe Price gave a detailed presentation to the bank's directors about its financial situation and Merrill's fourth-quarter woes, according to a person familiar with the meeting.Within a few days, Merrill's quarterly net losses had swelled to about $14 billion. People close to Bank of America say the losses ticked higher due to trading losses, as well as further asset write-downs. The trading losses stem largely from legacy positions Merrill Lynch took in previous years.Mr. Lewis told Bank of America directors in a conference call that the bank might abandon the acquisition, which was supposed to close in two weeks.In mid-December, Edward Herlihy, a partner at law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz who had helped set the merger talks in motion, reached out to Ken Wilson, a former Goldman Sachs Group banker and a top deputy of Mr. Paulson. By then, Merrill's losses had reached almost $21 billion on a pretax basis, roughly equivalent to about $15 billion in net losses, and some of Bank of America's lawyers felt there was sufficient grounds to invoke the legal clause to torpedo the deal.Mr. Herlihy, a longtime adviser to Bank of America, expressed concern to Mr. Wilson about the size of the losses, according to people familiar with the matter. Mr. Wilson was stunned by the news. Get Mr. Lewis to call Mr. Paulson, Mr. Wilson said, according to people familiar with the conversation.At the meeting the next day, Dec. 17, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke asked Mr. Lewis to give government officials time to think through their options, according to people with knowledge of the discussions. Mr. Lewis agreed and returned to Charlotte.People close to Mr. Thain say he was unaware of Bank of America's concerns. On Dec. 19, he hopped a plane to Vail, Colo., with his family, people familiar with the matter said.That same day, about 20 people in Charlotte and Washington dialed into a conference call that included Mr. Lewis, other Bank of America executives, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke, and other Treasury and Fed officials. Mr. Bernanke told Mr. Lewis that Fed staff members had concluded there was no way for the bank to invoke the material-adverse-change clause in the takeover agreement that would allow it to abandon the deal.Government officials also warned Mr. Lewis that withdrawing from the deal would frazzle the markets, spark a flurry of lawsuits against Bank of America and tarnish the bank for years. A senior Fed official ratcheted up the pressure, telling Mr. Lewis that any future requests for government assistance would cause officials to consider taking a heavier hand in Bank of America's operations.The government's tone wasn't hostile. But the implication was obvious, people close to Bank of America say. As the bank's primary regulator, the Fed can force out executives if the agency concludes they are behaving irresponsibly. Mr. Lewis responded matter-of-factly that that government should do what it had to do, and Bank of America would do the same.Asked what he needed to move ahead with the deal, Mr. Lewis responded that Bank of America wanted additional capital and protection against future losses on Merrill's assets -- something akin to the protection J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. received from the government when it agreed to take over Bear Stearns Cos. last March. Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke agreed to keep talking.Over the next several days, government officials sifted through the books at Bank of America and Merrill, wrangling over which toxic assets to guarantee and how to value them, people close to the bank say. It became increasingly clear that Bank of America's balance sheet also was packed with assets that faced bruising write-downs, these people say.Later, talks slowed because bank executives were concerned about the 8% interest rate the government wanted on new preferred shares it would take in Bank of America, these people say. Executives also complained that executive-compensation restrictions were being forced on it, despite government assurances that officials didn't want to punish the bank. The bank wound up agreeing to limit total compensation, including bonuses, to a fraction of the amounts awarded in recent years.On Jan. 16, Bank of America announced the new bailout. At the same time, it disclosed Merrill's fourth-quarter net loss of $15.31 billion. Shareholders were floored. Bank of America reported a net quarterly loss of $1.79 billion.Asked by an analyst about his decision to go ahead with the Merrill deal, Mr. Lewis responded: 'We did think we were doing the right thing for the country.'DAN FITZPATRICK / SUSANNE CRAIG / DEBORAH SOLOMON
Kenneth Lewis is getting a hard lesson in the new balance of power between Washington and Wall Street.The Bank of America Corp. chairman and chief executive had agreed to buy brokerage giant Merrill Lynch & Co. in September, possibly saving it from collapse. But by early December, Merrill's losses were spiraling out of control. Internal calculations showed Merrill had a horrifying pretax loss of $13.3 billion for the previous two months, and December was looking even worse.Mr. Lewis had had enough. On Wednesday, Dec. 17, he flew to Washington, ready to declare that he was through with Merrill, people close to the executive say.'I need you to know how bad the picture looks,' Mr. Lewis told then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, according to accounts of the conversation by people inside the government. Mr. Lewis said Bank of America had a legal basis to abandon the deal.Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke forcefully urged Mr. Lewis not to walk away, praising the bank's earlier cooperation -- but warning that abandoning the deal would be a death sentence for Merrill. They said the move also could undercut confidence in Bank of America, both in the markets and among government officials. Despite the blunt talk, Bank of America executives interpreted the comments as a signal that the government was willing to work out a compromise.Two days later, in a follow-up conference call, federal officials struck a harder tone. Mr. Bernanke said Bank of America had no justification for ditching Merrill, according to people who heard the remarks. A Federal Reserve official warned that if Mr. Lewis did so and needed more government money down the road, Bank of America could expect regulators to think hard about their confidence in management. Mr. Lewis was told that the government would consider ousting executives and directors, people close to the bank say.The threats left no doubt: The federal government saw itself as firmly in charge of U.S. financial institutions propped up since October by infusions of taxpayer-funded capital.During the four weeks that followed Mr. Lewis's conference call, federal officials and Bank of America hashed out a deal to salvage the Merrill takeover. The government agreed to provide $20 billion in additional aid for the Charlotte, N.C., bank, and to provide protection against losses on $118 billion in troubled assets.The money is coming at a price. Six months into the great bailout of U.S. finance, Washington's rescue attempt has helped shore up the system. But that emergency effort, planned on the fly, has taken the government on a risky journey deep into the heart of American capitalism.Bureaucrats are calling the shots behind the scenes at some of the nation's largest enterprises. Critics of the bailout program say its rules are opaque and its execution ad hoc, leading to a lingering lack of confidence in the the financial system. Some lawmakers are scrambling to steer funds to favored lenders.Federal officials have said little publicly about their oversight of the institutions that received capital from the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Initially, the government seemed reluctant to use the ownership stakes it got in banks ranging from J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. to Saigon National Bank as leverage over bank executives.But the tough negotiations with Bank of America, along with other recent moves by federal officials related to executive compensation and other issues, suggest that the government's attitude toward the troubled banking industry has changed, as financial markets have deteriorated further and political ire has risen.When Citigroup Inc. took $25 billion in TARP funds in October, the executive-pay section of its pact with Treasury was just two sentences long and vaguely worded. A second rescue, for $20 billion in December, limits Citigroup's executive bonus pool for 2008 and 2009, requiring that a majority of 2008 bonuses be paid on a deferred basis.Tough talk by President Barack Obama and other officials about bonuses and perks is making bank executives uncomfortable. Last week, under pressure from Treasury officials, Citigroup canceled its order for a corporate jet. The bank now is exploring its options for modifying the terms of a nearly $400 million marketing deal with the New York Mets.On Wednesday, Mr. Obama unveiled a series of executive pay curbs, including a strict limit on executive salaries for companies that receive an 'exceptional' level of government assistance.The story of Merrill Lynch's troubles and subsequent rescue negotiations, pieced together from interviews with people who participated in the process, suggests that the government's extension of control over the U.S. banking system is evolving on an makeshift basis. Despite agreeing to pump $25 billion into Bank of America and Merrill in October, the government had no idea the securities firm was hemorrhaging money until it was too late to avoid a second bailout.By the end of November, two months into the fourth quarter, Merrill had accumulated $13.34 billion in pretax quarterly losses, according to an internal document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Some Bank of America executives expressed concern about proceeding with the takeover, people close to the bank say. On the advice of their lawyers, the bank decided to go ahead with Dec. 5 shareholder votes on the deal. Shareholders of both Merrill and Bank of America gave their approval.In September, when the deal was announced, it was viewed as a rare piece of good news during a week when much of Wall Street appeared to be teetering on the brink. On the same weekend that Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. prepared to seek bankruptcy protection, the 61-year-old Mr. Lewis found a motivated seller in John Thain, Merrill's chairman and chief executive. Mr. Thain was worried that Merrill might follow Lehman down the drain.After less than 48 hours of due diligence, Bank of America struck an agreement to buy the battered securities firm for $50 billion in stock, or $29 a share. (The value of the deal has since declined along with Bank of America's share price.) 'I look forward to a great partnership with Merrill Lynch,' Mr. Lewis said, toasting the deal with a glass of champagne.A month later, Mr. Lewis was at the Treasury Department along with eight other chief executives of large U.S. financial institutions, summoned there by Mr. Paulson. The Treasury secretary wanted the executives to accept a round of government capital totaling $125 billion as a way of shoring up confidence in the banking system.Mr. Paulson explained that saying no wasn't an option, according to a person who attended the meeting.'We are going to do this,' Mr. Lewis replied, urging the other CEOs to call their boards if they needed approval.After persuading the nine financial institutions to take taxpayer money, the government, at first, refrained from flexing its muscles.Bank of America executives remained confident about the deal. Doubts began to creep in shortly before Thanksgiving. With more than a month to go until the end of the fourth quarter, the pretax quarterly losses at Merrill were approaching $9 billion, according to people familiar with the figures. By month's end, the figure had exceeded $13 billion, or $9.29 billion after taxes.Most of the losses were coming from the securities firm's sales and trading department. But business was even suffering in Merrill's lucrative wealth-management unit, which saw its revenue drop to $797 million in December, from $1.08 billion in October. Still, not all the losses, which included expected asset write-downs on assets such as Merrill's investment in rental-car company Hertz Global Holdings Inc., should have come as a surprise to Bank of America.In meetings with Merrill managers, Mr. Thain acknowledged big losses, but said they weren't any worse than those of the firm's Wall Street rivals, noting that November had been a horrible month for everyone, say people who heard his remarks.At Bank of America, executives debated whether Merrill's losses were so severe that the bank could walk away from the deal, citing the 'material adverse effect' clause in its merger agreement. Merger agreements typically specify certain 'adverse' conditions that give an acquirer the right to abandon a deal.But lawyers from inside and outside the bank concluded that the losses likely were in line with other firms, and recommended that Bank of America move forward with the purchase, according to people familiar with the discussions.The deliberations continued up until a few days before shareholders of Merrill and Bank of America were scheduled to vote, one of these people says. Senior Bank of America executives had 'mixed emotions,' this person says, but 'everyone wanted to see the deal go through.'On Dec. 5, the deal was approved at separate shareholder meetings in Charlotte and New York. Nothing was said about Merrill's problems. 'It puts us in a completely different league,' Mr. Lewis said about the deal's completion.On Dec. 8, Merrill's board gathered in Manhattan for their last meeting. Mr. Thain said the firm faced continuing losses, but they weren't unusual, given upheaval in the markets, directors recall.The next day, Bank of America Chief Financial Officer Joe Price gave a detailed presentation to the bank's directors about its financial situation and Merrill's fourth-quarter woes, according to a person familiar with the meeting.Within a few days, Merrill's quarterly net losses had swelled to about $14 billion. People close to Bank of America say the losses ticked higher due to trading losses, as well as further asset write-downs. The trading losses stem largely from legacy positions Merrill Lynch took in previous years.Mr. Lewis told Bank of America directors in a conference call that the bank might abandon the acquisition, which was supposed to close in two weeks.In mid-December, Edward Herlihy, a partner at law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz who had helped set the merger talks in motion, reached out to Ken Wilson, a former Goldman Sachs Group banker and a top deputy of Mr. Paulson. By then, Merrill's losses had reached almost $21 billion on a pretax basis, roughly equivalent to about $15 billion in net losses, and some of Bank of America's lawyers felt there was sufficient grounds to invoke the legal clause to torpedo the deal.Mr. Herlihy, a longtime adviser to Bank of America, expressed concern to Mr. Wilson about the size of the losses, according to people familiar with the matter. Mr. Wilson was stunned by the news. Get Mr. Lewis to call Mr. Paulson, Mr. Wilson said, according to people familiar with the conversation.At the meeting the next day, Dec. 17, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke asked Mr. Lewis to give government officials time to think through their options, according to people with knowledge of the discussions. Mr. Lewis agreed and returned to Charlotte.People close to Mr. Thain say he was unaware of Bank of America's concerns. On Dec. 19, he hopped a plane to Vail, Colo., with his family, people familiar with the matter said.That same day, about 20 people in Charlotte and Washington dialed into a conference call that included Mr. Lewis, other Bank of America executives, Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke, and other Treasury and Fed officials. Mr. Bernanke told Mr. Lewis that Fed staff members had concluded there was no way for the bank to invoke the material-adverse-change clause in the takeover agreement that would allow it to abandon the deal.Government officials also warned Mr. Lewis that withdrawing from the deal would frazzle the markets, spark a flurry of lawsuits against Bank of America and tarnish the bank for years. A senior Fed official ratcheted up the pressure, telling Mr. Lewis that any future requests for government assistance would cause officials to consider taking a heavier hand in Bank of America's operations.The government's tone wasn't hostile. But the implication was obvious, people close to Bank of America say. As the bank's primary regulator, the Fed can force out executives if the agency concludes they are behaving irresponsibly. Mr. Lewis responded matter-of-factly that that government should do what it had to do, and Bank of America would do the same.Asked what he needed to move ahead with the deal, Mr. Lewis responded that Bank of America wanted additional capital and protection against future losses on Merrill's assets -- something akin to the protection J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. received from the government when it agreed to take over Bear Stearns Cos. last March. Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke agreed to keep talking.Over the next several days, government officials sifted through the books at Bank of America and Merrill, wrangling over which toxic assets to guarantee and how to value them, people close to the bank say. It became increasingly clear that Bank of America's balance sheet also was packed with assets that faced bruising write-downs, these people say.Later, talks slowed because bank executives were concerned about the 8% interest rate the government wanted on new preferred shares it would take in Bank of America, these people say. Executives also complained that executive-compensation restrictions were being forced on it, despite government assurances that officials didn't want to punish the bank. The bank wound up agreeing to limit total compensation, including bonuses, to a fraction of the amounts awarded in recent years.On Jan. 16, Bank of America announced the new bailout. At the same time, it disclosed Merrill's fourth-quarter net loss of $15.31 billion. Shareholders were floored. Bank of America reported a net quarterly loss of $1.79 billion.Asked by an analyst about his decision to go ahead with the Merrill deal, Mr. Lewis responded: 'We did think we were doing the right thing for the country.'DAN FITZPATRICK / SUSANNE CRAIG / DEBORAH SOLOMON