Germany is becoming more open and diverse

With the right leadership, it could be a model for the West
这里写图片描述
SINCE the fall of the Berlin Wall the Ampelmännchen, the jaunty, behatted “little traffic-light man” of communist East Germany, has escaped his dictatorial roots to become a kooky icon of Germany’s trendy capital. Tourists pose with life-size models and snap up memorabilia in souvenir shops. The Ampelmännchen’s quirky coolness is an increasingly apt symbol of the country as well as its capital. As our special report in this issue describes, Germany is entering a new era. It is becoming more diverse, open, informal and hip.

At first blush that seems a preposterous suggestion. The Germany of international newspaper headlines is a country with anxious citizens and stagnant politics. Angela Merkel is Europe’s longest-standing political leader, a woman who epitomises traditional German caution. Last September’s election saw a surge in support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD); it took Mrs Merkel six months to cobble together a lacklustre new coalition. To conservative foreign observers Germany is a byword for a reckless refugee policy; to others it is the country that bullied indebted southern Europeans.
But take the long view, and the Ampelmännchen captures how Germany is changing. Post-war German history has moved in cycles of about 25 years. First came the era of reconstruction. Then, from the late 1960s, the federal republic began to reckon frankly with its war guilt. In its latest phase, from the 1990s, Germany has reunified, become a normal country again and shed some of the fetters of its past. Now the wheels of history are turning once more. The Merkel era is drawing to a close. Many of the country’s defining traits—its ethnic and cultural homogeneity, conformist and conservative society, and unwillingness to punch its weight in international diplomacy—are suddenly in flux.

Promising signals

The biggest change comes from Mrs Merkel’s “open door” policy towards refugees, which brought in 1.2m new migrants in 2015-16. This has confirmed once-homogeneous Germany’s transformation into a melting-pot. A more inclusive identity is emerging—a country that waited until 2000 to extend citizenship to many of those without native ancestors increasingly defines nationality in civic rather than ethnic terms. A patriarchal culture has become more gender-balanced: the share of working-age women with jobs has risen from 58% to 70% in the past 15 years. Germans are divorcing more and marrying less. Even the Mittelstand’s firms are adopting disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence. And having undertaken no foreign military operations in the half-century to 1999, Germany has sent troops to Mali, Afghanistan and Lithuania.

This is shaking up a society that has long prized stability, opening cultural divides between those who embrace the new Germany and those who hanker for the familiar; between urban and rural voters; between young and old. The emergence of a new generation of more combative lawmakers, the AfD’s arrival in the Bundestag and the battle over the future direction of Mrs Merkel’s Christian Democrats are all stoking debates about the country’s identity.

The outcome will determine the future of Europe’s biggest economy. It will also matter beyond Germany’s borders. The country is grappling with the rise of a more plural society at the same time as many others are doing so. Germans are temperamentally moderate and, thanks to their history, particularly sensitive to the dangers of demagoguery. How they navigate their country’s transition could set an example for others.

At home, the new Germany has shed its post-reunification economic woes and is booming, but it is also ageing fast; the largest age group is the 50-to-54s. Preserving its prosperity requires forward-looking reform. Internet access is patchy and slow; roads and classrooms can be surprisingly shabby; a tangle of red tape restricts service industries; and under Mrs Merkel the retirement age has fallen for some and will soon be lower than in France. The flow of newcomers to Germany can help cushion the demographic crunch, especially if immigration procedures are streamlined, education is improved to break the tight link between background and results, and the strictly regulated German professions are made more accessible.

Abroad, the new Germany could also become a different sort of power. It remains frustratingly prone to a small-country outlook: reluctant to spend enough on defence, to confront the imbalances caused by its trade surplus and to accept more burden-sharing in the euro zone. Yet there are signs of movement. Under pressure from France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, it will reluctantly accept some moves towards euro-zone integration, albeit tentative and insufficient ones. Germany’s vulnerability to trade disruption makes it a natural broker in an age of tariff wars. Last month its new economy minister helped to persuade the White House to suspend planned steel and aluminium duties on the EU and other allies.

Meanwhile, the refugee crisis is expanding German horizons. At its peak Mrs Merkel requested a map shaded to highlight Germany’s true borders: North Africa, Ukraine and Turkey. Then at last year’s G20 summit in Hamburg the chancellor advanced a “Compact with Africa” to accelerate development and improve governance on the continent. Though overhyped and underfunded, it gives a hint of the convening and stabilising role a normalised Germany could yet play.

Green for go

All of which makes the character of Mrs Merkel’s successor pivotal. Her uncontentious, reactive style has suited her times. But a new Germany requires a different type of chancellor: proactive at home, ambitious abroad and with the skills to persuade German voters of the case for this ambition.

With the right leadership, there is little doubt about the country’s capability. In its latest historical phase alone it has absorbed the sclerotic, ex-communist east, overcome economic crisis in the early 2000s, taken in over 1m poor, often desperate immigrants—and coped. Now, as in the past, it would be a mistake to underestimate Germany. Like the Ampelmännchen, it has a knack for reinvention.

深度学习是机器学习的一个子领域,它基于人工神经网络的研究,特别是利用多层次的神经网络来进行学习和模式识别。深度学习模型能够学习数据的高层次特征,这些特征对于图像和语音识别、自然语言处理、医学图像分析等应用至关重要。以下是深度学习的一些关键概念和组成部分: 1. **神经网络(Neural Networks)**:深度学习的基础是人工神经网络,它是由多个层组成的网络结构,包括输入层、隐藏层和输出层。每个层由多个神经元组成,神经元之间通过权重连接。 2. **前馈神经网络(Feedforward Neural Networks)**:这是最常见的神经网络类型,信息从输入层流向隐藏层,最终到达输出层。 3. **卷积神经网络(Convolutional Neural Networks, CNNs)**:这种网络特别适合处理具有网格结构的数据,如图像。它们使用卷积层来提取图像的特征。 4. **循环神经网络(Recurrent Neural Networks, RNNs)**:这种网络能够处理序列数据,如时间序列或自然语言,因为它们具有记忆功能,能够捕捉数据中的时间依赖性。 5. **长短期记忆网络(Long Short-Term Memory, LSTM)**:LSTM 是一种特殊的 RNN,它能够学习长期依赖关系,非常适合复杂的序列预测任务。 6. **生成对抗网络(Generative Adversarial Networks, GANs)**:由两个网络组成,一个生成器和一个判别器,它们相互竞争,生成器生成数据,判别器评估数据的真实性。 7. **深度学习框架**:如 TensorFlow、Keras、PyTorch 等,这些框架提供了构建、训练和部署深度学习模型的工具和库。 8. **激活函数(Activation Functions)**:如 ReLU、Sigmoid、Tanh 等,它们在神经网络中用于添加非线性,使得网络能够学习复杂的函数。 9. **损失函数(Loss Functions)**:用于评估模型的预测与真实值之间的差异,常见的损失函数包括均方误差(MSE)、交叉熵(Cross-Entropy)等。 10. **优化算法(Optimization Algorithms)**:如梯度下降(Gradient Descent)、随机梯度下降(SGD)、Adam 等,用于更新网络权重,以最小化损失函数。 11. **正则化(Regularization)**:技术如 Dropout、L1/L2 正则化等,用于防止模型过拟合。 12. **迁移学习(Transfer Learning)**:利用在一个任务上训练好的模型来提高另一个相关任务的性能。 深度学习在许多领域都取得了显著的成就,但它也面临着一些挑战,如对大量数据的依赖、模型的解释性差、计算资源消耗大等。研究人员正在不断探索新的方法来解决这些问题。
评论
添加红包

请填写红包祝福语或标题

红包个数最小为10个

红包金额最低5元

当前余额3.43前往充值 >
需支付:10.00
成就一亿技术人!
领取后你会自动成为博主和红包主的粉丝 规则
hope_wisdom
发出的红包
实付
使用余额支付
点击重新获取
扫码支付
钱包余额 0

抵扣说明:

1.余额是钱包充值的虚拟货币,按照1:1的比例进行支付金额的抵扣。
2.余额无法直接购买下载,可以购买VIP、付费专栏及课程。

余额充值